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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to explore the idea of philosophy as a path to happiness in 
medieval Arabic philosophy. The starting point is in comparison of two distinct 
currents within Arabic philosophy between the 10th and early 11th centuries, 
Peripatetic philosophy, represented by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, and Ismaili philosophy 
represented by al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. These two distinct groups of 
sources initially offer two contrasting views about philosophy. The attitude of the 
Peripatetic philosophers is rationalistic and secular in spirit, whereas for the Ismailis 
philosophy represents the esoteric truth behind revelation. Still, the two currents of 
thought converge in their view that the ultimate purpose of philosophy lies in its 
ability to lead man towards happiness. Moreover, they share a common concept of 
happiness as a contemplative ideal of human perfection, merged together with the 
Neoplatonic goal of the soul’s reascent to the spiritual world. Finally, for both 
happiness refers primarily to an otherworldly state thereby becoming a philosophical 
interpretation of the Quranic accounts of the afterlife. 
For both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers the way to happiness consists of two 
parts: theory and practice. The practical part of philosophy manifests itself in the idea 
of the purification of the rational soul from its bodily attachments in order for it to 
direct its attention fully to the contemplative life. Hence, there appears an ideal of 
philosophical life with the goal of relative detachment from the worldly life. All 
Arabic philosophers moreover interpret the regulations of the religious law within this 
context, perceiving their purpose to lie in their purificatory function within the soul’s 
ascent to spirituality, and possessing a distinct meaning for philosophers and non-
philosophers. However, only for al-Kirmānī is the philosophical praxis limited to the 
religious regulations. For the rest, religious law emerges as only the first stage of pre-
philosophical purification, which is complemented by auxiliary philosophical 
practices conducive to happiness, such as the general practice of ascesis, methods 
habituating the soul towards virtue, and the practice of philosophical self-governance. 
The soul’s ascent to happiness, however, takes place primarily through the 
acquisition of theoretical knowledge, for which practical purification prepares the 
human soul. Within the soul’s theoretical ascent all parts of philosophy play a Gnostic 
role of providing the knowledge indispensable for salvation. The primary content of 
this knowledge is understood to consist of the conception of the hierarchy of physical 
and metaphysical reality. All of philosophy, however, forms a curriculum of 
knowledge through which the soul gradually ascends from a material to a spiritual 
state of being. For Ismaili philosophy the ascent takes place from the exoteric 
religious knowledge associated with the material sphere towards the esoteric 
knowledge of the spiritual plane. For Peripatetic philosophers the ascent proceeds 
within the philosophical sciences. Hence, within the soul’s ascent logic performs the 
function of an instrument enabling the ascent, mathematics is treated either as 
propaedeutic to philosophy or as a mediator between physical and metaphysical 
knowledge, whereas physics and metaphysics provide the core of knowledge 
necessary for the attainment of happiness. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Arabic philosophy as a path to happiness 
The idea of philosophy in classical and medieval times was in many ways more 
spiritual than what it was to become during the modern period. In his Qu’est-ce que la 
philosophie antique?1 Pierre Hadot depicts a classical conception of philosophy that 
appears in contrast to that of modern philosophy. While the modern conception is 
primarily one of theoretical reflection, in classical philosophy the starting point is a 
practical way of life. Theoretical doctrines and a certain world view follow 
secondarily from the existential choice of choosing a philosophical life. 
Classical Arabic philosophy2 largely adopts this idea of philosophy, but connects it 
further to the new context of prophetic religion. While the purpose for practicing 
philosophy in the first place is to attain theoretical understanding of the ultimate 
nature of the world through rational reasoning, philosophy serves in the end a more 
practical goal of man’s development towards his highest perfection. 
This perfection is conceived as the ultimate happiness (eudaimonia/sa‘āda) of 
man. In the Platonic tradition adopted by medieval Arabic philosophy in this question, 
attainment of happiness in the philosophical sense means essentially the ascent of the 
human soul from the material and sensible level of existence to a higher spiritual and 
intelligible grade of being. Philosophy then emerges as an upwards progression 
through which man approximates to the divine, crystallized in the definition of 
philosophy as “becoming like a god as much as is possible for man.” 3  Hence, 
philosophy, much more than just a theoretical discipline, is a complete spiritual path 
through which its practitioner aspires to ascend towards the transcendent ideal of 
human perfection and salvation to eternal life. 
It is the aim of this study to investigate medieval Arabic philosophy precisely 
through such a conception of philosophy as a spiritual path to happiness. The period 
on which I will focus is the early formative period of the Arabic philosophical 
tradition in the 10th and early 11th centuries. The sources on which the study is based 
are formed of two distinct schools of philosophy, the mainstream tradition of 
Peripatetic philosophy on the one hand and Ismaili philosophy on the other. This 
approach will highlight the idea of the philosophical path from two perspectives, and 
through comparison reveal the ultimately similar objectives of the secular Peripatetic 
                                                 
1 Translated as What is Ancient Philosophy? by Michael Chase. See, Hadot 2002. 
2 I have chosen to use the word Arabic philosophy throughout this study for the philosophical tradition 
that arose in the Islamic world since 9th century, and which for the most part was carried out in Arabic. 
The term is problematic, as a major part of these philosophers were not Arabs, and increasingly 
employed Persian besides Arabic as a language of philosophy. But even in the eastern parts of the 
Islamic world Arabic retained its status as the main language of philosophy well into modern times. 
Moreover, as Gutas (2002, pp. 17-8) notes, even when writing in Persian, the technical philosophical 
terms used by the philosophers were largely Arabic. The alternative term Islamic philosophy involves 
at least as many problems, as it would exclude the great number of Christians, pagans, and Jews that 
worked within the same tradition, and imply that the contents of the philosophy is somehow a priori 
based on Islam. Of the philosophers treated in this study, all but the Brethren of Purity are in fact 
Persian, but wrote exclusively in Arabic, with the notable exception of Ibn Sīnā’s Dāneshnāme-ye 
‘Alā’ī. While all four are Muslim, the context of the Baghdad logicians in which al-Fārābī was 
educated was largely Christian. 
3 “al-tashabbuh bi-ilāh bi-qadr mā fī ṭāqat al-insān.” See, chapter 5.1 below. 
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and esoterically oriented Ismaili traditions. The period of the sources is the one during 
which the tradition of falsafa as a separate and original school of thought with its own 
peculiar doctrines was truly formed. In this study, this so-called Peripatetic school of 
philosophy will be represented through two of its most towering figures, al-Fārābī (d. 
950) and Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), who were also the ones with the most lasting influence 
for the development of later Arabic philosophy. 
The Fārābian tradition of falsafa was, however, not the only early current of 
intellectual thought that incorporated Greek philosophical ideas. One of the most 
important and influential factions during the 10th century was the Shii sect of Ismailis, 
which rose to both political and intellectual prominence during this period. Early 
Ismaili philosophical thought achieved its maturity in the figure of al-Kirmānī (d. 
1021), while the anonymous group of the Brethren of Purity fused Ismaili and Greek 
philosophical influences into an eclectic mix at the end of the 10th century. It is these 
two authors that I will employ in this study as representatives of the more esoteric 
tradition of Ismaili philosophy. 
Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy appear in contrast to each other in many 
respects. Peripatetic philosophy is secular and rationalistic in its attitude, at least in 
theory only relying on the philosophical method for reaching true knowledge about 
the world, without resorting to a priori convictions or uncritical faith in revelation. It 
carries on the Greek tradition of philosophy in the Islamic world, drawing from 
Aristotle and the Neoplatonists in particular, which was conveyed into Arabic during 
the great period of translation activity of the 8th to 10th centuries. 
Ismaili philosophy, in contrast, rises from the doctrinal developments of the 
Ismaili sect of Shiism. It claims to be the divinely inspired truth conveyed by the 
imam of the time to the cadre of believers. All major Ismaili philosophers, including 
al-Kirmānī, are high-ranking functionaries within the religious hierarchy of the 
movement. Philosophy for the Ismailis therefore represents the esoteric truth behind 
the exoteric surface of prophetic revelation, rather than the independent speculations 
of a philosopher. In its initial position Ismailism is then clearly more religious in 
orientation, and Ismaili philosophers are highly critical of the Peripatetic premise of 
the primacy of reason. Still, Ismaili philosophers also in the end resort to the Greek 
tradition of philosophy in order to erect their esoteric doctrine. 
Despite this divergence in outlook, the two traditions of philosophy ultimately 
converge in their view of the final purpose of philosophy. Both Peripatetic and Ismaili 
philosophers in the end view the benefit of philosophy to lie in its ability to lead man 
towards his ultimate happiness. Both traditions perceive happiness, or the greatest 
imaginable human perfection, as the ultimate goal of man during his earthly existence. 
For both, happiness as human perfection is essentially intellectual because reason 
constitutes man’s highest part which distinguishes him from other animals. 
Furthermore, both traditions in the end identify human happiness with the soul’s 
salvation to an eternal supra-material existence, and resort to the language of 
Neoplatonism to portray this eschatological part of philosophy. 
Hence, it is not only in Ismailism, sometimes dubbed as the Gnosis of Islam, 
where philosophy plays the role of providing Gnostic saving knowledge. In 
Peripatetic philosophy philosophical knowledge also has its ultimately Gnostic 
function. Due to their initial differences of orientation, however, Ismaili philosophy 
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provides a good point of comparison for Peripatetic philosophy, and highlights the 
ultimately religious orientation also contained within Peripatetic philosophy. 
In his historiographical review on the scholarship of Arabic philosophy, Dimitri 
Gutas perceives the discipline to have been plagued by various classes of 
misconceived perceptions about the essential nature of Arabic philosophy, such as the 
Straussian perception of Arabic philosophy as essentially political or Corbin’s view of 
philosophy as inherently mystical.4  It is to such an overall conception of Arabic 
philosophy that this study is related. According to Leaman, there have been three 
major scholarly perceptions about the general nature of classical Arabic philosophy: 
firstly to view Peripatetic philosophy as a rationalistic enterprise discarding the central 
Islamic religious doctrines; secondly, as an attempt at reconciliation between religion 
and philosophy, and thirdly as an “esoteric” discipline concealing its genuine opinions 
under a disguise of apparent conformity with religion.5 
My own view, represented in this study, coincides with that of Ramón Guerrero of 
viewing Arabic Peripatetic philosophy as a holistic enterprise aiming towards a 
complete explanation of reality, which, while recognizing the necessity of prophetic 
religion, still proceeds on an independent path with respect to religion.6 
Hence, this study explores the view of medieval Arabic philosophy as a practical 
discipline, where the entirety of the philosophical system is oriented towards the 
attainment of the perfection and happiness of the one engaged in philosophy. Thereby 
practice of philosophy appears as one potential road among many towards perfection 
and truth in medieval Islam. Consequently, this is also an investigation of the religious 
dimension of Arabic philosophy, in that the purpose of philosophy is perceived to 
abide in the soul’s salvation to eternity. The role of philosophical knowledge is not 
merely to seek knowledge for its own sake, but to provide a means for the soul’s 
salvation. 
The practical function of philosophy is not wholly otherworldly in orientation, 
however. Besides its religious dimension, philosophy has its practical function in this 
life. Arabic philosophers, such as al-Fārābī in particular, repeatedly emphasize that in 
order to be truly meaningful, theoretical knowledge should be actualized in practical 
life in the sense of morally good actions. This is so despite the fact that the ultimate 
goal of happiness is perceived as essentially contemplative in nature. Therefore, 
philosophical knowledge also contributes to man’s morally good and happy life 
during his worldly existence. In this sense, the conception of Arabic philosophy 
materializes into a contrast to the contemporary view of philosophy as a purely 
theoretical enterprise. This view of philosophy is, however, not in variance with the 
tradition of Greek philosophy, where philosophy ever since Pythagoras was seen to 
serve the greater aspirations of the pursuit of human perfection. 
I do not claim that the philosophical and secular disciplines were not practiced in 
the medieval Islamic world also with purely theoretical aims in mind. My aim in this 
study, however, is to view the totality of philosophy as a practical and Gnostic 
enterprise, where all the parts of philosophy from logic to metaphysics serve man’s 
quest towards ultimate happiness. 
                                                 
4 Gutas 2002. 
5 Leaman 1985, pp. 182-201. 
6 Ramón Guerrero 2005, p. 518. 
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1.2 Program of study 
The purpose of this study is then to investigate the ways in which early philosophers 
of the Islamic world perceived philosophy as leading towards the attainment of 
happiness. While the question of happiness has often been investigated by scholars of 
Arabic philosophy, it has rarely been viewed from a holistic perspective as the end 
point of all philosophical enterprise. Most medieval Arabic philosophers agree in their 
perception of philosophy that philosophy consists of two parts: theoretical and 
practical. Whereas the aim of the theoretical part is to attain true knowledge about the 
world, the aim of the practical part is to become good. Hence, living a good life is 
seen to form as much part of philosophy as gaining theoretical wisdom. Both the 
theoretical and practical parts of philosophy are in the end seen as conducive to man’s 
final aim of ultimate happiness. 
Since both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers see man’s final goal as essentially 
intellectual, it is the knowledge gained through the theoretical part of philosophy that 
leads him towards this goal. However, they agree equally that theoretical wisdom 
alone is not sufficient for the soul’s salvation. In addition, the soul must be purified of 
its material attachments that hinder it from ascending towards the higher spiritual 
sphere of being. The practical part of philosophy investigates these means towards the 
soul’s purification. Ultimately, philosophy forms a dual path of theory and practice, 
both of which have man’s ultimate happiness as their aim. 
While the theme of happiness properly pertains to the sphere of ethics within 
Arabic philosophy, I believe it should be perceived through a view of the 
philosophical system as a whole. Philosophy forms a progression in which all parts of 
theoretical and practical philosophy are seamlessly bound to serve the ultimate goal. 
Hence, in order to truly understand the function of ethics, it must be located within 
man’s theoretical ascent towards intellectual perfection. On the other hand, theoretical 
philosophy must also be understood from a practical-ethical perspective as an 
aspiration towards human happiness. 
As the starting point of my study is in the idea of two distinct philosophical 
orientations; in the second and third chapters I aim to sketch the general lines of the 
Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophical schools, and to place them in their proper 
historical context. I will also discuss in these chapters questions specific to the authors 
and sources that I use, including such controversial questions as the affiliation of the 
Brethren of Purity to the Ismaili movement. 
There is no clear-cut division of philosophical schools within early Arabic 
philosophy, in the sense of the classical Greek schools of philosophy. I will, however, 
employ the term Peripatetic (peripatētikos/mashshā’ī) for the mainstream of Arabic 
philosophy that self-consciously carries on the Aristotelian tradition within the 
Islamic world. Peripatetic philosophy is not in reality a homogenous philosophical 
school, as philosophy was never institutionalized into such schools in the Islamic 
world. Still, there is a clear line of intellectual succession from al-Fārābī to Ibn Sīnā, 
and from Ibn Sīnā to the later Peripatetics. 
Ismaili philosophy, on the other hand, arises out of the doctrinal developments of 
the Shii Ismailis which during the 10th century were increasingly transformed into the 
form of a philosophical system. Such Ismaili philosophers as al-Kirmānī did not 
consider themselves philosophers (faylasūf), and were in fact highly critical of 
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philosophy, but still did not hesitate to draw on Greek and Arabic philosophy for 
inspiration. However, on the question of happiness the two schools are more alike 
than different. They make use of the common language of Neoplatonism in order to 
depict the religious side of philosophy, adopting the theory of creation as a process of 
timeless emanation and man’s purpose as the re-ascent of the rational soul to its 
spiritual origin. 
In order to investigate the philosophical path to happiness, it is of course first 
necessary to find out what it is precisely that the philosophers mean when they speak 
about happiness. While the meaning of happiness seems self-evident enough initially, 
it quickly becomes clear that the word possesses very different contents for the 
philosophers and for the common people. As a philosophical term, happiness (sa‘āda) 
is a translation of the Greek word eudaimonia which embodies centuries of discussion 
within the history of Greek philosophy. 
For both eudaimonia and sa‘āda, happiness may in fact be an inappropriate 
translation. Namely, unlike the modern common sense understanding of the word, 
eudaimonia does not primarily refer to a subjective state, but rather to an active and 
objective one of ‘living a good life,’ even if it may ultimately turn out also to be one 
that accords the most intense pleasure to man. Hence, translations such as ‘human 
flourishing’ have been suggested.7 Moreover, in Arabic philosophy happiness often 
becomes synonymous with an almost inhuman ideal of absolute perfection which is 
radically different from most common sense connotations of happiness. 
It is also not clear whether happiness is at all attainable during this earthly life, and 
for the Muslim philosophers happiness becomes almost synonymous with the 
religious idea of salvation. Still, I will adhere to using the word ‘happiness’ for lack of 
any generally accepted alternative, since it is this word that the philosophers 
themselves employ, even though furnishing it with a novel meaning. Salvation is 
moreover an inaccurate translation, as in Arabic philosophy the word is used equally 
for happiness in this life and the next. Worldly and other-worldly happiness are not 
incompatible, but Arabic philosophy promises to provide the answer to both. In the 
fourth chapter I address these questions about the nature of happiness, and delineate 
its contents with both its mundane and other-worldly connotations. 
The fifth chapter is devoted to a portrayal of the relationship between philosophy 
and happiness on a general level, as viewed in both Peripatetic and Ismaili 
philosophy. For Peripatetic philosophers, when perceived with happiness as its 
ultimate goal, philosophy appears as a special way of life in which theory and practice 
are bound together inseparably. Philosophy is not only gathering of knowledge, but 
also an ethically determined way of life. On the other hand, morality without a basis 
in knowledge is equally impossible. Both theory and practice have man’s ultimate 
good, happiness and salvation, as their aim. In the first part of the chapter I try to 
sketch this general picture of the transcendent idea of medieval Arabic philosophy 
where theory and practice together lead man towards his ultimate goal. In the other 
part, I portray the alternative Ismaili way to happiness. 
On a general level, Ismailis are in agreement with the Peripatetics. The way to 
happiness consists of practical and theoretical worship (al-‘ibāda al-
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Cooper 1987, pp. 195-7 and Nussbaum 1986, p. 6.  
 12
‘amaliyya/‘ilmiyya), both of which are necessary for the soul’s salvation. However, 
al-Kirmānī in particular is at variance with the idea that the proper way of life leading 
to happiness should be philosophical. For the Ismailis, as for Muslims in general for 
that matter, the moral way of life should be based on religious revelation, rather than 
the independent musings of a philosopher. Hence, for the Ismailis, philosophy alone is 
not capable of leading man towards salvation, but rather philosophy and revelation 
together. 
The chapters six and seven are the central chapters of this study, devoted to the 
two constituent parts of the quest for happiness: practice and theory. Both Peripatetic 
and Ismaili philosophers view attainment of happiness in Neoplatonic terms as the 
soul’s ascent towards an intellectual-spiritual state of perfection. While the ascent 
takes place through a mainly intellectual process, practical purification of the soul is 
indispensable for reaching that goal. In order to turn its gaze up towards the world of 
pure Intellects, the repository of philosophical knowledge, the rational soul must first 
be liberated from its material attachments that draw it down towards sensible reality. 
In chapter six I portray this practical part of the ascent, and its place within the soul’s 
general progression towards happiness. It is this philosophical praxis that forms the 
core of the philosophical life, and enables the life of contemplation. 
In Arabic philosophy, the question of practical purification is expressed in 
particular through the language of Aristotelian virtue ethics. When adopting the 
classical idea of philosophy as a way of life, however, the philosophers writing in the 
new context of prophetic religion necessarily must adapt the idea of philosophical life 
to fit with the religious ideals of Islam. Even for the most rationalistically oriented 
Peripatetic philosopher, individual effort alone is not sufficient for attainment of 
happiness, and hence religion occupies a central place within the moral molding of the 
individual. Hence, I strive to reconcile the philosophical-ethical and religious aspects 
of purification together, and see how they fit within a general view of the soul’s 
ascent. Moreover, I outline some general ideas about how the philosophical and 
religious methods of purification operate in relation to the ultimate goal of theoretical 
perfection. 
 Finally, in the seventh chapter I present my interpretation of the Gnostic aspect of 
philosophical knowledge, that is, of philosophy as a theoretical ascent to happiness. 
Theoretical philosophy assumes a form in which each of its constituent parts has its 
specific place within the ascent. Theoretical philosophy in the end serves to transform 
the human soul from its initial sensible state to a grade of pure intellect and complete 
spirituality, but the transformation must take place gradually in order to be plausible. 
Philosophy is then like a “ladder to salvation,” in the words of the Brethren of Purity, 
which guides the student of philosophy towards his intellectual perfection. To this are 
related the general ideas about classification of philosophy, in which the parts of 
philosophy are arranged to form a seamless progression according to the ontological 
status of their objects of study. While not all philosophical knowledge is equally 
important for the attainment of happiness, even the sciences that at first instance 
appear as purely theoretical have a specific purpose within the soul’s ascent. Hence, 
philosophy as a whole, even logic and mathematics, serves the practical purpose of 
man reaching his happiness and salvation. 
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2 Peripatetic background 
2.1 Development of Peripatetic philosophy 
Arabic philosophy was born as a consequence of the great translation movement of 
the 8th to 10th centuries, which resulted in the transfer of the majority of Greek 
scientific literature available in the eastern part of the classical world to the Arabic 
language and culture. In the field of philosophy, this included practically the entire 
philosophical output of Aristotle, paraphrases of Plato’s dialogues, and Neoplatonic 
treatises summarizing the philosophy of Plotinus (d. 270 CE) and Proclus (d. 485). 
Specifically, it continued the tradition of the philosophical schools of late Antiquity in 
Athens and Alexandria, which were primarily Neoplatonic, but in which Aristotle was 
incorporated to the Neoplatonic curriculum. This tradition was mediated to the Arabs 
mainly by Syrian Christians, who translated the Greek works to Syriac and Arabic. 
Therefore, just as in the various other sciences adopted from the Greeks, in its 
beginnings philosophy was also a foreign and borrowed enterprise. 8  The Arabic 
philosophers themselves were of course keenly aware of the Greek and pagan origin 
of their discipline, as well as of the opposition that such origin might arouse in some 
of the more conservative circles. Therefore al-Kindī (d. 866), who is usually held to 
be the first of the Arabic philosophers, almost apologetically defends the notion of 
thankfully adopting from the bygone centuries and nations their contribution towards 
attaining the truth, even if those who produced it were neither Arabs nor Muslims, 
since truth can only be reached through the combined work of successive human 
generations.9 
By the turn of the 10th century, Arabic philosophy, or the discipline known in 
Arabic as falsafa, had emerged as a largely independent endeavor self-consciously 
continuing the tradition of Greek philosophy. Its primary scientific foundation was 
Aristotle, as is illustrated by the fact that he was generally known by the name of First 
teacher (al-mu‘allim al-awwal). The bookseller Ibn al-Nadīm’s famous bibliography 
from the late 10th century shows the wide variety of Arabic translations of the works 
of Aristotle and his commentators that were available at that time.10 To a large degree 
Arabic philosophy therefore initially was Aristotle’s philosophy, as his works acted as 
at least the starting point in most areas of philosophical knowledge, especially in 
natural philosophy and logic. In Ibn Sīnā’s classification of the philosophical sciences 
a century later all the individual parts of physics and logic are given a work of 
Aristotle on which they are based,11 while an early 13th-century biographer of the 
                                                 
8 This does not mean the reduction of Arabic philosophy to a mere transmission of Greek sources, nor 
does it exclude originality from the philosophers of the Arabic tradition in adapting Greek philosophy 
to an Islamic environment. However, the early Arabic philosophers such as al-Fārābī are themselves 
the first to admit their indebtedness to the Greek philosophers. Since philosophy in the Islamic world 
was born out of the translation of Greek philosophers into Arabic, it is only natural that at its early 
phases the starting point would be in these sources, even if newly interpreted to answer the questions 
relevant for the nascent Islamic culture. 
9 Al-Kindī, Kitāb al-Kindī ilā al-Mu‘taΙim bi-´llāh fī al-falsafa al-ūlā, pp. 102-4. 
10 Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, pp. 342-50; Dodge 1970, II, pp. 598ff. 
11 Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām al-‘ulūm al-‘aqliyya, pp. 108-10, 116-8. 
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philosophers claims that it was “. . . because of Aristotle that philosophy and other 
ancient sciences proliferated in the Islamic lands.”12 
In practice, however, this devoted Aristotelianism was never so pure, but was 
mixed especially with the Neoplatonic tradition. Neoplatonism had been the 
prevailing school of Greek philosophy ever since its foundation in the 3rd century by 
Plotinus (d. 270). In it, philosophy was perceived essentially as a systematization of 
Plato’s “divine” philosophy, which Plato himself had presented in an unsystematic 
form in the dialogues.13 Still, ever since Plotinus Aristotelian and other philosophical 
elements were incorporated into their doctrine, and in the Neoplatonic curriculum of 
late Antiquity, Aristotle represented the “lesser mysteries” that were to be studied 
before the higher mysteries of Plato. Therefore most Greek Neoplatonists after 
Plotinus wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s works, in which Aristotle was interpreted 
in Neoplatonic light, some of which were later translated into Arabic. Behind this was 
a syncretistic idea of the history of philosophy, where Aristotle and Plato were seen to 
be in an agreement concerning the essential truth, despite occasional disagreements on 
details.14 
By the time of the Arab conquests, the study of philosophy flourished especially in 
the only remaining philosophical school of Alexandria. The school had been 
Christianized during the preceding century, and possibly to tone down the elements in 
most blatant contradiction with Christianity, during its final years it concentrated on 
teaching Aristotle, rather than Plato. 15  It is especially as a continuation of the 
Alexandrian school of philosophy that Arabic philosophy emerges, even if by the 10th 
century most philosophers were not particularly aware of this connection.16 
Within Arabic philosophy the situation was then a reversal of Greek 
Neoplatonism, in the sense that it was Aristotle who occupied the highest place of 
honor, even though Plato also was highly regarded. However, Arabic philosophy also 
adopted from late Antiquity the Neoplatonic syncretistic notion of the relationship 
between Plato and Aristotle. Among the Arabic philosophers and historians there was 
some awareness of Greek philosophical schools and their history derived from Greek 
and Syriac sources. 17  In the Arabic tradition Aristotle was often perceived as a 
continuator of the philosophy of Plato, rather than having founded a school of his own 
based on fundamental disagreements with his tutor. 
Al-Fārābī names seven Greek philosophical schools (firaq), but does not 
distinguish between Platonism and Aristotelianism, lumping them instead together 
                                                 
12 Ibn al-Qifṭī, Ikhbār al-‘ulamā’ bi-akhbār al-Ηukamā’, p. 29. 
13 Words like “Neoplatonism” and “Middle Platonism” were coined in the 19th century to emphasize 
the supposed distinction with respect to the thought of Plato. Plotinus and his followers, however, saw 
themselves as faithful disciples of Plato, rather than as innovators, and many modern scholars have 
increasingly tended to agree. See, Gatti 1996. 
14 Blumenthal 1996, pp. 21-34. 
15 Cameron 1967, pp. 661-2, 670-1. 
16 There were, however, teachers in Baghdad around 900 who traced their origins to Alexandria, as did 
al-Fārābī also. See, Peters 1979, p. 26. For a general account of the Arabic adoption of the philosophy 
of late Antiquity, see, Endress 2003.  
17  The history of Greek philosophy is presented not so much in the works of the philosophers 
themselves, as in the genres of gnomological and bibliographical literature, among which the book-
seller Ibn al-Nadīm’s Fihrist is especially noteworthy, as it was used by most authors in the genre 
during the subsequent centuries. See, Gutas 1975, pp. 332-3, 381-2 and Gutas 1985a, pp. 68-9 for the 
agreement of Plato and Aristotle in the gnomological tradition. 
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into one single school. This he calls the Peripatetic (al-mashshā’ūn) school, which in 
the Arabic tradition therefore in practice never means pure Aristotelianism in the 
same the way as it did for the Greeks.18 When Ibn al-Qifṭī (d. 1248) repeats al-
Fārābī’s list, he says two of them, the Pythagorean and Peripatetic, are the most 
magnificent of the Greek philosophical schools, the two foundations on which 
philosophy rests. 19  Since for Ibn al-Qifṭī Plato appears as a disciple of both 
Pythagoras and Socrates, while Aristotle obviously is a disciple of Plato,20 there is a 
perception of the unity of the Platonic-Pythagorean and Aristotelian traditions. 
Even though Plato was acknowledged as a major philosopher and founder of the 
Peripatetic school, his influence was for the most part mediated through 
Neoplatonism. As is well known, the Arabic Neoplatonic sources were either 
anonymous or falsely attributed to Aristotle, and hence the Arab philosophers were 
mostly unaware of such names as Plotinus or Proclus, who nevertheless were the two 
major Neoplatonic philosophers that affected them. That the most important 
Neoplatonic treatises were attributed to Aristotle further facilitated the syncretism of 
Platonic and Aristotelian thought. 21  Of other Neoplatonists Porphyry was known 
mainly for his Eisagōgē, or introduction to Aristotelian logic. 
The nature of Neoplatonism is more religiously oriented than that of 
Aristotelianism, and hence it suited well for the needs of all three monotheistic 
religions to reconcile a religious world view with philosophy. Of all the different 
fields of philosophy, metaphysics has the strongest Neoplatonic element, for most 
philosophers explained the creation and ultimate principles of the universe through the 
Neoplatonic hierarchical order of emanation. Neoplatonism also provided the 
philosophical language for eschatology, as the counterpart of emanation is the soul’s 
reascent to its home in the intelligible world. Also, despite the fact that psychology 
largely followed Aristotle’s De anima, the conception of the human soul was Platonic. 
The soul was seen as a substance independent of the body, whose ultimate goal was to 
liberate itself from its material and bodily attachments.22 
Besides the Neoplatonic mediation, Plato’s dialogues were also used directly to 
some extent. Al-Fārābī’s Philosophy of Plato (Falsafat AflāΛūn) shows that he was 
relatively familiar with the contents of Plato’s dialogues, even if they were probably 
reproduced in Arabic as paraphrases and fragments, rather than complete translations. 
Plato was a direct influence especially in the political philosophy of al-Fārābī and his 
                                                 
18 The Arabic word mashshā’ī is a rather literal translation of the Greek peripatētikos, “one who walks 
about.” Aristotle’s school was apparently called so because of the covered walkways (peripatoi) in the 
Lycaeum, where the members of the school met. According to a later legend, the word referred to 
Aristotle’s habit of walking while he was teaching. For al-Fārābī, reflecting late Alexandrian 
perceptions, both Plato and Aristotle had this habit in order to “train the body together with the training 
of the soul.” For Ibn al-Qifṭī, it was Plato who used to teach his disciples while “walking around the 
gardens,” and therefore Plato’s school was called Peripatetic. Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī an yuqaddam 
qabla ta‘allum falsafat ArisΛū, pp. 3-5; Ibn al-Qifṭī, Ikhbār, p. 26. 
19 Ibn al-Qifṭī, Ikhbār, p. 27. 
20 Ibid, pp. 22-8. 
21 Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, however, were probably aware of the non-Aristotelian origin of works like 
Theology of Aristotle. 
22 Already in Greek Neoplatonism the relationship between body and soul was perceived in Platonic 
dualistic terms, while the operations of the embodied soul were explained by means of Aristotelian 
faculty psychology. See, Blumenthal 1983. 
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followers, which was based on Republic and Laws, while Aristotle’s Politics was 
apparently never translated into Arabic.23 
The expression Peripatetic philosophy as used in this study therefore refers to the 
mainstream of Arabic philosophy, which is based on the Platonic-Aristotelian 
foundation sketched above, such as it was adapted in the Islamic world to answer to 
the specific questions within that culture. Among the individual philosophers there is 
variation as to their philosophical leanings, but all of them share the common 
Platonic-Aristotelian base. There is no general consensus among scholars of Arabic 
philosophy on clear-cut philosophical schools in the sense of those existing in Greek 
philosophy. It is only about two centuries later that there arise the illuminationist 
(ishrāqī) school founded by Suhrawardī and the “mystical” school of Ibn ‘Arabī, 
which explicitly reject Peripatetic rationalism and substitute or complement it with 
philosophically understood Sufism.24 
During the 10th and early 11th centuries the term Peripatetic is largely synonymous 
with falsafa, or those who voluntarily adopt the designation of philosopher. Among 
them there are distinct currents of thought, such as al-Kindī and his followers and the 
school of Baghdad, to which al-Fārābī also pertains. 25  Both of these currents 
culminate in Ibn Sīnā, the most influential Muslim philosopher of all times, who for 
later thinkers like al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) more than anyone else represented Arabic 
Peripatetic philosophy.26 
Peripatetic philosophy does not form a homogenous school, however, but rather 
there are various strands of thought within the tradition of falsafa. Despite his high 
appraisal of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā stands in conscious opposition to the Baghdad 
Peripatetic philosophers of his own time, and hence represents another strand of 
“eastern” (mashriqī) Peripatetic philosophy.27 
In this study Peripatetic philosophy is contrasted with Ismaili philosophy, which 
does not form part of the tradition of falsafa, but rather is expressly critical towards 
those who call themselves philosophers. Still, it is philosophy in its attempt to form a 
coherent and rationally argued view of the world, whose foundations are as much in 
the Greek philosophical tradition as they are in the doctrinal history of the Ismailis. 
                                                 
23 While al-Fārābī explicitly attributes true philosophy to Plato and Aristotle at the end of Attainment of 
Happiness (TaΗΙīl al-sa‘āda), Ibn Sīnā does not share his predecessor’s reverence for Plato. In the 
Sophistics of Healing (al-Shifā’) [cited and translated by Gutas] he concludes that: “if the extent of 
Plato’s achievements in philosophy is what came down to us of him, then his wares were paltry indeed 
and philosophy in his time had not matured to the point of reaping. Whoever affects allegiance to him 
with only the amount of knowledge about Plato that has been transmitted to us at his disposal, then he 
does this either out of envy for Aristotle or out of a foolish notion that the prior in time is also in a 
discipline prior in rank. The truth, however, is the opposite.” Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 196; Gutas 1988, p. 
38. 
24 This tripartition of Arabic philosophy is suggested, for example, in Leaman 2006, pp. x-xi.  
25 Netton (1992) refers by the term ‘school of al-Fārābī’ to a rather loose group of philosophers, such as 
Ibn ‘Adī, Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī, al-‘Āmirī, and al-Tawḥīdī. One could perhaps rather speak of the 
Baghdad Peripatetic school, proceeding from the Christian logicians through al-Fārābī to Ibn ‘Adī and 
his followers, to which the circle formed around al-Sijistānī, as chronicled by al-Tawḥīdī as one of its 
members, were loosely connected. See, Kraemer 1992, pp. 103ff. for a vivid portrayal of the 
philosophical groupings in 10thcentury Baghdad. 
26 See, the chart of Arabic philosophy and its “schools” in Gutas 2002, p. 7. 
27 See, Brown 1972 for Ibn Sīnā’s critique of the Baghdadian philosophers. 
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Due to the mixture of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements in Arabic Peripatetic 
philosophy, in the scholarship al-Fārābī and his successors have been designated 
rather interchangeably either as Aristotelians or Neoplatonists. This seems to imply 
some uncertainty as to which element is actually prevalent in their thought. Hence, for 
example, Fakhry designates al-Fārābī as the first systematic expositor of 
Neoplatonism, as opposed to al-Kindī’s Aristotelianism.28 Others have tended to see 
them rather as pure Aristotelians, even up to the point of rejecting the Neoplatonic 
element altogether. Walker goes as far as to regard al-Fārābī as responsible for 
making philosophy to be seen essentially as philosophy of Aristotle, and denies that 
they were Neoplatonists even in their metaphysical views.29 
If one regards the creation of the universe through an emanative hierarchical 
process as distinctive of Neoplatonic metaphysics, most of Arabic philosophy is 
Neoplatonic in this respect. As comes to the subject of this study, Peripatetic 
philosophy can be perceived as thoroughly Neoplatonic. The ultimate happiness of 
man is perceived in Neoplatonic terms as the soul’s liberation from the material 
sphere of existence and reunion with the intelligible world, which in the wider 
cosmological drama constitutes the soul’s reascent to the Intellect. 
2.2 The Straussian question 
One major problem concerning the interpretation of Arabic philosophy has been the 
possibly esoteric nature of Arabic philosophical writing. As is well-known, a 
distinction between exoteric (Νāhir) and esoteric (bāΛin) knowledge became prevalent 
in many intellectual traditions within the Islamic world, particularly in Sufi mysticism 
and Shii thought. The main purpose of such a division was to explain the relationship 
between the literal meaning of religious revelation and the inner esoteric meanings 
developed by various intellectual and mystical groupings. Usually both the exoteric 
and esoteric levels of knowledge were perceived as equally valid. Exoteric religious 
truth, consisting especially of the interpretation of the literal meaning of revelation 
and of religious law, was in possession of the religious scholars and was open to 
everyone. Esoteric inner truth, however, was open only to those initiated into the 
particular spiritual tradition, and had to be guarded from all others. 
The distinction seems to be at least partly defensive in nature, since it was the only 
way that allowed free intellectual speculation without overtly contradicting the 
religious dogma construed by the ‘ulamā’. Hodgson envisions three major kinds of 
such esoteric knowledge within classical Islamic culture: Shii interpretation of 
revelation, Sufi mysticism and speculation, and the metaphysics and some natural 
sciences of the philosophers. Over time these three intellectual currents were partly 
independent, but partly influenced and penetrated each other.30 
In philosophy the problem largely revolves around whether the philosophers 
deliberately concealed or blurred some of their true opinions in order to guard their 
                                                 
28 Fakhry 2004, p. 204. 
29 Walker 1993, pp. 35-6. Walker seems to perceive only Plotinian metaphysics as truly Neoplatonic. 
His arguments are different from the Straussian ones discussed below, even though he refers to them 
for support. While the Straussians deny that al-Fārābī actually believed in emanationist metaphysics at 
all, Walker argues that al-Fārābī’s emanationism is not Neoplatonic. 
30 Hodgson 1974, II, pp. 192-200. 
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doctrines from non-philosophers, or those who were not naturally disposed to 
philosophy. The idea of secret philosophical teachings also had a long history within 
Greek philosophy. At least since Plutarch (d. ca. 125 CE), and especially among the 
later Alexandrian Neoplatonists, such secret teachings were attributed to Aristotle, 
even though Aristotle himself did not distinguish between exoteric and esoteric 
writings. 
Partly the distinction mirrored the division of philosophy into theoretical and 
practical: ethical and political philosophy, as well as parts of logic, were considered as 
exoteric, while theoretical philosophy and other parts of logic were considered 
esoteric. For some late Alexandrian philosophers the distinction was in exposition, 
rather than content, insofar as the exoteric teaching was merely a simplified 
adaptation of the esoteric truth.31 The perception of Greek philosophy as an esoteric 
art of wisdom was to some extent adopted by the Arabic tradition. Ibn al-Nadīm 
claims that in ancient times wisdom was forbidden from all except those naturally 
disposed to it, and the philosophers would first examine the suitability of anyone 
desiring to learn philosophy before teaching him.32 
There is some evidence that at least some of the early Arabic philosophers adopted 
the notion of esoteric philosophical writing. For the likes of Brethren of Purity writing 
within the Hermetic and Ismaili traditions this is particularly clear.33  But even a 
Peripatetic like al-Fārābī appears to at least condone it in his Greek predecessors. 
According to al-Fārābī, both Plato and Aristotle employed a technique of 
concealment, even if of very different kinds. Plato was reluctant to write his ideas 
down at all, but when he finally did so, he deliberately buried them beneath symbolic 
and obscure language so that only the philosophically inclined would understand 
them.34 
Aristotle’s clear and unambiguous style is superficially different, but when 
accused of excessive openness by Plato, he claims to have ordered his writings in such 
a way and employed such expressions that would ensure that only those capable were 
able to grasp their true meanings.35 In his introduction to philosophy, which closely 
follows similar late Alexandrian Greek works, al-Fārābī names three reasons for 
Aristotle to have deliberately obscured (ighlāq/ighmāΕ) his teachings: to test whether 
the pupil’s character is fit for philosophical instruction, to avoid wasting philosophy 
on non-philosophical minds, and to train thinking by making the pursuit of knowledge 
more difficult.36 
Due to such evidence the scholars related to the Straussian school in particular 
have claimed that Arabic philosophers employed an esoteric form of writing in order 
to conceal part of their philosophical opinions from non-philosophers. Leo Strauss 
                                                 
31 Galston 1990, pp. 27-34. 
32 Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, p. 332. 
33 See, chapter 3.5 below. 
34 Al-Fārābī, al-Jam‘ bayna ra’yay al-Ηakīmayn, p. 84. Ibn al-Qifṭī (Ikhbār, p. 20) also claims that 
Plato used symbols and obscuration (al-ramz wa-´l-ighlāq). 
35 Al-Fārābī, al-Jam‘, pp. 84-5. Socrates, who of course did not write anything anyway, was not 
thought to have followed the esoteric path, at least according to al-Rāzī, who says that he is reported to 
not have withheld any of his ideas (lam yakun yasta‘mil al-taqiyya) either from the general public or 
from the rulers, which eventually led to his death. Al-Rāzī, Kitāb al-sīra al-falsafiyya, p. 99. 
36 Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī, p. 14. 
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himself believed that a so-called theological-political problem lay in the background 
of all premodern philosophy. For Strauss philosophy is more than anything a unique 
way of life based on an effort to attain rationally grounded knowledge of the world. 
At any time this is possible for only very few, while the great majority are guided by 
the conventional opinions that under-pin the society. 
Since the very premise of philosophy is then rebellious towards the values guiding 
the larger society, there always exists a natural hostility between the two. This 
troubled relationship antedates the rise of monotheistic religions, and is shown already 
by the fate of Socrates or the criticism that Aristophanes directs against philosophy. 
At least since Plato, philosophers understood the special position that they occupy in 
the society and shaped their writings accordingly. In Strauss’ thinking his fascination 
with this “lost art” of esoteric writing merges together with his hermeneutical 
requirement to understand pre-modern philosophers as they themselves did, rather 
than “better than themselves.”37 
Strauss was deeply influenced by the writings of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd, 
and Maimonides in his ideas, but did not write extensively on Arabic philosophy.38 
His impact has, however, been very widespread within the field. Following the 
classically Straussian position Mahdi maintains that Arabic philosophy remains 
unintelligible unless one takes into account the initial incompatibility prevailing 
between religion and philosophy. The traditional view of Arabic philosophy as a 
syncretistic blend of Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, and Islamic elements into a successful 
resolution between religion and philosophy is at least partly erroneous, since such 
resolution mostly represents the exoteric doctrine aimed at non-philosophers.39 
In general the texts of Arabic philosophers must be studied with the distinction 
between exoteric and esoteric in mind so that the true doctrines may be discovered 
from beneath the disguise of orthodoxy. This may manifest itself either in a division 
to exoteric and esoteric works of a philosopher, or esoteric doctrines deliberately 
hidden in a single work behind the exoteric exterior that can be discovered only by the 
philosophically adept.40   
The critics of this view deny the Straussian premise that conflict between 
philosophy and religion would be of central importance for understanding Arabic 
philosophy. Both Leaman and Gutas see it rather as a product of the history of 
western scholarship, which has devoted a disproportionate amount of attention to the 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Strauss 1952; Strauss 1954; Pangle 1983, pp. 9-23; Tamer 2001, p. 1. While Strauss 
modestly placed himself among scholars, rather than the very elect group of philosophers, his interest 
in classical and medieval political philosophy went beyond purely scholarly motivation. For him 
classical political philosophy seemed to provide an answer to the problems of relativism and 
historicism that characterized modernity, and that made founding of objective values impossible. He 
did not write any extensive works, however, but expressed himself through a multitude of small 
studies. Hence his own ideas have sometimes been equally hard to interpret as he claims pre-modern 
philosophers to be. His critics have accused him and his followers of forming an elitist sect propagating 
radical nihilistic and anti-democratic views hidden beneath the garb of scholarship. In the American 
media his influence has been traced all the way to the neoconservative figures operating behind the 
Reagan and both Bush administrations. 
38 Tamer 2001, the first extensive study about Strauss’ relationship to medieval Arabic philosophy, 
stresses this influence.  
39 Mahdi 1962, p. 1; Mahdi 1991, pp. 12-4; Leaman 1980, pp. 527-8. 
40  See, Leaman 1980 for an overview of what he calls the “standard interpretation” of Arabic 
philosophy. 
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relationship between philosophy and religion. This applies both to those earlier 
scholars who perceived Arabic philosophy as a successful resolution between the two, 
and the Straussians who see such resolution as merely illusory. When liberated from 
this distorted perspective one observes that in their philosophical works Arabic 
philosophers are mostly concerned with questions that have nothing to do with this 
relationship. Besides, the supposed persecution of the philosophers in reality was 
practically non-existent, and furthermore al-Fārābī in particular quite publicly 
supported very unorthodox ideas which he seemed to have no reason to conceal.41 
A second problem concerns the Straussian methodology. There is no generally 
agreed upon method to uncover the presumed true opinions of the philosophers, and 
such an attempt therefore necessarily remains arbitrary. Strauss and his followers have 
endeavored to discover these views from supposedly meaningful omissions and 
differences in al-Fārābī’s or Ibn Rushd’s Aristotelian commentaries with respect to 
the originals on which they comment. They, however, for the most part seem to over-
interpret and mystify the texts by reading into them ideas that in reality are not there. 
If philosophical writing truly had been so complicated, then understanding philosophy 
correctly would have been practically impossible even for the contemporaries. As 
Gutas points out, it seems unlikely that as keen a student and critic of philosophy as 
al-Ghazālī would have failed to detect the hidden doctrines that the modern 
Straussians have no problem in finding.42 
Despite this, it is quite plausible that there was some degree of dissimulation of 
philosophical ideas. Arabic philosophers generally did not hide their view that 
philosophy should be taught only to those disposed to learn it, and that it should be 
withheld from others. Such a view probably influenced the nature of philosophical 
writing to incorporate ways that would make it less accessible to non-philosophers.43 
But it just was not necessary to make philosophy an incredibly complex puzzle to 
prevent it from being attractive to the non-philosophically minded.44 
2.3 Al-Fārābī 
In many ways Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950), a son of a Persian army officer from the 
city of Fārāb in Khurāsān, is the real founder of the Arabic Peripatetic school of 
philosophy.45 Earlier philosophers, such as al-Kindī and his disciples, the translators 
                                                 
41 Leaman 1980, pp. 528-31; Gutas 2002, pp. 11-5, 19-22. 
42 Leaman 1980, pp. 529-37; Gutas 2002, pp. 21-2. 
43 As an example one may mention the elliptical style of Ibn Sīnā’s Remarks and admonitions (al-
Ishārāt wa-´l-tanbīhāt), which might be interpreted as a conscious stylistic method to prevent its 
accessibility to non-philosophers, especially since Ibn Sīnā explicitly urges its concealment from them. 
See, Inati 1984, pp. 2-4. 
44 Hodgson (1974, II, pp. 311-5) points out the practices of reading and writing that would have both 
encouraged and enabled a disguised form of writing. The small intellectual elite, especially within a 
single field like philosophy, largely had read the same books and shared the same presuppositions. 
Therefore many things could be left implicit. On the other hand, manuscripts were scarce, expensive 
and worn-out and were read slowly and repeatedly, enabling a careful pondering of each word. Besides 
the preferred mode of reading was orally with a teacher, who would explicate what the text itself left 
implicit. 
45  For the sometimes rather conflicting accounts of al-Fārābī’s life as presented by the Arabic 
biographers, see, Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘Uyūn, pp. 557-64, Ibn al-Qifṭī, Ikhbār, pp. 210-2, Ramón Guerrero 
2003, and Vallat 2004, pp. 11ff. As for al-Fārābī’s ethnicity, Vallat refutes the often repeated thesis of 
him being Turkish, agreeing rather with Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a’s assessment that his father was of “Persian 
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of Greek philosophical works, and the logicians of Baghdad, had an important role in 
appropriating the Greek philosophical tradition into the Arabic-Islamic culture. But 
none of them had the lasting influence of al-Fārābī, whose own original philosophical 
synthesis paved the way for his followers, particularly Ibn Sīnā in the east and the 
Andalusian line of philosophers in the west. It is for a reason that he became known 
by the title “second teacher” (al-mu‘allim al-thānī), that is, after Aristotle. 
Hence, the Arabic biographical tradition is full of praise for al-Fārābī. He is the 
“undisputed Muslim philosopher” and the philosopher “who brought the philosophical 
sciences into their perfection”, elucidating what al-Kindī had left unrevealed.46 Al-
Fārābī’s high esteem seems to have taken at least half a century to grow, however, as 
in the contemporary sources he goes largely unnoticed.47 
Al-Fārābī does not, however, seem to build much on the thought of his well-
known predecessors, such as al-Kindī or Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, but rather tends to ignore 
them completely. His philosophical system appears then in contrast to, rather than as a 
continuation of, the tradition of al-Kindī.48 Al-Fārābī himself traces the origins of 
philosophy to the Chaldeans of Iraq, from whom it passed through Egyptians, Greeks, 
and Syrians to the Arabs.49 
In his account of the genesis of philosophy in the Islamic world, he moreover 
portrays a direct continuum between the Alexandrian school of late Antiquity and the 
Peripatetic “school” of Baghdad, in the context of which al-Fārābī himself was 
instructed into philosophy. According to this account, after the coming of Christianity 
the teaching of philosophy was put to an end in Rome, but continued in Alexandria in 
a form circumscribed to mere logic, while the rest was concealed as harmful to 
religion. After the coming of Islam, some of these Alexandrian teachers moved to 
Antioch, where the Alexandrian tradition continued for some time. 
It is under a disciple of one such teacher of Antiochian provenance, Yūḥannā Ibn 
Ḥaylān, that al-Fārābī himself was initiated into philosophy, even though his teacher 
could guide him only until Aristotelian logic. Al-Fārābī apparently then ventured on 
his own towards the higher truths of Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy.50 Al-Fārābī 
therefore seems to carry on rather consciously the tradition of the Alexandrian school, 
from where he also derives his conception of the nature and purpose of philosophy.51 
More immediately his background is rooted among the logicians of Baghdad, the most 
distinctive of whom were Christians, such as his teacher Yūḥannā Ibn Ḥaylān (d. 908-
32) and his contemporary Abū Bishr Mattā Ibn Yūnus (d. 940). 
                                                                                                                                            
origin” (fārisī al-muntasab), apparently serving in Fārāb, “one of the Turkish cities of Khurāsān” 
(madīna min bilād al-turk). 
46 Ibn al-Qifṭī, Ikhbār, p. 210; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘Uyūn, p. 557. 
47 Ibn al-Nadīm (d. ca. 998) passes al-Fārābī with only few lines, despite his close association with the 
Baghdad Peripatetic philosophers, such as al-Fārābī’s pupil Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī. See also, Vallat 2004, p. 
24. 
48 See, e.g., Gutas 1988, pp. 242-9; Reisman 2005, p. 52. Gutas sees a major divergence in the Kindian 
and Baghdadian philosophical schools in their relation to Aristotelian metaphysics, which the former 
treated more purely as theology. 
49 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 181. 
50 Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘Uyūn, p. 559.  
51 This is also illustrated by al-Fārābī’s above-mentioned introduction to philosophy which closely 
follows its Alexandrian predecessors. 
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Like most Arabic philosophers, al-Fārābī wrote extensively on almost every 
branch of the philosophical sciences. Due to the great influence and high esteem that 
he enjoyed, a considerable number of these works has survived, even if they probably 
represent only a minority of all of his writings. True to the Baghdad logical tradition, 
al-Fārābī was particularly appreciated for his contribution to logic. He wrote both 
commentaries on the Aristotelian logical corpus and independent treatises dealing 
with logical and linguistic questions. What is particularly noteworthy about al-Fārābī, 
however, both with respect to his predecessors and immediate followers, is the 
prominence he gives to practical philosophy, and political philosophy in particular. 
Consequently, the question of attaining happiness seems to emerge as the central 
problem within his philosophy. 
A significant number of his works are therefore at least partly relevant for this 
study. The most important group are his major original works dealing in large part 
with ethical and political philosophy in the context of his holistic philosophical 
system. 52  Secondly, there are the works that situate him within the Platonic-
Aristotelian tradition, where he presents both his own perception of the thought of 
these two Greek philosophers, as well as attempts to prove, possibly for apologetic 
purposes, their essential agreement.53 In addition, there are various smaller treatises 
dealing directly or indirectly with ethical and political questions.54 
Al-Fārābī treated similar questions in many works, sometimes in similar and 
sometimes in differing ways. As al-Fārābī still remains a relatively under-studied 
philosopher, in comparison with Ibn Sīnā, for example, there is no generally accepted 
scholarly view of the picture that is formed of the compound of these works. One way 
to explain doctrinal differences between individual works would be to assume an 
evolution in al-Fārābī’s thought. However, despite various attempts, there is no 
general agreement on the relative chronology of his writings. 
Unlike Ibn Sīnā, al-Fārābī did not write an autobiography, and while the medieval 
bibliographers give a few hints as to the dates of his works, they were not interested in 
presenting a precise chronology. For example, Virtuous City, Political Governance, 
and Aphorisms of the Statesman all treat similar ethical and political questions, and 
are often assumed to be among his later works probably dating from around the same 
period.55 Aphorisms of the Statesman is, however, very different in style and content, 
already because it is arranged into aphorisms (fuΙūl) supposedly drawn from the 
ancients. In contrast to the twin political treatises, it also lacks a part dealing with 
metaphysics and other parts of theoretical philosophy. But whether this means that it 
represents al-Fārābī’s later evolution towards greater realism in his political thought,56 
                                                 
52 These include the twin political treatises, Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous 
City (Mabādi’ ārā’ ahl al-madīna al-fāΕila) and Political Governance (al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya), as 
well as Attainment of Happiness (TaΗΙīl al-sa‘āda) and Book of Religion (Kitāb al-milla). 
53 This group would include his summary of Plato’s Laws (TalkhīΙ nawāmīs AflāΛūn), Philosophy of 
Plato (Falsafat AflāΛūn), Philosophy of Aristotle (Falsafat ArisΛūΛālīs), and Agreement Between the 
Opinions of the Two Philosophers (Jam‘ bayna ra’yay al-Ηakīmayn). 
54 Of particular relevance are: Aphorisms of the Statesman (FuΙūl al-madanī), Enumeration of Sciences 
(IΗΙā’ al-‘ulūm), Exhortation to the Way of Happiness (Al-Tanbīh ‘alā sabīl al-sa‘āda), Book of Letters 
(Kitāb al-Ηurūf), and the introduction to philosophy with the title What Must Be Learned Before 
Studying Aristotle’s Philosophy (Mā yanbaghī an yuqaddam qabla ta‘allum falsafat ArisΛū). 
55 See, Abouzeid 1987, p. 88. 
56 As is suggested, although cautiously, by Abouzeid 1987, p. 89. 
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or that it is just a work with different objective in mind, seems unclear. Also, arguing 
from the supposed “maturity” of a certain work for it to represent the culmination of 
al-Fārābī’s philosophical thought seems hazardous, especially since everyone seems 
to have opted for a different work as the most mature one.57 
Therefore, we may agree with Galston that even if a certain chronology was 
attainable, it would not provide a certain means for distinguishing between al-Fārābī’s 
youthful and evolved opinions.58 
A more fruitful way to interpret al-Fārābī’s works is through classifying them by 
their intended objective, although here also scholars have held widely divergent 
opinions. This might enable one to elevate certain of al-Fārābī’s works over others as 
the crucial ones that best represent his own philosophical views. For the Straussians 
such evaluation is based on their underlying assumption of the political context of all 
Arabic philosophy. For them the corpus of al-Fārābī must be interpreted based on the 
intended audience, whether philosophers or non-philosophers, and hence al-Fārābī’s 
works may be divided into philosophical and popular. 
According to Mahdi, the truly philosophical or scientific works are his 
commentaries, whereas the political works are popular at least in their theoretical 
parts. Al-Fārābī uses emanationist metaphysics only for rhetorical purposes to 
legitimate his political ideas, to appease the religious sentiments of the common 
populace, or to hide his real unorthodox views. Therefore the apparently theoretical 
parts of his two political treatises must be understood as political, rather than 
theoretical, philosophy.59 
Since Straussians believe al-Fārābī to practice the ancient art of concealment of 
truth, even in the philosophical works his own ideas are not necessarily explicit. 
Parens follows the methodological lead of Strauss himself in attempting to find al-
Fārābī’s true opinions in the silences and omissions of his paraphrase of Plato’s 
Laws.60 Galston, on the other hand, rejects the traditional Straussian division into 
philosophical and popular works, but rather attempts to interpret al-Fārābī’s political 
works as a unified group, the way she believes they were supposed to be read. The 
doctrinal differences between them then reflect al-Fārābī’s complex method of 
                                                 
57 For Walzer “it is certain” that Virtuous City is al-Fārābī’s last work, while Dunlop claims Aphorisms 
as last, and for Rosenthal Attainment is the most mature. As Mahdi points out, all editors of al-Fārābī’s 
texts seem to be certain that their text is the final one. Rosenthal 1958, p. 125; Dunlop 1961, pp. 16-7; 
Walzer, 1985, p. 1; Mahdi 1990, pp. 693-694. 
58  Galston 1990, pp. 3-5. See also, Abouzeid 1987, pp. 77-89 for a summary of the attempted 
chronologies, and Dunlop 1961 and Walzer 1985 for their attempts. Like Galston, Druart (1987, p. 27) 
implicitly renounces the possibility of a chronology. 
59 Mahdi 1962, pp. 4-5; Mahdi 2001a, pp. 121-124. 
60 Strauss 1957; Parens 1995. Of course, since it is very unlikely that al-Fārābī possessed anything even 
remotely near the original Greek version of the text, such omissions probably tell more about al-
Fārābī’s source than his carefully hidden opinions. Parens acknowledges the problem, but then 
concludes (p. xxix) that such a view “. . . reflects old and deep-seated prejudgment among many 
orientalists that the peculiarities and oddities of a text by a medieval Muslim thinker must be the 
product of external historical forces or of as yet undiscovered (preferably non-Muslim) predecessors 
rather than of the mind of the thinker. This prejudgment is an odd combination of the modern, 
democratic tendency to overstate history’s power over the individual, described by de Tocqueville, and 
of the view that Muslim thinkers in particular are constrained by their tradition from thinking 
independently.” The methodological problems are not exactly erased by this statement. 
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“dialectical multi-level writing,” where the intention is not so much to conceal, as to 
educate both philosophers and non-philosophers simultaneously.61 
Among those approaching al-Fārābī with more conventional methodology, 
Reisman proposes a tripartite classification into introductory works, commentaries 
and paraphrases, and original works. While the middle category is rather self-evident, 
the introductory works for him comprise the great majority of al-Fārābī’s writings 
from logical to ethical, whereas the last consists solely of Virtuous City and Political 
Governance. This is because these two are his major works in the sense that they 
cover all of his philosophical system in a comprehensive way from metaphysics, 
through physics, to political philosophy, and especially present the emanationist order 
of creation and cosmology.62 
Consequently al-Fārābī’s writings would appear as an ascent within his 
philosophical curriculum, where the logical and ethical works form a gradual 
introduction to philosophy, logic providing the tool and ethical works being a kind of 
exhortation to the practice of philosophy. The deeper philosophical truths of the 
original works are reached by the mediation of Aristotelian and Platonic 
commentaries and paraphrases. It does not seem, however, that Attainment of 
Happiness in particular would be introductory at least in the sense of being merely 
“exoteric” philosophy, for it rather appears to be one of the most important works 
presenting his original philosophical ideas, wedding theoretical with practical 
philosophy. 
The classification proposed by Druart is an attempt to resolve the controversial 
question of Neoplatonic emanationism within al-Fārābī’s thought. Al-Fārābī’s 
writings seem to present a problem as to the interpretation of his metaphysical views. 
He gives his detailed emanationist account in the theoretical parts of his two political 
works, while in others he ignores it altogether. The fact that he does not attribute 
emanationism to Aristotle in works like Philosophy of Aristotle would moreover seem 
to show that he was aware of the un-Aristotelian origin of the doctrine.63 While the 
Straussians conclude from this that al-Fārābī in fact did not truly profess 
emanationism, Druart only agrees with that al-Fārābī is indeed aware of the un-
Aristotelian origin of texts like Theology of Aristotle, but still sincerely supports 
emanationist views. The discrepancy in his works rather reflects al-Fārābī’s 
dissatisfaction with Aristotelian metaphysics, which he consciously supplements with 
Neoplatonic emanationism. 
Therefore Druart divides al-Fārābī’s works into three categories based on their 
position on this question. In the Aristotelian texts al-Fārābī presents Aristotle’s views, 
and therefore omits emanationism.64 In the “programmatic” texts, such as Attainment 
                                                 
61 Galston 1990, pp. 10-13, 35-53. 
62  Reisman 2005, pp. 54-5. Hence, they form a partial parallel with Ibn Sīnā’s Healing and al-
Kirmānī’s Rest of the Intellect. 
63 Galston 1977. According to Galston, the only text where al-Fārābī does attribute emanationism to 
Aristotle is Agreement Between the Opinions of the Two Philosophers, where his intention is 
essentially apologetic: to undermine the traditional argument against philosophy that even its two 
greatest representatives could not find an agreement between themselves on important questions. 
64 To this group pertains al-Fārābī’s little treatise On the Objectives of Metaphysics (Risāla fī aghrāΕ 
mā ba‘da al-Λabī‘a). That al-Fārābī wrote such treatise shows that there was some degree of 
puzzlement as to the purpose of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which reappeared later in Ibn Sīnā, whose 
confusion was settled precisely by the aid of this treatise. What was puzzling was apparently the 
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of Happiness and Enumeration of Sciences, he presents his own views for the program 
of philosophy within an Aristotelian context, but also calls for a metaphysics that goes 
beyond Aristotle to include divine science. Finally, in his “emanationist” works, 
Political Governance and Virtuous City, he presents his own account of trans-
Aristotelian metaphysics.65 
Finally, there is the view of Vallat, who has made the greatest effort so far for a 
unified presentation of the whole of al-Fārābī’s philosophy.66 For Vallat the unity of 
al-Fārābī’s thought as reflected throughout his corpus far outweighs the doctrinal 
divergences. This unity has gone largely unnoticed by such approaches to his 
philosophy where his works are stratified into different classes according to their 
presumed objective. This study concurs with such a holistic perception of al-Fārābī’s 
philosophy, and agrees with Vallat’s assessment that al-Fārābī’s philosophical system 
emerging from the conjunction of his works is in fact largely coherent.67 Namely, 
from all of al-Fārābī’s philosophical works there emerges a perception of philosophy 
as a way to happiness, around which both his theoretical and practical philosophy are 
focused. 
Nothing in this general picture would suggest a need for a Straussian reading of 
one or another of his treatises, nor for the arbitrary rejection of his Neoplatonic 
metaphysics as merely rhetorical. This does not of course exclude the notion that 
different works might serve different purposes, which would explain their distinct 
approaches to a specific question. Of al-Fārābī’s so-called programmatic texts, 
moreover, Attainment of Happiness, far from being merely introductory, seems to 
illustrate best al-Fārābī’s holistic conception of philosophy as an ascent to happiness 
in which theoretical and practical philosophy are intimately bound together. 
Moreover, the picture of philosophy that emerges from this work seems to be in 
harmony with the rest of al-Fārābī’s ethico-political treatises, including the 
emanationist account presented in the twin political treatises. Namely, the 
philosophical ascent to happiness is the counterpart of the creative process of 
emanation in al-Fārābī’s Neoplatonic soteriology. 
2.4 Ibn Sīnā 
Abu ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), known as Avicenna in the west and as the 
“chief master” (al-shaykh al-ra’īs) in the east, is probably the most influential Muslim 
philosopher of all time, besides the fact that his medical works were equally 
influential in both the Islamic and Latin world. Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical synthesis 
represents the culmination of the Islamic Peripatetic tradition, building on the 
influence of al-Fārābī in particular. But his later influence is not limited to the 
Peripatetics, but is also relevant to the evolution of the mystical traditions of Arabic 
philosophy, particularly the illuminationist philosophy of Suhrawardī more than a 
century after his death. In contrast to al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā’s influence is still very much 
                                                                                                                                            
restriction of Metaphysics with respect to describing spiritual reality, which for Platonic and Islamic 
metaphysics was its chief content. See, al-Fārābī, Risāla fī aghrāΕ mā ba‘da al-Λabī‘a. 
65 Druart 1987. 
66 Vallat 2004. 
67 Vallat 2004, pp. 25-6. 
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alive today especially in Iran. 68  While there is definitely more of a religious 
dimension to Ibn Sīnā’s writings than to those of al-Fārābī, the mysticism in his own 
thought is a controversial question. In addition to his clearly Peripatetic works he 
wrote a series of allegorical treatises that convey another side of his thought. 
Moreover, there is the problem of his “eastern” (mashriqī) philosophy. 
Ibn Sīnā’s own intellectual and philosophical growth is rather better documented 
than that of most others as he wrote an autobiography, complemented by a biography 
of his disciple al-Jūzjānī.69 The autobiography is rather sketchy and concise, but even 
so it depicts his own view of his early development and philosophical education. Ibn 
Sīnā grew up in Bukhārā Khurāsān within the sphere of Ismaili influence. While both 
his father and brother had adopted Ismailism, and especially the Ismaili doctrines on 
soul and intellect, Ibn Sīnā claims to have rejected them, although even at an early age 
he states that he had no trouble in understanding them. Besides Ismailism his family 
was at least rudimentarily educated in philosophy and mathematics which also 
pertained to the topics of discussion among the family.70 During his early years he 
received an education in the Quran, Arabic literature (adab), Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), as well as the basics of calculation from a greengrocer. 
Unlike al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā was not initiated into philosophy by a major 
philosopher working in an environment of fervent philosophical activity. After the 
arrival to Bukhārā of a man named al-Nātilī, this self-claimed connoisseur of 
philosophy assumed Ibn Sīnā’s instruction into the philosophical sciences. But like al-
Fārābī, he could attain only the beginnings of logic under his instruction, for Ibn Sīnā 
soon surpassed his teacher and proceeded to the study of the deeper parts of logic and 
mathematics, and later physics and metaphysics, through independent study of the 
texts.71 The main bulk of these philosophical texts presumably would have consisted 
of Aristotelian works and commentaries, including the pseudo-Aristotelian Theology 
of Aristotle on which he later wrote a commentary. The only external aid he claims to 
have required was to understand the purpose of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where he 
found help in a chance encounter with al-Fārābī’s small treatise, Epistle on the 
Objectives of Metaphysics.72 
                                                 
68 According to Corbin (1960, p. 6), in Iran it is customary to divide philosophers into Peripatetics 
(mashshā’ūn) and Illuminationists (ishrāqiyyūn), both of whom are Avicennan at least to some extent. 
69Ibn Sīnā’s autobiography was transmitted by largely the same Arabic biographers as al-Fārābī’s 
biography, such as Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a. For the roots and prevalence of autobiography in classical Arabic 
culture, see, Reynolds 2001, which argues against the misconception of autobiography as a rarity in 
Arabic literature. 
70 Ibn Sīnā, Sīrat al-shaykh al-ra’īs, pp. 16-21 and pp. 120-1, note 2. The possible impact of this early 
Ismaili influence on Ibn Sīnā has not really been studied. In two variants of the autobiography he 
claims that both he and his father also studied the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. If not a later 
addition, which, however, is likely according to Gutas (1988, p. 24, note 7), this would be very 
interesting both because his father was an Ismaili, thus supporting an early Ismaili affiliation of the 
Brethren of Purity, and because Ibn Sīnā’s first encounters with philosophy would have taken place 
through these epistles. 
71 According to Gutas (1988, p. 26, note 15), the expression Νawāhir al-manΛiq means here a literal-
minded reading of logic, while Ibn Sīnā delved by himself to its deeper subtleties (daqā’iquhu). The 
reference here is then to two ways of interpreting Aristotelian logic. Ibn Sīnā would therefore have 
finished the entire Organon with his teacher, and not only a part of it, as Gohlman and most other 
translators have assumed. 
72 Ibn Sīnā, Sīra, pp. 20-35 and p. 122, note 30. Gohlman expresses his doubts that al-Fārābī’s treatise 
by the very name mentioned by Ibn Sīnā, Fī aghrāΕ mā ba‘da al-Λabī‘a, could have been so helpful to 
 27
By the age of eighteen he had fully assimilated the philosophical sciences, and 
although his knowledge later might be “more mature, otherwise it is the same; nothing 
new has come to me since.”73 Like the allegorical tale Ζayy Ibn YaqΝān by the 
Andalusian philosopher Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185), Ibn Sīnā’s autobiography then depicts a 
picture of a supremely intelligent autodidact philosopher, with the exception that Ibn 
Sīnā assumes the philosophical truth through studying the Aristotelian corpus, rather 
than through independent reflection of reality.74 
As in so many medieval writers the question of esotericism arises also in Ibn Sīnā. 
In the introduction to his main Peripatetic work, Healing (al-Shifā’), he makes a 
distinction between that work and eastern philosophy (al-falsafa/Ηikma al-
mashriqiyya), on which he says he has written another book. Ibn Ṭufayl writes a 
century and a half later that in Healing Ibn Sīnā presented his Peripatetic doctrine 
following Aristotle, whereas he expressed his true philosophical opinions in his book 
on eastern philosophy, which for the most part has not survived. Suhrawardī (d. 
1191), on the contrary, downplays the difference between Ibn Sīnā’s eastern and 
Peripatetic philosophy to occasional changes in forms of expression.75 
Many modern scholars have followed Ibn Ṭufayl in interpreting Ibn Sīnā’s eastern 
philosophy to contain his mystical and esoteric doctrine. For Corbin, who views Ibn 
Sīnā from the perspective of Iranian spiritualism, eastern philosophy emerges as a 
counterpart to the Peripateticism of Baghdad. Eastern, besides Khurāsān, Ibn Sīnā’s 
point of origin, refers to the spiritual sphere of existence referred to as eastern in his 
allegorical treatises, as opposed to the west of the material world. Nasr follows 
Corbin, and sees the contents of the lost eastern philosophy to be reflected in the 
allegorical treatises and the last chapters of Remarks and Admonitions (al-Ishārāt wa-
´l-tanbīhāt). For both of them Ibn Sīnā’s eastern philosophy is a bridge between his 
Peripatetic philosophy and illuminationism, which is the true eastern philosophy that 
first becomes fully actualized in Suhrawardī.76 
A majority of western scholars rejects this interpretation as unsubstantiated 
mystification, or projection of later Iranian tradition to Ibn Sīnā himself. For Gutas 
there is no distinction of substance between Ibn Sīnā’s eastern/Khurāsānī and 
western/Peripatetic philosophy, only of method. In his eastern philosophy Ibn Sīnā 
intends to express what he holds to be the philosophical truth only, without giving 
philosophical arguments or variant opinions. This is also what Ibn Sīnā himself 
clearly declares to be doing in his introduction to Healing, and it is supported by the 
surviving parts of the eastern philosophical texts. On the whole Ibn Sīnā’s eastern 
                                                                                                                                            
Ibn Sīnā, and suggests Book of Letters instead. While the former treatise is mainly a very short 
summary of the contents of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, it explains the purpose of Aristotle’s metaphysics 
of which theology forms only a minor part.  
73 Ibid, p. 38. 
74 Whether all of the self-glorification in the autobiography is to be taken at face value, or whether 
some of it must be attributed to the topos of exaggeration characteristic of the biographical genre, is 
another question. Gutas believes that the primary purpose of the autobiography for Ibn Sīnā is to 
illustrate his epistemological theory, specifically the function of intuition (Ηads) in the learning process.  
75 Gutas 1988, pp. 115-8; Gutas 1994. Since most of Ibn Sīnā’s book on eastern philosophy had been 
destroyed much earlier, neither had at their disposal at least more than what we have today, i.e., parts of 
logic and possibly physics. Gutas believes the name of the work to be Easterners (al-Mashriqiyyūn). 
76 Corbin 1960, pp. 5-6, 271-8; Nasr 1964, p. 181, 185-196; Nasr 1996. 
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philosophy then represents a stage in his philosophical evolution, where he gradually 
departs from the Aristotelian manner of exposition. In his latest phase Ibn Sīnā 
discards the term ‘eastern philosophy’ altogether, since there is no longer a trace of it 
in Remarks and Admonitions, which Gutas argues to be his latest and most 
independent work. There is also not much trace of this eastern philosophy in Ibn 
Sīnā’s disciples or the subsequent Islamic tradition.77 
Michot and Reisman similarly see the distinction as an intellectual rivalry between 
Ibn Sīnā’s “Khurāsānī” philosophy and the over-literal Peripateticism of Baghdad, 
rather than one of exoteric and esoteric doctrine.78 Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between 
eastern and western philosophy then illustrates his difference of view with the 
Baghdad Peripatetics, where one major point of divergence is the separability and 
survival of the soul. Still, Ibn Sīnā was considered an Aristotelian by both his 
opponents and other philosophers.79 
It does not seem then that Ibn Sīnā would have devised two separate systems of 
philosophy, one Peripatetic and one “eastern.” But even in Gutas’ theory there is an 
evolution from more rigid Aristotelianism towards an independent synthesis. Among 
his voluminous corpus of writings two major works, and the two major sources for 
this study, Healing (al-Shifā’) and Remarks and Admonitions (al-Ishārāt wa-´l-
tanbīhāt), stand out. Both of them present the entirety of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical 
system proceeding from logic through physics, and mathematics in Healing, to 
metaphysics, and finally practical philosophy. In addition, there is the much shorter 
Salvation (al-Najāt), which does the same as Healing in a very concise form, although 
it apparently is not its summary as is commonly believed.80 
Gutas places Ibn Sīnā and his conception of philosophy firmly within the 
Aristotelian tradition as mediated by the Alexandrians. From the Alexandrian tradition 
he adopts both the idea of philosophical knowledge as essentially that which is 
contained in the Aristotelian corpus, and the classification of the parts of that 
knowledge. But in his form of exposition Ibn Sīnā consciously departs from the 
traditional convention of writing commentaries and treatises on specific subjects. Ibn 
Sīnā is the first to actualize the philosophical curriculum implicit in the Alexandrian 
classification of Aristotelian sciences into a coherent account of all knowledge. The 
names of his two most Peripatetic summas, Healing and Salvation, reveal their 
ultimate purpose. They provide the philosophical path of knowledge through which 
the rational soul is actualized, and hence healed from ignorance and saved from 
error.81 
                                                 
77 Gutas 1988, pp. 115-30; Gutas 1994; Gutas 2000. 
78 Reisman 2000, p. 565. 
79 See, Pines 1953; Peters 1968, pp. 167-8. Ibn Sīnā seems to exempt al-Fārābī from the errors of other 
Baghdadian Peripatetics. Pines 1953, p. 9. 
80 Ibn Sīnā’s first complete presentation of theoretical philosophy is Philosophy for ‘ArūΕī (al-Ζikma 
al-‘ArūΕiyya), followed by the lost Available and the Valid (al-ΖāΙil wa-´l-maΗΙūl), Healing, 
Salvation, Philosophy for ‘Alā’ al-Dawla (Dāneshnāme-ye ‘Alā’ī) in Persian, the infamous Easterners, 
and finally Remarks and Admonitions, according to Gutas’ (1988, p. 145) chronology. See, Gutas 1988, 
pp. 87-93, 112-4, 145 and Gutas 2000, pp. 168-9. 
81 Gutas 1988, pp. 86, 125-6, 101-3, 199-211, 219. The metaphor of philosophy as medicine or healing 
of the soul was a commonplace in Greek philosophy, besides the fact that it obviously fits well with Ibn 
Sīnā as a distinguished practitioner of the art. The other famous philosopher-doctor, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, 
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Even though Ibn Sīnā in Healing and Salvation follows the Aristotelian tradition, 
what he presents in them is his own synthesis of it, and he is not afraid to depart from 
the Aristotelian doctrine when necessary.82 In Remarks and Admonitions, probably his 
last complete presentation of philosophy, he proceeds further from the Aristotelian 
style of exposition towards giving only the philosophical truth in its most naked and 
allusive form. For Gutas this is the culmination of what Ibn Sīnā attempted already 
during his “phase” of eastern philosophy. The work is written in a deliberately 
elliptical style, partly for guarding its knowledge from non-philosophical minds, and 
the student is expected to elaborate the rest by himself presumably through help of 
oral instruction.83 
The last part of metaphysics dealing with practical philosophy differs decisively 
from Healing in style, and those advocating Ibn Sīnā’s eastern philosophy have often 
seen it as representing his eastern doctrine. Because he in it employs the vocabulary of 
Islamic mysticism, it has also been connected to Sufism.84 Gutas is strongly against 
such association, and sees this part only as further elaboration of Ibn Sīnā’s 
philosophical epistemology, although admittedly using non-philosophical language at 
times. Especially in the ninth section (namaΛ) of the last part of Remarks, titled “On 
the stations of the knowers” (Fī maqāmāt al-‘ārifīn), Ibn Sīnā, however, seems to go 
beyond Peripatetic epistemology in describing the spiritual journey towards ultimate 
happiness in mystical, experiential terms.85 But even here the exposition falls well 
within Ibn Sīnā’s holistic philosophical system such as it was presented already in 
Healing, and it may be described as mysticism only in the same sense as Platonism in 
general.86 
                                                                                                                                            
also employs that metaphor in the title of his ethical treatise Spiritual medicine (Kitāb al-Λibb al-
rūΗānī). See also, Nussbaum 1994, pp. 13ff. and chapter 6.7 below. 
82 Gutas believes Ibn Sīnā to possess a historical perception of philosophy. While absolute intelligible 
knowledge, such as it exists fully actualized in the separate Intellects, is static and finite, it is attained 
cumulatively in the actual human history of philosophy, each generation adding to their predecessors. 
Ibn Sīnā himself explains his method in the introduction [cited and translated by Gutas]: “There is 
nothing of account to be found in the books of the ancients which we did not include in this book of 
ours; if it is not found in the place where it is customary to record it, then it will be found in another 
place which I thought more appropriate for it. To this I added some of the things which I perceived 
through my own reflection and whose validity I determined through my own theoretical analysis, 
especially in Physics and Metaphysics.” Gutas 1988, pp. 51, 199-211. 
83 Gutas 1988, pp. 140-1. Ibn Sīnā states this explicitly in the work [cited and translated by Gutas 1988, 
p. 55]: “What follows are pointers to fundamental principles and reminders of essential elements. 
Whoever finds them easy will be able to gain insights through them, while he who finds them difficult 
will not benefit even from the most obvious of them. . . . Here I repeat my admonition and restate my 
request that the contents of these parts be withheld as much as possible from those who do not meet the 
conditions I stipulated at the end of these pointers.” 
84 Inati in his translation titles it the fourth “Sufi part” of the work, although he does not claim that Ibn 
Sīnā was a practicing Sufi. Nasr refers to various, probably fictive, encounters between Ibn Sīnā and 
Sufi sages given in the Islamic sources, and ends up considering him as definitely influenced by, 
although in the end falling short of, the Sufi way. Inati 1996; Nasr 1964, pp. 191-6. 
85 See, Marmura’s (1991, pp. 340-2) criticism of Gutas with respect to this question. However, Ibn Sīnā 
does seem to consider Peripatetic philosophy and the Sufi experience to be in essential agreement with 
each other, as when he claims the doctrine of the soul, which he has reached by demonstrative means, 
to be verified by the practitioners of ascesis and pure vision (arbāb al-riyāΕa wa-aΙΗāb al-mukāshafa). 
Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, p. 183. 
86 See also, Ramón Guerrero 2000, pp. 65-71 for this view. 
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Besides the major philosophical compendiums, Ibn Sīnā wrote a great number of 
smaller works on distinct subjects. The soul and its fate is at the center of Ibn Sīnā’s 
philosophical system since it is in some sense related to all areas of philosophy, while 
the soul’s salvation to eternal happiness is in the end the ultimate purpose for the 
practice of philosophy. Therefore he wrote a number of separate treatises on subjects 
related to the question of happiness and its attainment. Some of these, however, were 
incorporated almost directly into the major Peripatetic works, and do not contain any 
doctrinal deviations in relation to them.87 Besides, there are some minor treatises on 
other subjects that are useful for this study.88 
As for the series of allegorical narratives composed by Ibn Sīnā, they pertain to a 
genre distinct from straightforward philosophical writing, which Corbin calls 
visionary recital and Hodgson mythical-visionary writing. These recitals, such as 
Ζayy Ibn YaqΝān, Recital of the Bird, and Salāmān and Absāl, treat in symbolic 
language the quest of the soul in the material and spiritual realms. As such they 
clearly form a bridge towards later non-Peripatetic philosophy, at least in the sense 
that they inspired the likes of Ibn Ṭufayl and Suhrawardī to compose similar 
narratives expressing philosophical truth in the form of an allegory. But rather than 
containing Ibn Sīnā’s mystical doctrine distinct from those set forward in his 
philosophical writings, they would seem to express a holistic vision of the same 
philosophical truth expressed in experiential, as opposed to analytical, language.89 
2.5 Practical philosophy 
In Arabic philosophy the question of happiness properly pertains to all of philosophy, 
since in the end the goal of philosophical knowledge is to elevate the rational soul 
from its ignorant, material state to a higher level of non-material existence. The 
intellectual aspect of this ascent is related to epistemology, and is therefore treated in 
the psychological part of physics. But it is the task of practical philosophy to 
specifically investigate the ways in which happiness may be realized. 
In the primary division of philosophy the theoretical (naΝarī) part investigates 
those objects of knowledge that exist independently of human volition, the physical, 
metaphysical, and mathematical entities. As such its objective is to attain 
comprehensive knowledge of the existence as a whole. The practical (‘amalī) part, on 
the other hand, investigates the sphere of existence generated by human volition, and 
specifically the good actions and ways of life that lead man towards his ultimate goal. 
But the objective of the practical part is not merely acquisition of knowledge about 
these things, but action based on that knowledge. In Ibn Sīnā’s summary: “the 
                                                 
87 For example, the treatise The State of the Human Soul (Ζāl al-nafs al-insāniyya) was copied into the 
De Anima parts of Healing and Salvation, while parts of Provenance and Destination (al-Mabda’ wa-
´l-ma‘ād) were transferred into their metaphysical parts. Other works include especially Short Treatise 
on the Soul (Maqāla fī al-nafs ‘alā sunnat al-ikhtiΙār), the first work authored by Ibn Sīnā, or his 
“dissertation” in Gutas’ terminology, and his very last, Treatise on the Rational Soul (Risāla fī al-
kalām ‘alā al-nafs al-nāΛiqa). See, Gutas 1988, pp. 72-8, 82-6, 98-100, 254-61. 
88 These include in particular Parts of the Intellectual Sciences (Aqsām al-‘ulūm al-‘aqliyya), where Ibn 
Sīnā outlines his concept of philosophy and its parts, Treatise on Ethics (Risāla fī ‘ilm al-akhlāq), 
Treatise on Love (Risāla fī al-‘ishq), Treatise on the Essence of Prayer (Risāla fī māhiyyat al-Ιalāt), 
and his autobiography. 
89 See, Hodgson 1974, II, pp. 313-5; Gutas 1988, pp. 299-308. 
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objective of theoretical philosophy is the truth and the objective of practical 
philosophy is the good.”90 
In the classical division followed by Arabic philosophers practical philosophy is 
further divided into three parts. The subject matter of practical philosophy is properly 
how man must be governed (tadbīr) for him to attain his perfection, and this is 
investigated on three levels of the individual, household, and society, thus generating 
the three practical sciences of ethics, economics, and politics. 91  In Ibn Sīnā’s 
formulation ethics gives knowledge about how the dispositions and actions of man 
must be formed so that he could attain happiness both in this life and the next, while 
economics investigates how man should govern his household in a way that would 
enable attainment of happiness. 
Political philosophy properly investigates the way the things discovered in ethics 
can be actualized in the society. Hence, following the Platonic pattern, it investigates 
both the virtuous kind of governance leading to happiness, including the qualities of 
the first leader or “philosopher-king”, as well as the different classes of non-virtuous 
types of government. In the more specifically Islamic context there is, however, 
another part of political philosophy that is related to religion and religious law 
(sharī‘a). According to Ibn Sīnā, through this part is known both prophecy and man’s 
need for a religious law in order for him to attain salvation.92 
In the curriculum of philosophical sciences practical philosophy follows 
metaphysics as the very last part of philosophy. On the other hand, the practice of 
ethics should be its very first part preceding the acquisition of theoretical 
knowledge.93 Inclusion of practical philosophy as part or epilogue of metaphysics is 
not accidental, since such as it exists in al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, it forms an integral 
part of their holistic system of philosophy. In their ethical philosophy they do not 
investigate the nature of the good, justice, or other ethical concepts through 
independent reflection on the mundane reality, but as an integral part of the system 
construed in theoretical philosophy. In the theological part of metaphysics is 
portrayed the creation of the world through the emanative process from the First 
principle downwards, by the intermediacy of the separate Intellects of the spiritual 
world, down to the level of the material world. 
                                                 
90  Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām, p. 105. See also, e.g., al-Fārābī, IΗΙā’, p. 102; TaΗΙīl, pp. 140-2. Compare 
Aristotle’s assessment in Nicomachean Ethics, II.i, 1103b26ff.: “As then our present study, unlike the 
other branches of philosophy, has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for 
the sake of knowing what it is, but in order that we may become good, without which the result of our 
investigation would be of no use). . .” 
91 While Ibn Sīnā gives the full tripartition, al-Fārābī divides his political science (al-‘ilm al-madanī) 
only to ethics and political science proper. According to Ibn Sīnā, ethics is based on Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics (kitāb ArisΛāΛālīs fī al-akhlāq), economics on Bryson, and political philosophy on 
the “book of Plato and Aristotle on governance (siyāsa)” and “two books on the laws” (kitābān humā fī 
al-nawāmīs). Economics was not really treated much by either of them. Nāṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s (d. 1274) 
Nasirean Ethics (Akhlāq-i NāΙirī) would be the most orthodox representation of a tripartite work on 
practical philosophy within Arabic philosophy. 
92 Al-Fārābī, IΗΙā’, pp. 104-7; Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām, pp. 107-8. The epistemological part of prophetology 
again pertains to the De Anima part of physics. 
93 Abū Sahl al-Masīḥī, a physician and companion of Ibn Sīnā, explicates in his classification of the 
philosophical sciences this double nature of ethics. Ethics is a science that should be both practiced and 
studied, as practiced it precedes theoretical philosophy, as studied it follows it. Gutas 1988, p. 152. 
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Ethics deals with the means to the reversal of this process, the Neoplatonic return 
(ma‘ād) of the soul to the spiritual level of existence. Hence, ethics mostly deals with 
the purification of the soul from its bodily entanglements, partly using concepts of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics. Good and virtue are defined as the instruments that lead 
man towards his absolute good of ultimate happiness, while evil and vice are 
whatever prevents him from attaining it. Since the absolute good for man is fixed in a 
transcendental level of existence, spatially in the spiritual world and temporally 
mostly in the afterlife, this kind of ethics could be called transcendental ethics.94 
Like ethics, political philosophy is also ultimately attached to metaphysics. Within 
classical Arabic philosophy al-Fārābī stands to a degree as an anomaly in his 
preoccupation with political philosophy, since neither his predecessors nor most of his 
followers ever treated it extensively. For Al-Fārābī, on the contrary, political 
philosophy seems to emerge as his foremost concern, as many of his most important 
works can be described as political. Both of his two most famous political treatises, 
Virtuous City and Political Governance, however, contain a structure, where the first 
part in fact treats theoretical philosophy, while only the second part is devoted to 
political philosophy. This raises the question of the relationship between the two parts 
which has seemed somewhat arbitrary to many. 
The Straussians interpret the first part to represent political cosmology, theology, 
and psychology, or the opinions that the inhabitants of the virtuous city should adopt. 
Their rhetorical character is shown by the undemonstrative fashion of al-Fārābī’s 
exposition, where the true opinions are merely given without philosophical 
arguments.95 The peculiar structure, however, rather seems to mirror the intimate 
relation between metaphysics and political philosophy. The harmonious hierarchical 
order that exists in the cosmos and within man is the best possible order of things. 
Therefore this same divine model should be reproduced in the virtuous city, the most 
harmonious kind of society that men could create for themselves. 
The prominence of political philosophy suddenly emerging in al-Fārābī has also 
seemed puzzling to his interpreters. Mahdi and Parens regard al-Fārābī as without 
precedents either in the previous Arabic tradition or late Greek philosophy in this 
respect. In fact al-Fārābī’s metaphysical Neoplatonism appears almost contradictory 
to his preoccupation with political philosophy, as generally Neoplatonism has been 
regarded as too otherworldly to be concerned with the political aspect of Plato.96 
While Walzer also considers Neoplatonism as inherently apolitical, throughout his 
commentary on the Virtuous City, he also believes al-Fārābī to be reproducing some 
unknown Greek text from the 5th or 6th century.97 
In his Platonopolis, O’Meara convincingly reconstructs the continuous existence 
of Greek Neoplatonic political philosophy. The ultimate purpose of Neoplatonic 
                                                 
94 In case of Ibn Sīnā, Gutas calls it his metaphysics of the rational soul. As Gutas (1988, pp. 254-61) 
points out, Ibn Sīnā was never very interested in practical philosophy in any other context. 
95 Parens 1995, pp. 20-1; Mahdi 1990, pp. 695-6; Mahdi 2001, pp. 82, 121-124. 
96 Parens 1995, p. 18; Mahdi 2001, pp. 56, 65. 
97 Walzer 1971; Walzer 1985, p. 8. For Walzer Virtuous City can be used to “reconstruct a consistent 
view of metaphysics, astronomy, physics, psychology, ethics, and politics held by one particular late 
Greek philosopher or by one particular group of late Greek philosophers with whose thought al-Fārābī 
became acquainted and whom he chose to follow.” Walzer seems to assume this a priori, without 
providing much evidence for the complete reductionism. 
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philosophy is the divinization of man, or assimilation to the divine to the degree 
possible for a human being. To achieve this, the practitioner of philosophy must 
follow an ascending scale of political, purificatory and intellectual virtues. Once the 
soul attains its highest possible state, union with the One in the case of Plotinus, it 
must return to share its goodness with others. It is in the nature of the absolute Good 
to overflow its goodness and give rise to the rest of existence. Similarly the perfected 
philosopher must return to the “Platonic cave” to communicate the vision that he has 
attained by legislating an image of it in the human world. While O’Meara is 
concerned mainly with Greek philosophy, in an epilogue he provides al-Fārābī’s 
Virtuous City as an example for the continuation of Neoplatonic political philosophy 
in the Islamic world, or an Islamic “Platonopolis.”98 
Al-Fārābī’s political philosophy is then firmly grounded in Neoplatonic 
philosophy, in addition to the direct Platonic influence of the Republic and Laws, and 
is as inherently related to his holistic philosophical system as its other parts. Therefore 
Gutas is right in asserting that it is not political philosophy in the modern sense of an 
autonomous discipline independently reflecting the political reality. 99  But it is 
political philosophy in the Platonic sense of a philosophical utopia that is not directly 
related to the ephemeral affairs of the political world. 
Still, since al-Fārābī did not live in a vacuum, it would seem natural, despite the 
abstract nature of his political philosophy, that al-Fārābī’s political and religious 
leanings would somehow manifest themselves in his thought. His political philosophy 
is placed in the context of a revealed religion in that the concepts of revelation, 
prophecy, and religious law occupy a central position in it. For Rosenthal, although he 
admits that Islamic political philosophy in general is tightly integrated to the general 
philosophical system, the acceptance of the authority of sharī‘a largely conditions 
Islamic political philosophy and limits its range of speculation.100 
At least in the case of al-Fārābī religious law is, however, philosophically 
determined, and not the other way round. Al-Fārābī also uses Islamic concepts that 
relate his political philosophy to the general Islamic tradition of political thought that 
discusses especially the question of imamate and caliphate, or the legitimate form of 
rulership. Still Parens’ claim that the central goal of his political philosophy would be 
to investigate the idea of a universal Islamic state seems far-fetched.101 As for his 
more specific religious orientation, Walzer, based on both biographical factors and the 
contents of the work, believes al-Fārābī to be strongly sympathetic to twelver Shiism 
and to propagate against the Ismailis and Abbasids, whereas Daiber finds Ismaili 
influences in his political ideas.102 Both alternatives seem plausible, although merely 
hypothetical, since there is nothing overtly Shii, whether Imami or Ismaili, in his 
political thought or in his use of the concept of imam.  
                                                 
98 O’Meara 2003, pp. 3, 8-10, 40-4, 73-82, 185-96. 
99 Gutas 2001, pp. 23-4. For Gutas, as for Rosenthal (1958, p. 3), the first political philosopher in the 
Islamic world in this strict sense would be Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406). 
100 Rosenthal 1958, pp. 3-4. Mahdi (2001, p. 97) depicts medieval political philosophy as essentially a 
philosophy of religion, classical political philosophy as a philosophy of the city, and modern political 
philosophy as a philosophy of the state. This seems accurate in the sense that religion occupies the 
same position of unifying communal concept as city does for Plato and state does for modernity. 
101 Parens 2006, pp. 1-3. 
102 Walzer 1985, pp. 5, 441-442; Daiber 1991.  
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In contrast to al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā devotes much less of his attention to political 
philosophy within the totality of his philosophical writings.103 While al-Fārābī was 
properly the founder of Islamic political philosophy, and the major influence on the 
subsequent writers on the subject, Ibn Sīnā’s treatment of it in the final part of 
Healing does not seem directly indebted to al-Fārābī. Nor does he treat in it all those 
topics that he elsewhere defines as the subject matter of political philosophy, such as 
the classification of the different kinds of government.104 
While Ibn Sīnā also partly bases himself on the Platonic-Aristotelian foundation, 
his treatment seems to be much more intimately bound to the Islamic context than that 
of al-Fārābī. Prophecy arises as the central theme of Ibn Sīnā’s political philosophy, 
and there is no trace of a philosopher-king as the leader of the virtuous city at least 
explicitly. He discusses the question of legitimate virtuous rulership within the 
context of imamate and caliphate, and the nature of that government within the 
context of religious law and observations. In addition, Ibn Sīnā goes beyond the 
abstraction characterizing al-Fārābī’s political philosophy to describe some of the 
specific regulations that the virtuous rulership should include. 
                                                 
103  Probably due to its scarcity Ibn Sīnā’s political philosophy has been studied rather little in 
comparison with al-Fārābī. See, e.g., Rosenthal 1958, pp. 143-57, Morris 1992, and Butterworth 2000 
for brief overviews of the subject. 
104 In the prologue to Healing Ibn Sīnā promises to later write a comprehensive work on practical 
philosophy. In addition, before Healing he wrote a larger work on the subject, called Piety and Sin (al-
Birr wa-´l-ithm), which has not survived. See, Gutas 1988, pp. 94-8, 238. 
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3 Ismaili background 
3.1 Development of Ismaili doctrine 
The Ismaili doctrine was first expressed in a philosophical form at the beginning of 
the 10th century. The birth and early phases of the Ismailis before this time still remain 
somewhat obscure, as the Ismaili literature truly developed only after the movement 
had risen to political prominence at the founding of the Fatimid state in 909. 
According to the tradition, the Ismailis were first separated from the twelver Shiis due 
to the dispute concerning the inheritance of the imamate after the fifth imam Ja‘far al-
Ṣādiq (d. 765). Up to this point the mainline of Imami Shiis had been able to agree on 
the succession of the imamate, each imam at least theoretically having appointed his 
successor during his lifetime. Due to the special circumstances and ambiguities 
involving the succession of Ja‘far, Shiis were irrevocably split into their two major 
branches, the twelvers and the Ismailis, each following a different line of imams from 
then on.105  
At this point the Shii doctrine still was not elaborated to the degree it was in the 
following centuries, and while the original separation apparently did not result from 
doctrinal disagreements, the two branches were to follow separate doctrinal evolutions 
as well. Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq himself, who was revered as one of the major authorities in 
knowledge by both branches, probably had a major role in formulating this early Shii 
doctrine. Its most important single ingredient, which distinguished all the Shiis from 
the rest of the Muslim community, was the doctrine of the imamate. Although 
originally the question was probably as much political as it was spiritual, an 
increasing number of spiritual ideas were attributed to the function of the imam, the 
most radical ones of the ghulāt “extremists” often influenced by the pre-Islamic 
religions of Persia.106 
Even if the mainline of Shiis following Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq rejected the most radical of 
these innovations, which might at times elevate the imams above even the prophets in 
reverence, the Shii tradition as a whole was also influenced by some of the ghulāt 
ideas. If originally the imam was for the Shiis the legitimate political and spiritual 
leader of the Muslim community due to his descent from the prophet through his 
daughter Fāṭima and cousin ‘Alī, now he became much more than that. 
According to the developing Shii doctrine, the imam was designated (naΙΙ) by his 
predecessor, normally from among his sons, and was distinguished from ordinary 
people by his special knowledge (‘ilm). It was this knowledge, that had descended to 
the imams from the prophet, that made him the rightful leader of all Muslims, even if 
the majority of Muslims would not recognize him as such, and which made his 
presence at all times necessary for the existence of the world. 
Related to the developing concept of imamate was the esotericism that 
increasingly characterized Shii thought. In it knowledge in general, but especially that 
concerning prophetic revelation, was divided into its exoteric (Νāhir) and esoteric 
                                                 
105 Madelung 1961, pp. 43-6. In fact the situation among the supporters of Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq was probably 
initially considerably more complicated, with the existence of various groups noted in Shii and Sunni 
sources, from which the later twelver and Ismaili Shii movements developed. 
106 See, e.g., Hodgson 1974, I, pp. 372-4. 
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(bāΛin) aspects. The fundamental esoteric truth behind the literal meaning of 
revelation was the secret knowledge possessed by the imam, from whom it was 
divulged to the general cadre of believers, or at least the select few who were 
sufficiently advanced in their spiritual development to comprehend it.107 It was the 
Ismaili brand of Shiism that was to develop this esoteric view of knowledge the 
furthest, with all its elitist implications. 
The following century, between the separation of the Ismailis from the twelvers, 
and their emergence as a major force in the Islamic history at the end of the 9th 
century, is the most obscure period in the history of the Ismaili movement. It is also 
the most crucial period for its development, since by the reappearance of the Ismailis 
in written sources many of their most distinguishing doctrines had already been 
formed. For later Ismailis, the time after Ismā‘īl is the beginning of the period of 
occultation (ghayba), when the seventh Ismaili imam Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl 
retreated into hiding from visible presence in his community.108 
As a distinctive religious movement Ismailism was probably born around the 
middle of the 9th century, when Ismaili missionaries were dispatched to several parts 
of the Islamic world. When the Ismailis first were noted in outside chronicles at the 
end of the century, they had developed into an active and centrally governed religious 
organization, achieving major success especially in Iraq and Persia.109  
The Ismailis of the time were united in their belief in Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl as 
the last seventh hidden imam. By this time the powerful eschatological aspect, which 
characterizes all Shiism, had been well integrated into the Ismaili doctrine of the 
imamate. The Shii idea of the imam as an intermediary figure between the divine and 
the worldly spheres requires the imam to be present in the world throughout its 
history. While Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl had not been visibly present for a century now, 
the Ismailis believed him to still be alive, awaiting his return as the mahdī, the 
messianic redeemer figure of the world, that existed in both Sunni and Shii Islam, but 
was especially important for the latter. For the Ismailis, the final imam was the qā’im, 
the rectifier, who would fulfill the final consummation of history on the judgment day, 
through bringing justice and truth to the world. Thus he would bring an end to the 
period of the concealment of truth (dawr al-satr), as well as probably to the whole 
physical world. 
One of the most characteristic features of Ismailism is the cyclical view of history, 
to which the doctrine of the imamate was incorporated early on.110 The qā’im as the 
consummator of divine history is preceded in time by six cycles (dawr), himself being 
the initiator of the seventh and final era. Each cycle, moreover, consists of a “prophet-
speaker” (nāΛiq), bringing a new revelation and religious law, i.e., the exoteric aspect 
of the religion, followed by his legatee, known as the “silent one” or the “foundation” 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., Daftary 1990, pp. 84-6. Obviously Shiism is not the only branch of Islam to develop an 
esoteric view of knowledge and reality, but while for the Sufis this kind of knowledge was at the end of 
a long spiritual path for anyone, for the Shiis it was in the possession of a single, divinely selected 
individual. 
108 Madelung 1961, p. 48.  
109 Stern 1960, p. 56; Madelung 1961, p. 198; Madelung 1988, p. 93. Halm (1996a, p. 82) places the 
birth of the Ismaili da‘wa (mission) in Southern Mesopotamia. 
110 Cyclical perception of time has been seen as a central feature of Ismailism by many, especially 
Henry Corbin (1957), who perceives in it traces of pre-Islamic Persian Mazdaism. 
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(waΙī/asās/Ιāmit), who would bring the corresponding esoteric interpretation. The 
foundation in turn is followed by seven imams, or completers (mutimm), whose task it 
is to retain the revelation in both its exoteric and esoteric aspects, and the last of 
whom is also the initiator of the next cycle, that is, the speaker.111 The revelation and 
religious law brought by each new prophet abrogated the law of the earlier era, while 
finally the qā’im would dispense with both law and exoteric religion altogether, once 
the period of concealment came to an end and the complete esoteric truth would be 
divulged to all humanity.112 
The idea that history consists of a series of messengers conveying the divine will 
to mankind was Quranic and pertained to the Islamic world view in general, but what 
was distinctively Ismaili was the cyclical perception of the emergence of prophecy in 
the world.113 The Ismaili doctrine implied to a certain degree a pluralistic view of 
religions, insofar as they all were valid exoteric expressions of the underlying esoteric 
truth. Still, from another perspective, the Ismaili view of history was also linear and 
evolutionary, since it involved an idea of the gradual unfolding of the truth, each 
prophetic revelation being more complete than the previous, hence making the last 
revelation, Islam, the most perfect of them all. 
Another feature characterizing Ismailism already at this early stage, both 
doctrinally and as an actual religious movement, was its effective organizational 
hierarchy. Doctrinally, the Ismaili religious hierarchy formed the vertical counterpart 
of the mediation between the divine and terrestrial spheres, whereas the line of 
prophets and imams was the horizontal one. While at each time there was to be a 
divinely inspired mediator present in the world, in the person of the prophet, legatee, 
or imam, between him and the common believer there was to be a hierarchy of 
religious functionaries mediating the knowledge downwards. The Ismaili religious 
hierarchy was known as da‘wa, or the call (towards the truth).114 
The precise organization of the early da‘wa is not known very well, but apparently 
at the top of the hierarchy there were 12 Ηujjas, proofs (of God), who would direct the 
movement in their areas, and below them a descending hierarchy of dā‘īs, or 
missionaries. Since at this point all Ismailis apparently believed the living imam to be 
in hiding, the Ηujjas were the highest actual representatives of the order.115 Before 
their final political and military triumph the Ismailis were known especially as a 
secretive and effectively organized religious organization, and it was this organization 
that was doubtless an important factor contributing to their eventual success. 
                                                 
111 The figure seven in the number of cycles, and the number of imams within the cycles, was of central 
symbolic significance for the Ismailis, repeated in the cosmos in the number of the planetary spheres, 
etc. 
112 See, e.g., Daftary 1990, pp. 136-40 and Madelung, 1988, p. 94 for a review of the early, pre-Fatimid 
doctrine. 
113 The line of law-giving prophets given by the Ismailis was usually Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, 
Jesus, and Muḥammad, although whether or not Adam actually brought an explicit law was a subject of 
debate. Since, according to one source, there had appeared 313 messengers (rusul) and 124,000 lesser 
prophets (anbiyā’) in history, most of them were perceived as legatees, imams, or lower representatives 
of the Ismaili hierarchy. See, Walker, 1993, pp. 28-9. 
114 The term da‘wa has of course been shared by a great number of movements as a term for missionary 
activity, including the Abbasids and other groups of both Sunni and Shii persuasion. Still, it is probably 
more developed and essential in Ismaili thought than anywhere else. 
115 Daftary 1990, p. 137. 
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As already noted, the Ismailis were from the beginning characterized by an 
esotericism of a more profound nature than that practiced among the twelver Shiis. 
Among the contemporaries the movement was known by many names during its early 
centuries, of which the most common was bāΛiniyya, the holders of the esoteric 
truth.116 At least for the later Ismailis this esoteric view of reality meant that not only 
was there some more profound inner meaning behind religious scriptures and 
religious law, but that all reality consisted of an apparent, exoteric and hidden, 
esoteric aspect. For the Ismailis this esoteric truth could be reached by a method of 
allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl).117 The method of ta’wīl could not be practiced by 
just anyone of course, but only by those divinely inspired to do this. Hence, for the 
Ismailis their esotericism was bound to the idea of religious hierarchy, which made it 
an essentially elitist movement. The esoteric truth flowed within the Ismaili hierarchy 
from the imam downwards, and was solely in the possession of its members. 
Hence, the Ismailis had the character of a Gnostic sect possessing the hidden truth 
indispensable for salvation. Despite their active missionary efforts, this truth was not 
actively divulged even to all Ismailis. For one to become Ismaili, one had to first be 
initiated (balāgh) to the movement and swear an oath of secrecy (‘ahd/mīthāq). He 
would attain the esoteric wisdom only gradually, proceeding first through the lower 
levels of exoteric knowledge. Hence, for Ismailis the Shii concept of taqiyya meant 
also the necessity of the Ismailis hiding their esoteric truth from all those who were 
not entitled to it – whether non-Ismailis or Ismailis who had not reached a sufficient 
level of initiation.118 
As a consequence of these Gnostic perceptions, Ismaili literature evolved into a 
system of knowledge, comprising both the exoteric sciences, for example Ismaili 
jurisprudence (fiqh) and history, and the esoteric sciences dealing with the ultimate 
esoteric knowledge of reality (Ηaqā’iq). Initially this esoteric truth consisted 
especially of the Gnostic-type cosmology, which explained the creation and inherent 
nature of the world through Quranic, mythological, and even cabbalistic concepts. At 
the top of the divine hierarchy, there is the completely transcendent God, the Absolute 
One, which is beyond human cognition. By the divine commandment (kun) are 
created the first, female principle Kūnī, known also as the preceding one (al-sābiq), 
and the second male principle Qadar, known as the following one (al-tālī). Their 
                                                 
116 Al-Shahrastānī (d. 1153) (Kitāb al-milal, p. 554) states them to have received this appellation due to 
their belief that for each exoteric truth there is an esoteric one. Besides he mentions the designations 
Ismā‘īliyya, mazdakiyya, qarāmiΛa, ta‘līmiyya, and mulΗida. The first name shows that he identifies the 
Ismailis with the Mazdakians, the second that he did not make a distinction between Fatimids and 
Qarmatians, and the third the centrality of the idea of instruction of knowledge among the Ismailis.  
117 Daftary 1990, pp. 137-8. Ta’wīl is contrasted with tafsīr, the explication of the merely external 
meanings of revelation (tanzīl). There was never one precise method of ta’wīl, however, for it could 
mean anything from numerological or cabbalistic interpretation to the philosophical method of al-
Kirmānī. 
118 Daftary 1990, pp. 137-8; Halm 1997, pp. 18-20. Hodgson sees a close parallel and probable line of 
influence with Manicheanism, the pre-Islamic Persian Gnostic religion that was relatively common 
among elite circles in the Islamic world during the previous century, and vehemently opposed by the 
Islamic orthodoxy. While they shared the idea of Gnostic knowledge that they exclusively possessed, 
the Ismailis were less “Gnostic” in their practical orientation towards reforming the existing worldly 
order. Ismaili Gnosticism is not distinctly Manichaean, however, and the origins may lie in some 
unknown Gnostic sects of Iraq. Hodgson 1974, I, pp. 379-80; Halm 1996a. 
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seven Arabic consonant letters form the seven heavenly letters (al-Ηurūf al-‘ulwiyya), 
that function also as the heavenly archetypes of the seven prophets. 
From these two primary principles three further divine principles, jadd, fatΗ and 
khayāl, are emanated, that function as intermediaries between the spiritual and 
terrestrial realms, and were often identified with the archangels Jibrā’īl, Mīkā’īl and 
Isrāfīl, that act as the agents of revelation enabling men to attain knowledge of the 
divine world. This cosmological myth is further bound to the Quranic tale of the fall 
of Iblīs, another of the spiritual beings of the divine world, who fails to submit to 
Qadar, interpreted as the heavenly, spiritual Adam. Finally, the lower, physical world 
is created by God through the mediation of the two highest principles.119 
The early Ismaili cosmology is of clearly Gnostic inspiration, even if the names of 
the spiritual beings are mainly Quranic, and early Ismaili texts tend to legitimize them 
by references to coded allusions in the Quran. What is characteristically Gnostic about 
the creation myth is that the material world is created by a lower “god,” instead of 
God himself, and that at least in some texts an arrogant assumption of omnipotence by 
the lower divinity is involved, implying the Gnostic theme of creation of the lower 
world due to the fall of a spiritual being.120 
Even if Gnostic cosmology at times seems rather complex and even arbitrary, it 
had the practical function of explaining to man the ultimate nature of the cosmos and 
man’s place within it: the absolute distance between God and the material world, the 
divine origin of man, and the reason for the soul’s fall to the material level of 
existence. Ismaili cosmology provided the initiate the saving knowledge (gnōsis), 
which was the only means by which his soul could be saved to the spiritual existence 
of the afterlife.121  
The 10th century represents the period of greatest political success for the Ismaili 
movement, which also had a major impetus on its doctrinal development. First of all, 
at the turn of the century the Ismaili da‘wa was split, when its leader in Salamiyya, 
‘Ubayd Allāh, introduced a huge doctrinal innovation to the doctrine of imamate. 
According to the new doctrine, ‘Ubayd Allāh and his predecessors, who until now 
were regarded as Ηujjas mediating between the absent imam and the common 
believers, were elevated to the status of imams. By implication this presupposed a 
continuous line of imams, as well as abolishment of the expectation of the return of 
Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl as mahdī. The other branch of Ismailis, that came to be 
known as Qarmatians, refused these Fatimid innovations, and instead carried on with 
the anticipation of Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl’s return.122  
                                                 
119 Madelung 1988, pp. 94-5; Halm 1996a. Many of the pre-Fatimid texts, such Kitāb al-‘ālim wa-´l-
ghulām, Kitāb al-rushd wa-´l-hidāya, and Kitāb al-kashf do not give a systematic picture of the early 
cosmological doctrine. Halm 1996a is based especially on a text by Abū ‘Īsā al-Murshid dating to 
around the Fatimid conquest of Egypt.  
120 Halm 1996a, pp. 80-3. See also Halm 1978 for a more detailed study of early Ismaili cosmology. In 
al-Murshid’s treatise Kūnī in her arrogance imagines herself to be the creator, resulting in the 
emanation of six more spiritual principles from it, in order to show her that there is an invisible Creator 
above her. 
121 Moreover, as in Ismaili thought cosmology is always inherently connected to everything else, due to 
the harmony prevailing in the world, it is never irrelevant for any other sphere of knowledge. 
122 Madelung 1961, pp. 69-72; Madelung 1988, pp. 95-6; Daftary 1993. Daftary sees it as possible that 
there always existed a group among the Ismailis holding a continuous line of imams since Ja‘far al-
Ṣādiq, corresponding to the Fatimids’ own historical perception, where the true identity of the imams 
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Both branches attained some degree of political success; Qarmatians were the first 
to found a state in Baḥrayn in 899, from where they continued their attacks and 
attempts at expansion to the central regions of the disintegrating caliphate during the 
following century. Of even greater significance was the founding of the Fatimid 
caliphate in North Africa in 909, from where it expanded to Egypt in 969, and to Syria 
and Arabia during the final decades of the century. These events made Fatimid 
Ismailism an official religion of a major territorial state and therefore unavoidably 
transformed its nature. Diffusion of Ismailism was, however, by no means determined 
by the borders of these states, which rather acted as the central points of Ismaili 
learning and propaganda. Ismaili ambitions were always towards universal 
propagation of the true faith, and the da‘wa remained particularly strong in Iran and 
Iraq, while in the Fatimid heartlands the great majority of the population remained 
Sunni throughout their rule.123  
The so-called classical Fatimid period initiated by the founding of the caliphate 
manifests itself, among other things, in the blooming of Ismaili literature. During this 
period Ismaili thought reaches its greatest summit in both philosophy and other 
branches of knowledge.124 For the Fatimids there was an obvious need for the revision 
of the Ismaili doctrine of the imamate with respect to its sixth and final historical 
cycle in order to fit the present reality into the cyclical perception of history. This 
involved especially a re-evaluation of the temporal and eschatological roles of the 
qā’im Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl and of the sequence of imams during the sixth era, 
which was expanded by adding additional heptads of imams. 
At the time of the influential fourth caliph al-Mu‘izz (953-75) the doctrine, which 
in part revoked modifications enforced by ‘Ubayd Allāh, and as formulated especially 
by the famous Ismaili jurist and theologian al-Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān (d. 974), now came to 
interpret the qā’im as a figure with multiple degrees (Ηadd), both spiritual and 
corporeal, appearing in the alternating periods of concealment (satr) and 
manifestation (kashf). When appearing as the seventh imam of the era of Islam, 
Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl, qā’im attained his first degree bringing the esoteric truth, but 
since he appeared during a period of concealment both he and his message remained 
hidden. The Fatimid caliphs and their ancestors were now interpreted as deputies of 
the qā’im, or his second corporeal degree, who finally manifested themselves openly 
at the appearance of ‘Ubayd Allāh and founding of the caliphate. They would rule 
until the end of the sixth era and of the physical world, when the qā’im would appear 
                                                                                                                                            
was withheld according to the principles of taqiyya during the interim period. The abolition of the 
mahdīship of Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl altogether did not survive in the later Fatimid doctrine, however. 
123 The relationship between the two main branches of early Ismailism seems quite ambiguous at times, 
and non-Ismaili contemporaries often did not make the distinction at all. After the initial rupture at 899, 
Stern suggests a later rapprochement, in which the Qarmatians of Baḥrayn recognized the Fatimid 
caliphs as “. . . lieutenants” of the mahdī, rather than as actual imams, while Daftary perceives the 
relationship as permanently hostile. See, Stern 1960, pp. 74-6; Madelung 1996; Daftary 1993, pp. 138-
9.  
124 Daftary defines the classical period as between the establishment of the caliphate in 909 and the 
death of the eighth Fatimid caliph al-Mustanṣir in 1094, which leads into yet another split in the Ismaili 
movement and the gradual decline of Fatimid power. Daftary 1990, p. 144. 
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in his final spiritual form passing judgment to mankind, and ultimately ascending to 
be united with the Universal Soul.125 
The doctrine of imamate did not remain constant even during the Fatimid period, 
however, but evolved in time. Apparently, initially many dā‘īs did not accept the 
Fatimid caliphs as imams in the full sense, but remained somewhat ambiguous 
towards them. During the period of al-Ḥākim (d. 1021), and of al-Kirmānī, the mere 
deputies of the hidden imam had, however, evolved into a continuous line of repeated 
heptads of imams of the sixth era.126 On the whole, the main structure of pre-Fatimid 
Ismaili doctrine remained intact during the Fatimid period. The general cyclical view 
of prophetic history and the conception of the exoteric and esoteric aspects of 
knowledge remained characteristic of Fatimid Ismaili thought. Most Fatimid works, 
however, emphasize the importance of balance between exoteric and esoteric aspects 
against any antinomian tendencies. Doctrinally one of the most important changes 
involved the content of the deepest kind of esoteric knowledge, when during al-
Mu‘izz’s reign the mythical, Gnostically inspired cosmology was replaced by the 
Neoplatonic cosmology of the Ismaili philosophers.127 
3.2 Development of Ismaili philosophy 
The 10th and 11th centuries of the classical Fatimid period were also the classical 
period of Ismaili philosophy, during which the philosopher-theologians still today 
revered by the modern-day Ismaili communities were active. It was in the eastern 
lands of Islam where the philosophical form of Ismailism was developed, rather than 
in the Fatimid heartlands. All of the Ismaili philosophers of the period were Persian, 
even though with the exception of Nāṣir-i Khosrow (d. ca. 1088) they wrote in Arabic, 
and for the most part they operated in the hazardous vocation of dā‘īs of the Ismaili 
mission in the Persian lands governed by dynasties mainly hostile to the Ismaili 
cause.128 
Initially Ismaili philosophy was in no way bound to the Fatimid state. The earliest 
of the Persian Ismaili philosophers, al-Nasafī (d. 943), Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 934), 
and al-Sijistānī (d. 971) during his early period, probably rejected the imamate of 
‘Ubayd Allāh and the legitimacy of the Fatimids. 129  One major objective of the 
doctrinal changes implemented by al-Mu‘izz was precisely to attract the dissident 
eastern Ismailis to the fold of the Fatimids by reverting some of the more radical 
                                                 
125 Madelung 1961, pp. 86-90, 100-1; Daftary 1990, pp. 176-80, 234. 
126 Walker 1993, pp. 9-12, 28. 
127 Daftary 1990, pp. 232-4. Most scholars see the development of Ismaili doctrine as presented here, 
where Neoplatonism represents a secondary stage of evolution. Some, however, perceive it as possible 
that the philosophical and Gnostic-type doctrine always existed side by side. While the scarcity of pre-
Fatimid sources makes such speculation possible, the earliest surviving texts do not seem to contain 
Neoplatonic influences. 
128 According to the mainly Sunni accounts used by Stern, al-Nasafī and al-Sijistānī were executed by 
Samanid and Saffarid rulers respectively. As Stern’s account of early Ismaili dā‘īs in Persia shows, the 
political situation of the Ismailis was volatile. Stern conjectures that the da‘wa in Persia targeted the 
ruling elite, while in the western Islamic lands it rather targeted the common people. While it achieved 
some temporary successes at times through the conversion of some of the notables in Persia, it was 
unable to attain any larger success. Stern 1960, pp. 79-82. 
129 Daftary 1990, pp. 234-5. It is not always very clear, however, what is their stand towards the 
question of the status of the actual ruling Fatimid caliphs, as Sijistānī, for example, does not refer to 
them by name, and does not even discuss the question of the imamate in detail. 
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changes made by ‘Ubayd Allāh to the doctrine of imamate.130 This proved successful 
as all subsequent Ismaili philosophers, al-Sijistānī, al-Kirmānī, al-Shīrāzī (d. 1078), 
and Nāṣir-i Khosrow, subscribed to Fatimid Ismailism. While carrying out most of 
their careers in the east, they usually spent at least a part of their lives in the service of 
the Fatimid caliphs in Cairo, the religious and intellectual epicenter of the Ismaili 
world.131 
Since all the Ismaili philosophers were major dā‘īs of their time, whether 
Qarmatian or Fatimid, they played their part in the formulation and revision of the 
Ismaili doctrine. Therefore, they all confessed to the main dogmas of Ismailism 
described above, even if they might have disagreements on the specific questions 
involved. The major doctrinal revision brought about by the philosophers was the 
portrayal of this doctrine in the terms of Greek philosophy, where Ismaili cosmology 
especially was transformed into Neoplatonic form, drawing from the Arabic treatises 
paraphrasing Greek Neoplatonism. At this the Ismailis were not alone, since 
Neoplatonism was clearly the common language of the intellectual circles of the early 
10th century. 132 Still their cosmology was by no means identical with the Peripatetic 
philosophers, but represented a distinct trend of Neoplatonism, which in some 
respects followed more closely the Greek precedents. 
Neoplatonism was probably first introduced into Ismaili thought by al-Nasafī, of 
whose major philosophical work, Book of the Yield (Kitāb al-maΗΙūl), only fragments 
survive in the mainly critical responses of his followers.133 The work dealt with both 
cosmology and the cyclical history of the seven prophetic eras, and included the rather 
heterodox idea that the Islamic era had already ended with the appearance of qā‘im 
Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl, and therefore the final seventh era had begun and the 
exoteric law had been abolished. Al-Nasafī’s antinomianism was vehemently 
criticized by Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī’s Book of Correction (Kitāb al-iΙlāΗ), where the 
author defines the era following Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl’s first appearance as an 
“interim” period (fatra) terminating the era of Islam, in which the world is governed 
by the deputies of imam.134 Al-Sijistānī, on the contrary, devoted a now lost work, 
Book of Support (Kitāb al-nuΙra), to the defense of al-Nasafī’s views, but seems to 
have later changed his mind, as his surviving works do not contain the more radical 
ideas attributed to him, and suggest that he recognized the validity of the Fatimid 
caliphs.135  
                                                 
130 Madelung 1961, pp. 101-2. 
131 The Qarmatian communities of Iraq and Iran in general were either absorbed by the Fatimids or 
otherwise vanished altogether towards the end of the 10th century, surviving only in the Ismaili state in 
Baḥrayn for one more century. Madelung 1988, p. 101. 
132 Other examples of early 10th century Neoplatonists, besides the actual falāsifa, include the Jewish 
philosopher Isaac Israeli (d. 955) and the “Nabatean” popular philosophy of the Iraqian Ibn Waḥshiyya 
embedded within his agronomical treatise. See, Altmann and Stern 1958 and Mattila 2007. 
133 According to Daftary (2004, p. 29), the book was written around 912. 
134 Madelung 1961, p. 106; Daftary 1990, pp. 235-7. 
135 Madelung 1961, pp. 102-6; Daftary 1990, p. 238. Kitāb al-nuΙra survives, in addition to al-Rāzī’s 
refutation, in the quotations of Al-Kirmānī’s Kitāb al-riyāΕ (Book of the Meadows), which contains the 
latter’s assessment of the theological discussions of the previous generations of dā‘īs. In the work al-
Kirmānī criticizes both al-Nasafī and al-Sijistānī, siding with al-Rāzī against the antinomian tendencies 
of his predecessors. Still, he recommends all three of them as introductory reading for his Rest of the 
Intellect. Al-Sijistānī’s writings present the same problem for research as most Ismaili authors in that 
they have survived through the continuous transmission of the modern-day Ismaili communities, 
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Al-Nasafī was clearly an influential figure in his time, and possibly represented an 
early Khurāsānī school of Ismaili thought, whose influence survived for some time as 
a current of its own, but then waned. Hence, his works were no longer copied, and 
have not survived.136 Whatever doctrinal differences al-Rāzī and al-Sijistānī might 
have had with al-Nasafī, they both adopted his Neoplatonic cosmology. Since al-Rāzī 
was much less a systematic philosopher than he was a theologian, it was al-Sijistānī 
who made the most lasting contribution to the development of Ismaili Neoplatonism, 
being also by far the most important philosophical precursor for al-Kirmānī. 
While al-Sijistānī’s philosophical system is an innovation in its Neoplatonism with 
respect to the Gnostic-type cosmology of early Ismailism, it also carries it on. Al-
Sijistānī preserves the most essential features of Ismaili theology, the absolute 
distance between the ineffable God and the creation, and the hierarchy of spiritual 
entities mediating between the terrestrial and spiritual worlds. His cosmological 
system also serves the same function of explaining the place of man within the order 
of creation, and the final destiny of his return to his spiritual home. Moreover, al-
Sijistānī himself identifies the two cosmological systems, preserving many of the 
older layers of Ismaili cosmological language alongside the novel Neoplatonic 
terminology. 
At the top of al-Sijistānī’s cosmological hierarchy is the absolute oneness of God, 
which completely transcends both being and non-being. Hence, God is beyond 
attribution through human concepts pertaining to the created world, and is neither a 
substance nor an Intellect, in contrast to the hybrid Aristotelian-Plotinian God of the 
Peripatetic philosophers. In its complete transcendence and ineffability God then 
rather approximates the One of Plotinus. In fact al-Sijistānī goes beyond Plotinus in 
God’s transcendence, since while for Plotinus the One may be approached at the end 
of a spiritual path through a supra-rational experience, for al-Sijistānī there is no 
mystical state by which man could rise beyond the level of the Intellect. 137  In 
distinction of both Plotinus and Arabic Peripatetic philosophy, however, the world is 
not produced from the One through timeless and involuntary emanation, but God 
creates (abda‘a) the Intellect (‘aql) ex nihilo by his timeless divine Commandment 
(amr) or Word (kalima), that in itself acts as a complex intermediary entity between 
being and non-being, and that corresponds to the pre-Neoplatonic kun.138  
                                                                                                                                            
especially the Bohras of India in the case of al-Sijistānī, and all the surviving manuscripts are recent. 
Especially in the case of al-Sijistānī, who was not a major authority for later Ismailis, it is quite 
possible that they have undergone revision to conform to later changes in doctrine. Possibly these 
revisions were in part made by himself, since both al-Kirmānī and Khosrow claim that he modified his 
views between earlier and later works. See, Walker 1993, pp. 19-20. 
136 Al-Bustī speaks of such a school in his Kashf al-asrār al-bāΛiniyya (Disclosure of the Secrets of the 
Ismailis), citing its differences with other schools, and mentions the followers of al-Nasafī as 
continuing its tradition. According to Walker (1994, pp. 351-2), this early school would have been 
distinguished precisely by its adherence to the doctrines of al-MaΗΙūl, drawing heavily from 
cosmology, physical sciences, astrology, and alchemy to describe the relationship between the human 
soul and the physical world. 
137 See, Daftary 1990, p 240; Walker 1993, pp. 70, 73-4, 8. 
138  Daftary 1990, p. 241; Walker 1993, p. 86. While the falāsifa rejected creation ex-nihilo, and 
perceived the universe as eternal, al-Sijistānī’s solution seems a compromise that only produces a 
paradox. 
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The Intellect (‘aql) is in a way the real creator-God of the Ismailis, since as the 
archetype and source of all existing things it is the real creator of the visible world. It 
is also the highest spiritual entity of which something may be known, or which man 
may pursue to know. In al-Sijistānī’s cosmology, as in that of Plotinus, Intellect is the 
first created being (al-mubda’ al-awwal/al-awwal), that encompasses in itself the 
whole of creation in the sense of the Platonic world of ideas. It is perfect in its essence 
and activity, and completely motionless and tranquil in its timeless eternity. It is 
furthermore the source of all being below it, like the Sun at the top of the Neoplatonic 
hierarchy from which being flows downwards in a timeless procession. As such 
Intellect corresponds to the kūnī of the early Ismaili cosmology, and al-Sijistānī also 
refers to it with the characteristically Ismaili term Precedent (al-sābiq), as well as with 
terms of Quranic origin, such as Throne (‘arsh) or Pen (qalam).139  
To complete the Plotinian trinity of hypostases, from the Intellect emanates the 
Soul (al-nafs), or the Universal Soul (al-nafs al-kulliyya), which is the principle of 
motion in the universe, making it inherently deficient in contrast to the perfect 
tranquility of its source. Despite its movement, it also is eternal, and eternally desires 
to return to the tranquility of its creator. Intellect and Soul together constitute the two 
spiritual roots (aΙlān) of the universe, from which everything else is derived. Soul is 
the spiritual counterpart of Intellect, the qadar of the older cosmology, and for each 
designation employed by al-Sijistānī as a synonym of the Intellect, there is a 
corresponding term for the Soul: the Second (al-thānī), the Follower (al-tālī), the 
Moon, the Footstool (kursī), and the Tablet (lawΗ). 
Still, breaching somewhat the near-complete correspondence of the cosmological 
system with Plotinus, al-Sijistānī preserves the three angelic spiritual entities of old 
Ismaili cosmology, jadd, fatΗ, and khayāl, which emanate from the two higher 
principles completing the spiritual pentad. As for Plotinus, it is from the Soul that 
celestial spheres, nature, and the sublunar world, emanate. And as for Plotinus, for al-
Sijistānī the workings of the sublunar world of generation and corruption are also best 
left to Aristotelian physics.140 
While the lower world, in contrast to the unchanging simplicity of the Intellect, is 
a realm of the ever-changing compounds of the four elements, both spiritual 
hypostases are present there as well. Intellect engenders the Soul, and through the 
Soul it participates in nature and the physical world created by the latter. As the 
Intellect contains the archetypes of all existing things, nature in fact is an embodied 
intellect (‘aql mujassam). Consequently, the material world is not evil in itself in a 
Gnostic sense, even if it is deficient in comparison to its divine archetype. Moreover, 
all entities existing in the sublunar world are hylomorphic compounds of matter and 
form, both of which have their ultimate origin in the Soul. At the top of the terrestrial 
hierarchy is man, whose composition of a spiritual soul and material body makes him 
                                                 
139 Walker 1993, pp. 87-91; Daftary 1990, pp. 242-3. 
140 Daftary 1990, pp. 241-3; Walker 1993, pp. 95-106. Al-Sijistānī has no problem with the scientific 
world-view of the philosophers in the realm of the natural world, since Aristotelian physics is for the 
most part neutral in regard to the truths of revelation. An exception is the claim for the eternity of the 
material world, which al-Sijistānī rejects as contradictory with divine revelation. 
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an intermediary between the spiritual and material worlds, and in whom all of creation 
is contained in a microcosmic form.141 
In the Neoplatonic creation story, creation of the visible world, manifested in the 
Soul’s descent to matter, has its counterpart in the soul’s re-ascent, which completes 
the cycle of creation. In this process man is the means through which the Soul can 
realize this ascent, and therefore becomes the centerpiece of the wider cosmological 
drama.142 The partial souls of men are part of the Universal Soul, and the Soul desires 
to return to the tranquility and perfection of its creator, the Intellect. Therefore the 
ultimate quest of the partial souls in the material world is to attain their intellectual 
perfection by ascending from the level of material and sensible existence and, in the 
end, rejoining the Intellect. All this manifests itself in the ideal of a gradual ascent 
along the ladders of knowledge towards its most profound esoteric forms, so that man 
may ultimately grasp the real intelligible nature of the cosmos behind the veil of its 
material and sensible exterior.143 
Up to this point al-Sijistānī’s thought appears to be in agreement with the 
Peripatetic philosophers. The world is intelligible in its essence, man’s ultimate goal 
is to perfect his intellect through grasping the intelligible nature of the world, and 
even man’s ultimate end in the after-life consists of an intellectual bliss akin to that of 
the philosophers, as al-Sijistānī also refutes resurrection of the body. Since nature is 
an embodied intellect, al-Sijistānī’s cosmology also encourages man to the study of 
nature as the starting point of his intellectual journey. 
Al-Sijistānī’s major divergence with respect to the philosophers, as of Ismailis in 
general, is that he denies the possibility of the human intellect to reach the ultimate 
intelligible knowledge without divine aid. Due to its entanglements in the physical 
world, even the most perfect of human intellects reflects the pure Intellect only in 
part. Hence, the benefits (fawā’id) of the Intellect are transmitted to the human souls 
by means of the divinely supported speaker-prophets, who for al-Sijistānī are 
embodiments of the divine Intellect even more so than nature, and thus convey the 
ultimate esoteric truth to the core of believers through the da‘wa hierarchy.144 
Another major difference between Ismaili Neoplatonism and the Neoplatonism of 
the Greeks and the falāsifa is that in Ismaili Neoplatonism the normally ahistorical 
                                                 
141 Walker 1993, pp. 92, 97, 102-107. While the idea of man as a microcosm is of ancient origin in 
philosophical thought, in the Islamic world it is especially common in Ismaili thought, which in general 
perceives an ontological analogy between different levels of existence. 
142 The question why the Soul would have to descend to the inherently deficient material world in the 
first place concerns all Neoplatonic thought. The standard answer requires the perfectness of being to 
be actualized in full, bringing about its complete hierarchy down to the lowest levels of being, however 
deficient.  
143 Daftary 1990, pp. 244-5; Walker 1993, pp. 107-9. 
144 Walker 1997, pp. 92-3, 107-42. Neoplatonic and Gnostic thought share much with each other, such 
as the idea of generation of the spiritual and material worlds through a hierarchical progression of 
spiritual and material entities, and a strong dualism of material and spiritual spheres. Even the Gnostic 
idea of the generation of the material world due to the “fall” into hubris of a lower divinity is also 
present in Plotinus, where the Soul’s audacity (tolma) to believe itself self-sufficient leads to its descent 
into the material realm. Even after adopting Neoplatonism, Ismailism still retains its character as a 
Gnostic sect in the sense that it is characterized by the idea of saving knowledge (gnōsis), which is 
essential for salvation, and is transmitted to the initiated through the religious hierarchy. Even this idea 
is, to a lesser extent, present in the falsafa as well, as we will see during this study. See, Armstrong 
1992 for a comparison of Gnostic and Neoplatonic dualism. 
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procession of descent and re-ascent of the soul becomes unfolded in cyclical history. 
The Intellect is manifested at each historical moment through the prophets, and 
translated into a law and religion corresponding to the needs of that specific moment. 
The occurrence of historical events in the terrestrial world is further connected to the 
world of the spheres, since the celestial forces play a major role in influencing the 
unfolding of cyclical history. 
This history is divided into the seven eras, five of which are initiated by a 
messenger bringing a new religion, while the qā’im as the last one of them will restore 
the initial antinomian state of the first era of Adam.145 At this eschatological end point 
of history all veils will finally be removed from the full truth, eliminating also the 
need for exoteric religion or law, and the Soul will reunite with the Intellect. Hence, 
for Ismaili Neoplatonism the Neoplatonic reascent of the soul is realized through a 
process of 7000 years of history, where man is at the center of the cosmological 
drama.146 
3.3 Al-Kirmānī  
Many believe al-Kirmānī to be the most important Ismaili philosopher of all times. 
Like most Ismaili philosophers, he continues to enjoy much more than an academic or 
antiquarian interest, as his works are still read as spiritual guides by members of 
modern day Ismaili communities. With respect to the tradition of Ismaili 
Neoplatonism preceding him, especially that of al-Sijistānī, on one level al-Kirmānī 
fully continues it, blending Ismaili doctrine with the philosophical influences. But on 
another level, al-Kirmānī also represents a major doctrinal innovation with respect to 
the preceding tradition, as Ismaili cosmology in particular once again undergoes 
major changes. 
If al-Sijistānī’s Ismaili cosmology with its Plotinian triad of God, Intellect, and 
Soul was rather consonant with Greek Neoplatonism, al-Kirmānī now transforms it to 
conform to the prevailing Arabic Peripateticism of al-Fārābī and his followers, 
thereby showing the clear lines of influence existing between falsafa and Ismaili 
thought.147 In al-Kirmānī the evolution towards a purely philosophical cosmology also 
becomes completed, since the elements of Ismaili mythical cosmology, still present in 
al-Sijistānī, are much less prevalent in his thought. 
Due to the partly Fārābian cosmology adopted by al-Kirmānī, Walker considers 
his philosophy to be an Aristotelian version of Ismailism, in contrast to the 
Neoplatonism of al-Sijistānī, and concludes that the term Neoplatonism should not be 
employed in relation to al-Kirmānī at all.148 Still in al-Kirmānī’s system also the 
world is created through a hierarchical procession of timeless emanation, where each 
                                                 
145 The question of whether or not Adam as the first prophet brought a law was a controversial one 
among the Ismaili authors, related to the accusations of antinomianism. Al-Nasafī held that Adam did 
not bring an exoteric religion, an idea which was refuted by al-Rāzī and again held by al-Sijistānī. See, 
Daftary 1990, pp. 236-9. 
146 Walker 1993, pp. 92-3, 107-113.  
147 It is, however, significant to note that al-Kirmānī’s adoption of Peripatetic cosmology did not 
become universally prevalent among Ismaili thought for a long while. His most important followers 
during the next century, al-Mu’ayyad fī al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī and Nāṣir-i Khosrow, still profess to the 
traditional Neoplatonic triad of God, Intellect, and Soul.  
148 Walker 1993, pp. 35-6 and 168, note 47; Walker 1997, pp. 90-2, 98. In contrast, De Smet has 
assigned the word Neoplatonism to the title of his study on al-Kirmānī. 
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emanated being is inferior to the former in light and perfection. Even more relevant 
for this study, it contains the characteristically Neoplatonic relation between 
cosmology and eschatology, where the creation myth comprises the descent of the 
spiritual entity down to the material existence, and the reascent is bound to man and 
his salvation. As in Ismaili thought in general, in al-Kirmānī also the frustratingly 
complex cosmology serves an ultimately practical purpose, as he is not interested in 
philosophical speculation for its own sake. 
There is almost no knowledge about the life of al-Kirmānī in the contemporary 
sources, and practically everything known about him is therefore derived from the few 
references he makes to his personal life in his own writings. Hence, even his origin 
cannot be known for certain, as his nisba could either mean that he came from the 
Persian province of Kirmān, or that he was active there during his later life. The main 
lines most relevant for contextualizing his thought within the Ismaili tradition are 
known, however. 
Firstly, al-Kirmānī occupied a very high position within the Fatimid da‘wa during 
the rule of the famously unpredictable caliph al-Ḥākim (d. 1021). The Ṭayyibī 
Ismailis of Yemen and India later attributed to him the title Ηujja of the two Iraqs 
(Ζujjat al-‘Irāqayn), or of Iraq and the western Persian lands, which would make him 
the head of Ismaili da‘wa in this area.149 As can be deduced from the titles of his 
works and some passing references, his main area of operation seems to have been 
Iraq, and Baghdad in particular.150 At the end of his life, around year 1015, he was 
summoned to the Fatimid capital of Cairo to act at the direct service of the caliph, 
possibly for the purpose of fighting against the heretical currents of thought within 
Fatimid Ismailis, such as the movement declaring al-Ḥākim’s divinity, which would 
later lead to the genesis of the Druze religion.151 
As for his writings, a considerable number survive and have been edited in recent 
years, but their critical assessment presents numerous problems peculiar to early 
Ismaili literature. Al-Kirmānī’s writings seem to have had almost no influence outside 
the Ismaili community, and it takes almost a century and a half after his death before 
he is mentioned by any non-Ismaili author.152 Al-Kirmānī’s works rather survived 
within the living Ismaili religious tradition, particularly amongst the Ṭayyibīs of 
Yemen and India, who adopted him from the beginning of the 12th century as their 
most important intellectual authority.153 The purpose of these works was to serve the 
da‘wa in the instruction of the Ismaili community, not philosophical speculation or 
dialogue, and it was in this context that al-Kirmānī’s works were transmitted from one 
generation to the next. Due to the peculiar nature of their transmission, and the fact 
that all the surviving manuscripts are relatively recent, there is no way in which to 
                                                 
149 This title is given to al-Kirmānī, for example, in 1682 by the copyist of Rest of the Intellect. See, al-
Kirmānī, RāΗat al-‘aql, p. 591 and Walker 1999, pp. 10-1. 
150 Walker 1999, pp. 10-1. 
151 De Smet 1995, p. 7; Walker 1999, pp. 9-11, 16-24. Even the date of his death is unknown, but must 
be after 1020. Al-Kirmānī dedicated at least one treatise specifically to refute the doctrine of the 
“proto-Druze.” 
152 Walker 1999, pp. 25-6. 
153 For example, around the end of the 18th century, al-Kirmānī’s Rest of the Intellect is mentioned as 
one of the four major spiritual works for the Indian Dā’ūdīs (Ṭayyibīs), together with the Brethren of 
Purity, al-Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān, and al-Shīrāzī. Fyzee 1965, pp. 245-6. 
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reconstruct critical editions of them. It is also difficult to determine a precise relative 
chronology for his works, since many of them contain mutual cross-references, 
implying that they were re-edited at various times.154 
For the purposes of this study the work used to represent his philosophy is his 
major systematic philosophical treatise, the Rest of the Intellect (RāΗat al-‘aql). The 
rest of his works may be divided, following De Smet, into three categories: 
philosophical, dogmatic, and polemical.155 Of the other philosophical works, Book of 
the Meadows (Kitāb al-riyāΕ) is devoted to philosophical discussions of the previous 
generations of Ismaili philosophy, while the remaining minor treatises are devoted to 
single, mainly metaphysical, problems also discussed in Rest of the Intellect. The so-
called dogmatic works are relevant especially for al-Kirmānī’s political thought, as 
they treat in more detail the questions of prophecy and the imamate.156 
The remaining works are polemics against various currents of thought or single 
authors, such as the philosophers or Mu‘tazilī theologians. While they are helpful for 
contextualizing his thought within the wider intellectual history of the period, they are 
not especially relevant for this particular study. In any case the scholarship concerning 
al-Kirmānī is still in its early stages, and there still has been no attempt at a holistic 
interpretation of his thought based on all his surviving works. 
Of all his works, Rest of the Intellect is the most philosophical in style, 
methodology and content. It is the only work that discusses systematically the whole 
of his philosophical system, starting out from metaphysics, and proceeding through 
physical world to human soul and political philosophy, resembling quite closely in 
arrangement al-Fārābī’s political treatises. Al-Kirmānī’s complex cosmology is a 
combination of Ismaili tradition and Fārābian cosmology. As such it represents the 
other major cosmological variant in Ismaili philosophy, besides the Plotinian, which 
was prevalent among Ismaili philosophers both immediately before and after al-
Kirmānī. 
In contrast to the Peripatetics, and following his Ismaili predecessors, God is not 
an intellect, substance, or a necessary being, but completely transcends both existence 
and non-existence, and consequently all categories of human thought. Intellect as the 
first perfect being does not emanate from God in involuntary emanation of His being 
(fayΕ), but is created by God through eternal, active origination (ibdā‘) out of 
nothing. 157  However, al-Kirmānī departs from his predecessors in denying any 
separate existence as an intermediate entity to the divine commandment, for he 
conceives it as a violation against the ultimate goal of preserving the absolute unity of 
God (tawΗīd).158 For al-Kirmānī also, it is the Intellect that is properly speaking the 
                                                 
154 De Smet 1995, pp. 8-14; Walker 1997, pp. 24-8, 30-4. 
155 De Smet 1995, pp. 14-6. 
156 Among these noteworthy is particularly al-MaΙābīΗ fī ithbāt al-imāma (Lights on the Establishment 
of the Imamate). 
157 Ibdā‘ does not mean creation in time in Ismaili philosophy, but “eternal Existentiation,” in Corbin’s 
(1957, p. 35) terminology. Ibn Sīnā (Fī al-Ηudūd, p. 101) defines it as “origination of a thing from 
nothing without an intermediary” (ta’sīs al-shay’ lā ‘an shay’ wa-lā bi-wāsiΛat al-shay’). Al-Kirmānī 
contrasts it explicitly with the emanation of philosophers, apparently emphasizing its ex nihilo nature 
versus the flowing of God’s being through emanation. Still the term abda‘a is also used by Peripatetics 
like Ibn Sīnā to describe God’s creation. According to al-Kirmānī the exact nature of ibdā‘ cannot be 
known by man. 
158 See Walker 1997, pp. 83-9. 
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God of the revelation, the God of which something may be said or known, the Gnostic 
“demiurge,” or creator of all existent beings in the sense of the Aristotelian First 
Mover. It is from the Intellect that the emanative process of timeless creation 
(inbi‘āth) of the universe starts, producing in descending steps of perfection the 
pleroma of nine lower Intellects adopted from al-Fārābī, as well as the corresponding 
planetary spheres: the outermost sphere of spheres (falak al-aflāk), the sphere of the 
fixed stars, and those of the seven planets.159  
Al-Kirmānī also binds his essentially Peripatetic cosmology to the Ismaili 
tradition, for he employs alongside Peripatetic cosmological terminology traditional 
Ismaili cosmological terms, such as the pairs of Pen (qalam) and Tablet (lawΗ), 
Throne (‘arsh) and Footstool (kursī), Precedent (al-sābiq) and Follower (al-tālī), and 
First and Second, as well as the seven heavenly letters (al-Ηurūf al-‘ulwiyya), even if 
they now refer to different cosmological entities than they did for al-Sijistānī. In al-
Kirmānī’s novel Peripatetic cosmology the first part of the couple still refers to the 
Intellect as the active and perfect first principle, while the place of the Soul seems to 
be taken by the Second Intellect, which resembles the Universal Soul in its lower 
emanative aspect. 
It seems to be only the Third Intellect that truly introduces the element of 
imperfection, and consequent descent to nature and matter, to the perfection of the 
first two Intellects, and therefore more properly occupies the position of the latter part 
of the couple.160 The seven heavenly letters in turn refer to the seven lower Intellects 
and planetary spheres, which retain their original function as mediators between man 
and the spiritual world.  
All of the intellects and spheres play their part in the demiurgy of the sublunar 
material world. The Third Intellect is also called Prime Matter (al-hayūlā al-ūlā), and 
is the principle for the existence of the corporeal world, although the Platonic forms as 
paradigms of corporeal existents are first formed in the First, and distributed through 
the Second until the Tenth Intellect, from which the material world is actually 
emanated. While it is the Tenth Intellect that directly governs the material world, the 
planetary spheres act as its intermediaries in both its creation and governance.161 By 
their aid the ascending complexity of the material world is created from the four 
elements upwards, and is arranged into the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms, with 
man as their culmination. As for al-Sijistānī, the material world in itself operates in an 
essentially Aristotelian fashion.162 
                                                 
159 See, RāΗa, pp. 86-91 for al-Kirmānī’s own summary of the metaphysical part of his work and 
Walker 1997, pp. 83-98. 
160 Ibid. There is an apparent confusion here in al-Kirmānī. In Rest of the Intellect he claims both the 
First and Second Intellect to be Pen, while the Second is also called Tablet at another point, as is the 
Third. In al-Risāla al-WaΕī‘a, the First is the Pen and the Second is the Tablet. Since the Second 
Intellect is said to be like the First in its perfection, and it is the Third that it is the principle of the 
bodily sphere and prime matter, it would appear to be the most logical candidate to occupy the position 
of passivity related to the second part of the couplet. In later variations of Ismaili philosophy, Third is 
also referred to as the Spiritual Adam (al-Ādam al-rūΗānī), the Gnostic demiurge, which introduces the 
hubris that conduces to its fall to the material realm. Interestingly this Spiritual Adam also appears in 
the Brethren of Purity. See Walker 1997, pp. 97-8 for a discussion of the contradiction and Corbin 
1957, pp. 37-41. 
161 Sun and Moon, and the corresponding Seventh and Tenth Intellects, especially play a major part in 
governance of the material world and its generation.  
162 De Smet 1995, pp. 311-27.  
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The influence of the higher world on the terrestrial world is not limited to its 
creation. On the contrary, the totality of the Intellects, mediated by the related astral 
bodies, continuously play such a major role on the events of the material world, that it 
becomes almost completely determined by them. This is partly in agreement with 
Peripatetic philosophy, where the providence of the Intellect guides the existents of 
the lower world. Hence, it helps them to develop towards their respective perfections 
and arranges them in a harmonious and rational manner as a reflection of the wisdom 
of the Intellect. What is more typical to Ismaili philosophy specifically, is the 
importance of the influences (āthār) of astral bodies in determining events of the 
terrestrial world, and the consequent importance given to astrology, which was 
regarded rather lightly by many Peripatetic philosophers.163 
It is also from the Intellect, mediated by the Sun as the central astral body, that the 
souls come to the lower world.164 Unlike in al-Sijistānī or Plotinus, for al-Kirmānī, the 
souls in the lower world no longer form part of a larger spiritual entity called 
Universal Soul, but are an effect of the Intellect, that represents the luminous presence 
of the spiritual world in the corporeal world and give life and form to its beings. All 
beings of the material world are ensouled to some extent, and share the desire to 
return to their spiritual origin. This is the ultimate goal of all existents, or their second 
perfection (al-kamāl al-thānī) in Aristotelian terminology, and all beings in the 
terrestrial hierarchy strive towards it in their own way through approaching the 
Intellect to the greatest extent possible, and professing the Oneness of God (tawΗīd). 
But only man as a microcosm and the culmination of terrestrial hierarchy has the 
potential to be completely reunited with the Intellect, through leading the highest, 
rational part of his soul from passivity to actuality. It is this that is the final goal of 
human existence, or his ultimate happiness, to become a completely actualized 
intellect, forming part of the world of the Intellects, and becoming a microcosm 
(‘ālam Ιaghīr) fully reflecting the perfection of the macrocosm.165  
As in all Neoplatonism, the attainment of human perfection is intimately bound to 
the wider cosmological drama. It is through the actualization of human intellect and 
its reunion with the spiritual realm that creation is brought to its completion. As in 
previous Ismaili Neoplatonism, in al-Kirmānī also this process is bound to a historical 
process of seven consecutive cycles. In order for man to become fully actualized, he 
needs to actualize both the theoretical part of his intellect through knowledge and the 
practical part through moral purification. 
However, unlike for the Peripatetics, even the most perfect of men is not capable 
of achieving this alone. The terrestrial presence of the fully actualized Intellect, 
incarnated in the divinely supported prophets and imams, is required for the 
actualization of human intellect. It is then the instruction (ta‘līm) provided by these 
incarnations of the Intellect, through the intermediary of the ladders of da‘wa 
                                                 
163 De Smet 1995, pp. 335-50. As De Smet notes, even the Peripatetics do not deny the influence of the 
astral bodies as such, but only their arbitrary effects. Al-Fārābī in particular criticized the use of 
astrological calculations of, for example, certain planetary conjunctions to explain contingent events of 
the terrestrial world. See, Fakhry 2002, pp. 42-4. 
164 In both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity, the Sun plays a role in governing the psychic and the 
Moon the corporeal sphere. Such “solar theology” has a long history, and appears in Greek 
Neoplatonism, as well as the Arabic Hermetic corpus. See, De Smet 1995, pp. 335-42. 
165 De Smet 1995, pp. 312, 327-55. 
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hierarchy, that adopts the position of direct emanation of Active Intellect in 
Peripatetic thought.166 In practice for an Ismaili initiate the way towards perfection 
forms a spiritual road, which consists of ascending grades of theoretical (al-‘ibāda al-
‘ilmiyya) and practical (al-‘ibāda al-‘amaliyya) worship, as they are called in Ismaili 
terminology. 
3.4 Brethren of Purity 
The Epistles (Rasā’il) of the anonymous group of authors known as the Brethren of 
Purity (Ikhwān al-Θafā’) form the other major source used in this study to represent 
Ismaili philosophy.167 While the exact nature of the relationship of the Brethren of 
Purity to the Ismaili movement is problematic, at the very least they are influenced by 
Ismaili thought. But, in contrast to al-Kirmānī and the other philosopher-dā‘īs, it is 
highly unlikely that they would represent the official doctrine of Ismailism. The 
nature of the Epistles is extremely secretive and enigmatic, and hence there remains a 
multitude of unresolved questions regarding it. In fact these questions have aroused 
such curiosity among scholars during the last two centuries that the majority of 
research has concentrated on answering them, rather than on the actual substance of 
their philosophy. 
The two major enigmas concerning the Brethren are the interrelated issues of the 
dating of the epistles and the identity of their authors. In addition there are several 
minor problems, such as the exact number of the epistles, the manner of their 
arrangement and possible later editing, or the relative chronology of the epistles. 
There will be no attempt to resolve these questions here, although they will be 
discussed to the extent that they are relevant for this study. However, since the 
question of the Ismaili nature of the epistles is of obvious importance given the 
starting point of this study, it will be treated in more detail, and an effort will be made 
to support the view shared by the majority of scholars, that the authors of the Epistles 
were affiliated to Ismailism in one way or another. 
Due to the ambiguous nature of the Brethren of Purity I have chosen to discuss 
them only after al-Kirmānī, despite the fact that in all probability the Epistles are 
chronologically prior to him, and would hence represent an earlier stage of 
development within Ismaili thought. It is much easier to assess the degree of their 
Ismaili affiliations against the background of al-Kirmānī’s undisputedly orthodox 
Fatimid Ismailism. 
                                                 
166 De Smet 1995, pp. 352-68. At least in some later Ismaili forms of the cosmology of ten Intellects, 
the seven lower Intellects and seven cycles are bound together. The realm of the Intellects represents 
eternal time. The whole cosmological drama consists of the “fall” and “redemption” of the Third 
Intellect, and it takes the “time” of the emanation of the seven lower Intellects for it to redeem itself. 
This is the spiritual archetype of the seven historical cycles of terrestrial time, consumed by the 
historical process of redemption. Corbin 1957, pp. 39-41.  
167 Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Θafā’ wa-Khillān al-Wafā’. There is as yet no critical edition of 
the entire Epistles, although there is one in preparation in the series recently initiated by the Institute of 
Ismaili Studies. A critical edition will hopefully alleviate especially the problem of possible later 
interpolations within the Epistles, as the existing printed editions are based on rather late manuscripts. 
See, Poonawala 2008 and Hamdani 2008, pp. 92ff. 
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The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity consist of 52 treatises, which are divided 
into four sections. 168  These are the 14 mathematical (riyāΕiyya ta‘līmiyya), 17 
physical (jismāniyya Λabī‘iyya), 10 psychical-intelligible (nafsāniyya ‘aqliyya), and 11 
political-religious (nāmūsiyya ilāhiyya/shar‘iyya dīniyya) epistles. The actual reality 
of their arrangement and content does not always conform to this neat division, 
probably because they were re-edited, arranged, and moved during a period of time, 
and the end result did not completely conform to the original plan.169 Still, the epistles 
form a rather coherent philosophical compendium that goes through all the branches 
of philosophical knowledge in a carefully arranged manner. The precise nature of this 
arrangement, and the pedagogical ideas and conception of knowledge underlying it, is 
of central importance for this study, and will be treated in more detail in the later 
chapters. 
The actual contents of the epistles are an interesting variety of philosophy and 
philosophical argumentation, mixed with a great number of edifying stories, as well as 
prophetic citations used to support their views. The term that has been most widely 
used to describe the epistles is eclectic, as the philosophical, religious, and other 
sources used by them pertain to a very wide spectrum of thought. First of all, there is 
the Greek philosophical and scientific material, and, unlike most Ismaili philosophers, 
the Brethren acknowledge their Greek influences by name. Of these the standard 
sources of Arabic philosophy, Aristotle and Neoplatonism, play a major part, as do 
Plato and Socrates, the latter mostly as an exemplary figure represented in the often 
repeated story of his death. 
In addition, however, they portray a much greater influence than usual of 
Pythagoreanism, visible especially in the importance given to numbers and numerical 
relations as underlying all existence, and of the so-called Hermetic corpus, which is, 
however, not always easily distinguishable from Neoplatonism. They also employ 
various Greek scientific authorities, such as Ptolemy or Euclid. Marquet believes the 
Greek influence to be mediated by the Sabians of Ḥarrān, who would essentially 
determine their understanding of Greek philosophy and the prominence of 
Pythagorean and Hermetic ideas in their doctrine.170 While the Brethren do not refer 
to Arabic philosophers by name, al-Fārābī at least seems to be an influence.171 
Besides the philosophical-scientific stratum, there are also the religious Islamic, 
Christian and Judaic, and popular Persian and Indian influences, visible especially in 
the stories. Of all these the Brethren clearly aspire to form a synthesis, in which the 
                                                 
168 While this is the actual number of epistles in the manuscripts and printed editions, in fact there 
probably should be only 51, which is what the Epistles themselves and many contemporary authors 
mostly state their number to be. Marquet believes the excess and out of place epistle to be the 
penultimate, 51st. epistle, while Abouzeid, for example, argues that all of them are original, even if the 
initial plan was to write only 51 epistles. The Comprehensive Epistle (al-Risāla al-jāmi‘a, p. 537) states 
the number as 52 and proceeds to summarize all of them, although it postpones the 45th. epistle until 
the very end, and hence confuses the numbering. Marquet 1973, pp. 10-11; Abouzeid 1987, pp. 172-84. 
169 Both Marquet (1973, pp. 10-14) and Abouzeid (1987, pp. 184-202) are convinced that the epistles 
were not written in their present order, and attempt to reconstruct a relative chronology with largely 
similar results. 
170 See, Marquet 1973, pp. 21-31 for his view of the sources used by the Brethren. 
171 This is the conclusion of Abouzeid’s (1987) dissertation comparing the political philosophies of al-
Fārābī and the Brethren of Purity. Taking into account the possibility of a lengthy period of 
composition of the Epistles, it could of course also be the case that it was the Brethren who influenced 
al-Fārābī. 
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ultimate truth behind all the philosophical and prophetic wisdom of the previous 
centuries is revealed. 
Besides the actual 52 epistles there is yet another epistle, called the 
Comprehensive Epistle (al-Risāla al-Jāmi‘a), that in its two extensive volumes 
summarizes one by one all of the preceding epistles.172 While there has been some 
doubt as to its authorship, it is now rather generally acknowledged as having been 
written by the same authors as the original epistles, as it is quite uniform with them 
both in content and style, and the original epistles anticipate it repeatedly.173 The 
Comprehensive Epistle is more than just a summary of the previous epistles, however, 
and it is clearly more esoteric in nature than the original ones, and more oriented 
towards the afterlife as the goal of human existence. Its self-declared purpose is to 
reveal the ultimate truth and furthest mysteries behind each of the treatises that were 
only alluded to in the original epistles, rather than summarize precisely their doctrinal 
content. In a way the 52 epistles act as an introduction to it, and the Comprehensive 
Epistle repeatedly emphasizes that it should not be read before one has mastered the 
original treatises. All in all it is very important for understanding the nature of the 
epistles in general, and for this study in particular.174 
The main lines of the philosophical system presented in the epistles conform to 
Plotinian Neoplatonism. Hence, among the two main cosmological varieties present in 
early Arabic philosophy, the Brethren go together with al-Sijistānī, rather than the 
Peripatetics and al-Kirmānī. At the top of the emanative process of creation is the 
Plotinian triad of God, (Universal) Intellect and (Universal) Soul, from which emanate 
the six further levels of existence: Prime Matter (al-hayūlā al-ūlā), Nature (al-Λabī‘a), 
Absolute Body (al-jism al-muΛlaq), Sphere (falak), Four Elements (arkān), and the 
Generated Beings (muwalladāt). The nine levels of being are equated with the nine 
numbers, manifesting the Pythagorean notions underlying the Brethren’s thought 
throughout, and the related need to find a correspondence between ultimate and 
mathematical reality.175 
In contrast to the general Neoplatonic idea of creation, there is, however, a breach 
in the process between the spiritual and material realms. After the timeless and pre-
eternal emanation of the spiritual world down to Prime Matter, the material world 
from Nature downwards is created gradually in time, which in itself comes to being 
only through the movement of the spheres. This is probably because the Brethren 
vehemently oppose the doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity, professed by most 
Aristotelian philosophers.176 Cosmologically the universe may be divided into three 
                                                 
172 Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, al-Risāla al-jāmi‘a. 
173 See, e.g., Netton 1983, pp. 2-3. In contrast, the so-called Risālat jāmi‘at al-jāmi‘a is not mentioned 
in the epistles, and seems to be a later summary, since the Comprehensive Epistle with its 542 pages of 
the printed edition does not accomplish this function in a very convenient way. 
174 The scholarship on the Brethren has dealt surprisingly little with the Comprehensive Epistle, often 
even tending to completely ignore it. Hence, there is no comprehensive study of the relationship 
between it and the other epistles. 
175 See, Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 341-2. With the exception of Absolute Body, all nine are present in 
Plotinus. However, the Brethren seem to give them an independent status as hypostases. Still, for the 
Brethren as for Plotinus Nature, for example, is the lower manifestation or faculty of the Soul, and 
matter, which is absolute non-being for Plotinus, has similar characteristics in the Brethren. 
176 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (32), pp. 196-8; Jāmi‘a, pp. 482-6; Marquet 1973, pp. 41-2. The Brethren 
distinguish between eternal time (dahr) and physical time (zamān) in their account of creation, the 
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spheres: at the top is the purely spiritual world, in the middle the partly spiritual and 
partly material world of spheres (‘ālam al-aflāk), and at the bottom the material world 
of darkness.177 
As in all Neoplatonism, the cosmology is bound to eschatology: the Soul’s desire 
to reascend to its source in the Intellect reflects the partial souls’ quest to purify their 
souls. Through moral purification and intellectual perfection, to which the epistles 
themselves promise to be the ultimate guide, man must free himself of his material 
chains, accept the emanations of the Intellect and reascend to its level, and thereby 
return to his original home in the spiritual world. To attain this goal is actually the 
motive for the writing of the epistles in the first place, something that is emphasized 
throughout them, and in the Comprehensive Epistle in particular. To this end is also 
bound the name by which the anonymous authors call themselves – and those like 
them. They are the Brethren of Purity and Friends of Loyalty (Ikhwān al-Θafā’ wa-
Khillān al-Wafā’), who have purified their souls and attained true knowledge. 
For the Brethren the ascent of the particular souls is gradual. At the end of the 
descent, all the faculties of the Universal Soul, including embodied particular souls, 
are gathered at the center of earth, which is the lowest depth of the material world. 
Due to the “original sin” of Adam the particular souls were banished from paradise, 
that is, the spiritual world, and descended towards the center of the material world, 
inhabiting its bodies and immersed in the depths of matter. The actual ascent of the 
souls is temporal, culminating at the apocalyptic event of greater resurrection and the 
destruction of the material world, when the faculties of the Universal Soul reunite to 
re-ascend to the spiritual world. The virtuous human souls hence rise from the 
material world, through the world of spheres, up to the spiritual world, with Intellect 
as its upper limit. As in Ismaili philosophy in general, man again appears as the 
ultimate goal of creation, through which the cosmic cycle of history is completed.178 
The two questions concerning the dating of the epistles and the identification of 
the authors go hand in hand, and both probably can receive only indefinite answers. 
Various methods have been employed to arrive at a more precise dating, such as the 
astronomical conjunctions mentioned in the text, quotations of known poets, or 
presumed references to major historical events. Still, the estimates have varied 
anywhere between the late 9th and early 11th centuries.179 
A very early date, such as that of Hamdani at the decades before the establishment 
of Fatimid caliphate in 909, is improbable, assuming, for example, al-Fārābī (d. 950) 
as an influence on the work, as he seems to be, or the quotation of the poem of al-
Mutanabbī (d. 965) as authentic. The latest estimates, like those of Casanova at 1021-
                                                                                                                                            
former pertaining to the spiritual world. In fact there is slight inconsistency in the Brethren as to the 
doctrine of emanation already in the first step, since they also want to preserve God’s omnipotence and 
active will. Hence they also describe the act of creation through God’s commandment (amr) and word 
Be! (kun) as an act of His volition (irāda), rather than something flowing from His essence 
automatically. Parallels to Ismaili cosmology, such as that of al-Sijistānī or Nāṣir-i Khosrow, are again 
apparent, where both amr and kun are also incorporated into Neoplatonic cosmology. See, Marquet 
1973, pp. 56-60. 
177 Marquet 1973, p. 46. 
178 Marquet 1973, pp. 205-7. 
179 That is among datings based on “scholarly” argumentation. Some of the attributions to Ismaili 
imams would locate them even as early as the late 8th century. 
 55
37 based on astronomical conjunctions, are equally unlikely, because the work was 
known at least in some form to Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (d. 1001) and his pupil al-
Tawḥīdī (d. 1023) in the 980s, according to the account of the latter. To complicate 
the matter even more Marquet also proposes a very long period of editing lasting over 
most of the 10th century, with various generations of authors and editors.180 
While for the purposes of the present study it is sufficient to date the work to the 
general philosophical climate of the 10th century, the most probable date for its 
composition falls between 950s and 980s, or between the active years of al-Fārābī and 
Ibn Sīnā, bearing in mind, however, the possibility of a longer period of editing. This 
period between the two famous Peripatetic philosophers, vividly portrayed by 
Kraemer as the intellectual “renaissance” of Buyid Iraq, would provide a suitable 
context for the philosophical-religious group described in the Epistles. Hence, the 
circle of the Brethren of Purity in Basra is set by Kraemer alongside other 
philosophical and theological groupings booming in Baghdad at the time.181 
A question that is more relevant here is that of the identity of the authors and 
especially their doctrinal affiliation. The first to mention the epistles is the philosopher 
Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī who attributes them to a single person called Abū 
Sulaymān al-Maqdisī, whereas his pupil al-Tawḥīdī names a group of people in Baṣra 
as authors, mentioning some by name, including al-Maqdisī.182 Neither relates the 
Brethren to any particular sect, even if al-Tawḥīdī perceives their doctrine as 
heretical.183 Al-Tawḥīdī’s account was rather widely held in medieval times among 
non-Ismaili authors, and among modern scholars it has been both accepted and 
rejected. 
As for locating the Brethren to Baṣra, this receives additional support from the 
epistles, which contain many references that would make an Iraqi-Persian 
environment probable, and there is a rather wide scholarly consensus on this issue.184 
Attempts to attribute the epistles to a single, specific individual have also been rather 
unsuccessful, and there does not seem to be any reason to reject al-Tawḥīdī’s claim of 
group authorship. 
From the accounts of al-Sijistānī and al-Tawḥīdī, the Brethren of Purity appear as 
a an enigmatic society of individuals in Baṣra who hold sessions (majālis) discussing 
mainly philosophical themes, and attempt to divulge their “esoteric” doctrine, related 
in particular to the salvation of the soul and reconciliation of philosophy with 
religious law, through their epistles. It further appears that their doctrines were 
considered as suspect by their contemporaries, even by philosophers, including al-
Sijistānī and al-Tawḥīdī themselves. Still, some of the members of the Brethren of 
Purity did frequent the same intellectual circles as al-Tawḥīdī, and were personally 
known to him.185 Since the names on al-Tawḥīdī’s list are fairly unknown in external 
                                                 
180 Marquet 1973, p. 8. Hamdani 1996 and Abouzeid 1987, pp. 283-309 summarize the views of the 
dating of the epistles in both medieval Arabic and modern scholarly literature. 
181 Kraemer 1992, pp. 165-78. 
182 For the philosophical circle of al-Sijistānī as portrayed by al-Tawḥīdī in general, as well as their 
relations with and perceptions of the members of the Brethren of Purity in particular, see Kraemer 
1992, pp. 139-78 and Kraemer 1986. 
183 Al-Sijistānī, Θiwān al-Ηikma, p. 361; al-Tawḥīdī, Al-imtā‘ wa-´l-mu’ānasa, pp. 219-20. 
184 Daftary 2008, p. xv. 
185 Kraemer 1992, pp. 165-78. 
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sources, even accepting the account still allows various theories for their doctrinal 
affiliation. While the Brethren have been variously related to Mu‘tazilī theologians, 
Sufis and twelver Shiis, the Ismaili theory of authorship has received by far the most 
support among scholars.186 
It was the Ismailis themselves who first claimed the Brethren as their own, 
although it seems to have taken more than a century for them to fully adopt them, at 
least according to the surviving sources. The epistles were first mentioned by the 
Syrian Nizārīs at the end of the 11th century, attributed to various dā‘īs operating 
under the hidden imam Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl or his son ‘Abd Allāh. A century later 
they were also incorporated to the Ṭayyibī literature in Yemen, and later India. The 
Ismaili sources have been very divergent, however, in the more precise identification 
of the authors, naming various dā‘īs or imams as candidates.187 
The fact that the Ismailis embraced the epistles as their own is in itself an 
argument for their Ismaili character, since at least it shows that there was sufficient 
doctrinal familiarity for this to happen. But, on the other hand, Fatimid authors like al-
Kirmānī never mention them at the time when they were already fairly well-known 
among non-Ismaili authors. In fact, until recently it has appeared that the Epistles had 
no influence whatsoever on Ismailism until much later.188 
According to Baffioni, however, it seems likely that the Brethren did influence 
Fatimid Ismaili authors despite the fact they do not refer to them explicitly. Even al-
Kirmānī appears to have drawn from the Epistles for inspiration, although the 
parallels between al-Kirmānī and the Brethren remain on a more general level. Nāṣir-i 
Khosrow, writing about half a century later, however, goes as far as directly 
translating passages from the Brethren in his Jāmi‘at al-Ζikmatayn (The Compendium 
of Two Wisdoms). Insofar as the Ismailis had a tendency to mainly quote authors of 
their own persuasion, this would suggest a much more intimate link between the 
Brethren and the Fatimid Ismailis than what has been previously assumed.189 
The presence of Ismaili ideas in the epistles is sufficiently evident that practically 
all modern scholars have accepted at least some level of Ismaili influence in them. 
Still, again at a more precise level of identification there has been a great variety of 
views. The most cautious, such as Tibawi, Nasr, Lewis, or Netton, while admitting 
Ismailism as an influence, possibly merely as one among many, do not see there to be 
enough evidence to label the Brethren definitively as Ismailis.190 
Others have been more confident in positioning them precisely within the context 
of Ismaili thought. Stern believes that the Brethren, whom he identifies with the list 
given by al-Tawḥīdī, are affiliated with the Ismailis, but that their doctrine is of their 
own elaboration, and as such not harmonious with orthodox Ismaili views.191 Daftary 
                                                 
186 Tibawi 1976, Abouzeid 1987, pp. 212-82, and Daftary 2008 present summaries for the history of the 
distinct theories of authorship. Among modern authors Awa (1948, pp. 48-9) identifies them as close to 
the Mu‘tazilites and Nasr (1964, pp. 25-33) as close to Sufis, although recognizing the Ismaili 
connection. 
187 Abouzeid 1987, pp. 254-6; Daftary 1990, p. 248. As an example, the manuscript of the 
Comprehensive Epistle edited by Muṣṭafā Ghālib, himself an Ismaili, is attributed to the “concealed” 
imam Aḥmad Ibn ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ismā‘īl. 
188 See, e.g., Daftary 1990, p. 248. 
189 See, e.g., Baffioni 2008a and 2008b. 
190 Lewis 1975, p. 17; Tibawi 1976, p. 166; Nasr 1964, pp. 25ff.; Netton 1980. 
191 Stern 1964, pp. 417ff. 
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claims the epistles to be definitely non-Fatimid, representing rather another non-
Persian current of Ismaili Neoplatonism, and associates them with the Qarmatian 
community influential in Baṣra at the time.192 This view is further supported by the 
contemporary account of the Mu‘tazilite theologian ‘Abd al-Jabbār who relates the 
group loosely to the Qarmatians.193 Marquet, on the contrary, believes the epistles to 
represent the early orthodox Fatimid doctrine. According to him the authors clearly 
pertained to the top of the Ismaili hierarchy, and the work was probably at least 
sanctioned by the imams, if not written by them.194 More recently, Baffioni has also 
suggested that the Brethren might be dā‘īs propagating the Fatimid cause.195 
Marquet is the one who has most vigorously endorsed the Ismailism of the 
Brethren of Purity, providing arguments both for their general Ismaili and specifically 
Fatimid character. Some of the latter often involve interpreting ambiguous statements 
as allegorical references to specific historical events, such as the founding of the 
Fatimid caliphate in 909, and are not particularly convincing. As for generic Ismaili 
features, according to Marquet all of the doctrines presented in the epistles are also 
found in the writings of one Ismaili author or another. Some of the characteristically 
Ismaili doctrines apparently missing from the epistles, such as the da‘wa hierarchy, 
are explained by him through the general character of the work, which targets an 
audience going beyond the Ismailis. 
Among the major Ismaili characteristics mentioned is the importance given to 
astrology, and historical cycles determined by astronomical conjunctions, an idea that, 
according to him, is present only in Ismaili thought. While the Brethren puzzlingly 
never mention the Ismailis by name, Marquet interprets one of the doctrinal groups in 
the epistle dealing with Islamic sects to refer to them. Furthermore, he also views the 
number and letter symbolism prevalent in the epistles as yet another sign of their 
Ismaili character.196 Baffioni further supports the Brethren’s Ismaili affiliations by 
noting that they clearly perceive questions related to the figure of the Prophet and his 
succession from a Shii perspective, while discarding the idea of the “hidden imam.”197 
As for Marquet’s arguments that the epistles represent Fatimid orthodoxy, he also 
claims that the fact that such Ismaili contemporaries as al-Sijistānī or al-Qāḍī al-
Nu‘mān never mention the Brethren of Purity, demonstrates that they considered them 
as correct, and accordingly saw no need to refute them.198 It seems much more likely 
that either the epistles were completely unknown to these authors, or that they 
considered them irrelevant. The epistles therefore might represent some divergent 
form of Ismaili thought, along the lines of the views of Stern and Daftary, even if they 
also appear to have had some impact on later Fatimid authors. 
As we have seen, there always was more than one form of Ismaili thought even 
within the Fatimid context, and it is mainly the Fatimid sources that have survived 
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from this early period. Clearly, however, the Brethren themselves also play an active 
part in formulating a synthesis of distinct philosophical and religious elements, rather 
than merely reproduce a doctrine of a religious sect. But still the Ismaili influences are 
sufficiently widespread that the epistles may be called Ismaili philosophy in the 
context of this study, even if their Ismailism is rather unorthodox in comparison with 
the official Fatimid creed voiced by the likes of al-Kirmānī. 
Against this background the philosophical system of the Brethren may be 
contrasted with the Peripatetic tradition. In fact, while holding ancient philosophy in 
high esteem, the Brethren are extremely critical towards contemporary 
philosophers.199 Doctrinally the cosmology presented in the epistles is not that of the 
Peripatetics, but is relatively close to al-Sijistānī, according a major role to astral 
bodies in demiurgy of the material world and determination of earthly events, as is 
common in Ismaili philosophy. Like al-Sijistānī, the Brethren also employ Ismaili 
terminology at times when speaking of the highest pair of hypostases, Intellect and 
Soul, referring to them as the two roots (aΙlān), the Precedent (al-sābiq) and Follower 
(al-tālī), Throne (‘arsh) and Footstool (kursī), or Pen (qalam) and Tablet (lawΗ). 
While Netton finds it strange that the doctrine of the imamate does not appear 
prominent in the epistles, imams are discussed at times, even if the focus is more in 
the salvation of the individual. In the context of prophethood and the imamate, the 
Brethren do resort to distinctly Ismaili terms at times, such as the “master of the age” 
(ΙāΗib al-zamān) or the “speaker-prophet” (al-nāΛiq).200 
The epistles are also throughout more eschatologically oriented than Peripatetic 
philosophy. The ultimate goal of the epistles is to attain salvation through moral and 
intellectual purification. In the epistles this is not merely an individual ahistorical 
quest, but it focuses around messianic anticipation of the day of resurrection (qiyāma), 
an apocalyptic event that is also called the second creation (al-nash’a al-ukhrā/al-
thāniya), taking place at the appearance of the “pure soul” (al-nafs al-zakiyya), both 
of which are terms employed by al-Kirmānī.201  
The human history culminating in the resurrection is divided into cycles of 
occultation (dawr al-satr) and manifestation (dawr al-kashf), when the true realities 
are either hidden or revealed. Furthermore, ultimate knowledge is manifested in seven 
virtuous men or prophets, who appear at seven points in time, each initiating a new 
cycle, and bringing a religion (sharī‘a) that abrogates (naskh) that of his predecessor. 
The seventh of these appears at the end of time combining the knowledge of his six 
                                                 
199 Despite naming a multitude of Greek philosophers and scientists, they never do this for Arabic 
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201 See, Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 75 and al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 582-3. 
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predecessors, and through him the world is brought to its perfection, whereby creation 
finally returns its full cycle to the beginning. This seventh leader is the master of the 
pure brethren (sayyid ikhwān al-Ιafā’). 202 
All this together more than vaguely recalls the Ismaili doctrine, although the 
Brethren’s refusal to consistently employ explicitly Ismaili terminology is puzzling. 
The enigmatic nature could be explained by the proselytizing goals of the epistles in a 
hostile environment. The epistles were devised in Iraq, rather than in the Fatimid 
lands, where the Ismaili missionary zeal had to be veiled to prevent the hostility of the 
Sunni populace. An alternative explanation would be that the epistles aspire for an 
audience transcending the Ismailis, as suggested already by Marquet, thus presenting 
the Ismaili doctrine in non-Ismaili terms. 
However, the precise affiliation of the Brethren of Purity to the Ismaili movement 
still remains unclear. Their variety of Ismailism must be considered highly peculiar, 
and their affiliation to the Ismailis should also not be over-emphasized. In the end, 
they may best be viewed as a group of philosophically-minded individuals promoting 
their own idea of philosophy, religion, and virtuous brotherhood as a path to salvation, 
merging the philosophical and Ismaili ideas current at their time into their own 
peculiar doctrine. 
3.5 Methodology of Ismaili philosophy 
Another level where the thought of the Brethren converges to a large degree with al-
Kirmānī is what may be called the methodology of Ismaili philosophy. While 
demonstrative argumentation as the principle method of philosophy is also used by 
Ismaili philosophers, there are also other means for acquisition of knowledge 
characteristic to Ismaili thought. These so-called methods reflect a more profound 
difference between Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy, especially in regard to what is 
considered to be the source of philosophical knowledge. 
De Smet identifies two such methods in al-Kirmānī, that are closely related to each 
other and characteristic of Ismaili thought in general. The first is ta’wīl, or the 
principle of allegorical interpretation, by which the ultimate esoteric (bāΛin) truths are 
supposedly drawn from exoteric (Νāhir) knowledge. The second is the so-called 
balance of religion (mīzān al-diyāna), which is concerned with the analogy presumed 
to exist between different levels of reality. To these two must be added the principle 
of taqiyya, or concealment of esoteric truth, which also has repercussions for the 
presentation of philosophy.203 
The principle of ta’wīl is founded on the essential epistemological and ontological 
principle beneath Ismaili thought, that behind all apparent realities there are more 
profound inner realities (Ηaqā’iq). This applies not only to religious revelation but 
also to reality itself, where things of the exoteric level immediately grasped by the 
                                                 
202 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 285-7, 406-10, 467, 470. Under each of these seven leaders, furthermore, there 
are 12 men working as the “proofs of God” (taqūm al-Ηujja li-´llāh), who deliver his mission (da‘wa) 
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senses are signs of an esoteric level of being initially hidden from man. Both levels 
are equally existent and true, as Ismaili philosophers like al-Kirmānī are careful to 
emphasize. 
As a specific Ismaili method ta’wīl is then the device by which the esoteric truths 
may be extracted from the exoteric ones. In the practical reality of Ismaili doctrine it 
provides the bridge between religion and philosophy, as the scriptures as the exoteric 
truth are seen as symbolic representation of the inner realities of Ismaili philosophy. 
The precise manner of ta’wīl is not really defined anywhere, however, and it could 
mean anything from numerological or cabbalistic interpretation of Quranic passages 
to their seemingly arbitrary interpretation as references to specific philosophical 
doctrines. From the perspective of the Ismailis, ta’wīl was of course never a method to 
be used, or even understood, by just anyone, but only by the imam and those among 
the higher echelons of the da‘wa hierarchy.204 
Even Peripatetic philosophers in a sense resort to a distinction between exoteric 
and esoteric knowledge to explain the relation between religious revelation and 
philosophy, but Ismaili thought is esoterically oriented in a more profound way. In 
both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity the distinction is essential, for all things of 
the sensory level, especially the external level of religious revelation, contain hidden 
meanings and mysteries that can only be reached by those advanced in knowledge and 
divinely inspired in some way. 
The concept of hidden saving knowledge of the Gnostic kind, open only to those 
initiated to it, characterizes the thought of both the Brethren and al-Kirmānī. Both also 
resort to allegorically interpreted scriptural passages as a method of argumentation. It 
is especially in the Comprehensive Epistle that the Brethren promise to reveal these 
hidden esoteric truths, while the whole of the Rest of the Intellect of al-Kirmānī 
consists of the esoteric teaching of the highest level. While for al-Fārābī exoteric 
religious scriptures are derivative of the philosophical truth attained by the human 
intellect, and therefore not a source of philosophical knowledge, for al-Kirmānī and 
the Brethren they are rather two levels that refer to each other. 
Even more interesting as a philosophical method is what al-Kirmānī calls the 
balance of religion.205 Like ta’wīl, it is bound to an in itself unproven ontological 
presupposition of the ultimate nature of reality, and in fact ta’wīl may be seen as its 
particular instance. Whereas ta’wīl presupposes an ontological correspondence 
between the sensible and intelligible worlds, and hence epistemological 
correspondence between revelatory and philosophical knowledge, balance of religion 
extends the assumption of such correspondence further to a harmony prevailing 
between various levels of reality. The existence of this harmony goes back to the idea 
of tawΗīd, or the essential unity of all being, and the divine wisdom (Ηikma) behind 
creation. 
While al-Kirmānī says the balance to be concerned with the equilibrium 
(muwāzana) between religious things and existents, it seems to be more than that. Al-
Kirmānī distinguishes between several levels of existence or “worlds” in reality, such 
as the world of the Intellects (‘ālam al-ibdā‘), the physical world (‘ālam al-Λabī‘a), 
                                                 
204 See, Feki 1978, pp. 267-300, Daftary 1990, pp. 138, 232, De Smet 1995, pp. 23-6, and Nanji 1996, 
pp. 146-7 for discussion of ta’wīl in Ismaili thought.  
205 See, RāΗat al-‘aql, pp. 480, 494. 
 61
the religious world (‘ālam al-dīn) of the da‘wa hierarchy, the normative world (‘ālam 
al-waΕ‘) of religious law, and the microcosmic world (al-‘ālam al-Ιaghīr) of man 
composed of body and soul. Between all these worlds there is presumed to exist an 
essential harmony in their structure, which goes all the way down to the number and 
quality of their individual components. Therefore, it is possible to deduce from any of 
these levels to another, which leads to the surprising conclusion that knowledge about 
sharī‘a, for example, increases knowledge about the cosmos. While the principle of 
cosmic harmony and correspondences is essential for all Ismaili thought, al-Kirmānī, 
according to De Smet, is the first Ismaili thinker to use it as extensively and 
methodologically as he does.206  
A similar general view of cosmic harmony is also very much present in the 
epistles of the Brethren. For both of them the general idea probably goes back to the 
alchemical corpus of Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān, as it was to his name that the science of 
balance (‘ilm al-mīzān) was generally related.207 The Brethren offer endless lists of 
correspondences, in which the individual members of seemingly unrelated entities are 
seen as analogous with each other. This goes back to the idea of a correspondence 
existing between the different “worlds”, so that it is assumed natural that, for 
example, the twelve movements of the physical world have their counterparts in the 
world of religion.208 
Man as a microcosmic world comprising in itself all reality is particularly 
important for the Brethren, although for them also it probably in the end represents an 
individual case of the harmonious structure existing in the universe as a whole. And 
also for the Brethren the existence of such correspondences can at least to some 
degree be seen as a tool towards acquisition of knowledge. Since the same kind of 
hierarchies of entities that exist in other levels of existence also exist in man himself, 
both in his soul and his body, it is possible for him through enquiry of his self to attain 
knowledge of the universe as a whole.209 
The Brethren also employ the concept of balance as a method, distinguishing 
between three kinds of balances for “measuring” things: material, linguistic, and 
intellectual. It is, however, especially the intellectual balance, that is, demonstration 
by means of Aristotelian logic, rather than a “balance of religion”, that is primary for 
the Brethren, thus making them more rationalistic in spirit than al-Kirmānī.210  
A third characteristic feature of Ismaili philosophy shared by al-Kirmānī and the 
Brethren is the concept of taqiyya as understood in the Ismaili sense, that is, as 
concealment of knowledge.211 The need for taqiyya for both of them arises out of their 
esotericism and emphasis on Gnostic-type saving knowledge reserved for the chosen 
few. Both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren agree that the esoteric truths are meant only for 
                                                 
206  De Smet 1995, pp. 27-31. See also Walker 1993, pp. 68-9 for the appearance of the similar 
perception in al-Sijistānī.  
207 Corbin 1975, pp. 79-82; Kraus 1986, pp. 187ff.; De Smet 1995, pp. 30-1. According to Kraus (1931, 
p. 7), the Jābirian corpus also appears to have been born in an Ismaili context. 
208 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 466-72. 
209  See, Maukola 2009 for the presence of the idea of microcosm in the Brethren, and its 
epistemological consequences. 
210 De Smet 1995, pp. 30-1. The Brethren’s abundant interest in Aristotelian logic seems to be one of 
the characteristics that distinguishes them from mainstream Ismaili philosophers. 
211 The epistles do not use the term taqiyya, but the principle is present nevertheless. 
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those at the higher levels of initiation, and must be concealed from all others. For al-
Kirmānī Rest of the Intellect and for the Brethren the epistles as a whole, but 
especially the Comprehensive Epistle, supposedly contain the esoteric truth, and 
hence must not be divulged freely. Moreover, both hint, however, that even in these 
works they do not reveal all of the truth explicitly, but only allude to it in a way that is 
presumably understandable for those advanced in knowledge. 
For the Ismaili initiate rising in the ladders of esoteric knowledge instruction 
occurred in sessions of wisdom (majālis al-Ηikma) headed by the dā‘īs. Works like 
Rest of the Intellect were therefore never meant for solitary contemplation, but were 
supported by oral teaching. De Smet suggests the possibility of retrieving al-
Kirmānī’s orally transmitted doctrines from the Κayyibī literature, since it was their 
community that carried on the instruction of al-Kirmānī, and even of the Brethren, 
through the following centuries.212 If the Brethren of Purity were an actual group of 
people convening in sessions of philosophical discussion and teaching, their 
instruction would probably also have been transmitted orally in part. However, since 
no-one has so far attempted to retrieve the hidden orally transmitted doctrines of 
either of them, for the present the only esoteric truth of al-Kirmānī or the Brethren 
that a scholar can reach is the one they divulge voluntarily in writing. 
                                                 
212 De Smet 1995, pp. 31-3. As De Smet notes, it would still be next to impossible to distinguish which 
of the later Ṭayyibī doctrines go all the way back to al-Kirmānī as opposed to being a later elaboration. 
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4 The nature of happiness 
4.1 Happiness and perfection 
According to al-Fārābī, in order to become happy man must first know what 
happiness is, secondly set it as his goal, thirdly know the actions by which happiness 
is achieved, and finally carry out those actions.213 Therefore, the first task confronting 
this study must also be to find out what it is precisely that the philosophers mean 
when they discuss happiness. While there are some differences as to the content of the 
concept of happiness between the four philosophers discussed in this study, on the 
general lines they are very much in agreement. Their view of human happiness has its 
origin in Greek Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy, and hence they all share the 
basic concept.214 
For both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers happiness represents the absolute 
peak of human existence, which they believe can be known by means of reason. Since 
man’s highest part is his theoretical intellect, happiness also is essentially intellectual, 
even if it is intimately bound to a simultaneous moral virtue of a practical nature. 
Intellectual perfection is the ultimate goal towards which all men should strive in this 
world, and the final reason for which they exist. Such a state is what Islamic 
philosophers call happiness (sa‘āda), as a translation of Greek eudaimonia, or 
sometimes ultimate or eternal happiness (al-sa‘āda al-quΙwā/abadiyya), as opposed to 
the lower forms of merely transient happiness. 
As man’s final goal, happiness is also the ultimate motive for the practice of 
philosophy, for it is through philosophy that man can ascend towards it. Therefore in a 
sense happiness forms the core concept of philosophy, around which its distinct 
branches are centered. The practical aspect of finding happiness is the goal of ethical 
and political philosophy. As intellectual perfection happiness consists of acquiring 
theoretical knowledge, which is the subject matter of epistemology, while the content 
of that knowledge is contained within the philosophical system as a whole. As a union 
or contact of the rational soul with an immaterial Intellect of the higher world, 
happiness is also a metaphysical concept. And finally, as the philosophical portrayal 
of the afterlife, happiness is related to eschatology. All in all, the idea of happiness in 
Arabic philosophy is a much more complicated issue than it would seem at first 
glance. 
For the philosophers the symmetrical opposite of happiness is misery (shaqāwa), 
which then refers to the absolute imperfection of man, or the state of engrossment in 
the sensual pleasures of the material world, as opposed to the realization of one’s true 
intellectual nature. Since it is precisely such material states that are popularly called 
happiness, true happiness must be distinguished from merely imaginary happiness (al-
sa‘āda al-maΝnūna). At times the philosophers also make a distinction between the 
happiness attained in this world (sa‘ādat al-dunyā/al-sa‘āda al-dunyawiyya) and 
otherworldly happiness (sa‘ādat al-ākhira/al-sa‘āda al-ukhrawiyya). Both are 
supposedly attained through the practice of philosophy, but it is the latter that is the 
                                                 
213 Al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, p. 78. 
214 In Altmann’s (1969b, p. 73) summary: “There is a remarkable unanimity amongst the medieval 
philosophers of Islam and Judaism as to what constitutes man’s ultimate felicity.”  
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ultimate goal of human existence. In general, however, it is the ultimate happiness 
fully actualized in the afterlife that is meant by Arabic philosophers when they discuss 
happiness. 
The most popular way for Arabic philosophers to define happiness philosophically 
is as the perfection (kamāl) of the human rational soul. Such a perception is firmly 
grounded in the Aristotelian-Platonic background of all Arabic philosophy. In the 
Aristotelian teleologically oriented universe all existents have their proper perfection 
towards which they strive. While most existents of the lower world attain their 
inherent perfection by nature, for man this is not the case. As the crown of the 
sublunar world he must attain his perfection through his own efforts, by first 
becoming aware of its true nature and then by an active choice to pursue it. It is up to 
men themselves to decide whether they aspire to their highest intellectual nature, or 
rather choose to remain at the lowest level of sensual pleasures. 
In Neoplatonism this perfection is further entwined with emanationist 
metaphysics. In the emanationist account of creation each entity occupies its proper 
position within the hierarchy of being located between the two entities immediately 
above and below it. From the being above it receives its existence as an emanation, 
while it gives existence to the being below it. As the counterpart of the downwards 
procession of emanation, there emerges the inherent desire of each being towards an 
ascent or return (epistrophē/ma‘ād) to its source, which in a sense is the moving force 
of the universe. For each being it is the reascent to its cause that represents its own 
perfection. The human soul’s perfection is then composed of its reascent to the 
Intellect, which in Plotinian metaphysics is bound to the Soul’s desire as a hypostasis 
to attain a reunion with its creator, the Intellect. 
Since the main lines of Arabic psychological theory were drawn from Aristotle’s 
De Anima, Arabic philosophers also adopted the Aristotelian definition of soul as the 
first entelekheia of an organic body. The concept of entelekheia was coined by 
Aristotle himself, translated sometimes as actuality (energeia/fi‘l), where the first 
entelekheia refers to a capability to perform a certain function, whereas the second 
entelekheia refers to the actual practice of that capability. The soul as the entelekheia 
of a body is the principle that gives the body its life-producing activities. In Arabic 
entelekheia was translated as perfection (tamām/kamāl/istikmāl), and, as in the 
intermediate Neoplatonic Greek tradition, it was identified with both final cause and 
ultimate goal (ghāya). Hence, in the Neoplatonic understanding of things the soul’s 
being the entelekheia of a body, and accordingly its final goal, meant that the soul was 
separable from the body, and that the body existed for the sake of the soul. 
All Arabic philosophers adopted the Platonic notion of the soul as a separate 
substance, rather than the minimal interpretation of Aristotelian entelekheia, where 
the soul is inherently inseparable from the body with the possible exception of the 
intellect. The main consequence of this question was of course the survival of the soul 
after the demise of its body, which both Greek Neoplatonists and Arabic philosophers 
wanted to preserve.215  It is against this Aristotelian-Platonic background that the 
philosophers of this study also employ the concepts of first and second perfection in 
relation to man. Within this distinction second perfection is virtually identified with 
                                                 
215 See, Wisnovsky 2003 for a discussion of the complex history of the concept of entelekheia in 
relation to the soul-body question in Greek and Arabic philosophy. 
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actuality, as opposed to the deficiency (naqΙ) and potentiality (bi-´l-quwwa) of first 
perfection. First perfection is an initial state of the human soul, or the state of the 
minimal existence of man. Second perfection, in contrast, is the state of best possible 
existence, the ultimate goal towards which man must ascend by his own efforts, or the 
completely actualized rational soul in which all of its initial potentiality is realized.216 
The philosophical concept of happiness is then largely synonymous with human 
perfection, which in turn is identified with actuality. While both perfection and 
actuality are ultimately metaphysical concepts, they are further identified with the 
ethical concept of goodness (khayr), thus giving Arabic ethical philosophy its 
metaphysical foundation. Ibn Sīnā defines the good of each existent as “the thing 
which it desires and through which its existence is completed.”217 Hence, the good for 
each being consists of the actuality and perfection of that particular being. They are, 
however, perfection, actuality, and goodness only in relation to that particular being, 
whereas absolute perfection, actuality, and goodness are represented in the First Cause 
of all existence, in which there is no deficiency or desire for anything more to 
complete itself. But the greatest good attainable for man is the perfection and actuality 
of his human essence, that is, ultimate happiness. 
4.2 Intellectual happiness 
For all the philosophers discussed here, happiness then consists of the perfection of 
the rational soul, and particularly the theoretical intellect as its crowning part. 
Therefore the true nature of happiness is intellectual and theoretical, while its practical 
aspect seems to be more of a means towards attaining theoretical perfection. This 
view of happiness may be called the contemplative ideal, where, as in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, man’s highest moment is seen to be endless contemplation of 
the highest objects of thought, the divine ideas.218 Following Aristotle, the Brethren, 
for example, affirm that the best possible state of the soul is for it to “. . . know the 
divine things and lordly knowledge and eternally relish and rejoice in them.”219 
That true perfection is intellectual is founded already on a metaphysical basis, 
since intellect resides above soul in the Neoplatonic hierarchy of being. But the 
intellectual nature of happiness can also be argued by means of purely hedonistic 
personal ethics. Despite contradicting popular notions of happiness attached to sense 
pleasures, philosophical notion of happiness as man’s highest state is not supposed to 
be one of agony and torment, but on the contrary represents the greatest imaginable 
pleasure (hēdonē/ladhdha). But just as true happiness must be distinguished from 
merely presumed happiness, similarly true pleasure is to be differentiated from the 
lower forms of pleasure. Obviously for the philosophers it is intellectual pleasure that 
is the highest kind that man can attain. 
                                                 
216 See, Wisnovsky 2003, pp. 107-41; al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 204-6; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 
123, 493; Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 235. 
217 “al-khayr bi-´l-jumla huwa mā yatashawwaquhu kull shay’ wa-yatimm bihi wujūduhu.” Ibn Sīnā, 
al-Mabda’, p. 10. 
218 See, e.g., Fakhry 1976 for a review of the contemplative ideal in Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā. 
219  “aḥsan ḥālāt al-nufūs an takūn ‘ālima bi-´l-umūr al-ilāhiyya, ‘ārifa bi-´l-ma‘ārif al-rabbāniyya, 
multadhdha bihā, masrūra farḥāna muna‘‘ama abad al-ābidīn khālida sarmadiyya.” Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III 
(42), p. 516. 
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Ibn Sīnā makes a distinction between the highest kind of happiness and bodily 
happiness (al-sa‘āda al-badaniyya), of which the former can be discovered by means 
of reason and demonstration, whereas the latter is discussed in revelation and cannot 
be verified by philosophical methods.220 He argues for the superiority of a happiness 
consisting of an intellectual bliss based on the concept of perfection and the Platonic 
tridivision of the soul into a desiring (shahwānī), irascible (ghaΕabī), and rational 
(nāΛiq) soul. Each of these parts may be defined as the first perfection of the body 
with respect to the activities of that part.221 
Besides being a first perfection, each of the parts also possesses a second 
perfection that represents the fullest actualization of its activities. According to Ibn 
Sīnā, it is the perception of the attainment of that second perfection, or some degree of 
it, that produces the feeling of pleasure. But like everything in the Neoplatonic world, 
the faculties of the human soul also form an ascending hierarchy of perfection and 
virtue. The pleasures of the lowest faculties of the plant soul are those derived from 
the indulgence in food, drink, and sex, while the pleasures of the middle irascible soul 
are related particularly to power and domination (ghalba). 
The pleasures attached to the perfection of the intellectual part, however, are of a 
completely different nature than those of the lower faculties. It is the pleasure caused 
by acquisition of intelligible knowledge and of good moral qualities. It is like the 
pleasure experienced by the disembodied Intellects of the higher world, and hence 
much more pure and intense than anything related to the material sphere of existence. 
But just as a deaf person who has never heard music cannot miss hearing it, for even 
at best he can only have a vague idea of the kind of pleasure it might arouse in him, so 
only one who has actually experienced the highest kind of intellectual bliss can truly 
understand and desire it.222 
Al-Fārābī, the Brethren of Purity, and al-Kirmānī share the same psychological 
theoretical background and the related analysis of happiness and pleasure. The 
different faculties of the soul form an ascending hierarchy analyzable to three parts, 
where the faculties of the lower parts are necessary for the survival of the body, while 
the rational soul represents the distinctly human part for the most part functioning 
independently from the body. They also make a similar distinction between 
intellectual and bodily pleasures, of which the first are incomparably more intense and 
permanent, at least once the soul has reached its supreme degree of happiness.223 
Thus, even on purely hedonistic grounds man should seek intellectual happiness 
over the lower forms. The false forms of happiness are bound to the lower parts of 
                                                 
220 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 347-8. Here also the concept of happiness is related to the afterlife, 
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intellectual pleasures of the afterlife delineated by Ibn Sīnā.  
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Aristotelian terms. 
222 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 7-25; Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 348-50. 
223 For a distinction between corporeal and intellectual pleasure, see, e.g., al-Fārābī, al-Tanbīh, pp. 
15ff.; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (30), pp. 52-83 (the epistle is devoted solely to an analysis of pain and 
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soul and their respective pleasures. Such is the case then when happiness is believed 
to consist of amassing of wealth, attainment of honor, acquisition of sensual pleasures, 
or of other things related to the lower psychical faculties. The corporeal pleasure 
gained from good food or aesthetic beauty is not bad in itself, but merely lower on the 
hedonistic hierarchy than the spiritual pleasure of the intellect. 
In the best order of things the highest and most perfect part should govern the 
lower ones, just as is the case in the universe as a whole. In a balanced human soul it 
is then the rational part that directs the bodily faculties, rather than reason blindly 
following the desires and passions of the body. In such case, according to al-Fārābī, 
once man knows happiness in his rational faculty, he also desires it by his lower 
appetitive faculty (al-quwwa al-nuzū‘iyya),224 and all the faculties of the soul together 
strive towards attaining that highest goal. 
Despite the fact that the “perfections” of the lower psychical faculties are 
necessary for the maintenance of body, it is the bodily desires (shahawāt) that emerge 
as a hindrance to the attainment of true intellectual happiness. This is because they 
distract the rational soul from practicing its real intellectual nature. As Ibn Sīnā states, 
in its bodily state in the material world the human soul does not easily sense 
intellectual pleasure. 225 Only after casting off the desires of the lower faculties, can 
the soul arise to yearn for the highest good for the human soul. Hence, happiness 
necessarily involves a practical moral side as a necessary instrument for attaining 
theoretical perfection, although in the end it seems to be subservient to the highest 
good of theoretical perfection. 
For all the philosophers then happiness also consists of the liberation of the soul 
from its bodily and material entanglements. Happiness at its most complete 
manifestation therefore amounts to the rational soul becoming a pure intellect that no 
longer requires either the body or the lower psychical faculties bound to the body for 
its existence. Once liberated from matter, man also may attain the kind of happiness 
enjoyed by the angelic spiritual substances. According to Ibn Sīnā, one must therefore 
answer those asking what kind of happiness can there be in a state where there is no 
eating, drinking, or sex, that the state of the angels contains more pleasure and joy 
than that of the animals.226 
The nature of ultimate happiness portrayed here as intellectual perfection and 
liberation from matter seems to imply a very idealistic view of the capabilities of man. 
Happiness is conditioned on complete actualization of the intellect and acquisition of 
the totality of intelligible knowledge, since once the human intellect is perfected it 
would contain the forms of all existents within itself. Such a concept also seems 
extremely elitist in that happiness would be restricted to the few supremely intelligent 
philosophers capable of realizing it. In fact the absolute kind of happiness appears to 
be more of an ideal corresponding to the perfect man, whereas in actual reality there is 
more of gradation. 
While happiness is conditioned on knowledge, that knowledge may be acquired by 
a variety of means. Only very few are capable of acquiring it through independent 
reflection, while the rest will have to gain it through instruction. Moreover, since men 
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225 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 351. 
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vary in excellence in both their innate and acquired moral and intellectual 
dispositions, they similarly vary with respect to the happiness they attain. 
While there are a number of things, according to al-Fārābī, that all men must know 
in order to acquire any kind of happiness, the primary distinction among men follows 
from the manner in which they are capable of acquiring that knowledge. The 
philosophers acquire it in an intelligible form through employing their own reason, 
while those following the philosophers attain the same intelligibles by learning from 
them. The majority of men are, however, unable to grasp the philosophical truth at all, 
and therefore have to gain it in the form of imitations in sensible images, which is 
famously what religious revelation consists of for al-Fārābī. 
Therefore most people, in so far as they pursue happiness at all, seek it by means 
of their imaginative faculty (mukhayyala), whereas the fortunate few follow it as 
conceived (muΙawwara) in its true form in their intellects. The latter constitute the 
elect (khāΙΙa), since the knowledge they possess actually corresponds to the ultimate 
reality.227 And the elect, for al-Fārābī and his followers, is in essence composed of the 
philosophers, who alone are capable of reaching for the philosophical way towards 
happiness. 
Since philosophical knowledge is of a qualitatively better kind than symbolic 
knowledge, clearly the elect must also enjoy a more noble kind of happiness. But 
besides the qualitative variety there is also a quantitative one. According to al-Fārābī 
the kinds of happiness are distinguished in virtue (tatafāΕal) in three respects: species 
(naw‘), quantity (kammiyya), and quality (kayfiyya). The kind of happiness and 
pleasure gained varies according to both innate and acquired properties, and each one 
will have the degree of happiness that befits his nature.228 
Therefore there emerges a hierarchy of happiness, at the top of which is the perfect 
man representing the absolute culmination of humanity, the philosopher-prophet, who 
enjoys the highest degree of happiness possible for man.229 The rest of mankind forms 
a descending hierarchy of virtue, where each man enjoys happiness according to his 
particular rank in humanity.230 Those at the bottom of the hierarchy who are incapable 
of attaining any kind of knowledge at all, such as the insane, are excluded from 
happiness altogether.231 
Ibn Sīnā’s view comes close to al-Fārābī’s, especially in the dual ways of pure 
intelligible and symbolic revelatory knowledge reserved for the two classes of 
people.232 This view of course became a commonplace of Islamic political philosophy 
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232 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 365-6.  
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ever since al-Fārābī. As we will see in the discussion of the afterlife, the two groups 
also seem to enjoy different kinds of happiness in the afterlife. 
But even in this life the happiness enjoyed by philosophers and their followers 
would have to be of a greater kind than any based on sensible images, given that Ibn 
Sīnā has painstakingly argued for the intellectual nature of true happiness. As to their 
intellectual capabilities, for Ibn Sīnā also people form a hierarchy descending from the 
perfection of the prophet down to the lowest of men who are incapable of learning 
anything at all. Since happiness is conditioned on intellection, this at least partly 
reflects on the happiness attained in the afterlife. Since prophets occur only at rare 
times in history, the majority of people fall somewhere below them, and hence attain 
only some portion of complete happiness.233 
As for al-Fārābī, for Ibn Sīnā also the prophet represents the highest instance of 
humanity, but such men only come to being at singular moments in history, since the 
kind of matter required to receive their perfection only occurs rarely in bodily 
compositions.234 Other men would lie somewhere between the complete fool and the 
prophet as to their intellectual capabilities, and presumably this state of affairs is also 
reflected on the hierarchy of happiness. 
While in many respects the Brethren and al-Kirmānī are as elitist as the 
Peripatetics, sometimes they appear to be less so. The elitism of both comes from the 
Gnostic idea that only the elect group of people acquiring true knowledge attain 
happiness. But al-Kirmānī at least does not set the philosophers above common 
believers with respect to happiness. While as for al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā actualization 
through intelligible knowledge is a prerequisite for the soul to attain happiness, this 
knowledge is not supposed to be acquired by means of independent reflection. 
It is only the divinely supported prophets and imams who can attain such 
knowledge directly, while the rest attain it by instruction from them. Philosophers are 
therefore wrong to rely solely on their intellects in this question, while renouncing the 
divine proof, for this will only lead them to error. When the souls acquire their 
otherworldly happiness on the resurrection day, for al-Kirmānī also there seems to be 
some variation as to the degree reached by each. Each man will gain happiness in 
accordance with the knowledge he has acquired and the actions he has performed 
during his worldly life.235 
4.3 Contact with the Intellect 
Since for all these philosophers the state of ultimate happiness is identified with the 
perfection of theoretical reason, it is intimately bound to their epistemological 
theories. All of them also operate along the main lines of Aristotelian psychology in 
this respect, so that intellectual perfection for them stands for the last stage of the fully 
actualized human intellect, as opposed its initial state of potentiality, in which the 
rational soul has acquired the totality of intelligible forms.236 All of them also share 
the Aristotelian presupposition that for the intellect, as for anything else, to pass from 
potentiality to actuality an active element is required that itself is already fully actual. 
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As is well-known, the distinction Aristotle makes in De Anima between the 
passive and active aspects of human reason proved to be one of the most bewildering 
parts of the treatise for the later interpreters of his epistemological theory, and 
developed to a voluminous amount of theorizing about the role and nature of the 
active intellect (nous poiētikos/al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl) throughout classical and medieval 
times. In Aristotelian psychology, active intellect is the catalyst that makes the 
intelligible forms actually known for theoretical reason, commonly compared to the 
activity of light in transforming colors actually visible to the sense of vision. 
In the post-Aristotelian Greek tradition this agent was variously placed within the 
human soul or outside it, as Aristotle himself had left this, along with many other 
questions, ambiguous. Among the Aristotelian commentators influential in Arabic 
philosophy at least Alexander of Aphrodisias (d. early 3rd century CE), Themistius (d. 
ca. 387), and John Philoponus (d. ca. 570) offered theories where active intellect was 
interpreted as a transcendent entity existing outside the human soul, variously 
identified with the Aristotelian First Cause in the case of Alexander, or a lower deity 
in that of Philoponus. Plotinus also followed the transcendental interpretation in 
relegating the functions of active intellect to his second hypostasis of Intellect. All 
Arabic philosophers followed such Greek predecessors in regarding the originally 
psychological entity of active intellect to be also a metaphysical entity existing 
outside the human soul.237  
Hence, for Arabic philosophers in general the ultimate cause of man’s theoretical 
perfection is a separate entity existing in the non-material world, from which the 
intelligible forms are emanated to the human intellect once it is properly disposed 
towards receiving them. In fact, in a sense this supralunar Intellect is absolute human 
perfection, or at least the upper limit of perfection that man could ever hope to attain, 
although it may be that even in the best of cases he must fall short of it. In any case, 
all four of our philosophers are rationalists in the sense that they do not see a 
possibility for an ascent by suprarational means beyond the Intellect up till the Creator 
himself, unlike Plotinus and the Greek Neoplatonists, or mystical thinkers of later 
Islamic philosophy. 
Human happiness as absolute theoretical perfection then appears as a state of some 
kind of contact (ittiΙāl) or even union (ittiΗād) with a transcendent Intellect, a semi-
divine entity of the spiritual world, which is further identified with the Neoplatonic 
reascent of the soul to the intelligible sphere of being. This, however, gives human 
happiness, despite its inherent rationalism, also a definite mystical aspect, for it now 
involves a metaphysical ascent to a level of a non-corporeal spiritual being, a kind of 
lower deity. Within the history of Arabic philosophy the nature of this ascent has been 
interpreted in differing terms with varying degrees of mystical overtones. Moreover, 
the precise identification of which Intellect human soul is to ascend to is conditioned 
by the cosmological theory adopted by each of them. Therefore, the question of 
human happiness also becomes a part of metaphysics and cosmology. 
The cosmology of nine concentric spheres each accompanied with a separate 
Intellect was first assumed by al-Fārābī, from whom his Peripatetic successors, 
                                                 
237 See, Davidson 1992, pp. 13-18. None of them followed Alexander though in identifying active 
intellect as the First Cause, although the Peripatetics theoretically could have done this, since they did 
regard the First Cause to be an actual intellect. 
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including Ibn Sīnā, adopted it along the main lines, as did al-Kirmānī within Ismaili 
philosophy. The Arabic Peripatetics further adopted a somewhat unique solution in 
the long history of the concept of active intellect in that they identified the last tenth 
Intellect governing the terrestrial world as the active intellect of Aristotelian 
psychology. Hence, for al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā it is with this tenth and last Intellect 
that human rational soul forms contact to attain its theoretical perfection. 
For Ibn Sīnā this interpretation preserves well the Neoplatonic symmetry of 
descent and reascent, since for him Active Intellect is not only the cause of human 
thought, but also the source from which sublunar forms, including the human soul, are 
emanated. Hence, theoretical perfection constitutes the reunion of human soul with its 
source. Man’s return to the level of the Intellects, on the other hand, constitutes the 
closing of the circle at the cosmological level, that is, the return of creation back to the 
first principles.238 
In the case of al-Fārābī the symmetry is somewhat broken, however, since Active 
Intellect is only the cause of human thinking, while the origin of the existence of the 
human soul, as of all the sublunar world, seems to be located more vaguely in the 
celestial region.239 For both of them Active Intellect as a metaphysical entity is a 
bridge between the two worlds, spiritual and material, for while, on the one hand, it 
properly pertains to the spiritual sphere of being, on the other, it governs the sublunar 
material world.240 
Al-Kirmānī also adopted the Fārābian cosmology, but not the straightforward 
identification of active intellect with the tenth separate Intellect. In fact he does not 
seem to employ the term active intellect at all, nor does he elevate precisely the tenth 
Intellect to the imposing role it enjoys in most Peripatetic philosophers. However, he 
does subscribe to the principle that in order to be actualized human intellect needs an 
already actual agent existing outside of itself. This active principle for him appears to 
be the (First) Intellect, mediated by the series of lower Intellects, and manifested in 
the terrestrial world in prophets and imams. 
As for Ibn Sīnā the Neoplatonic symmetry is then complete, since once fully 
actualized the human soul returns to the Intellect from which the terrestrial souls were 
originally emanated. But unlike for al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, for al-Kirmānī, it is 
apparently the (First) Intellect itself, rather than the last one, that is both the beginning 
and end for the destiny of the human soul.241 The return to the Intellect is the “rest of 
                                                 
238 Ibn Sīnā’s probably most elegant and concise presentation of the Neoplatonic scheme of descent and 
reascent is the Provenance and Destination, in which the first two chapters constitute the descent 
through emanation, and the third the reascent in the material world culminated in the perfection of 
human soul. 
239 See, Davidson 1992, pp. 44-94 for their theories of the Active Intellect. 
240 As Ibn Sīnā (al-Mabda’, p. 98) says, all of the separate Intellects are of course active Intellects in 
the sense of being fully actual and acting on an entity below them, but only the last one is an active 
Intellect with respect to us (‘aql fa‘‘āl bi-´l-qiyās ilaynā), that is, the active intellect of Aristotelian 
psychology. 
241 De Smet 1995, pp. 332-4, 355-9, 368-9, 372-5. The alternative interpretation is that al-Kirmānī’s 
unspecified use of the term Intellect in these contexts refers to the pleroma of Intellects as a whole, 
rather than specifically the first one as the source of them all. The consequence would still seem to be 
that the human soul can ascend to the level of the first Intellect, since al-Kirmānī does not give a 
specific Intellect as the upper limit. This upper limit is where the soul “knows all existents, until only 
that from which all existents came to be remains. There it will stay amazed incapable of further ascent, 
. . .settling and submitting to its shortcoming.”(Ηadd lā yashidhdh mawjūd fīhā ‘an ma‘rifatihā, Ηattā lā 
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the Intellect” promised in the title of al-Kirmānī’s main work, a state characterized by 
complete tranquility and rest for the soul.242 
For the Brethren the harmonious relation between epistemology, metaphysics, and 
eschatology is in some sense even more elegant, for they hold to the original Plotinian 
triad of creation, instead of the more complex Peripatetic variant. (Universal) Soul as 
the third hypostasis is an emanation from the second hypostasis of (Universal) 
Intellect, and receives from its Creator the intelligible archetypes, through which it, or 
rather its lower “faculty” of Nature, creates the material world. Soul is torn between 
its double nature, governance of the material sphere it has created, and the desire to 
contemplate its own creator, the Intellect. While Soul is knowing in its essence, it is 
up to the guiding influence of the Intellect to gradually bring it towards perfection and 
actualization of its knowledge, a process which is fully culminated only at the 
destruction of the terrestrial world. 
Like the Peripatetics, the Brethren also use the term Active Intellect to denote a 
metaphysical entity, as a synonym of Intellect, whereas Soul as a contrast is 
designated the Passive Intellect (al-‘aql al-munfa‘il). Since the human particular souls 
are “faculties” of the Universal Soul, their epistemology is seamlessly united to this 
metaphysical process. The human souls are actualized through the knowledge 
received from the Intellect, and as a result the “particular soul attains the happiness of 
the Universal Soul, once it reaches the degree of the Universal Intellect.”243 As for al-
Kirmānī, this is the degree of complete rest (rāΗa) and serenity (Λum’unīna/sukūn), 
since it is the final point of ascent where the soul withdraws from the movement 
characterizing natural world.244  
Due to this metaphysical connection ultimate happiness appears as not only 
intellectual perfection, but also as a kind of divinization of man. Man attains the 
degree of a lower divinity, that of an immaterial Intellect of the spiritual world. This is 
part of the meaning of the classical Platonic idea of the ultimate goal of man, and 
hence of philosophy, as “becoming like god” (homoiōsis theō/al-tashabbuh bi-ilāh), 
an idea which the Brethren repeatedly present in their epistles.245 
For al-Fārābī ultimate happiness in the end therefore means that the human soul 
becomes like the immaterial Intellects, although still below the level of Active 
Intellect, in that the actualized human soul becomes a fully spiritual and intelligible 
substance like them, and thus no longer needs a body or its faculties for its 
existence.246 For Ibn Sīnā the rational soul becomes of the substance of the Intellects, 
an intelligible world (‘ālam ‘aqlī) in which the whole intelligible order of existence is 
reflected.247 And similarly for al-Kirmānī soul becomes like the separate Intellects, a 
                                                                                                                                            
yabqā illā alladhī ‘anhu wujidat al-mawjūdāt subΗānuhu fa-taqif ‘inda dhālika mabhūta lā qudra lahā 
‘alā al-nuhūΕ. . . fa-taqarr mudh‘ina bi-´l-quΙūr mutaΗaqqiqa bi-insidād al-abwāb ‘alayhā). Al-
Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 493. 
242 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 105; De Smet 1995, p. 20. 
243 “bulūgh al-nafs al-juz’iyya ilā sa‘ādat al-nafs al-kulliyya idhā balaghat ilā darajat al-‘aql al-kullī.” 
Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 53, 490-1; Rasā’il, III (35), pp. 231-48; Marquet 1973, pp. 57-84. 
244 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 51-2. 
245 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (5), p. 225; I (10), p. 399. For the idea of philosophy as divinization, see chapter 
5.1 below. 
246 Al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 204-6; 
247 Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 350. 
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microcosm reflecting the perfection of the macrocosm in its essence. 248  For the 
Brethren happiness is not likened to separate Intellects in the same way, because their 
cosmology does not consist of a series of such Intellects. Besides, the ascent of the 
soul is more gradual, through the world of spheres, up to the spiritual world. The 
semi-divinity of the perfected soul is expressed in it becoming a potential angel 
(malak bi-´l-quwwa), transformed into an actual one at the death of its body.249  
One of the most debated points among scholars concerning ultimate happiness in 
Arabic philosophy has been its mystical or ecstatic nature. This question is related to 
the character of happiness as either a connection (ittiΙāl) or union (ittiΗād) with the 
transcendent Intellect. When Merlan defines mysticism as a doctrine teaching that the 
highest moment of man’s existence is his absorption into whatever he regards to be 
the divine,250 this would seem to be true to some extent in Arabic philosophy. In its 
absolute perfection the perfected human soul is absorbed to the divine sphere of 
Intellects. 
However, for all four philosophers of this study this absorption is restricted, for 
the souls do not attain a complete union with the Intellects, and remain below them 
even at their highest perfection. They are merely conjoined with them, and hence they 
do not discard all their individual attributes, which would permit them to merge into 
one divine whole.251 They also fall short of complete mysticism in their rationalism. 
For Plotinus and the Sufi mystics, man’s highest state of perfection transcends reason, 
for it is a union with the ineffable Divine above the Intellect. 
For al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, while even the Creator himself is an Intellect in the 
Aristotelian fashion, He lies beyond the reach of human intellect. But the fact that the 
activity proper to the First Cause is to intelligize itself, which then constitutes the 
highest possible form of activity, pleasure and happiness, further enhances the divine 
nature of intellectual human happiness. For al-Kirmānī and the Brethren God as an 
absolute unity transcends the level of Intellect in the Plotinian manner, but, unlike for 
Plotinus, man cannot reach God by any other means either. Therefore while some 
scholars, such as Merlan and Fakhry, call this kind of state rational mysticism, others, 
like Davidson and De Smet, do not consider it to be a genuinely mystical state at 
all.252 
On an experiential level the main difference between the state of ultimate 
happiness and a mystical Sufi state seems to be that since the soul retains its 
individuality even after its conjunction with the Intellect, there is no annihilation of 
the self to the divine, nor a complete union of the soul with even a lower spiritual 
entity, let alone the Creator. 253  Within the Islamic philosophy of the subsequent 
centuries both for some Peripatetics, such as Ibn Ṭufayl, and particularly for the 
illuminationists, the highest state of man will become more clearly identified with that 
of the Sufis. Still, even for our philosophers there is a degree of an ecstatic flavor to 
the experience of intellectual bliss. Al-Fārābī is probably the most sober of the four in 
                                                 
248 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 481; De Smet 1995, p. 312. 
249 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 125. 
250 Merlan 1963, p. 2. 
251 See, Davidson 1992, pp. 53-5, 103-6; De Smet 1995, pp. 375-6. 
252 Davidson 1992, pp. 54, 105-6; De Smet 1995, pp. 372-7; Fakhry 1971; Merlan 1963, pp. 20-1. 
253 Nor is there of course the related ontological supposition of the oneness of all reality. 
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this respect, for he never delves deeper into the experiential aspect of happiness, nor 
employs ecstatic language to describe it. 
Ibn Sīnā, however, approaches the Sufi vision especially in Remarks and 
Admonitions, where he quite consciously employs distinctly Sufi terminology to 
describe the attainment of human perfection. In contrast to the more abstract 
philosophical portrayals of the corresponding passages in Healing and other works, 
here Ibn Sīnā goes beyond them to describe the actual experience of happiness such as 
it is “tasted” (Λa‘ama) by the “Gnostics” (‘ārifūn)254 proceeding on their way towards 
utmost perfection. The Gnostics are said to possess special stations (maqāmāt) and 
degrees (darajāt) that distinguish them from common people. Initially such degrees 
are moments of stupor (ghawāshin/awqāt) in which the light of Truth (nūr al-Ηaqq) 
appears to the Gnostic as in flashes of lightning, bringing about ecstatic joy (wajd) in 
him. But when he proceeds on the spiritual road through knowledge and exercise, the 
occasional glimpses of light gradually transform into a clear flame, as he attains a 
more stable disposition towards attaining the truth, and the moments of stupor become 
a stable state of tranquility. 
When he finally arrives (wuΙūl) at the end of his road, he becomes completely 
submerged in the ultimate reality so that the events of the sensory world appear to him 
as mere distractions. Ibn Sīnā admits, however, that portraying what are primarily 
experiential states by means of human language can never express them completely, 
which is probably why he, like so many of his Sufi contemporaries, also resorts to the 
alternative method of allusive symbolism through his allegorical narratives.255 Hence, 
despite the fact that at the level of ontology and epistemology ultimate happiness is a 
purely rational state, it definitely involves mystical and ecstatic elements on an 
experiential level. 
Al-Kirmānī at times also describes ultimate happiness in poetic terms mildly 
reminiscent of Sufi language, for example when comparing it to the state of a lover 
trembling from joy upon reuniting with his beloved. 256 Besides this there is nothing 
particularly mystical or ecstatic in al-Kirmānī’s depiction of the attainment of 
happiness. Like Ibn Sīnā, he compares the flowing of the intelligible emanation to 
sparks of light illuminating the soul with the light of knowledge. But al-Kirmānī does 
this only in the context of revelation and prophetology, for only the rarest and most 
noble souls can attain their knowledge this way. For others the intelligible knowledge 
that actualizes their souls is attained only by the mediation of prophets and imams, 
that is, through instruction, and they are not even supposed to seek private mystical 
states in this life.257 
As for the Brethren, they often portray man’s ultimate stage in eloquent terms, but 
as for al-Kirmānī such depictions seem to be connected more to the afterlife than to 
mystical states experienced by the soul in its embodied state. 
As stated previously, any mystical states that our four philosophers even could 
envision would have to be restricted to a contact with the lower “divinity” of Intellect, 
                                                 
254 Ibn Sīnā defines “gnostic” as someone who “devotes his thought to the holiness of divine power, 
seeking the perpetual illumination of the light of Truth into his innermost self” (al-munΙarif bi-fikrihi 
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255 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 47-8, 86-103.  
256 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 117. 
257 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 550-61. 
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rather than God himself, given their epistemological and ontological systems. The 
Brethren, however, seem to go beyond this when they devote a short passage to a 
discussion of the vision (shāhada) that “friends of God” (awliyā’ Allāh) may attain of 
God even in this world. While normally visible only through His creation, once God’s 
chosen ones (aΙfiyā’uhu) are perfected in their knowledge, the veil is removed from 
their eyes and they can witness God with their own vision and know Him through 
their hearts.258 
Baffioni believes this vision of God to represent the culmination of 
epistemological perfection for the Brethren, and that the “friends of God” here refer to 
the Brethren themselves.259 Alternatively the friends of God might be interpreted as 
the imams and dā‘īs, with whom the Brethren sometimes equate them in other 
contexts. But as Marquet sees it, since the Brethren do not elaborate the nature of such 
vision any further, even here the divine vision must actually refer to the knowledge of 
the Intellect, rather than to knowledge of God’s essence, which is after all completely 
inscrutable.260 
While knowledge of God’s essence, let alone complete assimilation to it, then lies 
beyond the reach of man, what can be reached is proximity (mujāwara) to God, given 
that Intellect as the first created or emanated existent is directly below God in the 
hierarchy of being. It is then as nearness to God that the ultimate state of the human 
soul is most commonly depicted by the Brethren, and occasionally by al-Kirmānī and 
Ibn Sīnā.261 But this divine intimacy is not a mystical state attainable in this life, but a 
state which the human soul in the best of cases may reach in the afterlife.262 
4.4 Happiness and the afterlife 
What sometimes makes the philosophical concept of happiness difficult to interpret, is 
that it is quite ambiguously used for both the bodily life and the afterlife. For all four 
philosophers it is clear that happiness is only truly consummated after the death of the 
body, once the perfected soul is completely liberated from the material existence to 
lead a purely spiritual life. Therefore, happiness becomes identified with salvation 
(najāt) in the afterlife, and theories of happiness turn into philosophical interpretations 
of life after death as described in revelation. 
The philosophical portrayals of happiness in the afterlife are, however, still an 
integral part of a philosophical system, where the graphic depictions of Paradise and 
Hell as presented in the Quran are interpreted allegorically to refer to the Neoplatonic 
account of the soul’s return to the spiritual world. It is not always quite clear, 
however, what degree of happiness is attainable already during the bodily life. Since 
the precondition for the soul to attain salvation in the afterlife at all is for it to be 
perfected during its bodily existence, clearly it must attain some degree of that 
happiness already before its release from the material world. 
                                                 
258 “ra’awhu wa-shāhadūhu bi-abṣārihim kamā ‘arafūhu bi-qulūbihim.” Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (39), pp. 
336-7. 
259 Baffioni 1998. 
260 Marquet 1971, p. 101.  
261 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 53; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 117; Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 348. 
262 According to the Brethren, the soul can ascend to the spiritual world and proximity with God only 
after its separation from its “corporeal mold” in this world, while for al-Kirmānī the proximity is 
connected to the event of second resurrection. Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 309-10; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 117. 
 76
Al-Fārābī states in the beginning of his Attainment of Happiness that both earthly 
happiness (al-sa‘āda al-dunyā) in the first life and ultimate happiness (al-sa‘āda al-
quΙwā) in the afterlife are attained through four kinds of virtues, foremost among 
them the theoretical virtues bringing about theoretical perfection. 263  But while 
ultimate happiness emerges as the focal point of a major part of his philosophical 
writing, earthly happiness is never really discussed after this. 
Ibn Sīnā likewise briefly mentions worldly corporeal happiness (al-sa‘āda al-
‘ājila al-badaniyya), which may be attained by those of a balanced bodily 
constitution.264 Ultimate happiness, on the other hand, is a state of the soul explicitly 
connected to the afterlife, for which man must prepare himself in this life by attaining 
moral and intellectual perfection.265 While for both of them earthly happiness in this 
context is a positive state, as opposed to the false conceptions of material happiness, 
the relationship between happiness in this world and the next is not clear. 
However, it seems that the happiness attainable in this world is merely a lower 
degree of ultimate happiness. For al-Fārābī the soul upon its conjunction with the 
Active Intellect is apparently completely liberated from matter already in this life, and 
would hence seem to enjoy complete happiness. But it is hard to see how it could 
immerse in such an immaterial state except occasionally before it is separated from 
the body.266 
According to Ibn Sīnā, the highest kind of spiritual pleasure “. . .is not entirely 
non-existent even when the soul is in the body, for those who immerse themselves in 
the contemplation of divine majesty, and turn away from their bodily preoccupations, 
attain a great degree of that pleasure even in their bodies, so that it may possess them 
and distract them from all other things.”267 But whatever intellectual pleasure the soul 
might feel in its embodied state in the material world is only a weak reflection of the 
indescribable pleasures of the afterlife. Only after its liaisons with the body vanish 
once and for all, is the soul free to immerse in its intellectual pleasure completely.268 
Al-Kirmānī makes a similar distinction between worldly and eternal or ultimate 
happiness, both of which are attained through following the guidelines provided by 
the divinely appointed imam.269 The Brethren present their own epistles as the guide 
through which man may attain happiness in both lives.270 Worldly happiness (al-
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264 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, III, pp. 306-7. Since Ibn Sīnā was a distinguished practitioner and theoretician of 
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268 See also, Ibn Sīnā, al-Mabda’, pp. 112-4. 
269 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 512, 571. 
270 E.g., Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (50), p. 250. 
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sa‘āda al-dunyawiyya) consists for each individual of his “staying in this world for as 
long as possible in the best possible state and the most perfect goal”, while the 
happiness of the hereafter (al-sa‘āda al-ukhrawiyya) means that the “. . .soul will after 
its separation from the body eternally stay in the best state and the most perfect 
goal.”271 While worldly happiness is not contradictory with happiness in the afterlife, 
nor is it a requirement for it. With respect to happiness in this life and the next, people 
are divided into four categories: those who are miserable in both lives, those happy in 
both lives, and the ones who are happy in one but not the other.272 
However, the philosophical outlook of the Brethren and al-Kirmānī is clearly more 
other-worldly in orientation than that of the Peripatetics, and worldly happiness does 
not arise as a major subject of discussion. Nevertheless, in the end these four 
philosophers are in agreement in both defining the ultimate kind of happiness as a 
state restricted to the afterlife, and in believing that happiness in this life is attained by 
the same means as that of the hereafter. Therefore the two are not contradictory, and 
after-worldly happiness does not require misery in this life. Hence, despite their other-
worldly focus, none of these philosophers can be accused of complete renunciation of 
worldly life. 
Although mixing an ethical discussion of happiness with a religious discussion of 
the afterlife may seem confusing from a modern perspective, it is philosophically 
argued and in line with the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas of happiness. 
Definition of happiness as the most perfect state imaginable, implies not only that it 
consists of the most noble kind of action, contemplation of divine ideas, but also that 
it is the most permanent state, and therefore eternal. While the substance of the soul is 
immortal, in its embodied state it is drawn between the spheres of Intellect and the 
material world. As Ibn Sīnā states, there can be no comparison between the two: one 
eternal and changeless and the other ever-changing and corruptible. According to the 
Brethren, there is an inherent desire in the soul towards eternity (baqā’), and therefore 
the pull of Intellect towards itself is stronger than the pull of Nature.273 Happiness, 
perfection, and eternity are inherently bound to each other. 
Here the question of happiness enters the major subject of the Quran and all 
prophetic revelations: the survival of man after death and the judgment of good and 
evil in the afterlife. Since bodily resurrection is refuted at the outset as a 
philosophically untenable doctrine, the philosophical account of the afterlife is 
necessarily incompatible with the Quranic, at least when interpreted literally. But still 
most Arabic philosophers want to preserve personal salvation for the soul, going 
beyond the impersonal union of souls in Neoplatonism, or standard Aristotelianism 
where at best the intellect or its part can survive the body. 
While al-Fārābī seems to be slightly inconsistent in this matter, his account 
approaches most the idea of impersonal immortality. When the soul becomes 
incorporeal, all of its bodily faculties and accidents are lifted from it, which would 
seem to include everything that individualizes the soul, such as memory, imagination, 
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or the general bodily constitutions affecting the states of souls. Each time a perfected 
soul is separated from its body at death, it joins (ittaΙala) others of its kind in an 
“incorporeal manner.” The more souls are united the more pleasure (iltidhādh) they 
will feel, since they will be contemplating (ta‘qil) more perfect essences like 
themselves. Since the number of souls following each other this way is infinite, the 
pleasure they feel will also grow infinitely.274  It is then that the soul attains its 
supreme happiness. 
Since the actualization of intellect is what enables the rational soul to dispense 
with its bodily functions, and hence to survive the death of its body, the non-
actualized souls must be destroyed together with their bodies. This is in fact what al-
Fārābī says will happen to the inhabitants of the ignorant city (al-madīna al-jāhiliyya), 
that is, the souls of imperfect intellect that still require matter for their subsistence. 
When their bodies die, they “perish and dissolve into nothingness, just as happens to 
animals, beasts, and snakes.”275 But the souls of those who have erred knowingly 
survive to suffer the consequences, since they have acquired the knowledge necessary 
to actualize their intellect. But as they have also acquired opposing dispositions 
(hay’āt) to their souls through their attachment to sensual pleasures, once the senses 
are destroyed together with the body, they will suffer eternally growing pain from the 
contrary draw of these desires.276 
While this philosophical portrayal of hellfire was very popular with al-Fārābī’s 
successors, it seems to be in contradiction with his philosophical views. Since the 
afterlife is supposedly a purely intellectual state, there should be no possibility for the 
survival of physical desires. Therefore, Davidson believes al-Fārābī to be 
dissimulating against his potential critics, while in reality the only immortality al-
Fārābī professes is that of the rational unindividuated soul.277 
While Ibn Sīnā partly draws from al-Fārābī on this subject, his views of the 
different states in the afterlife are both slightly more complex and slightly more 
confusing. Unlike al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā wants to preserve personal salvation for the 
whole soul with all its individual characteristics. For him intellectual perfection is not 
a condition of human immortality, but instead the human soul is immortal in its 
substance. Theoretical perfection or imperfection is therefore only the cause of the 
kind of state that the soul will enjoy during its afterlife, while all rational souls survive 
their bodies.278 
Initially Ibn Sīnā gives three kinds of states that the souls might expect to be 
subjected to in their afterlives. Souls perfected both intellectually and morally will 
obviously enjoy eternal and absolute pleasure after the death of their bodies. Those 
falling somewhat short of perfection especially in their intelligible knowledge attain 
some degree of that happiness, while the rest are subjected to torment. As in al-Fārābī, 
the pleasure and agony of the happy and tormented are augmented by the attachment 
of souls to others of their kind, when the souls perceive the essences of all those other 
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souls besides their own.279 The last class includes both intellectually and morally 
deficient souls. 
Among the first there are those who fall in between complete ignorance and the 
minimum degree of intellectual perfection required for any kind of happiness, that is, 
those who are aware of their true perfection but have failed to attain it. After their 
bodily deaths the bodily activities distracting them from facing their true perfection no 
longer exist, and they suffer immense and eternal torment as a consequence. The 
completely ignorant, on the other hand, are freed from this pain, since they never 
came to know their real perfection in the first place.280 Hence, according to Ibn Sīnā, 
“. . .foolishness is closer to salvation than deficient intelligence.”281 
As for the knowing but morally deficient souls, they are greatly harmed in the 
afterlife by their bodily desires due to the contrary nature of these desires to the soul’s 
intellectual perfection. But for Ibn Sīnā, the damage they have done to their souls is 
merely accidental, and hence their torment is not eternal, but they are gradually 
purified to reach their proper happiness.282 
In contrast to al-Fārābī even the ignorant souls might attain some degree of 
happiness in the afterlife, that is, if they are virtuous and hold to religious beliefs that 
are correct even in some kind of symbolic manner. At their deaths they would then 
actually imagine experiencing the kind of sensual pleasures they have been promised, 
possibly by the intermediacy of a celestial body, since they no longer possess bodies 
of their own by which to imagine or feel. Ibn Sīnā even allows the possibility that 
such new bodily connection might lead these souls in the end to be prepared for true 
non-bodily happiness. Similarly the immoral ignorant souls would imagine the 
sensual punishments promised to them in revelation.283 
But the language used in this context is very indecisive, and all of this is stated to 
be merely possible, rather than the certain philosophical truth. This theory would, 
however, first of all seem to contradict Ibn Sīnā’s repeated proofs on the impossibility 
of reincarnation.284 Ibn Sīnā’s uncertainty in this question is further emphasized by his 
statement in another context that at least some kind of ignorance leads to the complete 
destruction of the soul, which on the other hand contradicts his proofs on the 
indestructibility of human soul as a substance.285 
Therefore, as Davidson notes, Ibn Sīnā’s rationalization of the Quranic account of 
the afterlife might once more merely be meant to appease charges against religious 
unorthodoxy.286 However, whether or not Ibn Sīnā sincerely believes in his attempt to 
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explain revelatory depictions about sensual rewards and punishments in the afterlife, 
it is the purely spiritual kind of happiness that for him represents true salvation. 
While both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren employ more religious language to 
discuss the afterlife, ultimately their theories are quite similar to those of the 
Peripatetics, and probably influenced by al-Fārābī at least to some degree. Both of 
them, however, strongly reject such rationalists that refute the possibility of an 
afterlife altogether. Al-Kirmānī directs his attack specifically against Abū Bakr al-
Rāzī and the “materialists” (dahriyya) who are lured to the error of denying the 
afterlife by their complete reliance on their intellects and demonstrations.287 For al-
Kirmānī paradise (janna) is the eternal happiness that the virtuous soul enjoys in the 
spiritual world as a disembodied intellect. The pleasures enjoyed by those fortunate 
enough to attain this state are beyond description by words, and hence al-Kirmānī 
must resort to parables.288 
In describing the more unfortunate kinds of afterlife al-Kirmānī uses Quranic 
terminology, but substantially they are rather similar to those of al-Fārābī and Ibn 
Sīnā. The hypocrites (munāfiqūn) are those who only dissimulate belief and virtue in 
order to gain prestige, but who in reality are immersed in the pursuit of worldly 
things. In doing this they darken their souls and remain dependent on their bodies so 
that once their bodies die they fall into the “abysses of punishment and darkness.”289 
The immoral ones (fāsiqūn) have gained the knowledge, but still turn away from the 
truth to follow their natural desires. Thus, such a soul will attain two contrary forms 
(Ιuwar) in its indivisible essence, one through knowledge “binding it to the high stars 
and separate Intellects” and another through bodily desires, which resembles the 
“form of animals and beasts that do not worship their Lord.” In their contrariety they 
cause “indescribable pain” in the soul. The lost ones (Εāllūn) similarly turn away from 
the truth to follow false prophets or their own inclinations, and suffer torment in the 
hereafter as a consequence.290 
As for those simply ignorant of true knowledge and happiness, al-Kirmānī does 
not appear to state their fate explicitly. He does say, however, that the soul can only 
attain eternity (baqā’) through the knowledge that turns its essence into an actualized 
intellect, because only then it is protected from the alterations (istiΗāla) of the 
material sphere. At this point it is no longer harmed by the destruction of its body, just 
as a fully developed bird is no longer harmed by the breaking of the shell of its egg.291 
It would seem then that, as for al-Fārābī, for al-Kirmānī, the completely ignorant souls 
are destroyed altogether. On the other hand, he also states that those virtuous by 
nature will naturally revert to vices without external guidance,292 and thus without true 
knowledge the only eternity an unknowing soul could experience anyway would be a 
tormented one. 
As al-Kirmānī’s Rest of the Intellect, the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity are also 
oriented towards the afterlife throughout. In fact, as stated before, both of these works 
present themselves as guidebooks towards attaining salvation. Therefore the epistles 
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are filled with descriptions of the afterlife, and the eternal bliss or torment to which 
the soul is subjected. The Brethren are also equally vehement in refuting such 
“ignorant philosophers” who would go as far as to deny the existence of afterlife.293 
The purpose for which particular souls were placed in a body in the first place is for 
them to be perfected for their true existence in the afterlife. Paradoxically, it is only 
through bodily existence that particular souls can attain their eternal perfection, and to 
redeem the original sin of Adam that cast them into material existence.294 
As al-Kirmānī, the Brethren interpret paradise and hell allegorically, but for the 
Brethren paradise and hell are attached to their complex cosmological system, and the 
gradual reascent of the souls towards the spiritual world. Hell is composed of the 
seven concentric spheres of material world from the lowest depths of the center of 
earth, through the elements, up to the three kingdoms of minerals, plants, and animals, 
where man inhabits the highest level of hell. Paradise consists of eight degrees from 
the sphere of Moon, through the other planetary spheres, up till the outermost 
sphere.295 
Beyond this, the Brethren akin to al-Kirmānī also identify paradise with the 
ultimate happiness and eternal pleasures enjoyed by the virtuous soul in the afterlife, 
once it attains the highest level of Intellect. Hence, “true knowledge” of the bliss of 
paradise is for the particular soul to attain the degree of Universal Intellect: “. . . 
reinitiate its spiritual activity, leaving behind the activities of troubles and harshness 
once it departs the corporeal world, . . . [to enjoy] eternity in the paradise and 
proximity of the majestic and noble Merciful, ascend in degrees, and attain the most 
complete happiness.”296 For the Brethren, such souls are potential angels that become 
actual ones upon the death of their bodies. When bodily death overtakes them their 
souls are received by the angels, or the “spirits” (rūΗāniyyāt) of Venus and Mercury to 
be more precise, and they will enjoy “. . . such bliss and joy that no eye has seen and 
no ear has heard.”297 
As for the vicious souls that have not perfected themselves in either knowledge or 
morality, but have thrown themselves into the worldly pleasures instead, their fate is 
eternal torment. In contrast to potential angels, they are potential demons (shayΛān bi-
´l-quwwa) transformed into actual demons when their bodies perish. These are the two 
extremes that man may attain through his endeavours in this world, which determine 
the kind of afterlife that his soul will endure. While the angelic souls are released 
                                                 
293 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 297-301. 
294 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 328-9; III (42), pp. 491-3; Jāmi‘a, pp. 308-10; Marquet 1973, pp. 210-2. 
The original sin of spiritual Adam (Ādam al-rūΗānī) was the desire to know God directly, without the 
intermediacy of Intellect, whereas terrestrial Adam reproduced the error of his archetype in the lower 
world. 
295 Marquet 1973, p. 207. 
296 “ista’nafat al-‘amal al-rūḥānī wa-fāraqat ‘amal al-taklīf wa-´l-‘unf ‘inda mufāraqat ‘ālam al-ajsām . . 
. wa-´l-khulūd fī al-jinān wa-mujāwarat al-Raḥmān dhī al-jalāl wa-´l-ikrām wa-´l-taraqqī fī al-darajāt 
wa-´l-bulūgh ilā atamm al-sa‘ādāt.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 53. 
297 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 319-20. For the Brethren the soul’s salvation is a also personal one, for the soul 
retains its “spiritual accidents” (al-a‘rāΕ al-rūΗāniyya), such as movement, life, knowledge (‘ilm), and 
speech (nuΛq), while the “corporeal accidents” (al-a‘rāΕ al-jismāniyya) perish together with the body. 
See, Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 377-8. 
 82
through the world of spheres to the spiritual world, the demonic souls will remain in 
the sublunar world of generation and corruption residing in eternal misery.298 
Their torment consists of the desire of sensual pleasures that have become their 
nature, but which they, once cut off from their bodies and lacking bodily organs, are 
no longer able to fulfil. On the other hand, they are equally incapable of attaining the 
intelligible pleasures of the other world. Such souls are left without the rewards of 
either world at their death, for they lose the worldly joys without gaining the 
immensely greater ones of hereafter.299 The otherworldly bliss and torment are further 
augmented by the contemplation of the now disembodied souls of their own essences, 
which were moulded by the kinds of actions they performed during their bodily lives. 
For the virtuous souls this essence is a “luminous and brilliant spiritual form” upon 
whose contemplation the soul is overwhelmed with joy, while the vicious souls have 
to face their “ugly and loathsome form” from which they have no escape.300 
In order to make their polarized picture of angels and demons a little more subtle, 
the Brethren give a few exemptions from the punishment of eternal torment. First they 
state that the souls of children and the insane are saved by the intercession of their 
parents and the prophets.301 Also exempted are the souls of those who have correctly 
followed the exoteric aspect of religion without grasping its inner esoteric meanings 
concerning the spiritual reality. Such souls are said to retain their human form (Ιūra 
insāniyya) upon the death of their bodies, thus lying between the angelic form gained 
by the virtuous and the animal form of the non-virtuous.302 
Although the Brethren do not say that these souls are then united with new bodies, 
all this would seem to imply the doctrine of transmigration, giving such souls another 
opportunity to purify themselves and attain salvation. Considering their Pythagorean-
Platonic inclinations, such a doctrine would fit in perfectly within the Brethren’s 
philosophy.303 Unlike for al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, or al-Kirmānī, for the Brethren the 
particular souls are not only post-existent, but they also pre-exist their bodies, thus 
raising the question of the souls’ status before their union with the bodies.304 
There are also many passages in the Epistles that give the impression of 
reincarnation, without stating it explicitly.305 While some scholars therefore believe 
that the Brethren profess the doctrine of transmigration, Netton among others denies 
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this.306 This is supported by the fact that when the Brethren discuss the supporters of 
reincarnation (ahl al-tanāsukh), they do not appear to count themselves among them. 
But according to Marquet, the Brethren in these passages only refute the “Brahmani” 
kind of transmigration, while they profess another kind themselves. 
In their view the sublunar world forms a continuous hierarchy of existents from 
the center of the earth through the minerals, plants, and animals up to man, where the 
highest of each class approaches to the lowest specimen of the higher class. The 
particular souls originally descend to the stage corresponding to their degree of 
“error” in this hierarchy. Now paradise also has the meaning of “highest degree” (al-
martaba al-‘ulyā), and hence each stage of existents in the sublunar world has its own 
paradise: the paradise of plant soul is the animal form, that of animal soul the human 
form, and that of human soul the angelic form.307 
Hence, it would seem that the Brethren believe in some kind of reincarnation of 
souls, where the souls gradually ascend from one degree to another, until they finally 
attain the human form, and are ready to be released to the world of spheres, provided 
they have attained a sufficient degree of perfection during their bodily sojourn.308 
A major difference for al-Kirmānī and the Brethren with respect to the Peripatetics 
concerning the afterlife is that for them the attainment of otherworldly happiness is 
related to a temporal eschatological event. For both of them the final judgment of 
souls takes place at the coming of the day of resurrection, in contrast to the 
Peripatetics for whom the liberation of souls from matter to their respective afterlives 
appears to take place perpetually in a temporally eternal universe. 
For the Brethren this event of greater resurrection (al-qiyāma kubrā) represents the 
consummation of cosmological history. In analogy with the microcosmic lesser 
resurrection (al-qiyāma al-Ιughrā) occurring at the death of human body, it is then 
that Universal Soul is finally perfected in its reascent to the Intellect, and it can leave 
the body of the world, thus leading to the destruction of the material world.309 When 
the ascent of the Soul is brought to its perfection, evil disappears, and the world 
becomes good and happy in its totality.310 
The day of resurrection is further connected to the changing of the cycle of 
occultation (dawr al-satr) into the cycle of manifestation (dawr al-kashf) after the 
coming of the seventh and final leader (al-ra’īs al-sābi‘), also called the ‘pure soul’ 
(al-nafs al-zakiyya) by the Brethren.311 It is then that Universal Soul passes the final 
judgment between the particular souls, and the totality of particular souls are gathered 
together in order to return to the Universal Soul to enjoy the most absolute kind of 
happiness. This is the occurrence of second creation (al-nash’a al-thāniya/al-nash’a 
al-ākhira/al-khalq al-thānī), when the creation returns a full swing back to its initial 
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state of harmony.312 Since both evil and corporeality, which is the definition of hell 
for the Brethren, cease to exist, after the greater resurrection the imperfect souls 
apparently will disappear into nothingness. 
The parallel in the eschatology of the Brethren of Purity with al-Kirmānī’s Ismaili 
eschatology is obvious up to the terminology used. The resurrection (qiyāma/ba‘th) 
follows the consummation of cycles at the coming of the leader of the seventh and 
final cycle (ΙāΗib al-dawr al-sābi‘), that is, the qā’im or the pure soul (al-nafs al-
zakiyya), with whom all knowledge contained in the previous cycles will come into 
open both in its exoteric and esoteric form. Then as people will be illuminated by his 
knowledge, knowledge and happiness will prevail due to the great number of its 
possessors, while ignorance will nearly pass away completely.313 
Since al-Kirmānī vigorously denies transmigration, the souls dying before 
resurrection will have to wait for the completion of cycles in an “isthmus” (barzakh), 
knowing in their essence, however, whether they belong among the saved or lost ones. 
When the new creation (al-khalq al-jadīd/al-nash’a al-ākhira) finally befalls the 
world, all souls from the beginning until end of time are gathered together, and are 
judged according to their merits. It is then that the holy spirit (rūΗ al-qudus) will flow 
from the qā’im to the souls enabling them to pass to the spiritual sphere, and all 
virtuous souls will share the same form as if together forming one single soul.314 This 
is the final form of ultimate happiness that those saved to the eternal life will enjoy. 
4.5 Happiness and practical perfection 
In the preceding outline happiness appears to conform to the contemplative ideal, in 
which human perfection consists of the perfection of man’s theoretical intellect, 
through which the human soul is eventually transformed into a pure intellect 
unrestrained by corporeality. As stated above, this contemplative idea of happiness is 
in the end otherworldly in orientation, since it is only in the afterlife that the human 
rational soul becomes completely free to pursue its purely spiritual and intellectual 
existence. 
For none of the four philosophers, however, is happiness in this world a matter of 
mere contemplation. In addition to theoretical perfection, happiness consists of the 
practical perfection of morality and virtue, and as we have seen, mere theoretical 
perfection without its practical counterpart does not lead the soul to happiness in the 
hereafter. But even so, morality essentially appears as a means for turning away from 
the sensible level of existence to a purely contemplative one, while ultimate happiness 
as the very final goal of existence is purely contemplative. Therefore, practical 
morality would appear as subservient to a higher perfection, rather than the highest 
goal itself. Since the questions of virtue and morality are connected to materiality and 
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corporeality, and to the way that the human soul responds to them during its bodily 
existence, in an afterlife of pure intellects virtue no longer has much meaning.315  
Nevertheless, in order to attain happiness, man must be perfected morally as well. 
Happiness as the perfection of the rational soul entails the perfection of both of its 
constituent parts, theoretical and practical. The highest good of the contemplative 
happiness corresponds to the perfection of theoretical reason, while moral perfection 
corresponds to the perfection of practical reason, since it is the nature of theoretical 
intellect to conceive the intelligible nature of reality, whereas practical intellect is 
concerned with the particular actions of the human world.316 
Moreover, in the practice of philosophy the first may be equated with theoretical 
philosophy, which provides the intelligible knowledge needed for an ascent to 
contemplative happiness, and the second with practical philosophy, which provides 
the means for attainment of morality. 317  But the goals of practical intellect and 
practical philosophy are subordinate to the highest theoretical goal, which is the final 
goal of human existence, as al-Fārābī states explicitly.318 Similarly for Ibn Sīnā the 
perfection of theoretical intellect is the ultimate human goal, while practical intellect 
should be subjugated to the service of the theoretical intellect and its perfection.319 
But in the case of al-Fārābī in particular, not everyone agrees that he endorses a 
purely contemplative view of happiness ultimately oriented towards the afterlife. Ibn 
Bājja and Ibn Ṭufayl, two Andalusian philosophers succeeding al-Fārābī by two 
centuries, claim al-Fārābī in his lost commentary on Nicomachean Ethics to have 
gone as far as to state that the soul has no afterlife, there is no existence besides 
sensory existence, and the only happiness man could ever have is political happiness 
(al-sa‘āda al-madaniyya) as part of a human community.320 
However, such a completely materialistic perception of happiness does not fit at 
all into the general picture of al-Fārābī’s philosophy, and can therefore only be 
regarded with scepticism due to a lack of further evidence. While in most of his works 
al-Fārābī on the contrary clearly supports a contemplative ideal of happiness, even in 
some of his existing works al-Fārābī does, however, give more emphasis to its 
practical side such as it appears in the worldly life, as when portraying the prophet, in 
whom both theoretical and practical perfection are culminated, as an embodiment of 
ultimate happiness. 
                                                 
315 The question whether the Intellects of the higher world possess such human virtues as courage or 
justice is dealt with, for example, by al-Kirmānī (RāΗa, pp. 571-2), who denies that such moral virtues 
could be attributed to the Intellects. 
316 See, al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, p. 218; Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī ‘ilm al-akhlāq, p. 115; Ζāl al-nafs al-
insāniyya, pp. 134-5; De Smet 1995, pp. 353-4. 
317 But since theoretical perfection ends up also containing knowledge related to practical philosophy, 
such as the true nature of happiness, the correspondence is not as clear-cut as this. 
318 Al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, p. 73. 
319 See, e.g., Ibn Sīnā, Ζāl al-nafs al-insāniyya, p. 68. This seems to be the case even if at times Ibn 
Sīnā (Mabda’, p. 110) gives a more dualistic definition of happiness as consisting of the soul 
“becoming an intelligible world with respect to the perfection of its proper essence, whereas its 
happiness with respect to the relationship that it has with the body consists of acquiring the dominating 
form” (sa‘ādat al-nafs fī kamāl dhātihā min al-jiha allatī takhuΙΙuhā huwa Ιayrūratuhā ‘ālaman 
‘aqliyyan wa-sa‘ādatuhā min jihat al-‘alāqa allatī baynahā wa-bayna al-badan an yakūn lahā al-hay’a 
al-istīlā’iyya). Even here the soul’s governance of the body seems to be an instrumental good leading 
towards the absolute good of purely intelligible existence. 
320 Galston 1990, pp. 59-60. 
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For this reason some have tended towards interpreting al-Fārābī’s view of 
happiness as involving both theoretical and practical perfection to an equal degree, or 
even to be of predominantly practical or political nature.321 But it would seem that 
even in the case of al-Fārābī as the most rationalistic of philosophers, the 
overwhelming evidence of his works suggests that he views happiness to be of a 
contemplative-theoretical nature. What is equally clear, however, is that al-Fārābī 
more than anyone else emphasizes the impossibility of an isolated theoretical 
perfection in this world, without the presence of its counterpart in practical perfection. 
On the one hand, cultivating virtue and morality is a prerequisite for attaining the 
ultimate happiness of theoretical perfection, and on the other, theoretical perfection 
that does not culminate in political action is useless. Therefore, even if in the end 
happiness consists of pure intellection of spiritual substances, in the worldly life the 
philosophical road to happiness is one where morality and knowledge are seamlessly 
bound to one another. 
                                                 
321 See, the discussion in Galston 1990, pp. 56-94 and Galston’s own argument for practical perfection 
as a constitutive part of happiness in Galston 1992. 
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5 Happiness and philosophy 
5.1 Philosophical life 
Since happiness for the philosophers is the highest good which man can attain, it is 
only natural that it should also be the final goal of the practice of philosophy. In 
principle, philosophy leads towards both the theoretical and moral perfection involved 
in the quest for happiness, since theoretical philosophy provides the knowledge 
required for intellectual perfection and practical philosophy the principles towards 
moral virtue. Therefore the idea of philosophy transcends that of a merely theoretical 
discipline with the objective of gathering knowledge of the world, to be also a 
spiritual path leading its practitioner towards happiness and salvation. 
Of the works investigated in this study such spiritual dimension of philosophy is 
particularly evident in the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity and al-Kirmānī’s Rest of 
the Intellect, both of which present themselves as guides for one embarking on a 
spiritual road towards ultimate happiness. But it is also present in the Peripatetic 
philosophy of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Viewed from the perspective of happiness as its 
end, philosophy emerges as a special way of life leading its practitioner towards the 
ultimate target of human existence. 
While happiness is the perfection proper to a human being, unlike the lower 
irrational creatures of the sublunar world, man does not attain his perfection by nature, 
but only through his own free choice. He must both become aware of the true nature 
of happiness and make an active decision to pursue it.322 Once he has made the 
choice, he also must come to know the means by which he is able to progress towards 
happiness, and to implement those ways in his own life. All this together would seem 
to constitute the philosophical life – that is a way of life whose guiding lines are born 
as a result of philosophical reflection, as opposed to being merely arbitrary, and 
towards a goal that is considered to be the greatest possible good for man. 
Since the highest goal is essentially contemplative, the philosophical way of life 
may be characterized first and foremost as a contemplative life, of which the 
acquisition of knowledge forms the primary element.323 But since happiness in the 
material world cannot be attained by contemplation alone, without simultaneous 
moral rectification of the soul, the philosophical life in the end consists of a dual 
pursuit of knowledge and virtue. The philosophical life appears then in contrast 
especially to a purely hedonistic life of chasing immediate sensual pleasures, or the 
‘beastly life’ (al-sīra al-bahīmiyya) of ignorance and vice, over which al-Fārābī’s 
Plato would prefer death.324 
                                                 
322 See, e.g., al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, pp. 71-2. Men are in fact the only beings who can 
choose whether to pursue their proper perfection or not. Irrational creatures proceed towards their 
perfection by nature, whereas the angelic beings of the higher world are perfect to begin with. 
323According to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, I.v., 1095b17-19), the three main ways of life (bioi) 
that man can pursue are a hedonistic life of enjoyment, a political life, and a contemplative life (bios 
theōrētikos). 
324  Al-Fārābī, Falsafat AflāΛūn, pp. 17-8. Compare Ibn Sīnā’s contrast between the “intellectual 
adolescents” (Ιibyān al-‘uqūl) reveling in worldly and bodily pleasures and the truly happy who have 
been liberated from matter (takhallaΙū ‘an al-mādda) to enjoy the supreme intelligible pleasure. Ibn 
Sīnā, al-Mabda’, p. 114; Ishārāt, IV, p. 74. 
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The idea of philosophy as a way of life is a commonplace for students of classical 
philosophy. Pierre Hadot is particularly famous for painting in his works a picture of 
late Antique philosophy as a special way of life.325 For Hadot all four of the major 
philosophical schools prevailing in the Hellenistic period — Aristotelianism, 
Platonism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism — portray an idea of philosophy as a spiritual 
progression towards an ideal state of wisdom, involving both rational contemplation 
of the world and spiritual exercises aimed at self-control. Philosophy as love of 
wisdom focuses on a vision of the world as seen by the intellect, and entails a way of 
living according to that wisdom, aiming to transform the whole being of the 
philosopher. 
The practical aspect of philosophy involves not only ethics, which properly 
investigates the way man should live his life, but all parts of philosophy, even logic 
and physics. For Hadot, the final goal of such philosophy is not the theory and 
philosophical doctrines that it generates, but the soul’s spiritual progress that is 
attained through their contemplation.326 Even in Aristotelianism, the most ‘scientific’ 
of the four schools of philosophy, theoretical activity is portrayed as a life of 
contemplation, bringing about happiness and near-divine pleasure in the philosopher. 
Each philosophical tradition further portrays in its own terms the philosopher-sage as 
an almost unrealizable ideal of being, the perfect man that the student of philosophy 
should strive to emulate. 
Hadot’s view of philosophy as a way of life has been explored surprisingly little 
with respect to the Arabic philosophical tradition, despite the fact that the Arabic 
philosophers quite clearly adopt this classical perception of philosophy.327 The idea of 
the philosophical life has been investigated from the perspective of single authors in a 
number of brief articles. Chittick notes the similarity of Hadot’s teachings of 
philosophy as a spiritual quest to the thought of “Bābā” Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī (d. 
1214). 328  Lewin briefly surveys the ideal of the philosophical life in Arabic 
philosophy from the perspective of the treatise on the ideal philosopher by the 
Baghdad Peripatetic Ibn Suwār (d. ca. 1017).329 Griffith explores the theme based on 
the ethical writings of another philosopher from the Baghdad Peripatetic school, al-
Fārābī’s Christian pupil Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī (d. 974), concentrating mainly on the 
question of sexual abstinence.330 
For Hadot the philosopher living a life guided by wisdom appears as an anomaly 
in a society guided by conventional morality, resulting in a rupture between a 
philosophical and a common way of life, best exemplified in the life and fate of 
                                                 
325 Hadot 1995; Hadot 2002. 
326  According to the Neoplatonist Porphyry (d. ca. 305 CE), hence, the essence of the kind of 
contemplation (theōria) that brings happiness is not learning abstract doctrines, even true ones, but of 
ensuring that the teachings become “nature and life” within us. See, Hadot 1995, p. 100. 
327 Vallat (2008) has also recently pondered in an on-line article the question of why Hadot’s ideas have 
not been applied to classical Arabic philosophy, suggesting the absence of lavish biographies of the 
philosophers akin to the Greek Neoplatonists as one explanation. His article does not, however, so 
much delineate what the philosophical life would consist of in Arabic philosophy, as it explains why 
the classical ideal became truncated in the Islamic context. 
328 Chittick 2000. 
329 Lewin 1955. The treatise, translated by Lewin from an unedited manuscript, is entitled Treatise on 
the Qualities of the Philosopher (Maqāla fī Ιifat al-rajul al-faylasūf). 
330 Griffith 2006. 
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Socrates. Leo Strauss, a student of both Greek and Arabic philosophy, comes close to 
Hadot in his view of pre-modern philosophy as a special way of life of the elect, 
although for him the conflict between philosophy and society is much more central.331 
Among the scholars of Islamic history, Hodgson in particular, although not a 
specialist on philosophy, has observed how the tradition of falsafa carries on the 
classical idea of philosophy as much more than a purely academic discipline. For him 
the philosophers form a relatively cohesive group of people unified by their practice 
of the philosophical and natural sciences. But even more than the practice of certain 
intellectual sciences, the word philosophy implies a philosophical approach to living, 
a rationally based life apparent both in the seeking of rational knowledge about the 
world and the ideal of governing oneself and others according to rational principles. 
As for the Greek philosophers, the true philosopher is an elusive ideal of a perfect 
man who fully realizes the philosophical ideal in his being.332 
The one Arabic text in which philosophy is most clearly and explicitly portrayed 
as a way of life (sīra) oriented towards the greatest human good is a short treatise 
called Philosophical life (Kitāb al-sīra al-falsafiyya) by the early unorthodox 
philosopher Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. ca. 925).333 The starting point of al-Rāzī’s ethical 
treatise is apologetic in that al-Rāzī attempts to prove in it against his unnamed 
opponents that his own life has been a philosophical one, and that he therefore 
deserves the title of philosopher at least as much as any of his contemporaries. Al-
Rāzī’s treatise depicts a view of philosophy that is composed as much of practice as of 
theory, consisting of the dual way of knowledge and virtue. 
Philosophy is exemplified more than anything in the figure of Socrates, the imam 
of the philosophers, who embodies the philosophical ideal both in his quest for 
knowledge and in the ascetic practice of his life.334 Although al-Rāzī does not allege 
to have reached the level of this paradigm of philosophical life, he still claims to have 
lived in a way that embraces both sides that constitute philosophy: knowledge (‘ilm) 
and practice (‘amal). He points out to the innumerable treatises that he has written on 
all possible branches of the philosophical sciences to demonstrate that his level of 
knowledge is worthy of a philosopher.335 But al-Rāzī is even more passionate to prove 
that his way of life, governed by the principles of justice and moderate asceticism, is 
worthy of a philosopher. 
Arabic philosophers in general adopt a view akin to al-Rāzī’s of philosophy as an 
enterprise of double nature consisting of both a theoretical and practical aspect. Like 
the Greek Aristotelians and Neoplatonists before them, Arabic philosophers employ 
various definitions of philosophy, many of them borrowed from among those favored 
                                                 
331 See, chapter 2.2 above.  
332 Hodgson 1974, I, pp. 418ff.  
333 Al-Rāzī, Kitāb al-sīra al-falsafiyya. 
334 Al-Rāzī, however, argues against those whom he believes to exaggerate Socrates’ ascetic practices, 
and claims that any excesses that Socrates’ way of life might have embraced were caused by his 
youthful zeal, while at a more mature age he toned them down towards the ideal of moderation. In 
Arabic tradition the figure of Socrates often blends with the Cynic Diogenes, and is hence portrayed as 
the ideal of ascesis par excellence. For the Arabic Socrates, see Alon 1990. 
335 Al-Rāzī was a popular object of criticism for his heterodox views to such Ismaili philosophers as 
Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī and al-Kirmānī, among others. But he was also criticized by many philosophers, 
such as al-‘Āmirī and Maimonides, who did not hold his philosophical contributions in very high 
esteem.  
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in the late Greek Neoplatonic school of Alexandria in particular.336 Most of these 
definitions embody the view of philosophy as a practical discipline. Many of the 
Arabic definitions of philosophy moreover incorporate the idea of philosophy as a 
dual path of theory and practice, emphasizing the necessity of the theoretical 
knowledge acquired from the philosophical sciences being actualized in one’s actions. 
Among the early philosophers al-Kindī, while initially defining philosophy 
theoretically as the “knowledge of the true natures of things according to human 
capacity”, states the goal of the philosopher to be to “reach the truth in his knowledge 
and act according to it in his actions.”337 Al-‘Āmirī, a younger follower of al-Kindī, 
emphasizes the practical aspect of philosophy even more vehemently. Firstly he 
echoes al-Kindī in stating that man is endowed with the faculty of reason in order for 
him to both know the truth and act in accordance with the truth. He further argues 
against such philosophers and Ismailis whom he accuses of considering pre-eminence 
in knowledge to exempt them from virtuous actions, in particular the ones stipulated 
by religious law, that knowledge is only completed through action. Knowledge, far 
from being the final end in itself, is pursued for the sake of virtuous actions in the first 
place.338 
For al-Fārābī the practical nature of philosophy is particularly visible in the bulk 
of his writings, in which practical philosophy occupies a more central position than in 
any other Arabic philosopher. However, he also places more emphasis on the 
actualization of philosophical knowledge at the level of a political community, 
besides that of individual moral action. Al-Fārābī echoes al-Kindī’s double definition 
of philosophy as both true knowledge and true action in stating philosophy to consist 
of acquisition of theoretical knowledge (al-‘ulūm al-naΝariyya) on the one hand, and 
good actions on the other.339 In his introduction to the study of philosophy he also 
states the final goal of philosophical learning to be two-fold: knowledge of the Creator 
as the culmination of theoretical knowledge and the good actions performed by the 
philosopher.340 
While the core of philosophy of course consists of acquisition of theoretical 
knowledge, or true intelligible knowledge about the world, al-Fārābī goes a long way 
to emphasize that abstract knowledge alone does not constitute true philosophy. As 
for al-Rāzī, only one who embodies philosophy in both theory and practice can truly 
                                                 
336 For the six standard Alexandrian definitions of philosophy, and their afterlife in Syriac and Arabic 
literature, see, Hein 1985, pp. 86-130. 
337 “gharaḍ al-faylasūf fī ‘ilmihi iṣābat al-ḥaqq wa-fī ‘amalihi al-‘amal bi-´l-ḥaqq.” Al-Kindī, Kitāb al-
Kindī ilā al-Mu‘taΙim bi-´llāh fī al-falsafa al-ūlā, p. 9. Al-Kindī shows his familiarity with various 
further definitions of philosophy favored by the “ancients” in his Risālat al-Kindī fī Ηudūd al-ashyā’ 
wa-rusūmihā, pp. 172-4. 
338 “Knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the completion of knowledge” (al-‘ilm mabda’ 
li-´l-‘amal wa-´l-‘amal tamām al-‘ilm). Al-‘Āmirī, Kitāb al-i‘lām bi-manāqib al-islām, pp. 77-8. 
339 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl al-madanī, p. 170 [= FuΙūl muntaza‘a, p. 100]. “Philosophy, according to the first 
opinion and in reality is for man to acquire the theoretical sciences/knowledge, and for all of his actions 
to become harmonious with what is good according to the first [unexamined] common opinion and 
[what is good] in reality” (al-falsafa fī bādī al-ra’y fī al-Ηaqīqa hiya an yaΗΙul li-´l-insān al-‘ulūm al-
naΝariyya wa-an takūn af‘āluhu kulluhā muwāfiqa li-mā huwa jamīl fī bādī al-ra’y al-mushtarak wa-fī 
al-Ηaqīqa). Al-Fārābī does not consider the commonly held idea of good to be identical with what is 
good in reality, but one who acts contrary to the common opinion of good is less likely to perform truly 
good actions. 
340 Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī, p. 13. 
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call oneself a philosopher. Therefore, someone who has acquired even the totality of 
theoretical knowledge, but who is not virtuous in his actions, is merely a false 
philosopher (al-faylasūf al-bahraj). This is because he has not yet come to realize the 
real goal for which philosophy is practiced in the first place, that is, true happiness, 
and hence pursues his own sensual desires or some other vain goals instead. 
Therefore, even if he is capable of acquiring theoretical knowledge, such knowledge 
will dwindle away from him by old age unattached as it is to any higher purpose.341 
Given a choice between an immoral man who knows his Aristotle to perfection, and a 
virtuous man who is completely ignorant about Aristotle, al-Fārābī claims the second 
to be closer to being a philosopher.342 
But al-Fārābī goes further than al-Rāzī in extending the practical qualifications of 
a philosopher to his social function in a society. For al-Fārābī a philosopher who fails 
to impart his excellence to others, at least to the degree that is possible for him in the 
circumstances, is a useless philosopher (al-faylasūf al-bāΛil), despite all his superior 
knowledge and morality. Al-Fārābī’s perfect philosopher is one who possesses both 
complete theoretical and practical virtue, as well as the capability to convey as much 
as possible of his perfection to others by political means.343 
For al-Fārābī too then philosophy in the end comes to form a whole way of life, 
which consists of the pursuit of both theoretical knowledge and practical virtue, with 
contemplative happiness as its final goal. Philosophy forms a path by which one 
gradually ascends towards theoretical and moral perfection. In al-Fārābī’s prologue to 
philosophy the path of the philosophical initiate (al-sabīl allatī yaslukuhā man arāda 
al-falsafa) is portrayed again as one in which theory and practice are intimately 
wedded. The philosophical way consists of aspiring for both knowledge (‘ilm) and 
practice (‘amal) until the philosopher reaches perfection in both. 
But the two spheres of philosophy are not separate from each other, for the actions 
are based on knowledge. As for al-‘Āmirī, the philosophical venture towards virtuous 
action takes place through acquisition of knowledge, while knowledge is only truly 
completed in actions.344 These two together, theoretical knowledge of the world and a 
virtuous way of life (sīra fāΕila), are what al-Fārābī claims Plato to have found to be 
required for the attainment of happiness. After careful examination of all practical arts 
and theoretical sciences professed by people, al-Fārābī’s Plato discovers that it is only 
philosophy that provides the knowledge of both of those two requirements for 
happiness.345 
Hence, al-Fārābī’s perception of philosophy emerges as something much more 
than theoretical knowledge even of the most general kind. Just as for al-Fārābī the 
perfected philosopher represents the peak of the hierarchy of humankind, similarly 
true philosophy is situated at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge. Philosophy is the 
queen of all theoretical sciences and practical arts, to whose leadership all other forms 
of knowledge should be subjected. While other sciences and arts are perfectly valid in 
their pursuit of some partial goal of a theoretical or practical nature, philosophy as the 
                                                 
341 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 191-4. 
342 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl al-madanī, pp. 169-70 [= FuΙūl muntaza‘a, p. 100]. 
343 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 183-4, 187ff. However, the unfortunate circumstances where the surrounding 
society is not prepared to heed his instruction does not diminish his status as a philosopher. 
344 “tamām al-‘ilm bi-´l-‘amal.” Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī, pp. 2, 13. 
345 Al-Fārābī, Falsafat AflāΛūn. 
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absolute wisdom (al-Ηikma ‘alā al-iΛlāq) is oriented towards the good (jamīl) itself, 
the good of both knowledge and action. Since the truly good things are gained through 
philosophy, according to al-Fārābī, philosophy necessarily must also be the way by 
which ultimate happiness is attained.346  
Ibn Sīnā shares the idea about philosophy as a discipline consisting of both 
knowledge and action, as well as the idea that the practice of philosophy will 
ultimately bring one happiness. Ibn Sīnā gives a long and unique definition of 
philosophy (Ηikma) in his classification of the philosophical sciences, which perfectly 
represents the idea of philosophy as a practical discipline leading man towards his 
perfection in both theory and practice. According to Ibn Sīnā, the essence of 
philosophy is “. . . a speculative discipline from which man attains actualization 
through the knowledge of all existence in his soul, and the knowledge of the actions 
he must take to ennoble his soul, in order for him to be perfected and become an 
intelligible world corresponding to the existing world, and to be prepared for ultimate 
happiness in the afterlife.”347 
Ibn Sīnā therefore defines the essential nature of philosophy explicitly through its 
ultimate purpose of conveying its practitioner towards the final goal of happiness, and 
in particular to prepare him for the ultimate bliss in the afterlife. Both the theoretical 
and practical knowledge that philosophy provides are seen as instrumental for the 
final goal of soul’s ascent. In the Healing Ibn Sīnā defines both parts of philosophy 
through their functional role in the acquisition of happiness. Hence, theoretical 
philosophy includes the sciences that seek to perfect the theoretical faculty of the soul 
through actualizing the intellect by means of knowledge concerning the external 
reality, whereas practical philosophy seeks to perfect it through knowledge related to 
man’s actions. While philosophy then provides the knowledge about what brings 
about man’s final perfection, in its practical part such knowledge must also be 
actualized for it to become reality. Hence, for Ibn Sīnā the objective of practical 
philosophy is not knowledge of the good, but action based on such knowledge, that is, 
the good itself.348 
As for al-Fārābī then, ultimate happiness is gained through the combination of 
knowledge and action, which comprises the core of philosophical life. These together 
form the dual path of what Ibn Sīnā in one of his treatises calls the theoretical and 
practical purification of the soul (al-tazkiyya al-‘ilmiyya/‘amaliyya). The first of these 
consists of the practice of the theoretical philosophical sciences (al-‘ulūm al-Ηikmiyya 
al-naΝariyya), while the second is composed of both the practice of philosophical 
ethics and the adherence to religious observances, for which Ibn Sīnā grants a larger 
                                                 
346 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 181-3; Tanbīh, pp. 20-1. 
347 “al-ḥikma ṣinā‘at naԘar yastafīd minhā al-insān taḥṣīl mā ‘alayhi al-wujūd kullahu fī nafsihi wa-mā 
‘alayhi al-wājib mimmā yanbaghī an yuksīhi fi‘lahu li-tusharrif bi-dhālika nafsahu wa-tastakmil wa-
taṣīr ‘ālaman ma‘qūlan muḍāhiyan li-´l-‘ālam al-mawjūd wa-tasta‘idd li-´l-sa‘āda al-quṣwā bi-´l-ākhira 
wa-dhālika bi-ḥasab al-ṭāqa al-insāniyya.” Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām, pp. 104-5. 
348 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 2; Aqsām, p. 105. This may be compared with Miskawayh’s (d. 1030) 
statement in Degrees of Happiness (Tartīb al-sa‘ādāt) [cited and translated in Gutas 1983, p. 232]: 
“Whoever wishes to perfect himself as a human being . . ., let him acquire these two arts – I mean the 
theoretical and practical parts of philosophy; as a result, there will accrue to him the essential natures of 
things by means of the theoretical part, and good deeds by means of the practical part.”  
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role in the practice of the philosopher than the more rationalistically oriented al-
Fārābī.349 
For both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā then philosophical knowledge in the end has an 
ultimately Gnostic purpose: it is saving knowledge that leads man towards his 
ultimate happiness, understood as salvation of the soul to eternal existence. This 
Gnostic idea of philosophical knowledge is best epitomized in the contents of al-
Fārābī’s work by the title Attainment of Happiness, of which the first part rather 
surprisingly deals with the parts of theoretical philosophy, or in Ibn Sīnā’s statement 
that “all the sciences share in one benefit – namely, the attainment of the human 
soul’s perfection in act, preparing it for the happiness in the hereafter.”350 
There is one further definition of philosophy adopted from the Greek 
Neoplatonists that rather well characterizes the transcendent ideal of Arabic 
philosophy, when viewed as a comprehensive spiritual path towards human 
perfection. Al-Kindī, al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī, and the Brethren of Purity all at one time or 
another define philosophy as man’s divinization, or as “. . . becoming like god as 
much as is possible for man.”351 The definition is derived from Plato’s Theatetus, and 
was particularly dear to Greek Neoplatonists, pertaining to the six standard 
Alexandrian definitions of philosophy.352 
Perceiving philosophy as imitatio dei can refer to both the theoretical and practical 
aspects of philosophy, that is, grasping the totality of intelligible knowledge and thus 
becoming like the semi-divine Intellects, or becoming god-like in one’s actions as a 
result of moral perfection. While al-Kindī and al-Fārābī state the goal to be for man to 
become like God in his actions, Ibn Sīnā expresses it in terms of both theoretical and 
practical perfection. On the one hand, in transforming himself to an “intelligible 
world” man imitates the First Principle in his knowledge, while on the other in 
acquiring just actions he imitates God in his actions.353 
The Brethren of Purity also understand the definition of philosophy as a 
resemblance of God to refer to both its theoretical and practical part: “We mean by 
resemblance resemblance in knowledge, actions, and emanation of goodness, for the 
Creator is the most knowing of all savants, wisest of all sages, best in his actions, and 
the most virtuous in goodness, and anyone who advances his degree in these things 
becomes closer to God.”354 Such a view of philosophy goes back to both Aristotelian 
and Platonic traditions, since for Aristotle it is the highest goal of man to live a life 
                                                 
349 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-kalām ‘alā al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, pp. 196-7. 
350 “inna al-‘ulūm kulluhā tashtarik fī manfa‘a wāḥida hiya: taḥṣīl kamāl al-nafs al-insāniyya bi-´l-fi‘l 
muhayyi’a iyyāhā li-´l-sa‘āda al-ukhrawiyya.” Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 13. 
351 “al-tashabbuh bi-ilāh (or: bi-´llāh/bi-af’āl Allāh) bi-qadr mā fī ṭāqat al-insān.” Al-Kindī, Risālat al-
Kindī fī Ηudūd al-ashyā’ wa-rusūmihā, pp. 172-4; Al-Rāzī, Kitāb al-sīra al-falsafiyya, p. 108; al-
Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī, p. 13; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (5), p. 225; I (10), p. 399. 
352 See, Hein 1985, pp. 99-100, 116. According to Plato (Theatetus, 176b; Republic, X, 613B), the 
highest virtue for man is to “become like god as much as is possible for man” (hoson dunaton anthrōpō 
homoiousthai theō). The Brethren of Purity are particularly fond of this Platonic quotation, and they 
refer to it frequently throughout the Epistles. For the treatment of the passage by the Brethren as both a 
definition and Platonic quotation, see, Baffioni 1997, pp. 479ff.  
353 Ibn Sīnā, Mabda’, pp. 97-8; Risāla fī al-‘ishq, pp. 25-6. 
354 “aradnā bi-´l-tashabbuh al-tashabbuh fī al-‘ulūm wa-´l-ṣanā’i‘ wa-ifāḍat al-khayr, wa-dhālika anna 
al-bārī, jalla thanā’uhu, a‘lam al-‘ulamā’ wa-aḥkam al-ḥukamā’ wa-aṣna‘ al-ṣunnā‘ wa-afḍal al-akhyār, 
fa-kull man zāda fī hādhihi al-ashyā’ darajatan izdāda min Allāh qurbuhu.” Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (8), p. 
290. 
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contemplating the divine things, which is the kind of life gods would presumably live, 
while the goal of philosophy for the Neoplatonists may be stated to be man’s 
divinization, in the sense of soul’s reunion with the spiritual reality.355 
But as for the Greek Neoplatonists ascending in the scale of virtues,356 for the 
Arabic philosophers also man’s ascent is a progressive path towards divine perfection 
in both parts of philosophy, contemplation of theoretical knowledge and living a 
virtuous practice. Philosophy is a special way of life in both of its constitutive parts. 
Even the theoretical part of philosophy has the practical goal of lifting the soul above 
its mundane sensory reality, and transforming it into a pure spiritual substance for the 
afterlife. But in this life philosophy is manifested in practice also in the good actions 
of the philosopher. 
5.2 Dual path of the Ismailis 
For the Ismailis the practical-religious nature of philosophy is of course even more 
pronounced, since there is no question that Ismaili philosophers like al-Kirmānī would 
practice philosophy merely in order to acquire knowledge for the sake of knowledge. 
As De Smet points out, for al-Kirmānī philosophy is not a theoretical enterprise, but 
forms part of the worship of God, which is as indispensable for man’s salvation as is 
the practice of religious duties.357 Besides, philosophizing does not consist of the 
human intellect’s unlimited quest for the truth, since the ultimate theoretical truth of 
the world should at least in some way be founded on the esoteric truth mediated by 
the imam. 
But since we have seen that the ultimate purpose of philosophy for the Arabic 
Peripatetic philosophers is also to reach ultimate happiness or salvation, the 
divergence between the Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers does not appear very 
significant in the end. For the Ismailis the way towards happiness also consists of a 
dual path of theory and practice, just as it does for al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, even if their 
contents might be slightly different. And for Ismailis also the ultimate purpose of their 
works of philosophy is to provide the knowledge that is required for the ascent 
towards happiness. 
For al-Kirmānī the dual way of spiritual ascent consists of the two religious 
observances required from everyone in order to gain happiness: worship of God by 
knowledge (al-‘ibāda al-‘ilmiyya) and worship by practice (al-‘ibāda al-‘amaliyya). 
Al-Kirmānī argues repeatedly for the indispensability of both knowledge and practice 
for the soul’s salvation. In this double observance the function of practical worship is 
to purify the soul in order for it to be prepared for its illumination through knowledge, 
whereas the theoretical observance provides the means for the gradual intellectual 
ascent.358 
In comparison with the philosophers, the theoretical worship would then 
correspond to theoretical philosophy and practical worship to practical philosophy, 
                                                 
355 Hence, Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, X, 1177b30ff.): “If then the intellect is something divine in 
comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life” (ei dē theion 
ho nous pros ton anthrōpon, kai ho kata touton bios theios pros ton anthrōpinon bion). See also, 
O’Meara 2003, pp. 3, 31-9. 
356 See, O’Meara 2003, pp. 40ff. 
357 De Smet 1995, p. 397. 
358 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 104, 115-6. 
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which perform more or less the same functions in the soul’s ascent. But what sets al-
Kirmānī fundamentally apart from the philosophers, is that for him it is not 
philosophy that brings about happiness, but religion. Both practice and knowledge are 
for him religious observances, the exoteric and esoteric worship (al-‘ibāda al-
‘Νāhira/bāΛina) required of the Ismailis in order to attain salvation. The source of 
knowledge about both observances lies in the religious history and hierarchy of 
mankind, rather than in philosophical speculation. While the practical observance has 
been brought to men by the prophets in the form of religious commandments, the 
esoteric knowledge is provided by imams through the rest of the Ismaili religious 
hierarchy.359 
Hence, for al-Kirmānī there is no need for a practical branch of philosophy, 
through which man would discover by pure reason the specific moral precepts and 
actions required for the purification of the soul. What Ismaili philosophers like al-
Kirmānī can provide in the field of morality, however, is the esoteric meaning behind 
specific religious practices, or a rational explanation of the function they serve in the 
soul’s ascent. The role of philosophy such as it is practiced by the Ismailis, or the 
‘science’ of divine unity (‘ilm al-tawΗīd) as al-Kirmānī would rather call it, is 
identified with the esoteric observance, that is, the esoteric truth behind the exoteric 
level of religion. But philosophical knowledge is meant only for those who have 
already passed beyond exoteric knowledge and practice, and hence acquired the 
required purity of soul. 
Based on this initial difference, that is, the philosophers’ reliance on the pure 
intellect and the Ismaili belief in the necessity of divine guidance, it is hardly 
surprising that al-Kirmānī is more than skeptical that the way of the philosophers 
would truly lead anyone towards happiness. Al-Kirmānī accuses the philosophers of 
only endorsing knowledge of the two required forms of worship, while rejecting the 
practice, and of believing that the soul could become virtuous merely by studying 
their books.360 Hence, al-Kirmānī dismisses Aristotelian ethics by questioning the 
benefit of knowing, for example, that the virtue of courage is a medium between 
cowardice and foolhardiness, without actually becoming courageous oneself.361 
Given the Peripatetic insistence of philosophy consisting of both theory and 
practice, al-Kirmānī does not appear to be entirely right in his condemnation of 
philosophy. But the real core of al-Kirmānī’s rejection of the philosophic position is 
in fact that the philosophers reject the religious practice, and replace it with 
rationalistic philosophy. The basic error of the philosophers in the sphere of both 
practical and theoretical philosophy is that they discard both the religious ordinances 
and the esoteric truth brought by the prophets and imams, and instead rely on their 
own intellects, believing their speculations to be the truth. For al-Kirmānī, without the 
divinely revealed guidelines, the intellect will necessarily follow its natural 
                                                 
359 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 104. 
360 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 549, 589-90. Al-Kirmānī is equally dismissive of the polar opposite of only 
endorsing religious practice at the expense of esoteric knowledge. 
361  Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 590. This is, of course, precisely why both Aristotle and the Arabic 
Peripatetics emphasize that the goal of philosophical ethics is not to know what a virtue is, but to 
become virtuous. 
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inclinations and go astray. Therefore, the soul will not be able to ascend from sensory 
to angelic existence, and reach ultimate happiness.362 
For the Brethren of Purity happiness is also attained through the dual way of 
knowledge (‘ilm) and practice (‘amal), which is the self-proclaimed purpose of their 
epistles: to act as a “ladder of salvation” (sullam al-najāt) for man through which he 
can, through knowledge and action, gain happiness in both this world and the next.363 
Knowledge and action are equally important for the attainment of happiness and 
salvation, and for the student of philosophy they should be bound together. 
Knowledge is only of use to the philosopher, if it is accompanied by corresponding 
actions. On the other hand, action without knowledge is equally fruitless, from the 
perspective of ultimate happiness, as “God only accepts action from someone who 
knows.”364 
On the question of philosophy and happiness, the Brethren seem to fall somewhere 
between the Peripatetics and al-Kirmānī. The Brethren, as the Peripatetics, essentially 
present philosophy as an instrument for ascending towards happiness, and hence their 
attitude towards the human intellect as a tool for gaining knowledge, and towards 
philosophy in general, is clearly more positive than al-Kirmānī’s. 
In contrast to al-Kirmānī, the Brethren’s view of such ancient philosophers as 
Pythagoras, Plato, or Aristotle is highly reverent, although contemporary philosophers 
are mainly ignored or criticized anonymously. But the Brethren’s view of philosophy 
is very religious, and, as for al-Kirmānī, for them it is in the end a combination of 
both prophetic and philosophical knowledge that shows the true way towards 
happiness. Real saving knowledge is not grounded on the reflections of the unaided 
intellect alone, although true philosophy does seem to be harmonious with divine 
revelation. 
Like other Arabic philosophers, the Brethren also offer various definitions of 
philosophy in their epistles, with obvious resemblance to the ones embraced by other 
philosophers within the Graeco-Arabic philosophical tradition. Many of them contain 
the idea of philosophy as consisting of both knowledge and action. In the beginning of 
their very first epistle on arithmetic, they state the beginning of philosophy to be “love 
of knowledge,”365 its middle “knowledge of the true natures of existents according to 
human capacity,” and its end “speech and action in accordance with the 
knowledge.”366 Hence, philosophy is understood to consist of a progression from an 
inclination towards knowledge, through actually acquiring the knowledge concerning 
the true nature of reality, to finally living it out in one’s actions. As for al-Fārābī, the 
true philosopher-sage (faylasūf/Ηakīm) is one who has gained perfection in both his 
knowledge and actions.367 
                                                 
362 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 582, 588-90.  
363 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 17, 21. 
364 “lā yaqbal Allāh subḥānuhu al-‘amal illā min al-‘ālim al-‘ārif.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 138. 
365  The common definition of philosophy as love of wisdom/knowledge derives from the Greek 
etymology of the word, which was of course familiar to Arabic philosophers. 
366 “al-falsafa awwaluhā maḥabbat al-‘ulūm, wa-awsaṭuhā ma‘rifat ḥaqā’iq al-mawjūdāt bi-ḥasab al-
ṭāqa al-insāniyya, wa-ākhiruhā al-qawl wa-´l-‘amal bi-mā yuwāfiq al-‘ilm.” Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (1), p. 
48. 
367 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 99, 475. As for Ibn Sīnā, absolute human perfection is incarnated in 
the figure of the prophet, whereas the philosophers follow him in the hierarchy of human perfection. 
See, Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (47), pp. 124-5. 
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But in the more esoterically oriented Comprehensive Epistle in particular, the 
Brethren portray philosophy more than anything as a way towards ultimate happiness 
and salvation. Hence, philosophy is the universal science (al-‘ilm al-kullī) by which 
universal virtue (al-faΕīla al-kulliyya) is attained, or the “ladder of salvation.” 
Through philosophy the soul will “gain its happiness, through studying philosophy it 
will attain its perfection, through perfection it will gain its beauty, and through beauty 
it will be transferred to the abode of high virtues, angelic dispositions, lofty stations, 
and elevated degrees, and gain immortality, eternal power, and salvation from 
everlasting torment.”368 The benefit of the philosophical knowledge provided by the 
epistles themselves in the soul’s ascent towards ultimate happiness is stated 
innumerable times in even more eloquent terms.369 
But, despite their high opinion of the value of philosophy in general, like al-
Kirmānī, the Brethren are highly critical of the misguided philosophers who reject the 
religious revelation. Hence, with respect to ultimate happiness and afterlife, while 
philosophers in general are aware of the spiritual reality beyond the sensory 
appearances, most of them are ignorant of the way by which the soul can ascend to the 
spiritual afterlife.370 For the Brethren the way towards ultimate happiness consists of 
belief in revelation together with the practice of philosophy, for the worst of people 
are those who have no religion at all to prevent them from fully indulging in worldly 
pleasures. As for al-Kirmānī, divine support (ta’yīd) is an essential component of the 
ascent towards happiness and salvation. 
Therefore, for the Brethren the error of many, if not all, philosophers is to become 
infatuated with their intellects to the extent that they reject the prophetic revelation 
and do not feel bound by the religious law.371 The philosophers go astray because of 
their inability to grasp the deeper esoteric meanings behind the exoteric religious 
commandments. In the Brethren’s syncretistic vision, true philosophy, such as it was 
professed by the ancients and as it is presented in the epistles, is in perfect harmony 
with the prophetic message.372 
Again as for al-Kirmānī, for the Brethren exoteric and esoteric worship and 
knowledge are also intimately bound together, and both are necessary on the way 
towards ultimate happiness. The deeper meaning of religious law lies especially in the 
purification of the soul from its bodily dispositions, and while theoretically this would 
be possible for the most adept by themselves through the practice of philosophical 
ethics, the guidance provided by a divinely revealed law is indispensable.373 Exoteric 
religious knowledge and worship, identified with the corporeal and sensible level of 
                                                 
368 “al-falsafa . . .bihā takūn sa‘ādatuhā wa-bi-ta‘allumihā yakūn kamāluhā, wa-bi-kamālihā jamāluhā, 
wa-bi-jamālihā intiqāluhā ilā dār al-maḥāsin al-‘ulwiyya, wa-´l-akhlāq al-malakiyya, wa-´l-maqāmāt 
al-‘āliya, wa-´l-darajāt al-sāmiya, wa-bi-dhālika tanāl darajāt al-baqā’ al-dā’im, wa-´l-mulk al-muqīm, 
wa-´l-najāt min al-‘adhāb al-alīm.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 61-4.  
369 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (50), p. 250; Jāmi‘a, pp. 15ff. 
370 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), p. 330; III (42), pp. 451, 521. 
371 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (46), pp. 63-4, 79; IV (47), pp. 137-8. The worst philosophical belief for the 
Brethren is pure materialism and denial of a spiritual afterlife, which is not something that most 
Peripatetic philosophers would have professed. 
372 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (48), p. 179. As the Brethren (Rasā’il, IV (45), pp. 41-3) themselves proclaim, 
their teaching embraces all doctrines and sciences, and they draw their knowledge from the works of 
the philosophers and prophetic revelations alike. 
373 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), p. 335. 
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being, must precede delving into the deeper esoteric mysteries of the spiritual and 
intelligible nature. Only the spiritually pure and intellectually capable should continue 
their ascent towards the higher truths, however, while the majority must remain at the 
corporeal level of the exoteric religion.374 
While such people who only profess the exoteric religion (Νāhir al-sharī‘a) live a 
virtuous life to the degree that their nature allows, for they are only blameworthy if 
they in fact are capable of the spiritual ascent but knowingly refuse it, they are like a 
body without a spirit (jism bi-ghayr rūΗ), confined to the material level of existence. 
But those who profess to the philosophical doctrines (al-ārā’ al-falsafiyya) and 
knowledge of the ultimate realities (al-‘ulūm al-Ηaqīqiyya), without adhering to the 
exoteric religion, are equally mistaken about the true way to happiness, for they are 
like a spirit left without a body to protect them in the material world.375 
Hence, as for al-Kirmānī, the religious revelation and philosophical knowledge 
together come to compose the two aspects of exoteric and esoteric religion through 
which man will gain happiness and salvation. Together they form a seamless whole, 
for the esoteric truths of philosophy are contained potentially, as symbolic allusions, 
in the exoteric religious revelation.376 In one of their epistles the Brethren discuss 
these two aspects specifically as two separate forms of worship, in a way that bears at 
least superficial resemblance to the practical and theoretical worship of the Ismailis. 
For the Brethren these two ways of worship are religious worship (al-‘ibāda al-
shar‘iyya al-nāmūsiyya) and philosophical worship (al-‘ibāda al-falsafiyya al-
ilāhiyya). The first is required of all people, and essentially consists of submitting to 
God’s will (islām) through following the orders and prohibitions specified in the 
religious law. The essence of the second is belief (īmān) and acknowledgement of 
divine unity (taqrīr bi-tawΗīd Allāh). However, in contrast to al-Kirmānī, for the 
Brethren the exoteric and esoteric worship are not identical with the theoretical and 
practical parts of the way to happiness. Namely, esoteric worship also includes within 
itself practices that go beyond those specified in the religious law, and which for the 
Brethren represent the esoteric variants of the exoteric regulations. 
Hence, unlike for al-Kirmānī, for the Brethren there appears a special way of life 
of the philosophical elect into which are incorporated ordinances that are not required 
from the mass of believers. As the Brethren are careful to admonish, one must not 
                                                 
374 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (42), pp. 504-12; Jāmi‘a, pp. 462, 474, 510. Like the philosophers, the 
Brethren identify several classes of people with respect to knowledge, for each of whom they offer 
their proper sciences and ways of worship. While philosophy and esoteric knowledge are for the elect 
only, for whom the highest state of being is contemplation (tafakkur), for the lowest group, including 
women, children, and ignorant men, their best state consists of a devout practice of the religious 
regulations. 
375  Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 40, 288-9. Since the Brethren apparently believed in transmigration, the 
exoteric believers do seem to have the possibility of salvation in their next incarnation. While the 
completely immoral are lowered to the degree of animals after their separation from the body, exoteric 
believers remain at the human level, instead of rising to the angelic one. See, chapter 4.4 above and 
Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (47), pp. 138-9. 
376 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 36-7. This totality of exoteric and esoteric knowledge and practice 
seems to be the “religion of philosophy” (dīn al-falsafa), which the Brethren (Jāmi‘a, p. 61) passingly 
mention to consist of belief in divine unity, obedience to the religious law, justice, and attainment of 
good moral dispositions. 
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embark on philosophical worship before he has mastered the religious one, for 
submission must always go before belief.377  
5.3 Initiation into philosophy 
Both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy then constitute a complete path, composed of 
a theoretical and a practical part, with happiness as its ultimate aim. The main 
difference between the philosophical and Ismaili ways is that for Ismaili philosophy 
practical worship is from the outset identified with following the prophetic law, 
whereas in Peripatetic philosophy the practical part also is a subject for philosophical 
investigation. However, as we will see in the next chapter, even in Peripatetic 
philosophy religion in practice assumes a major role within the philosophical praxis. 
Nevertheless, the practical-religious orientation shared by both philosophical schools 
is further emphasized by the perception of philosophy as not only saving knowledge, 
but also a hidden system of knowledge that should not be freely divulged to everyone. 
While philosophy is the path to ultimate happiness and salvation of the soul, it is not 
meant for everyone, for only the ones who fulfill the prerequisites are allowed to join 
its cadres. 
Ismailism is of course a clearly Gnostic sect in this sense of a closed grouping 
possessing secret saving knowledge. To become an Ismaili a formal process of 
initiation (balāgh) is required, including an oath of allegiance (mīthāq/‘ahd) and 
promise of secrecy on the esoteric doctrine. The actual philosophical knowledge 
follows as the culmination of the long process of instruction, and is divulged within 
the sessions of wisdom (majālis al-Ηikma) to the initiates having passed through the 
prior echelons of knowledge.378 Accordingly, al-Kirmānī’s major philosophical work 
is forceful in warning about the dangers of divulging its contents to the uninitiated.379 
Peripatetic philosophy is not a religious sect in the sense of the Ismaili movement, 
although in the context of the rival creeds and doctrines of the intellectual scene of the 
period it does not always appear far from it.380 Like the Ismailis, the philosophers 
within the Peripatetic tradition share a set of essential doctrines and basic convictions. 
And as for the Ismailis, for the philosophers these doctrines are also ultimately related 
to man’s salvation to an afterlife, while the philosophical system provides an overall 
religious explanation of man and his purpose. 
In the Islamic context teaching of philosophy was not institutionalized into formal 
schools, but took place through private individual instruction, or within the informal 
circles (majlis) centered around an established philosophical authority in private 
homes or at other premises.381 There was neither a formal process of initiation nor an 
oath of secrecy through which a disciple would be initiated into the philosophical 
                                                 
377 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (50), pp. 261ff. 
378  See, e.g., Halm 1996b. In contrast, the instruction of the exoteric doctrine, such as Ismaili 
jurisprudence, was open to all in Fatimid Egypt. 
379 See, e.g., al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 105. 
380 Thus, a vizier invites Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī as the “head spokesman of the philosophical sect” (ra’s 
mutakallimī al-firqa al-falsafiyya) to a debate with the theologians present in his gathering (majlis). 
Kraemer 1992, p. 181. 
381 See, Kraemer 1992, pp. 56-60, 103ff. for a portrayal of the practices of the philosophical schools in 
Buyid Baghdad, particularly those formed around Ibn ‘Adī and Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī. 
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way. But still the same ideal of concealment of knowledge from the undeserving 
appears prominent in the works of the philosophers. 
Ibn Sīnā is as adamant as al-Kirmānī against spreading his work indiscriminately: 
“If you divulge or waste this knowledge, let God be the judge between us.”382 The 
philosophers of the Arabic tradition quite consciously related such practices of 
occultation of knowledge to the ancient masters, including Plato and Aristotle in 
particular.383 
Hence, the first step on the philosophical path to happiness is to be accepted 
among the fortunate few who are qualified to tread on it. But exactly what are the 
qualities that are required of a student of philosophy? For the Ismailis the answer is 
obviously that philosophy should only be divulged freely to the advanced Ismaili 
students who have reached the stage of highest esoteric knowledge – the grade to 
which philosophy pertains within the Ismaili curriculum. Despite the restrictions on 
spreading knowledge, in a sense the Ismaili community is less elitist than that of the 
philosophers. The “call” (da‘wa) to truth is not restricted to an intellectual elite, 
although the process of conversion is also not one of mass proselytizing. Especially in 
the delicate situation outside the Fatimid territories, the Ismaili missionary (dā‘ī) 
should carefully seek a prospective convert, and gradually lead him towards the truth 
through subtle persuasion. After the formal initiation, the dā‘ī should provide the 
student knowledge according to his capabilities, although he should be entitled to the 
whole truth eventually.384 
In the case of Ismaili philosophy then, it should be revealed only to those further 
advanced within the grades of practical and theoretical worship, who have reached a 
sufficient rank in both morality and knowledge. Al-Kirmānī, himself a dā‘ī and a host 
of sessions of wisdom, specifically warns of divulging his work to “worldly men” 
(abnā’ al-dunyā) and those denying the divine guidance of the imams.385 
For Ibn Sīnā the requirements of a philosophical pupil are similarly both 
intellectual and moral. In a prologue to the physical and metaphysical part of Remarks 
and Admonitions he insists on guarding the work from those who do not fulfill the 
prerequisites of a philosopher. In an epilogue he sets forwards what these 
requirements are precisely: “Protect it from the ignorant and vulgar, those not 
endowed with bright intelligence, experience, and habit, those whose inclinations lie 
                                                 
382 “fa-in adha‘ta hādha al-‘ilm, aw aḍa‘tahu, fa-´llāh baynī wa-baynaka.” Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, p. 162. 
383 See, chapter 2.2 above. Hence, according to Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 995/8), himself closely associated with 
the Baghdad Peripatetics: “In the ancient times wisdom was forbidden from all except those to whom it 
pertained and who were known to be naturally disposed towards receiving it. The philosophers used to 
inspect the youths desiring to gain wisdom and philosophy, and if they found him rightly disposed then 
they would adopt him and pass him the wisdom, otherwise they would not do this” (kānat al-Ηikma fī 
al-qadīm mamnū‘ minhā illā man kāna min ahlihā, wa-man ‘ulima annahu yataqabbaluhā Λab‘an, wa-
kānat al-falāsifa tanΝur fī mawālīd man yurīd al-Ηikma wa-´l-falsafa, fa-in ‘alimat minhā anna ΙāΗib 
al-mawlid fī mawlidihi ΗuΙūl dhālika lahu istakhdamūhu, wa-nāwalūhu al-Ηikma, wa-illā fa-lā). Ibn al-
Nadīm, Fihrist, p. 332. 
384 Halm 1997, pp. 66-7; Corbin 1972, p. 18. For an early portrayal of the process of conversion, see, 
al-Yaman, Kitāb al-‘ālim wa-´l-ghulām. Still, al-Kirmānī (RāΗa, p. 501) resorts to the Fārābian idea of 
instructing the truth in images approximating the intelligible truth (mithālātuhā allatī tuΗākīhā) in 
accordance with the intellectual capabilities of each student, which would imply that not all Ismailis are 
capable of reaching the final esoteric-intelligible truth. 
385 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 121. 
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with the rabble, and from the heretics and riffraff among the philosophers.”386 Next 
Ibn Sīnā proceeds to delineate the qualities of a suitable philosophical pupil: “. . . 
someone whom you trust to be of pure heart and a straight way of life, who abstains 
from the insinuations of Satan, and directs his gaze towards the truth with good will 
and sincerity.”387 
Finally, he gives instructions for the initiation of a prospective student into the 
philosophical path: “Then answer his questions gradually in parts and pieces, 
detecting from your previous answer what to say next, pledge him through an 
inviolable oath to God to follow the path you have presented to him, finding solace in 
you.” 388  In sum, Ibn Sīnā’s depiction of finding and instructing a student of 
philosophy does not appear very far from the activities of an Ismaili dā‘ī gradually 
initiating a suitable candidate into the tenets of the Ismaili creed. 
Al-Fārābī gives more detailed instructions on the prerequisites of a student of 
philosophy, drawing directly from the Republic of Plato.389 It is such prerequisites that 
a student should fulfill in order to avoid the fate of becoming a “false philosopher”, 
which is what happens to those who go about studying philosophy without being 
“prepared for it” (muwaΛΛā’ naΗwahā). Not all of the prerequisites are necessarily 
inborn qualities, as some presumably arise in the student through the “Platonic” 
education of the philosopher. 
Nevertheless, the student of philosophy should also be naturally disposed (lahu 
isti‘dād bi-´l-fiΛra) towards the theoretical sciences. This refers first of all to inborn 
intellectual capabilities, such as good understanding (fahm), conception (taΙawwur), 
and memory (hufūΝ). But equally it includes other character traits of a moral nature, 
such as patience, sincerity, lack of greed, piety, resolution, and virtue. At least in 
terms of the intellectual requirements, for al-Fārābī there is a safeguard built within 
philosophy itself that prevents the unqualified from attaining it. Namely, in his 
prolegomena al-Fārābī states Aristotle to have deliberately employed obscure 
language (ighmāΕ) to ensure that the student’s nature is suitable for the study of 
philosophy, and hence to restrict philosophical knowledge only to those entitled to it 
by nature.390 
Whether the Brethren of Purity are a group of Ismaili devotees or of religiously 
oriented philosophers, the manner in which they approach the question of recruitment 
of pupils certainly resembles that of a religious sect. The Epistles are filled with 
forceful warnings against divulging their contents to the unqualified: “You o’ faithful 
                                                 
386 “fa-ṣunhu ‘an al-jāhilīn, wa-´l-mubtadhalīn, wa-man lam yurzaq al-fiṭna al-waqqāda, wa-´l-durba 
wa-´l-‘āda, wa-kāna ṣaghāhu ma‘a al-ghāgha aw kāna min malāḥidat hā’ulā’ al-falāsifa, wa-min 
hamajihim.” Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, p. 162. The prologue and epilogue are translated in Gutas 1988, pp. 
55-6, although I have chosen not to follow Gutas’ translation which attempts to preserve something of 
the original rhymed prose. As a minor note, Gutas translates malāΗida as sycophants, whereas I am 
inclined to interpret it as a reference to the philosophers denying the soul’s afterlife, or the “western” 
Peripatetic philosophers who were an object of Ibn Sīnā’s polemics. 
387 “man tathiq bi-naqā’ sarīratihi, wa-istiqāmat sīratihi wa-bi-tawaqqufihi ‘ammā yatasarra‘ ilayhi al-
waswās, wa-bi-naԘarihi ilā al-ḥaqq, bi-‘ayn al-riḍā wa-´l-ṣidq.” Ibid, p. 163. 
388 “fa-ātihi mā yas’aluka minhu mudarrajan, mujazza’an, mufarraqan, tastafsir mimmā taslufuhu limā 
tastaqbiluhu, wa-‘āhidhu bi-´llāh, wa-bi-īmān lā makhārij lahu, li-yajrā fīmā tu’tīhi majrāka, 
muta’ayyisan laka.” Ibid, pp. 163-4. 
389 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 191-3; Plato, The Republic, VI, 485Bff. 
390 Al-Fārābī, Ma yanbaghī, p. 14. 
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and compassionate brother who have gained this great and noble knowledge, be 
resolute, trustworthy, and sparing with it, and don’t be like those demonic brethren 
who squander it!” 391  The Brethren of Purity present themselves as a society of 
righteous individuals entrusted by God with mystical saving knowledge which they 
can only reveal to those possessing the necessary qualities: “We do not conceal our 
mysteries from people for fear of kings possessing earthly power or due to caution 
against the wrath of the multitudes, but in order to guard what has been gifted to us by 
God.”392 For the Brethren the required prerequisites of a pupil are intellectual as well 
as moral, although the Brethren tend to emphasize moral purity as the primary 
requirement for joining their society of pure brothers.393 
The Brethren also give detailed instructions for the recruitment of a new member. 
Certainly reminiscent of the operations of an Ismaili dā‘ī, anyone wishing to adopt a 
new brother should proceed cautiously in this task. He should carefully investigate his 
history and character, and interrogate him about his beliefs, in order to determine 
whether he is suitable to become his pupil, just as the “worldly people” do for the 
purposes of a marriage contract or purchase of land. Moreover, the recruiter should be 
careful to probe into the prospective pupil’s inner qualities, and not be deluded by 
deceptive appearances, and he should prefer youths with a yearning for knowledge 
and the hereafter.394  As for the Ismailis, entering the brotherhood involves more 
formal procedures of initiation, such as a sacred oath (‘ahd/īmān) taken by the initiate. 
As an initiation rite, the Brethren recommend as a procedure for testing the pupil’s 
character a custom supposedly practiced by the ancient philosophers, which consists 
of 40 days of fasting and 40 nights of standing on guard.395 
The society of the Brethren of Purity themselves is further portrayed as a closed 
group of virtuous individuals recruiting and instructing new initiates towards the path 
for salvation. This community is said to arrange sessions every 12 days, in which the 
teachers train their disciples on the path of wisdom as fathers admonish their sons: 
“Appear to them in your garments, beautiful appearance, and great prestige, just as the 
Universal Soul emerges to the particular souls, for they are like children to you.”396 
As for Ibn Sīnā, the pupils are then gradually guided through the echelons of 
philosophical and religious knowledge, each according to his particular capabilities: 
“Read them from your wisdom, caution them with your admonitions, in accordance 
with their position and capabilities, and instigate them towards seeking of knowledge 
as their highest concern.”397 In the sessions of the Brethren of Purity, the Epistles 
                                                 
391 “fa-idh anta ayyuhā al-akh al-bārr al-raḥīm waqafta ‘alā hādha al-‘ilm al-‘aԘīm wa-´l-naba’ al-karīm 
fa-kun ‘alayhi qawiyyan amīnan wa-kun bihi ḍanīnan, wa-lā takun min al-mubadhdhirīn alladhīna hum 
ikhwān al-shayāṭin.” Ikhwān, Jami‘a, p. 66. 
392 “innā lā naktum asrāranā ‘an al-nās khawfan min saṭrat al-mulūk dhawī al-salṭana al-arḍiyya, wa-lā 
ḥadharan min shaghab jumhūr al-‘awāmm, wa-lākin ṣiyānatan li-mawāhib Allāh ‘azza wa-jalla lanā.” 
Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (48), p. 166. In another passage (Jāmi‘a, p. 23) the knowledge in their possession 
is said to have passed through history from ancestor to offspring, certainly reminiscent of the Shii 
notion of esoteric knowledge passing through the ‘Alid line of the Prophet’s family. 
393 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (50), pp. 251-3. 
394 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (45), pp. 43-52. 
395 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 365-6. 
396 “fa-ubruz lahum wa-ukhruj ‘alayhim fī ziyyika wa-ḥulalika, wa-jamīl hay’atika, wa-jalīl haybatika, 
ka-burūz al-nafs al-kulliyya li-´l-nafs al-juz’iyya, idh hum laka ka-´l-awlād.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 538. 
397 ”fa-utli ‘alayhim min ḥikmatika, wa-‘iԘhum bi-tadhkīrika, ḥasabamā yaḥtamil makānuhum, wa-
yattasi‘ lahum imkānuhum, …wa-´l-ḥathth ‘alā ṭalab al-‘ilm an takūn akthar ‘ināyatuhum.” Ibid. 
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themselves act as the ultimate guide in the instruction of disciples towards their 
theoretical and practical perfection: “Read them these epistles from the first to the 
last, epistle by epistle, and chapter by chapter, for in them there is the clearest sign for 
them.”398 
                                                 
398 “wa-utli ‘alayhim hādhihi al-rasā’il min awwalihā ilā ākhirihā, risāla risāla, wa-maqāla maqāla, wa-
baynahā lahum bi-awḍaḥ al-dalāla.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 539. 
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“My God, deliver me from the captivity of the four elements, and take me to Your limitless side and 
sublime proximity” –Al-Fārābī399 
6 Practical purification 
6.1 Beginning of purification 
In the fourth chapter we saw Arabic philosophers to be in essential agreement about 
the true nature of human happiness as contemplative bliss, so that attainment of 
happiness for the soul consists of its ascent to a spiritual-intellectual level of 
existence. Hence, their view of happiness reflects the Neoplatonic background of both 
Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy discussed in the second and third chapters. In the 
fifth chapter we saw further that for both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy the way 
towards ultimate happiness consists equally of attainment of theoretical knowledge 
and moral virtue, which together form man’s progression towards a dual perfection. 
It is now time to examine more closely the two parts of which the philosophical 
path to happiness is composed, knowledge (‘ilm) and practice (‘amal). As it is the 
practical part from which the student of philosophy should start his spiritual 
progression, it is the proper next step for this study also. Since Arabic philosophers in 
general agreed on that philosophy consists as much of action as of knowledge, what is 
the precise nature of such philosophical praxis for them? Moreover, what is the 
relationship of that practice with theoretical knowledge, since, on the one hand, moral 
virtue seems to be required before or simultaneously with the study of philosophy, 
while on the other, at least for the Peripatetics, moral purification is based on 
philosophical knowledge? But first of all, where is the need for the philosophical 
practice in the first place, when the contemplative ideal of happiness shared by Arabic 
philosophers in general would rather seem to encourage the philosopher to withdraw 
from the activities of everyday life to a purely contemplative existence? 
 For Neoplatonism, man’s final end consists of the soul’s rediscovery of its true 
spiritual nature.400 All Arabic philosophers are Platonists in their view of man, in the 
sense that for them the real human substance, or the thing people refer to with the 
word ‘I’, is soul rather than body, or even the union of soul and body.401 The soul’s 
attachment to a body during its worldly life is only accidental in nature, for its real 
nature is not the bodily and sensible existence it experiences in this world, but a 
spiritual and intellectual one. While the soul remains a separate substance even in its 
embodied state, its bodily entanglements will easily cause it to become oblivious to its 
                                                 
399 “Allāhumma, unqudhnī min asr al-ṭabā’i‘ al-arba‘, wa-unqulnī ilā janābika al-awsa‘ wa-jiwārika al-
arfa‘.” Al-Fārābī, Du‘ā’ ‘aΝīm, p. 90. 
400 Ibn Suwār in his depiction of the ideal philosopher states the philosopher’s goal as “directing the 
soul towards return to its essence” (yaqūd al-nafs ilā al-rujū‘ ilā dhātihā). Lewin 1955, p. 278. 
401 The very first treatise of Plotinus’ Enneads (I.i.), What is the living being and what is man? (Peri 
tou ti to zōon kai tis ho anthrōpos), argues for the identity of the true man with the rational soul, in 
contrast to Aristotle, for whom only the hylomorphic composition of soul and body could properly be 
called man, let alone the Stoics or Epicureans who define soul in purely physical terms. Ibn Sīnā 
echoes the Plotinian view in his proofs for the identity of ‘I’ with the soul, as well as his 
demonstrations for the substantiality and immateriality of the soul repeated in innumerable works. See, 
e.g., Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, pp. 183ff. 
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true spiritual essence.402 It is in this Platonic sense that Arabic philosophers interpret 
the Delphic maxim of “Know thyself!”, that is, as man’s quest to rediscover his true 
essence as a spiritual soul.403 
In order for this rediscovery to take place man must cleanse his soul from its 
bodily entanglements, which are identified as the reason for the soul’s neglect of its 
real nature. For the philosophers in the Neoplatonic vein, the concept of purity 
(zakā’/Ιafā’/Λahāra/etc.) then emerges as an essential one, up to the point that the 
Brethren of Purity derive their name from it, as it is through regaining its original 
purity that the soul can reclaim its spiritual nature. Man’s ascent to happiness through 
philosophy hence consists of a purification (tazkiya/taΙfiya/tahdhīb/etc.) of the soul, 
whereby the soul is gradually liberated from the material world to a spiritual level of 
existence. 
It is through both knowledge and practice that the soul can regain its purity,404 but 
in Neoplatonism it is especially the practical part that begins the soul’s detachment 
from the material world. Even before the student starts his ascent in the steps of 
philosophical knowledge, he should strive to form his character in a way that 
gradually detaches him from his bodily needs and the sensible world. 
In Greek Neoplatonism purification of the soul (katharsis) progressed through 
stages of civic (politikai arētai), purificatory (kathartikai), and theoretical virtues 
(theōrētikai), where each grade would represent a further step away from the soul’s 
attachment to the body, and towards the ideal contemplative state of being. These 
three stages of spiritual progress would at least partially overlap a tripartite 
classification of philosophy into ethics, physics, and metaphysics.405 In such a scheme 
the starting point of philosophical ascent would then consist of pre-philosophical 
ethics, that is, a kind of initial purification of the soul by means of ethical practices. 
Despite the fact that Arabic philosophy in general embraces the idea of philosophy 
as the soul’s ascent through both knowledge and practice, Arabic philosophers did not 
adopt the formal Neoplatonic ordering of the ladder of virtues. But to what degree is 
the purification of the soul through practice nevertheless understood as the first step of 
philosophical ascent that precedes the learning of theoretical knowledge? In Arabic 
Peripatetic philosophy the relationship between practice and theory does not always 
                                                 
402 The Neoplatonic theme of the particular souls’ oblivion of themselves after their descent is favored 
especially by the Brethren, who in many ways are the most Plotinian of the four philosophers. As al-
Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and al-Kirmānī deny the soul’s pre-existence, the soul cannot ‘forget’ a state of purity 
it never had, even though it can still be oblivious to its true nature. See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 
486ff.; Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 352. 
403 The Greek exhortation gnōthi seauton translates in Arabic into i‘rif nafsaka, meaning both “know 
thyself” and “know thy soul.” For those Arabic philosophers that employed the maxim, such as Ibn 
Sīnā, its meaning is precisely for man to come to know the true nature of his soul as his real essence. 
Ibn Sīnā in fact mainly uses the maxim as an inspirational introduction into his concise treatises on the 
soul. For the Brethren of Purity, who are also fond of the maxim, it seems to have a deeper 
epistemological meaning, since the idea of knowledge of the self is connected to the microcosm-
macrocosm analogy. See, Altmann 1969a; Ibn Sīnā, Maqāla fī al-nafs, pp. 147-8; Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-
nafs al-nāΛiqa, p. 182. 
404 In one of his treatises Ibn Sīnā (Risāla fī al-kalām ‘alā al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, p. 196) calls the theoretical 
part of philosophy “purification by knowledge” (tazkiya bi-´l-‘ilm) and the practical part “purification 
by action” (tazkiya bi-´l-‘amal). 
405  O’Meara 2003, pp. 8-10, 40-9; Hadot 1995, p. 137. See also, Plotinus, Enneads, I.2. for his 
discussion of the stages of virtue, which were further systemized by Porphyry and the later 
Neoplatonists. 
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seem to be as clear-cut, for at least in their ethical treatises Arabic philosophers 
usually do not state at which stage of the philosophical studies the practice of virtue 
should be introduced. Moreover, in contrast to the tripartite Greek Neoplatonic 
classification of philosophical sciences mentioned above, in their philosophical 
compendiums al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā place ethics at the end of the philosophical 
curriculum, rather than the beginning. 
When al-Fārābī insists that true philosophical knowledge must culminate in moral 
virtue, he seems to imply that virtuous practice follows from, rather than precedes, 
philosophical knowledge. Still at times al-Fārābī does insist on purification of the soul 
even before initiation into philosophy. Ibn Sīnā does not appear to specify any precise 
order in which the practical and theoretical part of the ascent should take place, but 
they are generally presented more as simultaneous, rather than an ethical practice 
preceding the theory. 
The necessity of practical purification before initiation to theoretical knowledge is 
supported with various reasons. First of all, it is necessary because of the assumption 
of the contrariety of the two spheres of being: the sensible-material and spiritual-
intelligible. The goal of the philosophical ascent is for the human soul to rise from the 
material to the spiritual world. From the perspective of the human soul these two 
worlds represent two contrary directions, and when the soul faces one, it turns away 
from the other. The role of moral purification is then to gradually turn the soul’s 
attention upwards from the material-sensible level of existence towards the spiritual-
intelligible realm, through eliminating the bodily connections of the soul that draw it 
down to the material world. The more fully the soul is liberated from its bodily 
attachments, the more strongly it becomes attached to the spiritual world. 
To this is related an epistemological basis for the necessity of practical purification 
as the first step of philosophy. It is the body and its activities that distract the human 
soul from devoting itself completely to intellection, and force it to be occupied with 
the sensible and material things. As Ibn Sīnā states the matter, man inherits a 
weakness from its immersion in matter towards conceiving (taΙawwur) the intelligible 
forms that are inherent in nature.406 Hence, the soul must be cured of this material 
state for it to become fully attentive towards the intelligibles. The more the soul is 
purified, the more it becomes like the Intellects of the higher world that are 
completely free from matter, and the more attached it becomes to their world. As a 
result its facility to receive intelligible emanations from the Intellect is enhanced. In 
al-Fārābī’s quotation of Plato: “Only the pure can approach the pure.”407  
Besides the epistemological foundation, the purpose of practical purification is 
even more importantly to consolidate the right kind of desire (shahwa/shawq) in the 
human soul. Practical moral purification helps man to direct his desire away from the 
worldly things towards which the soul is inclined by its bodily nature, towards the 
spiritual and intelligible things that the soul in reality desires in its essence. It is 
                                                 
406 Ibn Sīnā, Mabda’, p. 98. 
407 “man lam yakun naqiyyan zakiyyan fa-lā yadnū min naqī zakī.” See, al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī, p. 11; 
Ibn Sīnā, Ζāl al-nafs al-insāniyya, p. 94; Risāla fī al-kalām ‘alā al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, p. 197-8; al-
Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 100. Compare this to Olympiodorus’ (d. 570) argument for the necessity of pre-
philosophical purification: “For just as those whose eyes have been in the dark cannot look towards the 
sun, so a person weighed down by passions of the soul cannot take hold of these studies.” 
Olympiodorus, Prolegomena [quoted in: Sorabji 2004, p. 324]. 
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difficult for the soul to recognize its real object of desire while it is immersed in its 
bodily state, unless the soul is cleansed from its bodily appetites. This is the reason 
that al-Fārābī gives in his prolegomena for the necessity of purification of the soul, to 
rectify the moral dispositions (iΙlāΗ al-akhlāq) of the soul, so that it learns to desire 
the truly good spiritual and intelligible things, instead of the material ones.408 
Similarly the Brethren of Purity consider a philosophical disciple ready to receive 
intellectual knowledge only when he has renounced his desire for worldly life.409 For 
al-Kirmānī, once man subjugates his bodily faculties through practical purification, he 
will only desire the spiritual and religious things.410 It is therefore the subjugation of 
those bodily appetites that cause man to desire the wrong things that forms the core of 
the philosophical praxis.411 
For all these reasons, both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity are adamant in 
their insistence that the soul must be purified before the pupil is to be initiated into 
any kind of philosophical knowledge. However, when for the Brethren, as for al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, the concept of purity is attached to both knowledge and practice, 
al-Kirmānī explicitly identifies purification (tahdhīb/taΛhīr) of the soul with practical 
morality. He is also the only one who clearly delineates practical purification of the 
soul as a preliminary stage that must necessarily precede acquisition of theoretical 
philosophical knowledge. 
For al-Kirmānī the attainment of practical virtue must come first, because the soul 
in its initial state of being is not prepared to receive intelligible knowledge, attached 
as it is to the sphere of the sensible and worldly things. Since the two spheres of 
existence, material-sensible and spiritual-intelligible, are antithetical to each other, the 
nature of the soul must first be molded by actions. Only then will it become 
correspondent to the nature of the immaterial Intellects, to the company of whom it is 
preparing to ascend in its quest for ultimate happiness. 
For al-Kirmānī therefore the shaping of practical morality is the first stage in the 
ascent of an Ismaili initiate towards the spiritual world. In al-Kirmānī’s analogy, this 
practical purification works for the soul of the novice as fire works for a lump of gold 
on its way towards being transformed to a precious ornament: it must first be melted 
and refined of its impurities before it is ready to receive the crafting that brings about 
its greatest perfection.412 
Although the Brethren of Purity are not equally explicit that practical moral 
education must precede any philosophical learning, they share the assumptions behind 
al-Kirmānī’s requirement. The Brethren emphasize throughout their epistles the 
opposing natures of the worldly (dunyā) and corporeal as opposed to other-worldly 
                                                 
408 Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī, pp. 11-2, 15. 
409 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (50), pp. 251-2. 
410 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 115-6. 
411 However, desires are not only based on moral dispositions, but also on beliefs, and therefore 
possessing correct beliefs is equally important in order for man to desire the right things. Hence, the 
Brethren of Purity require correct beliefs from a suitable discipline of philosophy, such as belief in the 
afterlife in particular. For the same reason Ibn Sīnā appears to lean on logic as the first step of 
philosophy, since only knowledge of demonstration can make the soul desire intelligible things. The 
molding of correct beliefs engendering the right kind of desire pertains to the sphere of religious 
education. 
412 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 99-100, 115, 119-20, 501-2. Al-Kirmānī also speaks of practical worship as 
the matter with respect to the theoretical worship as form. 
 108
(ākhira) and spiritual spheres of being. Since they are of contrary natures, it is 
impossible for man to pursue the goods of both worlds simultaneously, but he must 
choose one over the other. The soul’s ascent through knowledge towards its spiritual 
nature must therefore be accompanied by the cleansing of the bodily accidents that 
draw its attention towards the lower world.413 
Hence, like al-Kirmānī, the Brethren come to emphasize that purity of the soul 
must be required from a student before he can be introduced into the deeper esoteric-
philosophical truths behind the exoteric religion. Philosophers should first seek to 
train the souls of their pupils, before they open the doors of wisdom to them.414 Once 
purified, the students of philosophy are already tuned towards the higher sphere of 
spiritual and intelligible being, when they start their philosophical education. A pure 
soul, unstained by bad actions, dispositions, and opinions, is like a mirror that reflects 
the spiritual forms transcending the sensible world, which remain hidden from an 
impure soul.415 
In the case of al-Fārābī, there are few places in his writings where he appears to 
presuppose purification of the soul as a pre-requisite for philosophical learning. In his 
introduction to Aristotelian philosophy al-Fārābī repeats the discussion concerning the 
proper starting point of philosophy that was routinely presented in the Alexandrian 
works of this genre.416 Al-Fārābī’s introduction gives alternative opinions of various 
Greek schools of philosophy about the correct initiation to philosophy as either 
geometry, logic, or ethics. While ethics was often considered the best point of 
departure to philosophy among late Greek Neoplatonists, since philosophical ethics is 
taught by means of logical arguments, logic or geometry were often proposed instead. 
But even then, logic was preceded by the pre-philosophical cultivation of morality, 
while a philosophical study of ethics would follow upon the study of logic.417 
This is also the conclusion of al-Fārābī’s treatise: even before one begins to study 
the philosophical sciences, the moral dispositions of the desiring soul should be 
rectified, not only through theoretical knowledge, but also in practice (bi-´l-af‘āl). It is 
only then that one may begin the shaping of the rational soul through study of the 
demonstrative sciences. Besides this, in the context of the philosophical education of 
the princes, al-Fārābī requires a prior training of the soul of the “Platonic kind” before 
the future king is introduced to the theoretical sciences. 
Anyone who sets out to study the speculative disciplines should fulfill certain prior 
requirements without which his theoretical studies are of no avail to him in his quest 
to become a true philosopher. These requirements include both sufficient intellectual 
capacities, such as good understanding and memory, but also moral qualities, such as 
                                                 
413 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 328-9, 375, 387. 
414 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (43), pp. 10-3.  
415 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (43), pp. 6-8. 
416 Al-Fārābī, Ma yanbaghī, pp. 12-3. As Gutas (1985b) emphasizes, al-Fārābī’s prolegomena is a 
rather faithful adaptation of the Alexandrian introductions to Aristotle’s philosophy, reproducing nine 
of the ten points usually covered in such treatises. 
417 Gutas 1985b, pp. 116-7; Sorabji 2004, pp. 319, 322-3; Westerink 1962, p. xxvi. Hence, Simplicius 
(d. ca. 560) (translated in Sorabji 2004, p. 323) suggests: “Perhaps, then, there is every need of an 
ethical pre-catechism, but not supplied through Aristotle’s Ethics, but through habituation without 
texts, and through non-technical exhortations, both written and unwritten, to straighten our character, 
and after that the logical and demonstrative method. After those, we shall be able to take in 
scientifically the scientific discussions of character and research into reality.” 
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love of justice, disregard for bodily appetites, and general virtue.418 In any case, al-
Fārābī’s pupil, Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī, does predispose “study of books on morals and 
deportment” before “schooling himself in the true science,” thus supporting the view 
that it was a general conception of philosophy within the Baghdad Peripatetic 
school.419 
While Ibn Sīnā does not state consistently that one should be morally purified 
before learning theoretical philosophy, he also insists, for example, in Remarks and 
Admonitions, that the knowledge contained in the work should only be divulged to 
those who are both intellectually and morally entitled to receive it.420 
While moral purification may be required before learning philosophy, it is also 
clear that to some degree, especially for al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, practical perfection 
comes as a consequence or culmination of theoretical perfection. In some contexts al-
Fārābī even seems to assume correct theoretical knowledge as the necessary 
prerequisite for one to even desire the acquisition of happiness in the first place. 
In Virtuous City, al-Fārābī assumes that only after one gains knowledge about the 
nature of happiness through his theoretical intellect, may he set it as his aim and 
pursue it. It is only after one learns theoretically what happiness is, that man starts to 
desire it within his appetitive faculty.421 This is similar to Ibn Sīnā’s position that the 
soul can only develop a desire (shawq) towards its intellectual perfection, after it has 
been introduced to the demonstrative sciences, and discovered the existence of 
intelligible things.422 
Al-Fārābī, however, appears to go even further in requiring one to learn all of the 
demonstrative sciences, before he gains the proper desire towards intellectual 
happiness. In another work he emphasizes the necessity of theoretical knowledge to 
virtuous practice: man can only truly practice virtue, once he knows of what virtue 
consists, and is capable of distinguishing between real and false virtue. Moreover, al-
Fārābī places this knowledge about happiness and virtue as the very last within the 
stages of philosophical knowledge. It is only after man has gained the complete 
knowledge contained within theoretical philosophy, through which he is already 
supposed to have gained his theoretical perfection, that he “progresses to the practical 
part, and he may begin to act the way he is supposed to act.”423 
This would implement the idea of “action as the perfection of knowledge” 424 to 
the fullest, since the student of philosophy is supposed to first gain complete 
theoretical knowledge about the world, before he is to implement that knowledge in 
the practice of his own life. But, if happiness is attained through philosophy, as al-
Fārābī believes, but one only starts to desire happiness as an intellectual perfection 
after finishing one’s studies on theoretical philosophy, how does one ever gain the 
impetus for learning philosophy in the first place? The way to resolve this dilemma, 
                                                 
418 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 166, 191-3. 
419 Griffith 2006, p. 302. 
420 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 162-3. 
421 Al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 206-10. 
422 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 351-3; Ishārāt, IV, p. 34. 
423 “fa-ḥīna’idhin yaqdur an yantaqil ilā al-juz’ al-‘amalī wa-yumkinuhu an yabtadi’ fa-ya‘mal mā 
yanbaghī lahu an ya‘malahu.” Al-Fārābī, FuΙūΙ muntaza‘a, pp. 95-9. 
424 Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī, pp. 2, 13. See also chapter 5.1 above. 
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and the apparent conflict in al-Fārābī of moral purification as both preceding and 
following theoretical philosophy, would seem to lie in the inclusion of a political 
dimension to the philosophical quest for happiness. But first, it is necessary to see 
what al-Fārābī and others mean by moral virtue and its practice. 
6.2 Theory of virtue 
Once it has been established that in Arabic philosophy moral purification is 
indispensable for the learning of theoretical sciences, whether before, concurrently, or 
even as the culmination of theoretical knowledge, the question arises about the precise 
nature of this philosophical praxis. For Peripatetic philosophers, the theory on which 
the practice of philosophical life is based is to be found in classical virtue ethics. The 
Brethren of Purity also employ virtue ethics to a degree, although their ethics on the 
whole tends to be more normative than analytical in style, and even al-Kirmānī makes 
some use of it. 
Virtue ethics, such as it was professed by both Aristotelians and Platonists, 
investigates the practice of good human life through the concept of virtue 
(aretē/faΕīla), which could be defined as an optimal character trait of man with 
respect to a certain sphere of action, which man should seek to acquire for himself. 
The ethical goal of becoming virtuous, that is, attaining good character traits, goes 
beyond merely performing virtuous actions and conducting life in the right way. 
Rather the goal is that the whole way of one’s being is transformed through the 
praiseworthy psychical qualities that become entrenched in one’s nature, after which 
the good actions follow naturally. For a virtuous man good actions are all that he 
desires to do, as opposed to someone who performs them through self-restraint or 
compulsion against one’s real desires.425 The goal of Peripatetic ethics is then for man 
to mold his character traits (khulq, pl. akhlāq) into virtues so that he will only desire 
to perform virtuous actions.426 
The question that instantly arises is how ethical terms such as virtue and good 
(khayr) are to be determined. As we have seen in the fourth chapter, for the Arabic 
philosophers happiness as ultimate perfection is the absolute good in relation to man, 
since it is the only human good sought only for its own sake, without any instrumental 
purpose.427 Secondary human good is anything that serves man in his final purpose of 
                                                 
425 Al-Fārābī (FuΙūl, p. 112) differentiates between a virtuous and self-restrained man, in that while the 
first gains pleasure from performing good actions, since the goodness is deep-rooted in his nature, the 
latter performs them against his real desires. For the virtuous to perform good actions can never be 
painful or odious, since to be virtuous means that one feels pleasure when performing good and pain 
when performing bad actions. 
426 Hence, ethics in Arabic is the “science of character traits” (‘ilm al-akhlāq), in analogy with the 
derivation of the Greek word from ēthos, meaning character or disposition. The word refers to a certain 
disposition or aptitude (malaka/hay’a/tahayyu’) of man, from which actions corresponding to that 
disposition proceed with facility. Interestingly, the Brethren define khulq as a “certain disposition in 
each bodily organ” (tahayyu’ mā fī kull ‘uΕw min a‘Εā’ al-jasad), from which the soul is able to 
manifest (iΝhār) the corresponding action, whereas for the rest it is defined in purely psychical terms. 
See, the definitions of al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, p. 6, Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 354, and Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I 
(9), p. 305. 
427 While happiness is defined as the absolute human good, absolute Good for Arabic philosophers is 
God. Aristotle states in Nicomachean Ethics, the work that al-Fārābī and others are following here, that 
absolute Good is not relevant for ethics, since it is transcendent and unattainable. As for Arabic 
philosophers, for Aristotle also the greatest practical good (to prakton agathon) is happiness 
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reaching the absolute human good. Therefore good actions (af‘āl jamīla) are 
determined purely by their instrumental value in reaching ultimate happiness. 
Consequently, virtues are the psychical dispositions that lead man to perform good 
actions. Respectively, evil (sharr), bad actions (af‘āl qabīΗa), and vices (radhīla, pl. 
radhā’il) are whatever hinder man from attaining happiness. 428  While becoming 
virtuous should then be the guideline for man in his practical life, it is not the final 
end, but an instrument for attaining the final end. 
The theory behind the actual task of discovering what the individual virtues are is 
for the Peripatetics further based on the classical Aristotelian idea of virtue as a 
mediate disposition (hay’at al-tawassuΛ) between two extreme character qualities. 
Each virtuous character quality lies between an excessive (ziyāda) and defective 
(nuqΙān) trait of character, both of which are vices. The lists of specific virtues, and 
their respective excesses and defects, which al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā provide in this 
context, are hardly a result of independent reflection, but are drawn rather routinely 
from the commonplace lists of virtues within the Aristotelian tradition. In fact, they 
seem to be meant more as an illustration of the general principle than as an exhaustive 
program for self-improvement, and hence are not given much further analysis beyond 
a short definition. Al-Fārābī, for example, recites such virtues as courage (shajā‘a), as 
a mean between foolhardiness and cowardice, generosity (sakhā’) between lavishness 
and stinginess, or wittiness (Νarf) between buffoonery and heavy-mindedness, along 
with many others.429 A more exhaustive list of virtues, however, would not even be 
well-placed within an ethical theory with universal pretensions, which is what al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā seek to accomplish. 
As al-Fārābī points out, there is no absolute measure (‘iyār) for the virtues as 
mean dispositions, but their determination always varies with respect to time and 
place. Moreover, the medium of moral qualities is never meant to be understood as an 
arithmetical one that could be precisely calculated as the exact middle position 
between the two extremes. Ethics is not a precise science in the sense of the 
theoretical sciences, but a practical one. It works rather as a medicine of the soul, 
where the psychic diseases, that is, the bad moral dispositions, of each individual are 
treated towards the mediate state according to each individual case, just as a doctor 
                                                                                                                                            
(eudaimonia), which is therefore the goal of human action. But, for the Arabic philosophers, who in the 
end incline from their affiliation to Aristotle towards a Neoplatonic ethics, the metaphysical and 
practical good are related, even if for Arabic Peripatetic philosophers also the absolute Good is not the 
subject of ethics, but of metaphysics. When man ascends towards the practical good of ultimate 
happiness, he will also approach the absolute Good to the degree that is possible for a human being, as 
in the definition of philosophy as approximation to God discussed in the previous chapter. For human 
evil, on the other hand, there is no absolute counterpart, since evil is merely deficiency of goodness 
without independent existence. See, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.vi-viii; al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-
fāΕila, p. 206; al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, p. 72; FuΙūl, p. 151; Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 340-7, 350; 
Mabda’, p. 10; Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 48-50, 58-60, 210. 
428 Al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, p. 206; al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, pp. 72-4; IΗΙā’, pp. 102-
3; TaΗΙīl, pp. 141-2; FuΙūl, p. 103. 
429 Al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, pp. 11-2; FuΙūl, pp. 114-5; Ibn Sīnā, Fī ‘ilm al-akhlāq, pp. 115ff.; Shifā’: 
Ilāhiyyāt, p. 354. All of the virtues in al-Fārābī’s list are drawn from Aristotle’s corresponding list in 
the book II.vii of Nicomachean Ethics. Al-Fārābī, however, reproduces none of Aristotle’s detailed 
analysis of the individual virtues in books III.viff. 
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attempts to treat the body towards a state of balance taking into account the particular 
circumstances of the patient.430 
On a more general level transcending the specifics of individual virtues, the 
virtues may be categorized into distinct groups, and Arabic philosophers adopt several 
of such classifications. First of all, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, the Brethren of Purity, and 
even al-Kirmānī, for whom Aristotelian virtue ethics otherwise plays no major role, 
adopt Aristotle’s division of moral (ēthikai/khulqiyya) and intellectual 
(dianoētikai/nuΛqiyya) virtues.431 Al-Fārābī further follows Aristotle’s sub-division of 
intellectual virtues into the virtues of theoretical and practical intellect, where the 
theoretical intellectual virtues are concerned with knowledge and the practical with 
deliberation.432 
Of the resulting classification, only the moral virtues and practical intellectual 
virtues are relevant for the task of practical purification, whereas the theoretical 
virtues are gained through theoretical knowledge. Although al-Kirmānī is the only one 
who explicitly subordinates the moral to the intellectual virtues, the first acting as 
matter to the second, for all of them moral virtues are clearly subordinate to the 
intellectual ones, because the former pertain to the lower irrational part of man, 
whereas the latter belong to the rational part. Acquisition of both of them is obviously 
essential for man’s quest for happiness, but it is in the theoretical virtues that the 
human soul’s real intelligible nature is ultimately realized. 
Despite leaning heavily on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Arabic Peripatetic 
ethics is far from orthodox Aristotelianism. Its ultimate ethical views are clearly of a 
Neoplatonic nature, and it is also influenced by Platonic ethics transmitted into Arabic 
philosophy by Galen (d. ca. 200) in particular.433 Unlike al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā in his 
discussion of virtue relies on the Platonic account of man’s tripartite nature, which is 
much more central for his ethical system than the binary division of virtues into moral 
and intellectual.434 
In this account each of the soul’s three principal parts is assigned its proper virtue, 
so that the three resulting cardinal virtues correspond to a balanced state of that 
particular part. Hence, the resulting virtues are temperance (‘iffa) as the medium of 
the appetitive (shahwāniyya), courage (shajā‘a) of the irascible (ghaΕabiyya), and 
                                                 
430 Al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, pp. 10-13. The imprecise nature of ethical science is emphasized by Aristotle in 
Nicomachean Ethics, I.iii, 1094b13ff. 
431 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.i., 1103a14ff.; al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, p. 108; Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-
kalām ‘alā al-nafs, p. 197; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 119. They all in fact employ different terms for this 
division. Al-Fārābī then speaks of moral (khulqiyya) and rational (nuΛqiyya) virtues, Ibn Sīnā of 
practical (‘amaliyya) and theoretical (‘ilmiyya) virtues, al-Kirmānī of moral (khulqiyya) virtues and 
virtues of the (intelligible) form (Ιuwariyya), and the Brethren of moral virtues and virtues of the 
rational soul. 
432 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, pp. 124ff. To be precise, the intellectual virtues of Ibn Sīnā and al-Kirmānī 
correspond only to the virtues of theoretical intellect in the classification of Aristotle and al-Fārābī. 
433 Ibn Sīnā claims the authoritative source for ethical science to be Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
(kitāb ArisΛūΛālīs fī al-akhlāq), while al-Fārābī wrote a commentary on the work. The Neoplatonist 
Porphyry’s commentary of this work, which is no longer extant in any language, was apparently also 
translated into Arabic, and probably played a role in its filtering towards Neoplatonism. Of Galen both 
epitomes of Platonic dialogues and original ethical treatises were translated into Arabic, conveying 
especially ethical ideas based on the tripartite division of the soul and the related cardinal virtues into 
Arabic philosophy. Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām, p. 107; Mattock 1972; Fakhry 1991, pp. 63-6. 
434 See, Plato, Republic, IV, 435e-444e; IX, 580d-581a. 
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practical wisdom (Ηikma) of the rational (nāΛiqa) part. The three cardinal virtues 
together amount to the virtue of justice (‘adāla), which is then identified with the 
composite of practical virtue. 435  Within the Aristotelian division all the cardinal 
virtues fall within what Ibn Sīnā calls practical virtues, and Aristotle moral virtues, 
whereas theoretical virtues equate to theoretical wisdom (al-Ηikma al-naΝariyya), 
which Ibn Sīnā, however, treats as a thing apart from, rather than as one of, the 
cardinal virtues.436 
The three main virtues are each concerned with a specific activity of the soul, or 
the three “motivating powers” (da‘āwā) as Ibn Sīnā sometimes calls them. 
Temperance is a balanced state in relation to basic bodily appetites, mainly the desire 
for food, drink, and sex. Courage is a balanced state of emotions in general, which 
includes fear, anger, envy, and similar passions, whereas practical wisdom is related 
to the rational regulation of man’s actions.437 
Ibn Sīnā’s account of virtue, unlike the one presented by al-Fārābī, is not so much 
concerned with the individual virtues, but with a holistic virtuous state, which one 
gains through the three cardinal virtues. The goal is, according to Ibn Sīnā, to gain a 
mediate disposition that exists simultaneously in the rational (al-quwwa al-nāΛiqa) 
and lower animal faculties (al-quwā al-Ηayawāniyya), so that all of the distinct human 
activities are also in balance in relation to each other. What this means in practice is 
that reason as man’s highest part must govern the lower faculties. Practical virtue 
consists of the rational soul acquiring itself a dominant disposition (hay’at al-isti‘lā’) 
with respect to the lower faculties, whereas the lower faculties acquire a submissive 
disposition (hay’at al-idh‘ān) with respect to reason.438 Thus, the system of three 
cardinal virtues means that man must acquire the virtuous mediate state through 
which the desires and emotions of his lower psychical faculties are governed 
according to rational principles, rather than being driven by his desires and emotions. 
In fact, the meaning of moral virtue for all Arabic philosophers, whether 
Peripatetic or Ismaili, lies precisely in this acquisition of the psychical disposition in 
which bodily desires and emotions are subjugated to rational principles. 439  The 
difference between al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā is that al-Fārābī does not really distinguish 
between bodily desires and emotions, but instead speaks of seeking a rationally 
determined mediate position within the “accidents of the soul” (‘awāriΕ al-nafs), 
                                                 
435 While justice in this Platonic ethical context then refers to man’s conduct in relation to himself only, 
its meaning is widened within the political and metaphysical contexts. 
436 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 378; Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, p. 190. Ibn Sīnā, unlike al-
Fārābī or even al-Kirmānī, usually does not discuss theoretical knowledge as a virtue, possibly because 
virtues are moderate states, whereas there is no excess in theoretical knowledge, for Peripatetic 
philosophers at least. The complete existence, and happiness, is for Ibn Sīnā the one in which the 
practical virtues are combined with theoretical knowledge. But even above this, the human hierarchy is 
culminated in the one in whom to practical virtue and theoretical wisdom is superimposed special 
prophetic properties (al-khawāΙΙ al-nabawiyya), which transcend common human virtue. 
437 See, Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 378; Mabda’, p. 109. 
438 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 354; Ishārāt, pp. 79-80. In Remarks and Admonitions Ibn Sīnā uses 
more Quranically inspired, as opposed to technical philosophical, terminology, calling the rational part 
the tranquil soul (al-nafs al-muΛma’inna) and the irrational part the commanding soul (al-nafs al-
ammāra), to express the same idea of subjection of the lower psychical faculties to reason. 
439 This applies even to al-Kirmānī, for even if he does not believe that man could govern his psychical 
states into moral virtues relying only on his reason, the prophetic regulations that govern them are 
rationally determined, since the origin of prophecy lies in the Intellect. 
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which include both appetites (shahwa) and passions (infi‘āl). 440  But in fact the 
distinction plays no major role for Ibn Sīnā either in the end, for in reality he does not 
treat desires and emotions separately, but both are to be subjugated to reason equally. 
Like Ibn Sīnā, the Brethren of Purity also at times discuss virtue based on the 
Platonic tripartition, with the identical conclusion that it is for the rational soul to 
subject the lower faculties. 441  In comparison, while al-Kirmānī does not care to 
analyze the concept of virtue analytically the way Peripatetic ethics does, he still 
seems to view the moral virtues of the natural soul (al-nafs al-Λabī‘iyya) in very 
similar terms as moderate states in relation to bodily desires in particular. Moral virtue 
means essentially subjugation of body and its faculties to religious principles, which 
for him are the earthly embodiment of reason.442 
All four would then generally agree that practical virtue consists first and foremost 
of cultivating such psychical dispositions within oneself through which reason 
subjects bodily desires and other bodily states to its control. All would also agree that 
man’s bodily and spiritual nature are somehow contrary to each other, and that his 
bodily temperament will easily lead him astray, if he does not consciously subject it to 
serve his spiritual needs. To lead a life of virtue, man must therefore make a choice to 
follow his reason, rather than his appetites. 
Since practical virtue for Arabic philosophers, as for the Greek for that matter, has 
to do with the way man governs his bodily desires and emotions, the question arises 
about the attitude that Arabic ethics adopts towards the passions. Namely, while the 
Peripatetic ethics that most Arabic philosophers adopt cultivates the ideal of 
metriopatheia, that is, of moderation with respect to desires and emotions, at the same 
time they seem to profess an ideal of apatheia in the Stoic sense, that is, of complete 
elimination of bodily states, which after all seems to pertain to the Neoplatonic ideal 
of ascent from a material-sensible to a spiritual-intelligible level of existence. Despite 
their discussion of moral virtue as a moderate state in the Aristotelian sense, both 
Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers repeatedly promulgate the ideal of completely 
purging the bodily states. 
Hence, Ibn Sīnā declares that the goal of virtue as a mediate psychical disposition 
is to lead the soul away from the bodily states, which are “harmful to the soul’s 
essence,” and “distract it from seeking its intellectual perfection,” towards an ideal of 
non-affection of the rational soul by the lower faculties.443 Similarly for al-Fārābī, al-
Kirmānī, and the Brethren of Purity the goal of virtue is to liberate the soul from its 
bodily attachments.444 
The two ideals seem to be contradictory, however, since with respect to bodily 
pleasures, for example, the virtue of temperance is defined as a moderate state 
                                                 
440 See, e.g., al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, p. 4. 
441 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 156-7, 415ff. In fact the Brethren collate the Aristotelian and Platonic 
division of soul in their terminology, speaking of desiring plant soul (al-nafs al-nabātiyya al-
shahwāniyya), irascible animal soul (al-nafs al-Ηayawāniyya al-ghaΕabiyya), and rational soul. 
442 See, e.g., al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 115-6, 571-3. Despite al-Kirmānī’s low esteem of analytical ethics, 
faint traces of the indirect influence of Greek ethical thinking can be found in the specific moral virtues 
he chooses to mention, as they happen to be the canonic ones of courage, justice, etc. See also, al-
Kirmānī’s criticism of Aristotelian ethics discussed in chapter five, which shows that his choice to 
dismiss it is conscious. 
443 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 354-5. See also, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 114-5; Ζāl al-nafs, pp. 88-9. 
444 Al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 204-6; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 502-3. 
 115
between gluttony (sharah) and insensitivity to pleasure (‘adam al-Ηiss bi-´l-
ladhdha), 445  not purging of bodily desires from oneself altogether. In Greek 
Neoplatonism this apparent contradiction was solved by identifying the virtues of 
metriopatheia with the lowest stage of political virtue, which were to be followed by 
the purificatory virtues identified with apatheia.446 The moderate notion of virtue is 
then only the first step, designed to tone down excesses of desire and passion, whereas 
the further goal is complete elimination of bodily states. 
There are no such grades for the Arabic Neoplatonists, however, for they have no 
intermediate stage between moral and theoretical virtues. However, despite their 
Neoplatonic tendencies, the notions of Arabic philosophers with respect to bodily 
desires and emotions are not wholly negative in tone, for bodily states are not evil in 
themselves, but only when they interfere with attaining higher intellectual states.447 In 
the end the tension between metriopatheia and apatheia translates into the question of 
the degree of ascetic requirements involved in the philosophical life; we will see later 
towards which end the Arabic philosophers incline in their practical ideal of a virtuous 
life. 
In Attainment of Happiness al-Fārābī makes one more classification of virtues into 
theoretical (naΝariyya), deliberative (fikriyya), and moral (khulqiyya) virtues, which 
he together with practical arts (al-Ιinā‘āt al-‘amaliyya) declares to be the four 
elements required for the attainment of happiness.448 This tripartite classification is in 
fact not a novel one, since it merely divides the intellectual virtues of the twofold 
distinction into virtues of theoretical and practical intellect. However, more than in his 
other works al-Fārābī makes each kind of virtue subservient to the following one. 
Hence, deliberative virtue requires moral virtue as its basis, whereas deliberative 
virtue must be subordinate to theoretical virtue.449 Al-Fārābī’s three grades of virtue 
are not temporal, however. Rather practical deliberation must be based on moral 
virtue, in order to be directed towards happiness, whereas deliberation must be based 
on theoretical reason in order to apply its universal knowledge to particular 
circumstances. While other philosophers do not distinguish it as a specific class of 
virtue, deliberation is a key feature for other philosophers as well in the practical 
purification of the soul. 
                                                 
445 Al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, p. 11; Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, p. 190. For Ibn Sīnā, a 
temperate person is moderate between subsiding (khāmid) and licentious (shabiq). 
446 Dillon 1983; Sorabji 2004, pp. 337ff. Dillon assumes that Plotinus’ grades of virtue, which were 
elaborated by later Neoplatonists to more complicated schemes, is a solution for a contradiction in 
Plato. While The Republic contains the four cardinal virtues based on the three parts of the soul, which 
instigate towards moderation and rational control of the lower parts by reason, Phaedo rather views 
virtue as elimination of all bodily states. Hence, Plotinus adopts the cardinal virtues as the first stage of 
civic and the purging as the second stage of purificatory virtues. 
447 See, al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, p. 151; Tanbīh, p. 15; Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-‘ishq, pp. 13-4. 
448 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 119. Attainment of Happiness is above all a political treatise, and it refers more 
than anything else to the role of these four things in a political context. Hence, the practical arts as 
complementing the three grades of virtue are required in the political community as a whole, not by 
each individual. 
449 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 154-5, 159-60. 
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6.3 Governance of the soul 
Since ethics is even at best an inaccurate science dealing with the particular and 
changing human things, rather than the universal and intelligible ones, it cannot 
provide universal rules for the attainment of practical virtue. 450  Instead it can 
complement the theory of moral virtue with a discussion of the practical intellect, 
which is the tool by which the particular actions leading to virtue can be discovered. It 
is this function of the practical intellect that al-Fārābī means by his deliberative virtue. 
Deliberative faculty (al-quwwa al-fikriyya/rawiyya) is that activity of the practical 
intellect by which man deliberates on the particular things of the human world, as 
opposed to the intellection of universal intelligibles, which is the operation of 
theoretical intellect. Through deliberation man discovers the means to attain an end, 
which are always conditioned by the particular circumstances. Deliberation can of 
course be used towards both good and bad purposes, and it only becomes a virtue 
when it is used as a means to gain the greatest end, ultimate happiness.451 It is for this 
reason that al-Fārābī states that man must have moral virtue in order to gain 
deliberative virtue, for only a virtuous man willingly employs his practical reason 
towards virtuous ends. For al-Fārābī moral virtue and practical deliberation together 
form complete human virtue (al-faΕīla al-insāniyya).452 
It is then the practical intellect and its faculties that for the Peripatetics play a key 
role in the actual task of subjugating the lower faculties. Man is at least in theory able 
to govern himself to virtue, if he only possesses sound deliberative powers and a 
strong enough resolve to act in accordance with his deliberation. Not all men are 
capable of reaching virtue relying only on their reason, but, at least for al-Fārābī, such 
men that have both good enough deliberative capabilities and strong resolve, are 
sufficiently independent-minded to attain virtue through philosophical self-
governance.453 Such people possess practical wisdom (ta‘aqqul/Ηikma), which is in 
essence a good faculty of deliberation directed towards virtuous ends. 454  It is a 
capability that one learns more from experience than from theory, and that enables 
one to discover the correct actions that favor one’s quest towards happiness. 
In contrast, while both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity share the general 
Aristotelian psychological theory with the Peripatetics, including the one concerning 
practical intellect and its faculties, practical deliberation does not play a major role in 
their theory of how actions leading to moral virtue are discovered. While for both of 
them deliberation (rawiyya) is a faculty of the practical intellect by which man 
distinguishes right from wrong, their discussion on the actuality of attaining moral 
                                                 
450 See, al-Fārābī, IΗΙā’, p. 104. 
451 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 149ff. 
452 Al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, pp, 4-7. 
453 Al-Fārābī (Tanbīh, p. 17) calls such men “free by merit” (al-Ηurr bi-isti’hāl). In contrast the bestial 
man (al-insān al-bahīmī) possesses neither good deliberation nor strong resolve, natural slave (al-‘abd 
bi-´l-Λab‘) lacks the resolve, whereas one who has resolve without deliberation may act like a free man, 
provided that someone else does the deliberating for him. 
454 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, pp. 128-30; Ibn Sīnā, Mabda’, p. 96. There is no agreement in terminology for al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā with respect to practical wisdom. The Aristotelian term phronēsis, prudence or 
practical wisdom, is rendered by Ibn Sīnā as al-Ηikma (al-‘amaliyya), which for al-Fārābī refers more 
to the perfection of the theoretical intellect. Al-Fārābī’s term ta‘aqqul means for Ibn Sīnā theoretical 
intellection, rather than practical wisdom. 
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virtue is more focused on the religious ordinances, than employment of practical 
reason.455 
Both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers essentially agree that the soul must be 
governed (tadbīr/siyāsa) to virtue, and that this virtue consists of the lower bodily 
functions being subjugated to the control of the rational soul.456 The disagreement 
concerns the nature of this governance, so that al-Kirmānī mostly identifies it with 
following of religious ordinances, whereas Peripatetics in the context of individual 
ethics perceive it as an operation of practical reason, and the Brethren fall somewhere 
in the middle. 
Nevertheless, all also share the assumption that man is by nature neither good nor 
evil, that is, that virtue is not an inborn characteristic, although people naturally do 
have a greater or lesser tendency towards virtue.457 Although Arabic philosophy does 
present a transcendent ideal of complete moral and intellectual perfection as 
conducive to happiness, few, if any, men are in fact capable of attaining that 
perfection. 
The Brethren of Purity convey this idea in the absolute universal man (al-insān al-
muΛlaq al-kullī), of whom the prophets and imams seem to be individuations, who is 
completely disposed to all virtuous dispositions and actions. While this absolute man 
is present in the partial men (al-insān al-juz’ī), they can only realize part of his 
perfection in accordance with their natural dispositions.458 Al-Fārābī presents a similar 
idea in saying that not all perfections can be found in a single man, but they are rather 
distributed collectively in the society.459 
Since the reason for bad moral dispositions for the Arabic philosophers lies in 
learned bad habits (‘āda), the key to the governance of the soul is its re-habituation 
(i‘tiyād) or exercise (riyāΕa), through which it is gradually molded towards virtuous 
dispositions.460 While for al-Kirmānī the precise contents of such spiritual exercises 
are conveyed wholly in the prophetic law, for Peripatetics a capable man may exercise 
himself into virtue by following his intellect. This seems to be the case in part also for 
the Brethren of Purity, who distinguish self-governance (al-siyāsa al-dhātiyya) as one 
of the five kinds of governance steering man towards virtue, besides three levels of 
political governance, and that of the household.461 
Governance of the soul is based on the idea that constant repetition of any actions 
is gradually transformed into stable habits or dispositions of the soul. Therefore, in 
order to become virtuous, as virtues also are habits of the soul, it should be sufficient 
                                                 
455 For the functions of practical intellect in al-Kirmānī and the Brethren, see, De Smet, pp. 353-4; 
Diwald 1972.  
456 For governance of the soul in al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity, see, e.g., al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 
100, 499; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (9), pp. 258ff. 
457 See, al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, p 76; FuΙūl, p. 108; Ibn Sīnā, Fī ‘ilm al-akhlāq, pp. 119-20; 
al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 99; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 305-10. 
458 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), p. 306. The fact that the absolute man is said to be God’s deputy on earth 
(khalīfat Allāh fī arΕihi) from the creation of Adam until resurrection would seem very similar to the 
Ismaili doctrine of the continuous presence of the imams as the reincarnation of the Intellect. 
459 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, p. 53. 
460 See, e.g., al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, pp. 8ff.; Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-kalām, pp. 196-7; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 
100, 115, 499; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (42), pp. 532-4. 
461 See, e.g., Baffioni 2004, p. 338. 
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for one to repeatedly perform virtuous actions, so that they in the end become rooted 
in one’s nature as virtuous dispositions. 
Al-Fārābī goes furthest to give more detailed instructions about the ways by which 
a rational individual may govern himself to virtue. First man should practice self-
reflection in order to find out which moral dispositions he currently possesses. This he 
can find out by considering which actions appear as most pleasant and easy, since it is 
the actions that correspond to man’s moral disposition that are the easiest for him to 
perform. Then, he should evaluate whether the disposition in question is excessive, 
defective, or a virtuous mediate disposition. If it is either excessive or defective, he 
should repeatedly perform actions pertaining to the opposite disposition, until the 
disposition is gradually tilted towards the virtuous medium.462 
Moral virtue is for Peripatetic philosophers then like any skill or craft, such as the 
skill of writing often mentioned as an analogy by al-Fārābī, which one learns through 
practice and repetition. As in virtue, people may naturally be more talented with 
respect to a certain skill and learn it with more ease, but it is still possible for anyone 
to acquire it through practice.463 A similar idea of governance of the soul through 
habituation and repetition is also presented by Ibn Sīnā and the Brethren of Purity, but 
with a less individualistic focus. Also, rather than discussing the governance as a 
pursuit of individual mediate dispositions along Aristotelian lines, both of them rather 
emphasize it as habituation of the soul towards conquering the body and its states.464 
In the end, however, for all Arabic philosophers, even for al-Fārābī, despite his 
emphasis on the rational self-governance of an enlightened individual, moral purity is 
not primarily acquired by each individual in isolation through his own efforts. Rather, 
as we will see later, the precepts leading towards such purity are transmitted in a 
society through moral education, which in the Islamic context is materialized in the 
form of religious law. 
6.4 The practice of virtue 
The discussion of practical virtue and purification of the soul, focused around the 
Aristotelian ideas of mediate psychical dispositions and domination of practical 
intellect over bodily faculties, has so far remained on a rather theoretical level. Next 
we must see how the idea of practical virtue is represented in Arabic philosophy 
beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian theory. How is the theory of virtue transformed into 
practical life, and in what kind of ideal of human life does it culminate? Beyond the 
analytical ethical theory, Ibn Sīnā and the Brethren of Purity in particular also offer 
ethical ideas of a more normative kind, which present some glimpses of what the ideal 
of philosophical life could consist. Such accounts should also give us an idea about 
towards which end, Aristotelian metriopatheia or Neoplatonic apatheia, their ethical 
theories tilt with respect to regulation of desires and emotions. 
As we have seen, for all Arabic philosophers the primary purpose of practical 
virtue is the Neoplatonic one of enabling the soul’s ascent from the material-sensible 
level of existence towards a spiritual-intelligible one. In practice this would seem to 
be a call towards renouncement of the worldly material things in favor of a higher 
                                                 
462 Al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, pp. 8-15. 
463 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, p. 108. 
464 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), p. 310; IV (50), pp. 258-9. 
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spiritual existence. After all, it would seem that only by cutting off his material 
attachments altogether, can man become liberated to pursue a completely spiritual 
existence. The question of the practice of virtue then revolves to a great degree around 
the degree of asceticism that Arabic philosophical ethics encompasses. For all Arabic 
philosophers the question is in particular about the bodily desires for food, drink, and 
sex, and to what degree man is allowed to indulge in the pleasures they give. 
Clearly the ideal of philosophical life is ascetic to some degree, since it 
encompasses the notion of elevating oneself from these bodily pleasures towards a 
desire for spiritual things. But does this mean that an initiate of philosophy is to 
discard worldly pleasures and attachments altogether, and that the attitude of Arabic 
philosophy is wholly negative towards them? Furthermore, if the goal of practical 
virtue is the liberation of the soul from worldly things, does that practical virtue 
involve any social virtues, or does it condone an apathetic ideal towards the 
cultivation of human relations? 
In the end all of Arabic philosophical ethics seems to encourage a practice of 
moderate ascesis with respect to worldly desires, but without severing worldly 
attachments completely. There are, however, differences of degree in the asceticism 
portrayed by the philosophers. There is no particularly ascetic flavor in al-Fārābī’s 
rationalistic ethics, despite the fact that for him also the ultimate ethical end is for the 
soul to be detached from materiality. The Aristotelian idea of virtue that he employs 
more consistently than most Arabic philosophers clearly calls towards moderation, 
rather than ascesis, with respect to worldly things. 
Al-Kirmānī’s position is also rather lenient. There does not seem to be any need to 
go beyond the requirements of religious law in practice of ascesis, and even the 
prophets and imams as the perfect human embodiment of virtue are described as 
lacking excessive desires for bodily pleasures, rather than being completely purged of 
them. Also, man is advised to take care of the body for as long his soul stays in the 
material world.465 
Ibn Sīnā and the Brethren of Purity, in contrast, present a more vocal call for 
ascetic practices, although the kind of ascesis they have in mind is not an extreme 
form of self-mortification of the body. In case of Ibn Sīnā, as we have seen, his 
theoretical position is one in which desires and emotions of the two lower parts of the 
soul are subjugated to the rational soul. However, the ideal of temperance as the 
moderation of appetitive soul does not seem to require asceticism in relation to bodily 
desires, but only avoidance of excessive indulgence in them. 
In Remarks and Admonitions Ibn Sīnā presents in a descriptive manner some of 
the practical virtues that the ‘Gnostic’ (‘ārif) attains, once he has progressed further 
on the spiritual road of the philosopher, and hence attained some proximity to the 
Active Intellect. The attitude of such men seems to be rather ambivalent in relation to 
worldly goods. According to Ibn Sīnā, the Gnostics differ from each other with 
respect to worldly and external things, and the worldly preferences of an individual 
Gnostic may even vary during his life-time. For one it may make no difference 
whether he lives an ascetic (qashaf) or luxurious (taraf) life, while another may be 
more disposed towards the former. Rejection of worldly things occurs in particular 
                                                 
465 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 495, 546, 572-3. 
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when the philosopher becomes so involved with his spiritual-intelligible occupations 
that he comes to despise everything else but the Truth. 
The philosopher-mystic may, however, be inclined towards ornaments and 
beautiful things, because he by nature loves beauty, which as the most perfect 
representative of its genus best represents divinity within the material objects.466 In 
sum, for Ibn Sīnā, moral virtue as incorporated to the philosopher’s life involves no 
harshly ascetic demands, although worldly goods appear trivial for someone who has 
tasted the spiritual pleasures. 
However, Ibn Sīnā is here describing the attributes of a person who has already 
progressed far within the practical and intellectual virtues, for whom a relative 
indifference towards worldly things flows naturally from the higher spiritual state that 
he has attained. It would seem that the initial states of practical purification would 
require more drastically ascetic measures, if one is to attain the indifference and 
detachment of a more highly evolved sage in the first place. This is in fact what Ibn 
Sīnā says earlier in Remarks and Admonitions. The practice of asceticism (zuhd) 
forms a part of the spiritual exercise (riyāΕa) of the soul by which the philosopher 
aspires to subjugate his bodily desires and passions. Through turning away from the 
worldly things by ascetic practices, the aspiring philosopher is able to liberate himself 
from everything that distracts him from his spiritual occupations, and devote himself 
wholly towards the spiritual sphere of being.467 
The ascesis that Ibn Sīnā advocates is of a rather mild variant, however. Man is 
allowed to satisfy his bodily needs to the degree that they are beneficial for the 
preservation of bodily health, and as long as they are not harmful to his higher 
spiritual aspirations. Individual pleasures seem to be subordinated to the rule that they 
must be rationally determined, rather than enslaving their seeker to their power. An 
example is wine-drinking, which Ibn Sīnā famously admits to be a habit of his in his 
autobiography. It is allowed to a moderate degree, when it serves a medical or 
psychical benefit, but not when the purpose is the pleasure itself that one gains from 
drinking wine. It is precisely such beneficial function that Ibn Sīnā ascribes to wine in 
his memoirs: it enhances intellectual keenness and physical stamina in the long hours 
of his theoretical studies.468 When the harm caused is greater than the medical benefit 
gained, as happens in the case opium, it is to be avoided.469 
The Epistles of the Brethren Purity are characterized by a similar apathetic ideal in 
relation to material, worldly things, but of a slightly higher degree than in Ibn Sīnā’s 
philosophy. The Brethren contrast time after time after time love for this world 
(dunyā) and its pleasures, which is for them the greatest cause for evil between 
people, with love for the spiritual after-life (ākhira). 
                                                 
466 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 107-8. 
467 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 57-60, 78-80. 
468 Ibn Sīnā, Sīra, p. 30; Gutas 1988, pp. 184-7; Fakhry 1991, p. 87. Gutas emphasizes the functional 
role that Ibn Sīnā gives to wine-drinking in the autobiography, as a pharmacological method enhancing 
the epistemological process, rather than as a haphazard sign of his hedonism. Medically, Ibn Sīnā 
believes that wine helps to balance the temperament and reduce black bile, and thus to predispose the 
philosopher towards receiving intellectual emanations. 
469 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-‘ishq, p. 14. According to his student-biographer (Sīra, pp. 84-6), Ibn Sīnā had 
first-hand experience of the harmful effects of opium, when one of his students put some into his 
medicine in order to drug him. 
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In the Brethren’s analysis, all bodily desires (shahawāt) are in the end caused by a 
desire for eternity (shahwat al-baqā’) and revulsion of extinction (karāhiyat al-fanā’) 
that is entrenched in the nature of all created beings. The answer to this inherent 
desire for eternity is plainly not to cling to transient, worldly things, which man will 
eventually lose anyway, but to adopt instead a desire for eternal, spiritual things. 
While even bodily desires are not evil in themselves, as they are necessary for one’s 
survival, they are reproachable if they exceed the limit of satisfying one’s needs. 
Consequently, for the Brethren abandonment of the worldly (zuhd fī al-dunyā) and 
desire for the other-worldly (raghba fī al-ākhira) are the basis from which all moral 
virtues develop.470 
Given the Brethren’s attitude towards indulging in worldly pleasures, it is not 
surprising that they view ascetic practices as conducive towards attainment of moral 
virtue. The virtuous nature of ascetics (zāhid) is greatly praised by the Brethren, for 
they represent the highest degree of men with respect to renunciation of worldly 
things.471 
With their characteristic tendency towards the concrete, the Brethren of Purity 
elevate light eating (qillat al-akl) in particular as a primal form of such asceticism. 
The practice of eating lightly, and avoidance of fullness (shiba‘) and over-eating, has 
for them direct consequences both for one’s practical morality and intellectual 
preparedness. Overt indulgence in culinary pleasures leads to such moral, social and 
intellectual vices as loss of clarity (bahā’), neglect of the Lord, abandonment of 
knowledge, contempt of the poor, and heaviness of the soul (thiqal al-nafs), for it 
increases one’s love towards the world, and decreases fear and recollection of 
death.472 
The same principle applies to all bodily desires, such as sexual desires, in that man 
is allowed to satisfy his needs, but not to submerge in them beyond that. For the 
Brethren practical purification of the soul consists of a struggle against the “demons” 
of human nature, that is, the lower bodily faculties of the soul. This is the greater jihād 
of man, as the Brethren also call it in religious terminology.473 
As for Ibn Sīnā, for the Brethren also ascesis must not be extreme, however, but 
should be practiced in moderation. The objective is such abstention as will not harm 
one’s bodily health, although the Brethren do counsel employment of deliberate 
hunger at appropriate times as a method for enhancing one’s spiritual condition and 
reaching a balanced temperament.474 Although the Brethren greatly revere the ascetics 
as the cream of humanity, they do not expect such practices from everyone, but show 
some compassion towards the defects of human nature. 
                                                 
470 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 316-7, 354-7; III (42), p. 522; IV (46), pp. 81-2; Jāmi‘a, p. 22. Hence, 
“knowledge of God is the most noble of sciences, while renunciation of the worldly is the head of 
action” (ma‘rifat Allāh ajall al-‘ulūm wa-´l-zuhd fī al-dunyā ra’s al-a‘māl). 
471 The Brethren also attribute ascetic qualities in particular to the “friends of God” (awliyā’ Allāh), a 
group that might refer either to the Brethren themselves, or to Ismaili dā‘īs and imams – or both, 
depending on one’s interpretation of the identity of the Brethren. See, the list of the characteristics of 
the awliyā’ provided in Baffioni 1993-1997. 
472 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 357-9. 
473 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 366-7; Jāmi‘a, pp. 75, 421-3. 
474 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (50), pp. 254-5. 
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For the Brethren the primary practices of practical purification are determined in 
the religious law, and to attain salvation it is sufficient to follow the ‘middle course’ 
(iqtiΙād) with respect to religious regulations. People are different, and each should 
perform the kind of purificatory actions that suit his particular degree of humanity, 
allowing himself as much of the worldly things as is suitable for his nature. The 
ascetics who renounce worldly pleasures altogether represent the highest degree of 
men who help guide the less virtuous towards other-worldly happiness.475 
Despite their relative moderation, the list of virtues that, according to the Brethren, 
characterizes a true believer (mu’min)476 reflects the Neoplatonic attitude of apatheia 
with respect to worldly attachments, which is clearly evident in the Brethren’s ethical 
thought. The virtues that the Brethren choose to advocate, however, also show the 
more religious and Islamic foundation of their ethics, as they have nothing to do with 
the commonplace lists of Aristotelian or Platonic origin employed in Peripatetic 
ethics. 
These virtues include such moral qualities as reliance on God (tawakkul), patience 
(Ιabr), and contentment with one’s fate (al-raΕā’ bi-´l-qaΕā’), which correspond well 
both to the Neoplatonic impassionate attitude towards worldly events, as well as to a 
Sufi-kind of piety. They require from the true believer a rather Stoic attitude in face of 
adversities and changes of worldly fortune. With their emphasis on the role of 
religious law as the primary ethical foundation, the Brethren also elevate obedience 
(Λā‘a) towards the divine law as a key virtue of the believer. The Brethren further 
illustrate this attitude of resignation to one’s fate and obedience of the law with the 
exemplary behavior of both philosophical and religious figures of the past, who best 
embodied these virtues in their lives, such as the humble way in which Socrates, 
Jesus, and imam Ḥusayn resigned themselves to an unjust death, or in which prophet 
Muḥammad accepted the demise of his companions in the battle of Uḥud.477 
Although the Platonic cardinal virtues, which the Brethren also employ, spring 
from completely different ethical traditions, ultimately they are related. As for Ibn 
Sīnā, it is the liberation from the passions and desires of the lower psychical faculties, 
which is the ultimate purpose of Platonic virtues, that brings about a Stoic attitude of 
resigned acceptance of temporal events. Once man has attained such degree of moral 
virtue that he is no longer passionately attached to worldly things, their removal also 
causes no anxiety in him. 
As for the social virtues of the philosopher on the way towards moral perfection, 
they seem to come naturally after attainment of dispassionate attitude towards 
material world. Even though for Arabic philosophers the highest ideal of human life is 
to be submerged to a spiritual sphere of being, and hence to be detached from the 
ephemeral worldly things, for neither the Peripatetic philosophers nor the Brethren of 
Purity is the morally perfected philosopher one who withdraws from human 
community to isolated contemplation. As we have seen, al-Fārābī’s ideal philosopher 
                                                 
475 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 507-8. 
476 Belief (īmān) is a key concept in the Epistles, as it is besides knowledge the highest virtue for the 
Brethren. Hence, ‘believer’ in the Epistles means more than merely a Muslim. It would seem that 
believer refers to a person who pertains to the same elect group as the Brethren of Purity themselves, 
but whether this means some form of Ismailism depends on the interpretation of the Brethren’s 
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477 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (46), pp. 68-82. 
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is one who brings his philosophical knowledge into perfection through conveying it to 
others. Despite the fact that there is a contradiction between contemplative and 
political life, most philosophers at some point offered their services to the rulers of 
their time, as in the case of Ibn Sīnā who famously depicts his migrations from one 
court to another in his autobiography.478 
At the outset, it seems that the ideal of virtue embodied in Arabic virtue ethics is 
completely inward-oriented. In Ibn Sīnā’s analysis of practical virtue, based on the 
four Platonic cardinal virtues, as a rationally governed state of psychical balance 
between each part of the soul, man’s virtuous nature appears to bear no relation to the 
way he acts towards other beings. Justice as the complex of the three cardinal virtues 
is also defined as an internal psychical state, rather than as something defining 
interactions between people. It seems, however, that the goodness of the virtuous man 
somehow radiates naturally into man’s behavior towards his fellow-men, just as 
goodness radiates from the First Cause downwards to the natural world. Hence, in the 
end, the apparently inwardly oriented ideal of practical virtue in Arabic philosophy 
also has its social dimension. 
Hence, Ibn Sīnā’s philosopher-mystic is presented as a perfect embodiment of 
social virtue as well in Remarks and Admonitions. However, the virtuous nature of the 
philosopher in relation to other human beings emerges from his relative indifference 
to the things of this world, rather than a passionate attachment to them. The 
philosopher-gnostic is friendly and smiling, because he enjoys the supreme spiritual 
pleasures, and he treats all people as equals, because they appear as equals to him with 
respect to the Truth he has witnessed. He is forgiving and lacks resentment because he 
is incapable of being hurt by other human beings, while his mind is devoted to the 
spiritual truth. He is generous because he does not desire the futile material things. He 
is not aroused to anger by the moral imperfection of others, but is rather gentle and 
merciful towards his moral inferiors, because he perceives the higher mysteries of 
God regarding the unfolding of destiny.479 
While Ibn Sīnā’s morally perfect philosopher then is an epitome of magnanimity 
in his relations with his fellow men, in the end behind all that is revealed a rather 
Stoic attitude of apatheia. He is devoid of all petty character traits, because he is 
liberated from the passions and desires that attachment to worldly things evokes in 
most men. 
                                                 
478  Not all philosophers, however, shared Ibn Sīnā’s attitude towards worldly power – other 
philosophers, according to the biographical sources, were more grudging in surrendering their services 
to the rulers. In ‘eulogy’ to their Buyid patron ‘Aḍud al-Dawla, al-Sijistānī and his followers implicitly 
contrast the corruptive effects of the deceased king’s immersion in seeking of worldly delights and 
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479 “mustabṣir bi-sirr Allāh fī al-qadar.” Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 104- 6. 
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For the Brethren, it is in particular the ascetics that are characterized by an endless 
list of magnanimous social qualities, such as generosity, nobility, benevolence, 
altruism, gentleness, modesty, mercifulness, and tolerance. 480  Again these virtues 
appear to follow causally from purification of the soul from material attachments, 
rather than require special practice. However, unlike in Ibn Sīnā and most Arabic 
philosophers, there are also some tendencies in the thought of the Brethren of Purity 
that reflect ideals of solitary contemplation. This is the case despite the fact that for 
the Brethren attainment of happiness and moral virtue also occurs in the context of a 
social community. The Epistles namely state that the best state of affairs for one 
seeking purity of soul would be solitude (waΗda/infirād), although it is not required, 
because it does not suit everyone, and in any case procreation is necessary for the 
survival of the species. 
For the Brethren of Purity, the best social context to seek salvation and moral 
purity is their own community of pure believers, although whether it actually existed 
or is merely a fictional entity is not clear. In some passages the Brethren instigate the 
philosophical initiates to leave their families and spend their wealth in favor of this 
community of true believers, devoting themselves completely to spiritual 
occupations.481 This would seem to represent an ideal of a more rigorous kind of 
social asceticism than what was commonplace within Arabic philosophy. 
6.5 Love and death 
There are two philosophical themes that rather well exemplify the practical ideal of 
Arabic philosophy with respect to worldly life, and the kind of Stoic attitude that the 
morally perfected philosopher should adopt in it. These are the themes of love, on the 
one hand, and fear of death, on the other. Since love and death are the two major 
existential forces in life, the attitude that Arabic philosophers show towards them 
reveals a great deal about their ideal of human life. Both of these themes had been 
treated extensively by Greek philosophers, and Arabic philosophers were clearly 
influenced by these classical discussions of love and death. Both Ibn Sīnā and the 
Brethren of Purity devote a special treatise to the subject of passionate love (‘ishq).482 
Both of them ultimately interpret love in Neoplatonic terms in the context of the 
soul’s ascent towards its perfection, where spiritual love is elevated far above 
mundane corporeal love. In this context love is the Neoplatonic counterforce of 
emanation by which beings strive to re-ascend to their source. 
According to Ibn Sīnā, into all created beings there is rooted an inherent love 
towards their perfection and towards the good, which manifests itself as a desire 
towards the object of love when it is absent, and to be unified with it when it is 
present. Similarly, for the Brethren of Purity, love is an intense desire for a union 
(ittiΗād) with the beloved.483 For both of them the most worthy object of love is of 
course the Creator, since it is the absolute Good that has brought them into being. 
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Love is then the metaphysical power that manifests itself as much in the rotation of 
spheres, as in the aspiration of men towards their proper perfection.484 
While the former idea depicts love as a universal cosmological force working in 
the universe, both Ibn Sīnā and the Brethren of Purity also analyze the workings of 
love at the human level. The basis of this analysis is for both the tripartite soul, which, 
as we have seen, also forms the basis of their analytical views of human virtue. In this 
analysis distinct faculties of the soul possess different objects of love towards which 
their desire guides them, so that, according to the Brethren of Purity, the love of the 
appetitive soul is directed towards food, drink, and sex, that of the irascible towards 
power (riyāsa) and domination, and that of the rational soul for knowledge and 
attainment of moral virtues. 
Ibn Sīnā’s analysis is similar, but slightly more complex in that he gives specific 
objects of love for a variety of sub-faculties within the three parts of the soul.485 As is 
evident from this analysis, there is nothing inherently bad in any of the different forms 
of love, or rather forms of desire, because all form part of human nature. However, 
love of the rational soul appears as its highest form, whereas lower forms of love are 
reproachable when they are excessive, or when they are in conflict with rational love. 
Both Ibn Sīnā and the Brethren of Purity contrast corporeal love with the spiritual, 
although corporeal love is in itself also natural, and therefore not bad. Both also relate 
corporeal love to love of external beauty, which is a positive disposition that 
characterizes the most virtuous souls in particular. That is because the human soul has 
a natural inclination towards well-ordered and balanced forms, whether musical 
melodies or human bodies, since they are what best represent the intelligible in the 
sensible world. Outer beauty therefore reflects inner beauty, as the most beautiful 
corporeal forms are also most balanced in their material composition, and therefore 
closest to the simplicity and balance of their intelligible models. 
Hence, for the Brethren this desire towards external beauty is part of the inherent 
desire of the soul towards an ascent from the deficient towards more perfect things, 
whereas according to Ibn Sīnā even the noblest philosophers are usually not devoid of 
love of the beautiful human form. 486  For the Brethren, the love for a specific 
individual is in addition determined by the mutual compatibility of the bodily 
temperaments of the lover and the beloved, or the astrological constellations under 
which they were formed. Bodily constitutions are also largely responsible for 
determining the individual inclinations of people, such as their dispositions towards 
heterosexual or homosexual love, both of which the Brethren explain by kind of 
naturalistic causes.487 
                                                 
484 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-‘ishq, pp. 4-5; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (37), pp. 285-6; Jāmi‘a, pp. 413-4. 
485 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-‘ishq, pp. 7-10; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (37), p. 272; Jāmi‘a, p. 416. 
486 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-‘ishq, pp. 14-6; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (37), p. 276; Jāmi‘a, p. 414. Since 
balanced corporeal composition also implies good inborn moral dispositions, the beautiful also tend to 
be virtuous. Hence, Ibn Sīnā includes the science of physiognomy (‘ilm al-firāsa), in which character 
traits are deduced from physical appearance, among the applied forms of physics. Ibn Sīnā attempts to 
solve the consequent problem of the existence of the ugly but virtuous by stating that such individuals 
either gained their virtuous dispositions after the completion of their bodily constitution (istiΗkām al-
tarkīb), or through strong habituation. For similar views of Plotinus on the sensible beauty as an 
inspiration for the soul’s ascent, see, Miles 1999, p. 64 and Hadot 1993, pp. 48-63. 
487 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (37), pp. 276-8; Jāmi‘a, pp. 417-8. Hence, the love of man for woman is 
explained by the need for procreation, for which reason it exists naturally in most animals. For the love 
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Despite its naturalness, love of the corporeal kind is in the end something to be 
transcended for a philosopher desiring to rise from the material to the spiritual level of 
existence. Fulfillment of purely corporeal love is in the end impossible anyway, since 
love is defined as an intense desire to be unified with its object, but two corporeal 
beings can never merge to each other completely. Besides, such love is, even in the 
best case, only temporary, since bliss is inevitably followed by sorrow and anxiety 
following its loss. This is the kind of love that, according to the Brethren, was called 
love sickness by the ancients, since it extinguishes the rational soul under its passions, 
and wears down the lover.488 Even in its love of external beauty, the soul should 
therefore arise from the corporeal forms towards the intelligible forms behind them. 
According to Ibn Sīnā, the true love for the human soul is rational love (al-‘ishq 
al-nuΛqī), which can never flourish completely free until the animal faculties are 
repressed. Even the inherent nobility of love of beauty does not in itself justify 
corporeal love, when it occurs for the wrong reasons. The consummation of corporeal 
love is for Ibn Sīnā praiseworthy only in the cases where it is legitimated by rational 
reasons, such as procreation within matrimony, while forms where the only objective 
is pleasure, such as promiscuity or homosexuality, are reproachable.489 
For the Brethren, the ultimate purpose of love is to elevate souls from the 
corporeal degree towards the spiritual sphere of being. Hence, when someone who has 
progressed further within the intellectual and moral virtues witnesses a beautiful 
artifact (maΙnū‘) or person (shakhΙ), he will no longer merely desire to look at it and 
seek proximity with it, as common people do. Instead he will see beyond the 
corporeal object of desire to the Creator of its beauty, desiring to reach His proximity 
by emulating Him in his actions. For the Brethren of Purity, true virtuous love (al-
‘ishq al-fāΕil) of the human soul is then a desire towards proximity with the First 
Cause.490 
While Arabic philosophy elevates intellectual over corporeal love in the context of 
the ideal of contemplative life, both the Brethren of Purity and Ibn Sīnā treat sexual 
desires as something natural to a human being – even the philosopher. While the 
contemplative life might at first view appear as contradictory with the pursuit of 
sexual desires, Arabic philosophers in general do not opt for complete abstinence as 
part of the philosophical life. Rather, Ibn Sīnā, in this as in other questions, promotes 
                                                                                                                                            
of grown men (al-rijāl al-bālighīn) towards young men (Ιibyān/ghilmān) the Brethren offer one of their 
fascinating pseudo-scientific theories, which in this case is greatly suggestive of the pederastic ideals of 
Antiquity. Such desires are explained to be natural particularly amongst men of nations that highly 
value sciences, such as the Persians or Byzantines (al-rūm). Among such nations it inspires mature men 
to occupy themselves with the education, perfection (takmīl), and purification (taΛhīr) of young men, 
after they have reached an age at which their parents are no longer responsible for their upbringing. 
Consequently, the inherent desire for sexual relations with young men (nikāΗ al-ghilmān) is low among 
nations that are not scientifically oriented, such as Turks or blacks. For the homosexual ideals in 
medieval Islamic culture, see, Hodgson 1974, II, pp. 145ff. 
488 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (37), pp. 270, 273, 281, 283; Jāmi‘a, p. 417. It was not only Platonists who 
criticized passionate love among the ancients, but also, for example, Epicureans despite all their anti-
Platonism in other respects. As materialists Epicureans did not believe in spiritual love either, but like 
the Brethren, they believed passionate love to cause anxiety because of the contradiction between the 
desire to be completely unified with the beloved and the impossibility of ever realizing it completely. 
See, Nussbaum 1994, pp. 140ff. 
489 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-‘ishq, pp. 15, 17. 
490 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (37), pp. 281-5; Jāmi‘a, p. 428. 
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the Aristotelian mean where sexuality is restricted to marriage aiming for procreation, 
while extramarital and homosexual relations are banned explicitly. The Brethren of 
Purity, however, do elevate celibacy (tafarrud) as the ideal state for a philosopher, 
while admitting its unsuitability for most people.491 
That the question of celibacy as part of the philosophical life was a subject of 
debate among the philosophers is shown by a treatise by Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī.492 While 
stating that philosophers in general disagree on the question of abstinence, Ibn ‘Adī 
goes on to defend the practice against its philosophical adversaries. Moreover, he 
relates it explicitly to the philosophical life. In response to philosophical arguments 
condemning celibacy as antithetical to virtue, Ibn ‘Adī argues that abstinence, on the 
contrary, is virtuous for the philosopher insofar as it enables him to concentrate 
exclusively on contemplative life and pursuit of happiness, and eliminates the sizeable 
distractions that family life and child bearing present to the attainment of 
knowledge.493 
Ibn ‘Adī’s defense is, however, in the end related to a religious debate between 
Christians and Muslims on monastic practices which he seeks to defend by 
philosophical arguments. Ibn ‘Adī’s apologetic tone, moreover, reveals the scant 
appreciation that Muslim philosophers in tenth-century Baghdad showed towards 
celibacy as part of philosophical life. In the end, then, perceptions about philosophical 
life seem to be conditioned by religious views about virtue, as the views of both 
Christian and Muslim philosophers on this particular question are consonant with the 
general views of their religious community.494 
If abandonment of corporeal love will free the soul from the sorrow and anxiety 
that attachment to the transient things of material world causes, Arabic philosophy 
promises to do the same in the face of the greatest cause of anxiety in life, fear of 
death. The idea of philosophy as preparation for death, which entered among the 
definitions of philosophy favored in late Greek Neoplatonic schools, was another 
classical theme of philosophical ethics that was adopted by many Arabic 
philosophers.495 
For Arabic philosophers, philosophy shows that there is no rational reason to fear 
death, because upon death the perfected soul will enter a greater kind of spiritual life. 
Fear of death is based on false beliefs and excessive attachment to the material world, 
of which philosophical knowledge about the true nature of soul and its afterlife, as 
well as moral virtue and purging of soul from worldly attachments, will liberate man. 
Hence, as Ibn Sīnā explains in his short treatise Dispelling the Anxiety of Death 
(Risāla fī daf‘ al-ghamm min al-mawt), fear of death is caused by false beliefs about 
                                                 
491 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-‘ishq, pp. 15, 17; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (50), p. 259; Jāmi‘a, p. 538. 
492 Griffith 2006. 
493 Griffith 2006, pp. 312ff. 
494 Ibn ‘Adī in fact recognizes at the outset that his adversaries would regard his position as a distinctly 
Christian claim (da‘wat al-naΙārā), even though he employs exclusively philosophical arguments to 
support it. Griffith 2006, p. 332. 
495 Plato’s idea of philosophy as training for death in Phaedo, 64A is adopted, for example, in the late 
Greek Neoplatonist Ammonius’ introductory treatise as one of the definitions of philosophy. In the 9th 
century al-Kindī and Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā echo the Greek Neoplatonists by offering “preoccupation with 
death” (al-‘ināya/ihtimām bi-´l-mawt) as one of many definitions of philosophy. See, Westerink 1962, 
p. xxviii; al-Kindī, Risālat al-Kindī fī Ηudūd al-ashyā’ wa-rusūmihā, p. 172; Ibn Lūqā, Min kalām 
QusΛā Ibn Lūqā, p. 106. 
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its true nature, such as the materialistic assumption that the soul will perish together 
with the body, belief that death will cause great pain, or fear of a punishment in the 
afterlife. Fear of death may also simply spring from uncertainty about man’s fate after 
death, or the sorrow of having to leave behind family, wealth, and earthly pleasures. 
All these fears are caused by ignorance, and are hence cured by correct knowledge 
about the soul. 
Once man realizes that death will release the soul to its true spiritual existence, 
there is no reason to fear any of these events. Then man will grasp the transient nature 
of earthly pleasures, and the infinite regression to which chasing them drives him, and 
he will no longer be sad to leave them behind. Fear of death causing pain is also 
irrational, since sensation only belongs to embodied beings. Finally, to cure himself of 
the fear of punishment in afterlife, man only needs to purify his bad actions.496 Hence, 
in the philosopher-gnostic advanced in his theoretical and moral perfection the virtue 
of courage is manifested in his complete liberation from the irrational fear of death.497 
Similarly, for al-Fārābī only the ignorant and immoral have reason to fear death, 
while those who have acquired the moral and intellectual virtues during their worldly 
life will know that no evil will come upon them at the death of their bodies.498 
For the Brethren of Purity also it is false beliefs and absorption in worldly life that 
cause anxiety of death. A man who believes that life has no exterior purpose besides 
enjoyment of worldly goods, cannot truly enjoy his life, because he is constantly 
conscious of his imminent death, which he fears will steal everything from him. Thus, 
when man contemplates his old age, the decay of his youthful body, and its eventual 
decomposition and transformation into dust, he is afflicted by confusion and anxiety. 
But this fear is cured by the wisdom about the true nature of bodily and spiritual life 
and death. 
True life for man is the life of his soul, which is an intelligible and spiritual life 
that will continue eternally for the soul that has used its worldly life to perfect itself. 
Only ignorance of its own substance and absorption in worldly pleasures can bring 
death to the soul. Bodily death is therefore liberation, rather than cause for anxiety, for 
the virtuous soul, for it only means that the human soul ceases to employ a body for 
its existence, and makes the transition to the life according to its own essence.499 
Consequently, for Arabic philosophers liberation from the fear of mortality also 
follows from a general detached attitude towards worldly things. 
                                                 
496 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī daf‘ al-ghamm min al-mawt. While Ibn Sīnā and other Arabic philosophers see 
belief in soul’s destructibility as a cause of anxiety, Greek schools of philosophy also provided an 
alternative materialistic cure for the fear of death. Epicureans, with their minimalistic definition of 
happiness as freedom from bodily pain and psychological anxiety, proclaimed it to be irrational 
because death as the cessation of being liberated one from both. Instead, religious beliefs on reward and 
punishment in the afterlife are the cause of irrational anxiety, as with their false hopes of eternity they 
prevent man from enjoying his finite existence. Interestingly, the early Arabic philosopher Abū Bakr 
al-Rāzī provides both the Platonic spiritual and Epicurean materialistic cure for the fear of mortality, 
among which one can apparently pick one or the other according to one’s beliefs. See, Nussbaum 1994, 
pp. 113, 192ff.; Fakhry 1991, pp. 75-6. 
497 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, p. 106.  
498 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, pp. 153-5. 
499 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (29), pp. 38-42; III (42), p. 520; Jāmi‘a, p. 309. Compare al-Kirmānī’s similar 
analysis of life and death in RāΗa, p. 503. 
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There is then no reason to fear death when worldly life is understood as a 
transitional period in which the human soul prepares itself for a purely spiritual 
existence. Both the Brethren of Purity and al-Kirmānī employ the metaphor of the 
material world as the womb of the soul to illustrate this idea. The embryo grows and 
develops in the protection of its mother’s womb, in darkness devoid of sensation, until 
its bodily perfection is actualized to a degree that is prepared to enter the outside 
world, and to be overwhelmed by its sensations. Equally, the soul in this world should 
gradually grow towards its intellectual and moral perfection so that it will be prepared 
at the death of its body to enter the spiritual world, to be filled with cognition of 
eternal things.500 
In sum, Arabic philosophy promises to liberate man from the anxiety caused by 
death, but he must pay a price for that freedom. The student of philosophy should 
adopt an impassionate attitude towards worldly affairs, that is, to subjugate his 
passions and desires, and realize their limited value in contrast to the other-worldly 
bliss that the soul will attain in the afterlife. After this, physical death may appear 
even as desirable, although actual suicide is never condoned by any Arabic 
philosopher, but rather man is encouraged to make use of the time he is allotted for 
self-improvement. But in a metaphorical sense, according to the idea adopted by al-
Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and al-Kirmānī from Greek Platonism, man must die a voluntary 
death in this life, understood as “killing” the desiring and passionate souls, in order to 
live a life according to the soul’s own essence in the afterlife. This idea is crystallized 
in the maxim: “Die a voluntary death, so that you may live according to your 
nature.”501 
6.6 Philosophical lives 
The practice of virtue and adoption of a moderately apathetic attitude towards worldly 
events then appear as the guiding lines of the philosophical life. The tension between 
the Aristotelian metriopatheia and Neoplatonic apatheia remains somewhat 
unresolved within this ethical ideal, however, although Arabic philosophers in general 
appear to have a tendency to opt for moderation, as opposed to complete eradication 
of emotions and desires. It is then interesting to see how this ideal of the philosophical 
life is reflected in the lives of the Peripatetic philosophers themselves, as depicted in 
the biographies of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. While both biographies offer rather scant 
and schematized information about their subjects, in contrast to the more lavish 
biographies of such Greek Neoplatonic philosophers as Plotinus and Proclus, they still 
offer some idea about how the practice of virtue was perceived as part of the life of 
the philosopher. Moreover, the two biographies sketch rather distinct pictures of the 
                                                 
500 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 328-9, 342-3; III (42), pp. 491-2; Jāmi‘a, pp. 253, 309; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, 
pp. 480, 508-9, 540, 546-7. The Brethren make the point even clearer by adding a number of other 
analogies. With academic circles might resonate in particular the comparison of the soul in the material 
world to a student in the library (Ιabī fī al-maktaba), who after completing his studies is prepared to 
enter the outside world. 
501 “mut bi-´l-irāda taḥyā bi-´l-ṭabī‘a.” Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī daf‘, p. 52; al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, p. 
320; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 503. The maxim is repeated by both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, the latter 
attributing it to Plato. It is interesting that not only the two Peripatetics, but even al-Kirmānī, adopt the 
idea of voluntary and natural death and life in almost identical terms, because it shows how all three 
ultimately depend on the same Greek tradition in this theme. For the same idea in late Greek 
Neoplatonism, see, e.g., Westerink 1962, p. xxviii. 
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philosophical life, and the relation between the philosopher’s contemplative and 
worldly needs in it.502 
The image of al-Fārābī’s life as painted in the biography of Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a (d. 
1269) befits rather well the classical ideal of a philosopher. Al-Fārābī is said to have 
been a judge (qāΕī) in his youth (fī awwal amrihi), but then to have devoted himself 
completely to the pursuit of knowledge, at the expense of all other interests. After this 
he excelled in the theoretical life, becoming a “perfect philosopher” (faylasūf kāmil) 
who “brought the philosophical sciences to perfection,” “excelled in mathematical 
sciences.” and “was proficient in medicine,” although he did not practice it actively. 
As a motif shared with Ibn Sīnā’s autobiography, al-Fārābī’s life illustrates the 
priorities of the contemplative life where the pursuit of wisdom precedes any more 
mundane concerns. When employed in his youth as a guard of a garden in Damascus, 
al-Fārābī was constantly occupied with wisdom, reflection (naΝar), and inspection of 
the opinions of the ancients, sometimes at the expense of his health, as he stayed 
awake at night occupied with reading and writing by the light of a candle.503 
To this complete devotion to pursuit of knowledge, are added the virtuous 
character traits and ascetic tendencies through which the biographer portrays al-
Fārābī, and which he links explicitly to al-Fārābī’s adoption of the ancient concept of 
philosophy as a way of life: “He was of pure soul, strong intellect, and turned away 
from the worldly things, being content with what fulfilled his needs, thus leading the 
way of life of the ancient philosophers.”504 
Like most philosophers of the period, as al-Fārābī’s intellectual fame spread 
further, he also eventually earned a royal sponsor, and entered the court of the 
Ḥamdānid ruler Sayf al-Dawla (d. 967). Despite the relative comfort of living that 
such an arrangement afforded him, however, al-Fārābī apparently did not enter into 
the functions of power, nor did he abandon the lifestyle of relative independence and 
ascesis: “It is said that he only received from all that Sayf al-Dawla bestowed him 
four silver dirhams daily which he spent on the necessities of living. He was not 
concerned with outer appearance, housing, or profit, and it is said that he used to 
nourish himself exclusively with the water of the hearts of Aries and spiritual 
wine.”505 That is to say, he abstained from both meat and wine, thus joining the line of 
philosophers in the classical tradition that practiced vegetarianism as part of 
philosophical ascesis.506 
                                                 
502 For the biographies of al-Fārābī in the Arabic biographical tradition, see Ramón Guerrero 2003 and 
Vallat 2004, pp. 11ff. As the focus here is on the perceptions of the philosophical life in Islamic 
tradition, the historical accuracy of these biographies is not particularly important. 
503 Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘Uyūn, p. 557. 
504  “wa-kāna…zakiyy al-nafs, qawiyy al-dhakā’, mutajannib ‘an al-dunyā, muqtani‘ minhā bi-mā 
yaqūm bi-awadihi, yasīr sīrat al-falāsifa al-mutaqaddimīn.” Ibid. 
505 “wa-yudhkar annahu lam yakun yatanāwal min Sayf al-Dawla min jumlat mā yun‘im bihi ‘alayhi 
siwā arba‘at darāhim fiḍḍa fī al-yawm yukhrijuhā fīmā yaḥtājuhu min ḍarūrī ‘ayshihi. wa-lam yakun 
mu‘taniyan bi-hay’a wa-lā manzil wa-lā maksab. wa-yudhkar annahu kāna yatagadhdhā bi-mā’ qulūb 
al-ḥumlān ma‘a al-khamr al-rayḥānī faqaṭ.” Ibid.  
506 See, Vallat (2008, p. 1 and 2004, p. 23, note 4) for understanding “water of the hearts of Aries” and 
“spiritual wine” as abstention from meat and wine, as opposed to, for example, Ramón Guerrero (2003, 
p. 232) who translates it as “nourishment with lambs’ internals and fruit juices.” The idea of 
vegetarianism as part of the philosophical way of life is natural in the context of Greek Platonism, as in 
the treatises composed by Plutarch and Porphyry in philosophical defense of vegetarianism. Within the 
Arabic philosophical tradition the theme of animal ethics was not equally prevalent – but neither was it 
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The story of Ibn Sīnā’s life, as told in his brief autobiography and biography of his 
pupil, portrays a slightly different image of a philosopher’s life.507 Like so many 
philosophers and scholars of his time, Ibn Sīnā wandered throughout his life from one 
court to another in search of learning and royal sponsorship. The topos of a 
philosopher holding his distance with respect to the worldly leaders certainly does not 
apply to Ibn Sīnā. He liberally provided his distinguished medical and philosophical 
knowledge to worldly authorities, frequented various royal courts, and established 
close relations with a number of rulers, famously accepting an appointment as the 
vizier of the Buyid amīr Shams al-Dawla (d. 1021). 
Nor does his way of life appear as particularly ascetic, based on the scant 
information provided in the biography.508 Ibn Sīnā apparently received ample income 
from the ruler he served at each time, and was not particularly reluctant to participate 
in the pleasures of the courtly life. Nor did he renounce wine or meat for the sake of a 
contemplative life, but famously enjoyed a glass of wine to enhance his studies on a 
regular basis. His pupil, moreover, reports on one occasion on which they participated 
in a drinking party (majlis al-shirāb) with singers in the court of Shams al-Dawla, and 
also enjoyed wine as part of their philosophical sessions.509 
An image of a bon vivant of moderate proportions also appears from his attitude 
towards other worldly pleasures. His pupil notes his rather considerable sexual 
virility: “The master was vigorous in all his faculties, the sexual faculty being the 
most vigorous and dominant of his appetitive faculties, and he exercised it often.”510 It 
was to this and other excessive habits that his pupil attributes his being afflicted by the 
colic that eventually led to his demise.511 
While the philosopher emerging from Ibn Sīnā’s biography is not one who refuses 
the worldly delights for the sake of higher gains, the portrayal does at least reach 
almost hagiographical heights in extolling Ibn Sīnā’s theoretical virtue. Ibn Sīnā 
himself famously shows little modesty in depicting his prodigious intellectual 
capabilities, epitomized in his announcement of a complete grasp of all of the 
philosophical sciences by the age of 18,512 and his pupil continues in the same vein. 
                                                                                                                                            
completely non-existent. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and the Brethren of Purity both endorse ethical treatment of 
animals without opting for vegetarianism, although al-Rāzī is conscious that many of the ancient 
philosophers did so. In contrast, the protagonist of Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophical fable does adopt a 
vegetarian regimen as part of the philosophical life. A clear and explicit ethical defense of 
vegetarianism is to be found in the Syrian poet al-Ma‘arrī (d. 1057) who defends his lifestyle of 
veganism against the accusations of the contemporary Ismaili dā‘ī and philosopher al-Shīrāzī. See, al-
Rāzī, Kitāb al-sīra al-falsafiyya, pp. 103ff; Ikhwān, Case of the Animals versus Man Before the King of 
the Jinn; Ibn Ṭufayl, Ζayy Ibn Yaqdhān; Margoliouth 1902. 
507 Ibn Sīnā, Sīrat al-shaykh al-ra’īs. The autobiography/biography is also transmitted by Ibn Abī 
Uṣaybi‘a, among other sources. See, Gohlman’s introduction, pp. 1-9. 
508 It is interesting to contrast the way Ibn Sīnā’s life is portrayed by himself and his pupil, to the way 
that the almost hagiographical biographies of Proclus and Plotinus present their teachers as 
embodiments of all virtue, or even with that of al-Fārābī. 
509 Ibn Sīnā, Sīra, pp. 28-30, 54, 78. 
510 “wa-kāna al-shaykh qawiyy al-quwā kullihā wa-quwwat al-mujāma‘a min quwāhi al-shahwāniyya 
aqwā wa-aghlab wa-yashtaghil bihi kathīran.” Ibn Sīnā, Sīra, pp. 80-2. 
511 Ibid, pp. 86-8. 
512 Ibid, pp. 36-8. But as Gutas (1988, pp. 160-76) observes, Ibn Sīnā’s intention is, however, not so 
much to glorify his intellectual abilities, but to highlight the role of intuition within the epistemological 
process in his particular case. 
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Moreover, in at least one aspect Ibn Sīnā’s biography does coincide with that of al-
Fārābī in its depiction of an ideal philosopher. For Ibn Sīnā the contemplative life is 
also one in which the pursuit of wisdom supersedes all other needs. During his youth 
he devotes both day and night to study and learning, while in later life he is obliged to 
teach at night due to his daytime profession as a vizier, and throughout his later 
itinerant life he vigorously seeks knowledge from the libraries of the lands he visits.513 
It does not then appear necessary for Ibn Sīnā to renounce worldly pleasures 
altogether in order to devote himself to a life of contemplation, for Aristotelian 
moderation is sufficient for that purpose. But although Ibn Sīnā, in contrast to al-
Fārābī, is not a model of asceticism akin to the Socrates of Arabic tradition, in 
expression of religious piety he prevails over his predecessor. As often noted, Ibn Sīnā 
states at the course of his studies to have often visited mosques to pray for divine 
inspiration – a method which he reports to have been rather successful.514 Hence, the 
ideal of philosophical life in Arabic philosophy is closely intertwined with the 
practices of the religious community in which the philosophers partake. 
6.7 Religious purification 
So far we have seen what practical purity consists of in Arabic philosophy, both at the 
theoretical level of virtue ethics, and in its practical manifestation in the philosopher’s 
life. We still have not seen very much, however, of how the process of purification 
actually proceeds, beyond general ideas of moral self-reflection and governance of the 
soul. Since Arabic philosophy, like Greek Neoplatonism, appears as a spiritual road 
involving gradual detachment from the sensible-material level of existence, does it 
offer any concrete practices or spiritual exercises by which the moral part of that 
progression could take place? 
In the end it appears that in Arabic Neoplatonism the religious regulations as a 
whole are understood in the context of this purificatory practice, and it is primarily 
religious law that provides the concrete means for moral purification. In addition, 
there are, however, isolated ideas within Arabic philosophy for non-religious 
purificatory practices. However, unlike in the Greek and Roman worlds, where 
purificatory practices were formed and actually employed within the philosophical 
schools, in the Islamic world philosophy was not institutionalized in the same way. 
Hence, the philosophical practices probably represent more theory than lived reality. 
Despite the fact that practical virtue and purification is in this study discussed 
mainly from the perspective of an individual, Arabic philosophers in fact do not 
believe that either happiness or moral perfection could be attained in isolation. Rather 
men must strive towards their perfection as part of a larger community, which ideally 
should be organized in a way that all of its parts together contribute according to their 
capabilities to acquisition of happiness.515 
                                                 
513 Ibid, pp. 26-30, 34-6, 54-6. 
514 Ibid, pp. 28, 78. 
515 For the impossibility of man attaining happiness in isolation, or living a satisfactory existence of any 
kind for that matter, see al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, p. 228; al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, p. 69; TaΗΙīl, 
p. 139; Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 364; Ishārāt, IV, p. 60; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (2), p. 100. The 
Andalusian philosophers Ibn Bājja and Ibn Ṭufayl, writing a century and a half later, famously opt for 
the solitary contemplation of the philosopher, or even a group of philosophers, in the case where the 
surrounding society is not virtuous. Al-Fārābī, however, discusses the attainment of happiness solely in 
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Such ideal society is investigated in political philosophy, which for al-Fārābī and 
his followers is focused around the concept of virtuous city (al-madīna al-fāΕila). For 
al-Kirmānī the ideal society is the imamate, which for him is already realized in the 
Fatimid caliphate of his time, centered on the figure of imam in Cairo. The Brethren 
of Purity are highly enigmatic in their political discussions, but their epistles clearly 
attach soul’s ascent to messianic expectations of a just political society, whether of an 
Ismaili imamate or something else remains a controversial question. Superimposed on 
their emphasis on the necessity of both prophetic and temporal rulership as guiding 
men towards happiness, the Brethren also construe their own version of the Fārābian 
utopia of “virtuous city” (al-madīna al-fāΕila).516 
In sum, while the traditional notion that Greek Neoplatonism is inherently 
apolitical is no longer tenable, Arabic Neoplatonists clearly attach a much greater 
political dimension to the soul’s ascent to happiness than their Greek predecessors.517 
For Arabic philosophers the basic political unit, however, is not so much the city 
(polis/madīna), despite the fact that Fārābian political philosophy following classical 
models employs the term, but religion (milla/dīn).518 Religion is the concept around 
which the larger society is organized in order for the society as a whole to pursue 
happiness. 
Hence, the political dimension of Arabic Neoplatonism is also what sets the idea 
of soul’s ascent within the Islamic context, and joins the question of purification to the 
perennial question about the relationship between philosophy and religion. In some 
sense the theme of religion as the means towards purification of the soul is the most 
original part of Arabic philosophical theory about the soul’s ascent, or the sphere 
where Arabic Neoplatonism deviates most from its Greek predecessors. 
While political philosophy and the ideal political societies go beyond the scope of 
this study, what is relevant here is the function of religion in the context of the soul’s 
ascent. For all Arabic philosophers religion serves an important function in the moral 
                                                                                                                                            
the context of his ideal virtuous society. Since moral education occurs primarily in a political context, it 
is not clear whether for al-Fārābī or Ibn Sīnā either it is possible to attain happiness in an immoral 
society, since the pre-philosophical education in such a society would cultivate vices instead of virtues. 
The Brethren of Purity, in contrast, discuss their own “secret society” of virtuous individuals as a 
vehicle for precisely this purpose of practical purification, as it guides its members towards virtue even 
when the surrounding society is evil. 
516 For a comparison of the “virtuous cities” of al-Fārābī and the Brethren of Purity, see Abouzeid 
1987. For the Brethren’s views on religious and worldly rulership, see Baffioni 2004, 2006, and 2008c. 
Baffioni highlights in particular the often ambiguous manner in which the Brethren deal with the 
distinction between prophetic and kingly governance. In theory, the first represents otherworldly and 
the second worldly governance, and hence the two would appear in contrast to each other. Still, the 
Brethren emphasize the principle of the complementary nature of religion and kingship, epitomized in 
the saying “religion and kingship are twins” (dīn wa-mulk ikhwān taw’amān), often appearing to 
identify the functions of kingship with those of the imam.  
517 For a refutation of the traditional idea that Neoplatonism is Plato without politics, see O’Meara 
2003. 
518 For this view, see Mahdi 2001a, p. 97. To reflect the more universal context of Islamic political 
philosophy, al-Fārābī (al-Madīna al-fāΕila, p. 228) in fact does speak of three categories of “perfect 
associations” (al-ijtimā‘āt al-kāmila): small association of the inhabitants of a city, middle association 
of a nation (umma), and great association of the inhabitants of all societies of the inhabited world 
(ijtimā‘ al-jamā‘āt kullihā fī al-ma‘mūra). 
 134
purification of the soul, as it is the religious law-givers or prophets,519 who determine 
the actual ways by which the soul is purified from bad dispositions. Hence, in the 
philosophical theory religion is seamlessly connected to the context of the soul’s 
ascent, and religion is understood to be in essential harmony with Neoplatonic 
philosophy. 
All Arabic philosophers understand the ultimate function of religious regulations 
to be precisely in their purificatory purpose. For al-Kirmānī, and to a lesser degree for 
the Brethren of Purity, the practice of religious devotions is in practice equal with 
moral purification. While al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā discuss rational self-governance and 
the practice of virtue in terms of individualistic ethics, in the end the actual practices 
are determined in a political context by the law-giver. It is not, however, immediately 
clear how the Aristotelian-Platonic ethical theory and religious regulations are 
compatible with each other. What then is the role of religious practices in moral 
purification, and what function do Arabic philosophers understand them to serve 
within the Neoplatonic ascent? Moreover, how is religious purification related to 
philosophical purification? 
In al-Fārābī’s definition of the term, religion (milla) consists of two parts, one 
theoretical and the other practical, thus reflecting the two parts of philosophy. The 
theoretical part of religion consists of religious beliefs, whereas the practical part 
consists of the actions required from the citizens, that is, of religious law 
(sharī‘a/nāmūs). For al-Fārābī both parts are subordinate to philosophy. Religious 
beliefs represent in dialectical form the demonstrative truth of theoretical philosophy, 
whereas the particular actions of practical religion should be based on the universal 
knowledge of practical philosophy.520 It is only this practical part of religion that is 
relevant for the subject of this chapter, whereas the theoretical part pertains to the 
theoretical ascent of the soul discussed in the next chapter. 
While Ibn Sīnā, and even less so the Ismaili philosophers, do not adopt an equally 
rationalistic interpretation of the relation between philosophy and religion, in which 
philosophy is primary and religion is derived from it for political purposes, all of them 
interpret religion similarly as consisting of beliefs and actions, each of which is 
related to one part of the philosophical ascent.521 It is the practical part of religion that 
forms the core of purificatory practice, as through it the philosophical initiate ascends 
at least the first ladders of moral virtue and separation from the sensible level of 
existence. Hence, the Brethren of Purity announce explicitly that the purpose of 
religious law is to purify the soul (tahdhīb al-nafs) and elevate it from the material to 
the spiritual world, and Ibn Sīnā defines religion as purification of the soul (taΙfiyat 
al-nafs) from the impurities caused by its immersion in nature, and states its purpose 
as turning the soul away from “worldly accidents” (al-a‘rāΕ al-dunyawiyya).522 
To employ a metaphor commonly applied in Arabic philosophy, religious law then 
functions for the soul sort of as medicine does for the body. The shift from classical 
                                                 
519 The terminology employed in Arabic political philosophy again reflects its dual Greek-Islamic 
background. The commonly used abstract term law-giver (wāΕi‘ al-sharā’i‘) is a direct translation of 
Greek nomothetēs, which in Arabic philosophy is identified with the prophet as a founder of religion. 
520 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, pp. 46-7; IΗΙā’, p. 107. 
521 See, al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 104, 495, 500; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (42), p. 452. 
522 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (29), p. 34; Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī māhiyyat al-Ιalāt, p. 34. See also, Ibn Sīnā, 
Risāla fī al-kalām ‘alā al-nafs, p. 197. 
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individual ethics to an Islamic religious context can in a sense be perceived in the 
employment of this metaphor in Greek and Arabic philosophy. The analogy of 
philosophy as medicine for the soul was commonly cultivated in Greek philosophy, 
and Arabic philosophers also adopted it to refer to the therapeutic function of 
philosophy, but possibly to an even larger extent to that of prophecy. All four 
philosophers discussed in this study employ the metaphor at least in some sense, but 
their different emphasis on the role of religion and philosophy in the “healing of the 
soul” might be reflected by the way in which they use it. 
While Ibn Sīnā’s adoption of Healing (Shifā’) as the title of his major 
philosophical compendium would seem to reflect the classical metaphor of 
philosophy as medicine, al-Fārābī uses the analogy in the context of both individual 
ethics and the political philosophy of the virtuous city. For the Brethren of Purity and 
al-Kirmānī it is, however, prophets and imams who are doctors of the soul, and it is 
religion which works like a drug curing the diseases of the soul. The metaphor refers 
to both the theoretical and practical aspects of religion, as religious beliefs cure souls 
from their false doctrines, whereas religious law heals them from bad dispositions. 
The metaphor also illustrates rather accurately the particular nature of religious 
practice in the purificatory process. Just as the doctors apply medicine to their patients 
according to their particular circumstances and the specific diseases from which they 
are suffering, similarly the prophets legislate for different nations and distinct classes 
of people the precise psychical remedies that are most suitable for their particular 
condition.523 
Moreover, for all Arabic philosophers the harmony between the religious law and 
the philosophical ascent is ensured by the way they perceive the relationship between 
philosophy and religion. This is realized in particular through their theories of 
prophecy in which philosophical and religious knowledge share the same 
epistemological foundation, and prophecy is interpreted in a rather naturalistic fashion 
in order for it to fit within the philosophical framework. The origin of both 
philosophical and religious knowledge lies ultimately in the Intellect, and hence there 
is no possibility for a discrepancy to exist between them. 
For al-Fārābī, as we have seen, religious knowledge is derivative of philosophy 
anyway, and the particular religious laws are derived from philosophical principles. 
Religious law is legislated by the philosopher-prophet, who merely employs his 
philosophical knowledge of the universal kind to particular circumstances, or 
alternatively receives the particular laws directly as an emanation from the Active 
Intellect.524 Therefore religious law in fact is nothing more than a practical application 
of philosophical ethical knowledge. This is at least how things should work in theory 
in the virtuous religion (al-milla al-fāΕila), in which religions perfectly mirror true 
philosophy for particular nations. Whether the actual religions of this world, or Islam 
in particular, fully implement this principle for al-Fārābī is another question. 
                                                 
523 Al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, p. 13; FuΙūl, pp. 103-5, 116, 118-9; al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 268-70; Kitāb al-
milla, pp. 56-9; al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 490, 499, 532-3, 536-7; Ikhwān, Rasā’il, III (42), p. 487; IV 
(44), pp. 16ff.; Jāmi‘a, pp. 506-7, 514-5. For an excellent treatment of the metaphor of philosophy as 
medicine in Greek philosophy, see Nussbaum 1994, pp. 13-77. 
524 Al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 218-20; al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, pp. 79-80; Kitāb al-milla, pp. 
44, 47; Kitāb al-Ηurūf, p. 152. 
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While Ibn Sīnā does not reduce prophecy to philosophy in the same way, the 
origin of prophecy and religious law for him also lies in the Active Intellect, which is 
also the source of philosophical knowledge. Both the Brethren of Purity and al-
Kirmānī view the legislator-prophets as embodiments of the Intellect in the material 
world, and hence religious regulations are rationally founded, even if they have not 
been devised by philosophers.525   
While both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy then perceive religious law 
primarily as a means of moral purification directly connected to the higher purpose of 
philosophical ascent, this is not the only meaning that political philosophy gives to 
religion. Religion is meant for all people, not just aspiring philosophers, and its 
purpose in the context of Arabic political philosophy is also the political governance 
of all the distinct classes of people. Of these only a small minority, according to the 
highly elitist view of man prevalent in Arabic philosophy, are capable of approaching 
the awe-inspiring goals of theoretical and practical perfection. 
All Arabic philosophers assume the religion of the commoners and philosophers to 
be distinct as comes to the theoretical part of the religion, in that common people 
believe in the literal truth of religious revelation only, whereas the philosophically 
inclined reach the philosophical truth behind that exterior. Is there similar distinction 
in the practical part as to the religion practiced by distinct classes of people, or are the 
religious duties the same for both philosophers and commoners? And moreover, is 
purification by means of religious observances in itself sufficient for philosophical 
purification, or should the philosophical initiate go beyond what is required by 
religious law? 
While none of the Arabic philosophers go as far as to liberate philosophers from 
following the religious law, they do assume its meaning to be different for 
philosophers and for laymen. In al-Fārābī’s philosophical utopia of the virtuous city 
people strive together towards happiness through both theoretical knowledge and 
practical actions. While some of them are common to all inhabitants, others are 
specific to each class within the city.526 The Brethren of Purity distinguish an exoteric 
and esoteric aspect in religious law, of which the common people (‘āmma) are only 
familiar with the exoteric shell, while the intellectually advanced (khāΙΙa) also know 
its inner mysteries.527 Ibn Sīnā similarly assumes the philosopher-gnostic to perceive 
the meaning of religious devotions (‘ibāda) differently from most people. For non-
philosophers religious practices are just obligatory external ways of conduct 
(mu‘āmala), whereas for the philosopher they gain a higher meaning as part of the 
soul’s training (riyāΕa) to practical virtue.528 
Al-Kirmānī, however, seems to differ from the rest in this respect, as for him 
religious obligations rather represent the exoteric level of worship required from all 
people equally, whereas the esoteric worship consists entirely of knowledge. 
Apparently for him also, however, the true purpose of these obligations would unfold 
for an Ismaili initiate in a deeper sense, once he has submerged into esoteric 
knowledge. 
                                                 
525 See, Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 461; De Smet 1995, pp. 311-2. 
526 Al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, p. 260. 
527 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), p. 328. 
528 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, p. 59. 
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How is it then that religious obligations function as part of the soul’s purification? 
Arabic philosophy integrates the religious devotions firmly into the theory of virtue 
discussed above, so that the purpose of religious practices is seen as a subjugation of 
desires and passions, and liberation of the higher soul from its material attachments. 
Hence, for the Brethren the purpose of religious duties is to fight man’s bodily nature 
by restraining the fulfillment of its sensual desires. When the religious duties are 
contemplated rationally, it is seen that many of them involve mildly ascetic 
requirements, as in the case of fasting or prohibition of alcohol, that urge man to rise 
from the sensible pleasures towards spiritual existence.529 
According to al-Kirmānī, religious obligations function as landmarks for the soul 
lost in the sea of matter so that it may liberate itself from its corporeal attachments. 
All the religious practices specified in the religious law have for him a higher purpose 
that connects them to attainment of moral virtue. From among these, al-Kirmānī 
specifically elevates nine forms of practical devotion, for each of which he sets aside a 
specific moral virtue that it promotes in man, so that, for example, the creed of faith 
(shahāda) fosters sincerity (Ιidq), alms-giving (zakāt) generosity (sakhā’), fasting 
(Ιawm) temperance (‘iffa), and jihād courage (shajā‘a).530 
Ibn Sīnā similarly directly relates religious practices to his theory of moral virtue 
as part of the soul’s ascent. The primary function of religious practices is therefore to 
develop mediate dispositions of the soul, and to subjugate man’s bodily functions to 
the rational faculty. Hence, many of the religious practices involve precisely 
formulated actions that turn the soul away from the body towards its own essence, and 
prevent man from wholly following his bodily nature. Especially useful in this 
context, according to Ibn Sīnā, are tiring activities that wear down the body and the 
lower faculties, and thereby overcome the bodily desires that arise from them, as in 
the case of the bodily movements that form part of Islamic prayer ritual. When the 
soul with help of such bodily movements is frequently forced to turn towards its own 
essence, it will no longer be equally affected by its bodily states.531 
Besides their functions related to moral virtue, religious practices also have the 
important spiritual task of constantly reminding the worshiper of God and the 
afterlife, and hence turning his attention towards the spiritual sphere of existence. For 
the advanced philosopher-Gnostic such forms of worship are merged with his 
contemplative activity, as he turns his mind towards the higher world in order to 
reflect on God and the spiritual beings.532 
The way in which Ibn Sīnā understands the religious rituals as part of 
philosophical purification is further illustrated by his small treatise on prayer.533 In 
this treatise Ibn Sīnā defines prayer as imitation (tashabbuh) of the celestial bodies 
and worship of the absolute Truth. But he distinguishes two levels in the Islamic 
ritualized prayer, each of which is adapted to a specific class of people, or perhaps 
alternately people in differing stages of their moral and theoretical ascent. The first 
                                                 
529 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 328, 33; IV (46), p. 118; Jāmi‘a, p. 306. 
530 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 104, 123, 499; De Smet 1995, p. 357. 
531 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 369; Ishārāt, IV, p. 59. 
532 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 367; Ishārāt, IV, pp. 64-7. 
533 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī māhiyyat al-Ιalāt. See also, Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 367-8. Ibn Sīnā 
apparently did not consider this short treatise as one of his major philosophical accomplishments, since 
he says he devised it in “less than half an hour.” 
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exoteric level of prayer is related to bodily and preparatory (riyāΕī) governance of the 
soul, where the ritualized recitations and bodily movements are designed in 
harmonious proportions to reflect the intelligible order of the world. It is only a 
corporeal trace of the higher intelligible prayer, but through it the worshipper may be 
elevated towards a longing for the Active Intellect and reception of its intelligible 
emanations. 
But for those who have already liberated themselves from the material and bodily 
attachments, the true form of worship is the esoteric prayer of an intelligible kind. 
Such prayer no longer has anything to do with bodily movements, but it is a form of 
intelligible contemplation where the purified rational soul reflects the pure ideas and 
spiritual entities of the higher world. Ibn Sīnā sees prayer then as serving two distinct 
functions for two different kinds of people. In its bodily variety it forms part of the 
initial moral purification of the soul, whereas in its intelligible form it is a sort of 
contemplative exercise for the philosophically and spiritually advanced. 
The esoteric prayer also has the purely epistemological function of preparing the 
soul to receive intelligible emanations from the Active Intellect. In his autobiography 
Ibn Sīnā describes how prayer in his own life was seamlessly incorporated into the 
philosophical practice: “And because of those problems which used to baffle me, not 
being able to solve the middle term of the syllogism, I used to visit the mosque 
frequently and worship, praying humbly to the All-Creating until He opened the 
mystery of it to me and made the difficult seem easy.”534  
In al-Fārābī’s virtuous religion, prayer also constitutes an important part of the 
practical actions required from the citizens in order for them to strive towards 
happiness. Unlike Ibn Sīnā, al-Fārābī is, however, not speaking in concrete terms 
about the actual prayer ritual practiced in Islam, but of abstract and undetermined 
measures and utterances by which virtuous citizens should praise God and the 
spiritual beings.535 The particular instances of this universal idea remain for al-Fārābī 
to be determined by each prophet-legislator according to the requirements of time and 
place. 
Al-Fārābī, however, devised himself a little philosophical prayer (du‘ā’) that is 
nothing like the standard Islamic prayers, and which might have been designed to 
inspire a philosophical initiate towards the practical-theoretical ascent.536 Al-Fārābī’s 
                                                 
534  “wa-alladhī kunt ataḥayyar fīhi min al-masā’il wa-lā aԘfar fīhi bi-´l-ḥadd al-awsaṭ fī al-qiyās 
ataraddad bi-sabab dhālika ilā al-jāmi‘ wa-uṣallī wa-abtahil ilā mubdi‘ al-kull ḥattā yaftaḥ lī al-
munghaliq minhu wa-yusahhil al-muta‘assir.” Ibn Sīnā, Sīra, p. 28 [Gohlman’s translation]. Gutas 
(1988, pp. 181-3) once again emphasizes that Ibn Sīnā’s reference to frequent praying in the 
autobiography is to be understood in the context of the epistemological process, as part of his theory of 
intuition (Ηads), rather than as a self-laudatory reference to his piety. It is true that in this particular 
context Ibn Sīnā relates prayer to syllogistic reasoning in its role of enhancing the emanation of the 
middle term from the Active Intellect. But to interpret prayer in general as being only an 
epistemological method for Ibn Sīnā would be wrong, as it clearly has a wider spiritual meaning for 
him. 
535 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, p. 46. 
536 Al-Fārābī, Du‘ā’ ‘aΝīm. The prayer is transmitted by Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a. Despite the fact that it is not 
listed among al-Fārābī’s writings in any early bibliography, Mahdi (2001b, pp. 32-3), as its editor, has 
no doubts about its authenticity, but suggests it was omitted by medieval bibliographers because it is 
not an actual philosophical treatise. The prayer, however, contains a particularly interesting line: “make 
me one of the brethren of purity, possessors of loyalty, and dwellers of heaven” (ij‘alnī min ikhwān al-
Ιafā’ wa-aΙΗāb al-wafā’ wa-sukkān al-samā’). The resemblance with the self-designation of the 
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Magnificent Prayer (al-du‘ā’ al-‘aΝīm) is clearly at least not meant for the common 
populace, since it resorts to heavily philosophical language, whereas in al-Fārābī’s 
political philosophy philosophical concepts should be conveyed for common people 
in symbolic sense imagery. Hence, the prayer is interesting already due to the 
rationalistic spirit and complete lack of mysticism that it embodies, whereas Ibn Sīnā, 
in contrast, would in similar circumstances have resorted to more emotively powerful 
Quranic or mystical language. 
Al-Fārābī, then, begins his prayer by addressing it to God as the “Necessary 
Existent” (wājib al-wujūd) and “Cause of causes” (‘illat al-‘ilal). The main core of the 
prayer is devoted to an invocation for support in the philosophical ascent, in both its 
theoretical and practical aspects. Thus, al-Fārābī asks God to “save me from the world 
of misery and destruction,” “grant me emanation of the Active Intellect,” and “purify 
my soul by the lights of wisdom” from the “mud of matter.”537 With respect to 
practical purification, al-Fārābī furthermore begs for “deliverance from the captivity 
of the four elements,” support in “severing the blameworthy attachments between me 
and the earthly bodies,” and fortitude against the “dominion of transient sensual 
desires.”538 
 As for Ibn Sīnā, for the Brethren of Purity also, religious practices have besides 
the function of subjugating passions and desires, the important task of raising man’s 
awareness from the mundane things towards the spiritual world. Religious rituals in 
their exoteric meaning are often corporeal reflections of a higher spiritual reality, as 
for the Brethren the exoteric aspect of religious law is based on the hierarchy of 
corporeal creation, whereas the esoteric aspect is bound to its spiritual hierarchy.539 
In their syncretistic vision of religions the Brethren are not speaking only of 
Islamic law, however, but of religious rituals universally. Hence, all religious houses 
of prayer, whether temples, mosques, churches, or synagogues, reflect the same 
symbolic idea. That the believers, according to the Brethren of Purity, are ordered to 
enter places of worship as purified and well-dressed, giving up many of those things 
that they would be allowed at their homes, carries an allegorical meaning. Through 
this habit the worshippers come to understand that the same applies to entering the 
ultimate temple of the afterlife, to which the soul can enter only after purifying itself 
from the stains of matter and dressing itself with moral virtue.540 
                                                                                                                                            
Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Θafā’ wa-Khillān al-Wafā’) is striking enough to make one consider 
whether it might have served as an inspiration for the Brethren of Purity, or even to suggest an 
alternative attribution of the poem to the Brethren of Purity, or some author under their influence. 
Given the uncertainties about the dating of the Epistles, and the possibility of a lengthy process of 
redaction, it might also be that it was the Brethren of Purity who influenced al-Fārābī. 
537 “Allāhumma unqudhnī min ‘ālam al-shaqā’ wa-´l-fanā’, . . . imnaḥnī fayḍan min al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl, 
…hadhdhib nafsī bi-anwār al-ḥikma . . . min ṭīnat al-hayūlā” (pp. 89-90). 
538 “Allāhumma unqudhnī min asr al-ṭabā’i‘ al-arba‘, . . . ij‘al al-kifāya sababan li-qaṭ‘ madhmūm al-
‘alā’iq allatī baynī wa-bayna al-ajsām al-turābiyya wa-´l-humūm al-kawniyya, . . . qawwi dhātī ‘alā 
qahr al-shahawāt al-fāniya.” (pp. 90-1) 
539 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 137. 
540 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (9), pp. 335-6. 
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6.8 Philosophical purification 
For Arabic philosophers practical purification of the soul then takes place primarily 
through the practice of religious law. But is this alone sufficient for the kind of 
practical purification that is necessary for the attainment of moral perfection and 
liberation from passions and desires? It appears that only al-Kirmānī assumes moral 
purification and practice of religious law as virtually identical, and does not perceive 
the need for any supplementary forms of purificatory practice. As we have seen, for 
Arabic philosophers even the religious forms of worship often assume a different 
meaning for philosophers and common people, so that for the philosophers they 
become fully integrated into the purposes of the philosophical ascent. But even 
beyond this, while no Arabic philosopher declares religious law to be inadequate for 
the philosopher, it seems that the philosopher, unlike the common people, must 
proceed beyond the religious practice in order to be completely purified. 
In Remarks and Admonitions Ibn Sīnā briefly discusses the spiritual training 
(riyāΕa) that is required from the aspiring philosopher-gnostic in order to turn him 
away from the material world, and for him to be able to devote himself completely to 
contemplative activity. Religious observances form only one part of such spiritual 
exercise, and even they must be performed in a contemplative manner.541 Besides 
them, Ibn Sīnā states several methods to be useful for the training of the soul, of 
which he mentions the practice of “true ascesis” (al-zuhd al-Ηaqīqī) in particular. 
While the Islamic observance of fasting may serve as a useful first step to 
philosophical purification, clearly a yearly abstinence from food and drink in the 
daytime is not what Ibn Sīnā has in mind when he speaks of ascesis. Rather, for Ibn 
Sīnā philosophical ascesis means turning away from the worldly pleasures altogether, 
and liberating oneself from the passions and desires that distract the philosopher from 
contemplation of more noble things.542 
Similarly, while the Brethren of Purity primarily relate moral purification to the 
practice of religious law, they do require considerably more from a philosophical 
discipline. As we have seen, the Brethren highly revere the ascetics, and while such 
religious regulations as fasting or prohibition of alcohol are related to this ideal, they 
are in no way sufficient for the aspiring philosopher. Surprisingly, considering their 
otherwise rather religious orientation in contrast to al-Fārābī’s rationalism, the 
Brethren of Purity are the only philosophers who actually explicate the inadequacy of 
religious law for the philosopher. 
This happens when they make a distinction between religious observances (al-
‘ibāda al-shar‘iyya al-nāmūsiyya) and philosophical observances (al-‘ibāda al-
falsafiyya al-ilāhiyya), the latter of which the Brethren claim to have derived from the 
ancient practices of Greek philosophers. While the first consists of performing the 
observances of religious law that are obligatory for all, the second is meant for only 
those who have advanced further in their spiritual progression. Each philosophical 
observance seems to have its counterpart among the religious observances, as they are 
                                                 
541 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 79-85. Ibn Sīnā speaks of observances accompanied by contemplation (al-
‘ibāda al-mashfū‘a bi-´l-fikra). 
542 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 57-9. 
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related to the same ultimate spiritual purpose, but the philosophical observances take 
further steps to the purificatory goal. 
Hence, philosophical observances include such things as the four philosophical 
feasts (‘īd) which take place at the dates of equinox and solstice, all of which are 
related to some higher spiritual meaning. Each of them is connected to a 
corresponding Muslim feast, for example, the philosophical spring feast and the feast 
of Ramaḍān (‘īd al-fiΛr) are said to be symmetrical, since both are festivities of joy, 
the first celebrating the end of winter and the second the end of fasting. Similarly, the 
philosophical observance of sacrifice (qurbān) corresponds to the Islamic ritual 
sacrifice during Ηajj, but its goal is said to be to “approach God with bodily means” 
(al-taqarrub bi-´l-ajsād ilā Allāh), and to renounce fear of death, the “way Socrates 
did when he drank his cup of poison.”543 
While the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity then abound with obscure 
philosophical rituals of unknown origin, the Peripatetic philosophers are much more 
restrained in describing of what the precise practices leading to philosophical 
purification could consist. Both Peripatetic philosophers and the Brethren of Purity, 
however, concur in hailing the blissful effect that music has on the soul. Al-Fārābī, 
Ibn Sīnā, and the Brethren of Purity all wrote rather extensively on the theory of 
music, which forms part of mathematics within the philosophical curriculum, while 
al-Fārābī was also a practicing musician. 544  Besides their often rather technical 
theoretical treatment of music, Arabic philosophers also discuss in more philosophical 
terms the therapeutic effects that music has on the soul, mostly based on 
psychological and humoral theories.545 This therapeutic function also makes music a 
convenient method for philosophical purification. 
Hence, Ibn Sīnā mentions musical melodies soothing the lower faculties and 
arousing convenient images in the imaginative faculty as one possible form of 
spiritual exercise for the practicing philosopher.546 Poetry was in Arabic philosophy 
often seen as having a rather analogous effect on the soul, for example in its capability 
to evoke images within the imaginative faculty, although technically the subject 
pertained to poetics as part of the logical Organon. Al-Fārābī then suggests the 
employment of both poetry and music to influence man’s psychical dispositions. 
While the way that music and poetry influence emotions and the imaginative faculty 
can be used for both good or bad purposes, in the context of philosophical purification 
they can be employed for enhancing the attainment of happiness. Like music, poetic 
                                                 
543 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (50), pp. 262-271. The Brethren further associate the philosophical feasts with 
their cyclical view of history and messianic expectations. Hence, for example, the joyous second feast 
of springtime relates the death of winter to the subsiding of the cycle of tyranny (dawlat ahl al-jawr), 
whereas the sorrowful fourth feast of winter is related to the return of the faithful to occultation (istitār) 
and dissimulation (taqiyya). 
544 For medieval Arabic musical theory, see Shehadi 1995. Al-Fārābī’s devotion to the subject is 
manifested in his two-volume Great Book of Music (Kitāb al-mūsīqī al-kabīr), the greatest work 
written on music by any Arabic philosopher. The Brethren of Purity devote their fourth mathematical 
epistle (I.4.) to music, whereas Ibn Sīnā discusses it within the mathematical parts of his philosophical 
compendiums, such as Healing and Dāneshnāme-ye ‘Alā’ī. 
545 According to Shehadi (1995, p. 75), the therapeutic function of music was not mere theory for Ibn 
Sīnā, as he actually employed it as a practicing physician. Whether he employed it for the spiritual 
needs of his philosophical pupils, as he did for the bodily needs of his patients, is unknown. 
546 Ibn Sīnā, Ishārāt, IV, pp. 82-3. 
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images have the capability to evoke either a desire or repulsion towards a thing, thus 
giving the listener an impulse towards acting on it. Specific varieties of tunes or poetic 
forms can be used firstly for advancement of the rational faculty and directing the 
soul’s reflection towards the spiritual sphere, and secondly for moderating the 
passions within the irascible soul.547 
The Brethren of Purity’s interpretation slightly differs from the Peripatetic 
philosophers, as they are influenced in particular by Pythagorean ideas about 
harmonious mathematical relations underlying the ultimate nature of the world. Also, 
their musical theory is related to the idea of correspondence between different levels 
of reality, such as between the four strings of the lute (‘ūd) and the four elements and 
humors of the body. Hence, melodies composed to proper harmonious proportions 
have the power to soothe the soul, and even to cure bodily diseases due to their direct 
connection with the bodily humors. But besides the simple pleasure that music can 
produce, it also has a relevant function in the soul’s spiritual ascent. Since “corporeal” 
music for the Brethren is in the end an imitation of the celestial music of the spheres, 
music has the power to arouse in the soul a desire for ascent to the higher world. 
Hence, according to the Brethren, “when souls hear music that is devised in 
harmonious, correct, and balanced proportions, they feel pleasure and joy because of 
it, and start to long for their Beloved, and desire to remain with their Beloved and to 
be united with Him.”548 
Finally, for the Peripatetic philosophers at least, rational self-governance of the 
soul discussed above also forms an integral part of the purificatory practice of the 
philosophical kind. In the end rational self-governance of the soul appears to be in 
complete harmony with the practice of religious law and other auxiliary methods of 
purification. As we have seen, the philosophical understanding of the ultimate goal of 
religious observances is consonant with the objectives of philosophical ethics, as they 
embody the same principles of moderation of passions and desires, as well as arouse 
in the soul a desire towards the spiritual sphere of being. 
Hence, Ibn Sīnā states that practical purification takes place through the 
combination of the methods (Λuruq) described in the philosophical works of ethics and 
the practice of religious duties. 549  Apparently the philosopher will just take this 
purificatory practice further than the rather lenient requirements that are integrated 
within the religious law. 
Now we are in a position to solve the apparent contradiction of the position of 
ethics within Arabic Peripatetic philosophy, namely that moral purification of the soul 
seems to be required before the study of theoretical sciences, while at the same time 
ethics is placed as the last science in the philosophical curriculum following 
theoretical philosophy. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, in Greek 
Neoplatonism the ascent of the soul followed a grade of virtues, where the actual 
philosophical studies were preceded by pre-philosophical ethics corresponding to the 
first degree of moral virtue. 
                                                 
547 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, pp. 134-6; Fakhry 2002, p. 64; Shehadi 1995, pp. 61-5. 
548 “al-nufūs matā sami‘at mā kāna minhu mustawiyat al-ta’līf, ṣaḥīḥ al-tarkīb, mawzūnan ‘alā mīzān 
mustaqīm, iltadhdhathu wa-fariḥat bihi wa-ṭaribat lahu, wa-ishtāqat ilā maḥbūbihā, wa-tamannat al-
khulūd wa-´l-wuṣūl ilā ma‘shūqihā.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 97-100; Shehadi 1995, pp. 43-9. 
549 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-kalām ‘alā al-nafs, p. 197. 
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It seems that at least in theory a similar gradation of moral purification emerges 
for Arabic philosophy, while the place of pre-philosophical ethics in the purificatory 
scheme is assumed by religious law. Even before his initiation into the philosophical 
sciences, the student of philosophy should strive to purify his soul through the 
practice of religious observances, which serve the function of moderating his natural 
desires and passions, and arouse in the soul a desire for further spiritual ascent. Some 
auxiliary practices, such as music or poetry, may serve the same purpose. It is only 
after the student of philosophy has already been somewhat detached from his bodily 
desires and passions through this initial purification that he is prepared to delve into 
the philosophical sciences. 
Practice of philosophical ethics forms a higher part of the purificatory ascent that 
takes place only after or together with the learning of theoretical sciences. This is 
because understanding of philosophical ethics requires theoretical knowledge, such as 
knowledge of logic to understand the demonstrations, and even more importantly 
metaphysical knowledge about the nature of the soul and its ultimate purpose in the 
world. Once the student proceeds along the steps of theoretical philosophy and 
contemplative activity, he is also prepared to advance further towards moral 
perfection through rational self-governance of the soul. In al-Kirmānī’s case the 
picture is of course much simpler. The only practice that an Ismaili student requires 
for moral purification, is the one provided by religious law. 
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“My God, . . . reveal to the darkness of the soul the Sun of Active Intellect, remove from it the shadows 
of ignorance and perdition, make actual what exists in its faculties potentially, and guide it from the 
shadows of ignorance to the light of wisdom and intellect.” –Al-Fārābī550 
7 Theoretical ascent 
7.1 Philosophical knowledge as saving knowledge 
The previous chapter presented the question of practical virtue as part of the 
philosophical ascent, and explored the purificatory practices attached to the attainment 
of practical virtue. The primary contents of practical virtue for Arabic philosophers 
appeared as the Neoplatonic one of gradual separation of the soul from matter which 
enables the soul to turn away from the material reality towards the higher sphere of 
spiritual existence. While this idea of practical virtue as relative detachment from 
worldly things then represents the ideal of philosophical life, in the end it is merely an 
instrument for the ultimate contemplative goal of philosophy. 
All Arabic philosophers identify the greatest human happiness with man’s 
theoretical perfection, for which his practical perfection is a necessary prerequisite. 
On the ascending scale of virtue, the practical virtues should lead man towards 
theoretical virtue, identified with theoretical as opposed to practical wisdom, through 
which the philosopher’s soul reaches its utmost perfection. 
While this theoretical part of philosophy consists of the acquisition of 
philosophical knowledge, even it is not, however, theoretical in the modern sense of 
philosophy, in that theoretical knowledge is acquired merely for the sake of 
knowledge. As the goal of theoretical knowledge is to lead the soul towards a higher 
kind of spiritual existence, the ascent through philosophical knowledge forms a 
spiritual path for the soul through which it approaches God and spiritual reality to the 
extent possible for a human soul. Hence, the idea of saving knowledge is even 
attached to the seemingly dry speculations of the Peripatetic philosophers, let alone 
the esoteric philosophy of al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. 
In order to complete the philosopher’s progression towards ultimate happiness, we 
must now investigate the intellectual part of his ascent. Since Arabic philosophers 
believe knowledge to lead man towards his transcendental goal of human perfection, 
the question arises about the nature of that knowledge, and the way in which it relates 
to the gradual change of human substance towards its spiritual goal. Precisely what 
kind and what amount of knowledge is required according to the philosophers for man 
to attain his intellectual perfection? And what are the stages of the intellectual ascent 
within that progression? 
All these questions are intimately related in particular to two specific areas of 
scholarship on Arabic philosophy, namely epistemology and classification of 
sciences. Both of these subjects have received a considerable amount of attention 
within scholarship, and while I will discuss both to some degree, I hope to accomplish 
this from a different perspective. Neither of these subjects has normally been viewed 
within the context of the Neoplatonic ascent of the soul. Namely, for Arabic 
                                                 
550 “Allāhumma…aṭli‘ ‘alā Ԙalmā’ihā shamsan min al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl, wa-amṭi ‘anhā Ԙulumāt al-jahl wa-
´l-ḍalāl, wa-ij‘al mā fī quwāhā bi-´l-quwwa kā’inan bi-´l-fi‘l, wa-akhrijhā min Ԙulumāt al-jahl ilā nūr 
al-ḥikmā wa-ḍayā’ al-‘aql.” Al-Fārābī, Du‘ā’ ‘aΝīm, pp. 91-2. 
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philosophers the epistemological process is not merely a theory of how man acquires 
knowledge about the external reality, but also one about the human soul’s ontological 
change through that process. The increase of intelligible knowledge is reflected in the 
substance of the soul as its gradual transformation into a purely spiritual substance 
separated from sensible reality. 
Secondly, the classificatory hierarchies of philosophical sciences adopted by 
Arabic philosophers are not merely intended to arrange the philosophical sciences in a 
logical order, but rather correspond to the epistemological and ontological progression 
from sensory to intelligible existence that the philosophical initiate should pass 
through within his studies. While the origins of these classifications lie in the 
Aristotelian and Platonic schools of late Antiquity, it is important to see how they 
correspond to the idea of theoretical ascent for the Arabic philosophers, and how each 
part within that classification assumes a role within the ascent. 
The idea that acquisition of knowledge would lead man towards some 
transcendent goal of theoretical perfection, and transform his essence spiritually, 
seems unconvincing from the modern perspective. However, behind it there are a 
number of suppositions about the nature of knowledge which make it more plausible. 
As we have seen, there is an experiential dimension to philosophical knowledge, 
which Ibn Sīnā in particular at times portrays in almost mystical and ecstatic terms.551 
Moreover, the acquisition of knowledge entails an ontological change in the substance 
of the knower, which helps to explain how knowledge could cause an internal 
transformation of the soul from a corporeal-sensible to spiritual-intelligible kind of 
existence. This derives from the Platonic idea that knowing is becoming, or that the 
conception of an intelligible form is to become that form, so that a complete identity 
between the knower (‘āqil), the intellect (‘aql), and the object of knowledge (ma‘qūl) 
is formed.552 
Hence, according to Ibn Sīnā, intellection is essentially different from sense 
perception in that when the intellect perceives an intelligible form, the intelligible 
object unites to it and becomes one with it, which is not the case in the perception of 
sensible forms. When the human intellect conceives an intelligible form (Ιūra 
ma‘qūla), that intelligible becomes its essence (taΙīr dhātuhu). The final goal of 
becoming an “intelligible world” (‘ālam ‘aqlī) entails gathering the totality of such 
intelligible forms to oneself. 553  To achieve that ultimate goal would mean the 
transformation of the human substance in its totality, as in acquiring the totality of 
intelligibles it would become like those intelligibles, and hence in effect reproduce 
within itself the contents of the separate Intellects. 
The Brethren of Purity also explicitly link epistemology with an ontological 
change of the knowing subject. The more man acquires demonstrative knowledge, 
through reflection and instruction, the better he is able to conceive (taΙawwur) 
spiritual entities. Then he becomes like those spiritual things potentially, and at death 
of his body also actually.554 Consequently, there is a special visionary part in knowing 
                                                 
551 See, chapter 4.3 above. 
552 This is the Platonized interpretation of intellection in Aristotle’s De Anima, adopted by Arabic 
philosophers. See, e.g., Arnaldez 1977, p. 57. 
553 Ibn Sīnā, Mabda’, pp. 18, 97, 112; Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 351. 
554 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (10), pp. 450-1. 
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which the modern idea of knowledge lacks, epitomized in the idea of knowing as 
seeing. 
Hence, the idea of saving knowledge in Arabic Neoplatonism is connected to a 
specific kind of intelligible knowledge, not just any knowledge. Knowledge in the 
philosophical sense is then to be distinguished from mere belief or opinion. First of all 
this derives from the Platonic polarity of sensible and intelligible knowledge, so that 
true knowledge (epistēmē/‘ilm) is concerned with the universal, unchanging, and 
eternal, that is, the intelligible reality behind sensory appearances, whereas on the 
particulars of the sensible world one can only have beliefs (doksa/Νann) that lack the 
syllogistic certainty of philosophical knowledge. 555  The knowledge by means of 
which the philosopher should ascend towards his theoretical perfection consists of the 
intelligible forms, not the ever-changing events of the world of generation and 
corruption. These intelligible forms, moreover, have a transcendent existence within 
the ultimate reality which lies beyond the sensible world. 
Hence, the objects of philosophical knowledge are the intelligible forms abstracted 
from matter on the one hand, and the separate Intellects that are intelligible in their 
essence to begin with. It is especially the latter which al-Fārābī identifies with wisdom 
as the perfection of theoretical intellect, since they are the remote causes (al-asbāb al-
ba‘īda) of the things in the visible world from which the rest of beings draw their 
existence.556 True knowledge is concerned with the ultimate causes of existents, rather 
than their manifold effects at the end of the chain of existence. 
This brings about the related idea of the finite nature of knowledge. Unlike the 
infinite and ever-changing things of the sensible world, such intelligibles are both 
unchangeable and finite. Hence, it is at least theoretically possible for the philosopher 
to attain all of them, whereby his soul would become like the separate Intellects in its 
substance.557 
A second distinction between knowledge and belief involves that between 
philosophical knowledge and religious belief. Namely, besides presumptions 
concerning the sensible world, it is also possible to have non-philosophical opinions 
concerning the eternal things of the spiritual realm of being. Theoretical knowledge 
concerning the ultimate reality may be possessed in differing forms, as intelligible 
knowledge or opinions emulating the intelligible knowledge. 
According to the well-known distinction formulated by al-Fārābī in his political 
treatises, people are divided in their capacity to receive the saving knowledge into the 
elect few (khāΙΙa) who can grasp the intelligible reality such as it actually exists, 
either by themselves or through instruction from others, and to the larger masses 
(‘āmma) who can only grasp the theoretical truths through images (mithālāt) imitating 
the intelligible truth. Hence, the majority of people attain their portion of happiness 
through the opinions provided for the mass of believers in the form of religious 
                                                 
555 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, p. 126. Hence, according to al-Fārābī, real knowledge consists of what is true and 
certain at all times, not of temporal transitory events, such as a particular man sitting at a particular 
time.  
556 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl, pp. 126-7. 
557 See, e.g., Davidson 1992, p. 49; Gutas 1988, p. 219. 
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dogma, whereas only the philosophers attain it by cognizing the actual intelligible 
truth from which the religious opinions are derived.558 
The same idea is adopted by most Arabic philosophers to explain the relationship 
between philosophical and religious knowledge, although without al-Fārābī’s 
rationalistic reduction of religious revelation to philosophical truth.559 For al-Kirmānī 
and the Brethren of Purity, religious dogmas and philosophical ideas represent the 
exoteric and esoteric levels of the same truth, both of which are necessary for the 
attainment of happiness. Hence, the Brethren define knowledge (‘ilm) as grasping the 
form of the object of knowledge (ma‘lūm), in distinction of belief (īmān) as assent 
(taΙdīq) to the sayings of someone else. 
In contrast to al-Fārābī’s view of polarity between knowledge and belief, the 
Brethren’s view is decidedly more religious. Both knowledge and belief are necessary 
for spiritual salvation, with belief in religious revelation representing the first exoteric 
level leading towards the esoteric intelligible ideas. As for al-Fārābī, however, people 
form different classes in their capacity of grasping the truth, of which only the elect 
(khāΙΙa) are able to conceive the theoretical truth without resorting to similitudes.560  
Despite their relative differences with respect to their attitude towards revelation, 
all Arabic philosophers believe that only philosophical knowledge possesses an 
absolute syllogistic certainty, whereas revelation only approximates it. Besides, only 
philosophical knowledge actually corresponds to the ontological structure of the 
world. Hence, it is clear that for the philosopher only intelligible knowledge can aid 
the soul in its quest to regain its spiritual nature. 
The classical Peripatetic theory about philosophical and symbolic knowledge both 
leading to happiness enables at least some degree of happiness for non-philosophers, 
and explains the relationship between philosophy and revelation for al-Fārābī and Ibn 
Sīnā. Still, clearly only philosophical knowledge leads to theoretical perfection and 
absolute happiness. Theoretical philosophy, for Ibn Sīnā, provides “conceptual and 
verifiable knowledge” (al-‘ilm al-taΙawwurī al-taΙdīqī) about the world which 
perfects man’s theoretical faculty, thereby leading him to ultimate happiness.561 It is 
distinguished from mere belief in that man acquires it through demonstrative means, 
and hence can attain certainty of its truth, whereas belief through authority is always 
open to doubt. 
For the Brethren of Purity and al-Kirmānī also intelligible knowledge about the 
world going beyond religious belief is necessary for the soul’s salvation. But for them 
religious belief and philosophical knowledge are not alternative, but two stages of the 
same process. Esoteric philosophical knowledge represents the last stage of the soul’s 
ascent to complete liberation from matter. 
Moreover, even this esoteric-philosophical knowledge has religious connotations. 
It is learned not so much through independent reflection or philosophical study, but 
through instruction from a divinely supported individual. The imam is an Intellect 
incarnate in whom the totality of intelligible knowledge and moral virtue is gathered 
                                                 
558 Al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 278-80; al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, pp. 85-6; TaΗΙīl, pp. 165-7, 
178. 
559 See, Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 365-6. 
560 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (46), pp. 62-7; IV (47), pp. 132-3. See also, al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 501. 
561 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 2. 
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to one human individual. For the Brethren, this is the “religious man” (al-insān al-
dīnī) and “knowing individual” (al-shakhΙ al-‘ilmī), “a holy soul supported by the 
power of the divine Word, in whom the knowledge of the true natures of things is 
gathered, and through whom the knowledge of first creation is attained.”562 
7.2 Theoretical requirements of happiness 
How much theoretical intelligible knowledge does man then need to obtain in order to 
attain happiness? Both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā provide an answer to this question in 
devising specific lists of the minimum amount of philosophical knowledge required 
for the attainment of happiness. Al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity offer in a less 
explicit form information about the fundamental religious and philosophical 
knowledge that everyone should acquire.563 
While happiness as the ultimate ideal of theoretical perfection refers to the 
actualization of the totality of intelligible knowledge in the human intellect, in the end 
not all philosophical knowledge appears to be equally essential for its attainment. The 
theoretical requirements of happiness are then like philosophical credos, which further 
reveal the Gnostic aspect of philosophical knowledge. They present the philosophical 
beliefs that are deemed vital for the soul’s salvation, and hence reveal which parts of 
philosophy are most crucial to the religious dimension of philosophy. While they in a 
sense are parallel to the fundamental beliefs that any Muslim must possess in order to 
be saved, there is one central difference: for the philosophers, man comes to know 
their truth demonstratively through his own intellect, and is not required to rely 
merely on revelation. 
As we have seen, Ibn Sīnā defines ultimate happiness as the transformation of the 
human soul into an “intelligible world” (‘ālam ma‘qūl), a fully actualized intellect that 
embraces all of the intelligible forms within itself. To achieve this man should 
conceive the whole Neoplatonic emanationist order of creation within himself, 
starting from the “Principle of All” (mabda’ al-kull), down through the substances of 
the higher world, the separate Intellects completely detached from matter, the astral 
souls attached to heavenly bodies, and the heavenly bodies themselves, until it gains 
the “form of all existence” (hay’at al-wujūd kullihi) within itself.564 
Ibn Sīnā gives a precise list of what he “believes to be required for the soul” to 
gain happiness in more than one work, and while the contents are more or less the 
same, they are presented in slightly differing manners.565 These lists embody the idea 
that the requirement for happiness is for the intelligible order of the universe to 
become reflected in the human soul. Hence, the minimum knowledge includes 
essentially the hierarchy of metaphysical and physical entities, that is, First Principle, 
spiritual substances, and corporeal beings of the material world, as well as the 
relations prevailing between them. Besides knowledge about man’s place in the 
                                                 
562 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 279. “wa-ammā al-qawl ‘alā ma‘rifat al-insān al-dīnī, wa-´l-shakhṣ al-‘ilmī, 
alladhī huwa al-nafs al-qudsiyya, al-mu’ayyada min quwwat al-kalima al-ilāhiyya, alladhī bihi ma‘rifat 
al-ashyā’ bi-ḥaqā’iqihā, wa-bihi yakūn al-wuṣūl ilā ma‘rifat ibdā‘ al-khalq al-awwal, . . . .” 
563 See, Appendix I for the theoretical requirements of happiness for each of the four philosophers. 
564 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 350. 
565 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 353-4; Ζāl al-nafs al-insāniyya, pp. 134-5; al-Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-
nafs al-nāΛiqa, pp. 190-1. 
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cosmos is required, that is, knowledge of the substance of human soul as incorporeal 
and eternal. 
Al-Fārābī gives the minimum requirements of theoretical knowledge similarly in 
various works with slight variations.566 For him they form part of political philosophy, 
that is, they are the theoretical opinions that all inhabitants of the virtuous city should 
possess, whether as intelligible ideas or religious images. Al-Fārābī’s lists are 
considerably more detailed than those of Ibn Sīnā. But as for Ibn Sīnā, they 
materialize to incorporate the requirement of conceiving the whole emanationist 
structure of the world, starting from the First Cause, proceeding through the spiritual 
existents, and ending in the corporeal beings, as well as the relations prevailing 
between the beings at different levels of the hierarchy. 
Unlike Ibn Sīnā, however, al-Fārābī includes besides metaphysical and physical 
knowledge the main parts of practical philosophy also. In Aphorisms al-Fārābī refers 
to knowledge of theoretical philosophy as the beginning of knowledge, since it 
portrays the general lines of the Neoplatonic account of creation. Besides this, the 
inhabitants should, however, come to conceive the end and middle of knowledge, the 
end being happiness as the end point of the human soul’s ascent, and the middle the 
actions leading to this end. In the more detailed accounts the required knowledge of 
practical philosophy includes both ethical and political philosophy, and even historical 
knowledge about virtuous and vicious leaders of past and present. 
The lists in the end appear to be virtually identical to the contents of al-Fārābī’s 
two major political treatises, Virtuous City and Political Governance. Hence, the list 
of knowledge required from a virtuous citizen presented in Book of Religion is almost 
a blueprint for the contents of Virtuous City, proceeding through the metaphysical and 
physical entities of the Neoplatonic hierarchy to cover the nature of happiness and the 
ethical and political means to achieve it.567 
For the two philosophers, the theoretical requirements for happiness of are then 
slightly different especially in that Ibn Sīnā does not seem to include knowledge of 
practical philosophy, whereas al-Fārābī does. The discrepancy, however, might be 
more apparent than real. For both, the primary condition for the attainment of 
happiness is arriving at a general conception of the Neoplatonic structure of the world, 
from God down to the material world. Since practical purification is as essential to 
finding happiness for Ibn Sīnā as it is for al-Fārābī, clearly the means towards 
happiness, that is, ethical and political philosophy, should be known as well. But they 
do not form part of the theoretical perfection of which the contemplative end of 
happiness is composed. 
Hence, the lists by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā are designed for different goals. Al-
Fārābī’s more comprehensive list purports to offer the knowledge that virtuous 
citizens should have in order to achieve happiness, which includes both intelligible 
knowledge of the world and knowledge of the practical means to achieve happiness. 
                                                 
566 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, pp. 44-5; al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 276-8; al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, pp. 84-
5; FuΙūl, p. 141. 
567 This explains why these political works have a theoretical part in the first place, that is, because they 
represent the theoretical opinions that the inhabitants should possess, besides the fact that the 
Neoplatonic hierarchy of reality provides a model for the arrangement of human society. This does not 
mean, however, as the Straussians claim, that the theoretical parts do not represent al-Fārābī’s own 
philosophical beliefs. 
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In Book of Religion the second kind of opinions are depicted as opinions concerning 
voluntary things (ashyā’ irādiyya), that is, related to practical philosophy, whereas the 
first concern theoretical things (ashyā’ naΝariyya).568 Ibn Sīnā, however, promises 
only to enumerate the intelligible knowledge or theoretical wisdom required for 
intellectual happiness, which excludes ethical and political philosophy. Clearly, for al-
Fārābī also anecdotal information about past kings and leaders is not philosophical 
intelligible knowledge required for actualization of the theoretical intellect. 
For al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity their philosophical compendiums in 
effect promise to offer the theoretical knowledge required for contemplative 
happiness. Both require knowledge of both philosophical and religious kind in order 
to gain happiness. Such knowledge is for al-Kirmānī essentially contained within 
knowledge about the divine unity (tawΗīd), which he states as the main requirement 
for the soul to attain its eternity. What al-Kirmānī calls the science of divine unity 
(‘ilm al-tawΗīd) in fact encompasses the whole of Ismaili theoretical and religious 
knowledge required for ultimate happiness, such as it is presented in Rest of the 
Intellect, since that science is an undivided whole divided into parts only for purposes 
of exposition.569 
On a more particular level, man must come to know the whole Neoplatonic order 
of descent from God, through “proximate angels” and astral bodies, to material 
bodies, and back upwards through the hierarchy of generated beings of the lower 
world culminating in man. Hence, as for the Peripatetics, man must conceive in an 
intelligible manner both the metaphysical and physical existents and their relations to 
each other. Besides this, however, specifically Ismaili religious knowledge about the 
prophets, prophetic cycles, religious hierarchy, and religious law is required.570 
For al-Kirmānī such religious knowledge is intimately bound through the idea of 
balance of religion (mīzān al-diyāna) to theoretical knowledge concerning the world, 
as there is no distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge within the 
science of divine unity, only esoteric knowledge concerning different levels of 
reality.571 
While the Brethren of Purity do not offer an exhaustive list of the precise items of 
knowledge that are required for the soul’s salvation, at times they come close to it. For 
the Brethren both religious belief and demonstrative knowledge are necessary to 
salvation. The origin of their conception of belief is Quranic, and is condensed to five 
basic pillars of faith in the Creator, angels, prophets, revelation, and resurrection 
involving reward or punishment in the afterlife.572 But this purely exoteric belief is 
still not sufficient for the soul’s intellectual perfection; demonstrative intelligible 
knowledge about the world, which is not provided by exoteric revelation, is also 
necessary. For the Brethren, this means knowledge about the hierarchy of hypostases, 
in particular, God, Intellect, Soul, Nature, and Matter.573 
Both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers are then in essential agreement that the 
theoretical knowledge required for happiness consists of conception of the physical 
                                                 
568 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, pp. 44-5. 
569 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 111-2; De Smet 1995, pp. 19, 329. See also, chapter 3.5. 
570 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 501. 
571 See, chapter 3.5 above. 
572 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, IV (46), p. 67. 
573 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 279-80, 528. 
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and metaphysical levels of reality, to which might be added some degree of practical 
philosophy for the Peripatetics, Ismaili religious knowledge for al-Kirmānī, and belief 
in religious doctrines for the Brethren of Purity. 
Of the remaining parts of theoretical philosophy, knowledge of logic is not listed 
explicitly among the intellectual requirements of happiness, although it is 
indispensable for the theoretical ascent for Peripatetic philosophers. Since knowledge 
of physical and metaphysical reality must be attained in a way that produces certainty, 
that is, through philosophical demonstration, or even direct intuition in case of Ibn 
Sīnā, knowledge of logic is necessary for acquiring real physical and metaphysical 
knowledge. In fact, the philosopher who gradually proceeds to discover the nature of 
reality through the process of independent verification (taΗqīq), as opposed to 
uncritical faith on authority (taqlīd), acquires knowledge of the ultimate reality in a 
way that perfectly reflects the essentially syllogistic structure of the universe. 
Therefore, it is not possible to acquire the saving physical and metaphysical 
knowledge merely as externally transmitted doctrines, without understanding their 
inherent logical structuring.574 
In contrast, al-Kirmānī does not accord logic any role within his science of divine 
unity, in which the intellectual balance of the philosophers (mīzān al-‘aql), hailed by 
the Brethren of Purity, is replaced by his own balance of religion. Since the 
philosophical truth is attained through the Ismaili hierarchy culminating in the 
divinely guaranteed knowledge of the imam, attaining certain conviction of the 
intelligible truth does not require knowledge about logical demonstration. 575  The 
Ismaili initiate is not expected to discover the ultimate nature of reality through a 
process of independent reflection, because an ordinary human intellect is not capable 
of such a feat without going astray.576 Instead, that knowledge is transmitted to the 
rest of humankind through the human incarnations of the transcendent Intellect, that 
is, the imams. For al-Kirmānī, it is the presence of such individuals throughout human 
history – not Aristotelian logic – that ensures the possibility of certain knowledge 
about the world. 
As for mathematics, like logic, it seems to be a necessary part of the theoretical 
ascent for all except al-Kirmānī, for whom mathematics has no use at least within the 
esoteric saving knowledge. Given the Pythagorean inclinations of the Brethren of 
Purity, it is natural that they give the greatest relative weight to the importance of 
mathematics within the soul’s ascent. For them mathematical relations underlie the 
ultimate reality, and mathematics therefore appears as more than an instrument, 
although even for them the mathematical sciences seem to appear as a spring board 
for even higher knowledge. 
For al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, mathematical knowledge does not in itself form part of 
the intelligible requirements of theoretical perfection just discussed, but seems rather 
to have an instrumental role akin to that of logic. However, it occupies a slightly 
different part within the ascent for each, as mathematics is presented as either a 
preparatory or intermediary stage in relation to physical and metaphysical knowledge. 
For both of them, however, even if the ultimate theoretical perfection is achieved 
                                                 
574 See, Gutas 1988, pp. 173-6, 187-94, 219. 
575 See, chapter 3 above and De Smet 1995, pp. 357-9. 
576 See, al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 103-4, 588. 
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through physical and metaphysical knowledge about corporeal and spiritual reality, 
the two other parts of theoretical philosophy also have their place within the soul’s 
spiritual progression. Even logic and mathematics as the seemingly most purely 
theoretical of sciences are not free of extra-academic spiritual aspirations. 
7.3 Ascent from sensible to intelligible knowledge 
According to Ibn Sīnā, the more man gains insight in his reflection of the intelligible 
ideas, the more receptive he becomes to ultimate happiness, and the more his liaisons 
to corporeal reality are weakened.577 In the minimum lists of theoretical knowledge 
the relatively few items of mainly physical and metaphysical knowledge are 
enumerated in an indiscriminate manner with no particular order of precedence. It is 
not, however, possible for the student to proceed directly towards conceiving the 
necessary intelligible ideas about the Neoplatonic order of being in order to become 
happy. 
As mentioned above, prior knowledge of logic is necessary for the student already 
in order for him to understand the physical and metaphysical works, and to become 
truly convinced about their truth. But with respect to all other branches of philosophy 
as well, the system of knowledge forms a relative progression in which one has to 
proceed according to a determined order. On the whole, the philosophical curriculum 
should correspond to the idea of the soul’s gradual ascent in order for it to operate as a 
spiritual road towards ultimate happiness. 
In a sense then, as Hadot suggests in his portrayal of the thought of Plotinus, the 
different grades of philosophical knowledge are reproduced as stages within the 
soul.578 As the human soul is situated in the Neoplatonic hierarchy of being between 
the materiality of its bodily activities and the pure spirituality of the higher world, to 
which it has access through its intellect, it contains within itself both levels of being. 
The grades of philosophy correspond to the corporeal-sensible and spiritual-
intelligible levels of reality, as in the classical Platonic tripartition of philosophy into 
physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, where each philosophical discipline 
investigates progressively higher kinds of objects with respect to their degree of 
materiality.579 
Hence, the philosophical student’s progression along the grades of philosophy 
simultaneously forms the soul’s progression within itself towards the ultimate goal of 
retrieving its purely spiritual essence. The core of the philosophical progression is the 
soul’s gradual ascent from its initial state of purely sensible existence up to a purely 
intelligible level of being. In this sense, the idea of ascent is connected to the adoption 
of the Delphic maxim “know thyself!” (gnōthi seauton) in Arabic philosophy. The 
theoretical ascent is a voyage towards self-knowledge, or rather knowledge of the 
                                                 
577  “thumma kullamā izdāda al-nāԘir istibṣāran izdāda li-´l-sa‘āda isti‘dādan.” Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: 
Ilāhiyyāt, p. 354. 
578 Hadot 1993, pp. 26ff. This might, however, apply better to Plotinus than to the Arabic philosophers, 
as for him the three hypostases exist even within the individual soul, and it is hence possible for the 
soul to ascend to the One within itself. This is not strictly the case for the Peripatetic philosophers and 
al-Kirmānī with their more complex cosmology, and with the restriction of the ascent to an Intellect 
below God. The Brethren of Purity again come closest to the Plotinian conception in this respect, as all 
the hypostases below God are present in man as a microcosm.  
579 See, e.g., Merlan 1953, pp. 53-4 and chapter 7.4 below. 
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highest potential of oneself fulfilled through the soul’s ascent towards the highest 
echelons of spiritual-intelligible reality. 
Hence, Ibn Sīnā in one of his treatises on the soul depicts man’s knowledge of 
himself (ma‘rifat al-insān nafsahu) as the most important of pursuits, and self-
knowledge as a “stairway towards knowledge of the Lord” (mirqāt ilā ma‘rifat al-
rabb).580  For the Brethren of Purity the ascent through self-knowledge is further 
connected to the idea of man as a microcosm. Since man as a microcosmic image of 
all existence reflects the order of the cosmos from its lowest material to the highest 
spiritual levels, man also contains within himself knowledge of all existence.581 
The ontological change of the soul by means of philosophy is inherently connected 
to the epistemological process. Ascent from the material to the spiritual is identified 
with the epistemological ascent from perception of sensibles to grasping of 
intelligibles. For all Arabic philosophers this process is portrayed by means of 
Aristotelian psychology, where the soul’s progress is identified as distinct stages 
within the actualization of human intellect’s capacity to grasp intelligible knowledge, 
although the terminology and identification of the precise stages varies slightly from 
one philosopher to another. 
The soul’s initial state of materiality corresponds epistemologically to the degree 
of a completely passive intellect, at which point the possibility for intelligible 
knowledge is still present only as a potential disposition within the human soul. The 
end point of man’s spiritual ascent, on the other hand, is equivalent to the 
epistemological state of a fully actualized intellect, whereby man has acquired the 
totality of intelligibles.582 
Despite the fact that for all Arabic philosophers man attains his final goal of fully 
actualized intellect through a contact with a transcendent Intellect, from which the 
intelligibles emanate to the human soul, the epistemological process still involves a 
process of abstraction from sensible to intelligible knowledge. According to Ibn Sīnā, 
for the intellect to conceive the intelligibles it must abstract the sensible forms from 
all their accidental material qualities so that only their common universality remains. 
The process of abstraction is a gradual one, where the faculties of imagination and 
estimation each adopt the sensible form in a more purely abstract manner, until the 
intellect divests it completely from all its accidental qualities. 583  Despite the 
apparently empirical nature of the process, however, for Ibn Sīnā the intelligible 
                                                 
580 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, p. 182. See, chapter 6.1 above for the relation of the 
Delphic maxim to the practical purification of the soul. Altmann (1969a, p. 29) treats the idea of the 
Delphic maxim connected to the soul’s ascent towards the One as its specifically Neoplatonic 
interpretation in which the act of self-knowledge implies withdrawal from the sensible world, and in 
which the soul comes to know itself through looking upwards towards the highest reality. 
581 See, e.g., Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 261ff. For al-Kirmānī also there is an ontological correspondence 
between man as a microcosm and the other levels of reality, but, despite this, he does not favor the 
theme of self-knowledge. See, De Smet 1995, pp. 27-8. 
582 See, e.g., Davidson 1992, pp. 49-50, 84-6 for al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā; De Smet 1995, pp. 354-5 and 
RāΗa, pp. 467-8 for al-Kirmānī; and Jāmi‘a, p. 363 for the Brethren of Purity. The technical term for 
the initial stage is potential intellect (al-‘aql bi-´l-quwwa), or for al-Kirmānī potentially subsisting 
intellect (al-‘aql al-qā’im bi-´l-quwwa), of which al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and the Brethren of Purity also 
employ the term material intellect (al-‘aql al-hayūlānī). The final stage of intellectual perfection is 
called by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā acquired intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafād), and by al-Kirmānī the actual 
intellect (al-‘aql bi-´l-fi‘l). 
583 Ibn Sīnā, Mabda’, pp. 102-3. 
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concepts are not in fact truly abstracted from the particulars, but rather the process 
prepares the rational soul for the emanation of the universals from the Active Intellect. 
The indivisible intelligible ideas have an objective existence within the Active 
Intellect, to which the human soul only has a gradually more complete access through 
its intellectual progression.584 
For al-Fārābī, the active role of human intellect seems greater. For him also the 
Active Intellect transforms the potentially intelligible sense perceptions stored in the 
imaginative faculty into actually intelligible thoughts. But for al-Fārābī it is only the 
first intelligibles, that is, the self-evident principles shared by all men and the first 
principles of sciences, that are emanated directly from the Active Intellect, whereas 
the rest is construed by men themselves through demonstrative means.585 
For both, when the human intellect reaches its perfection at the degree of acquired 
intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafād), it attains a more complete conjunction with the Active 
Intellect, the repository of all intelligible forms, whereby it no longer has need for 
resorting to sensible forms and the abstractive process in its conception of 
intelligibles.586 
For al-Kirmānī the gradual progression of the soul from sensible to intelligible 
existence is similarly attached to a gradual epistemological process. Al-Kirmānī 
identifies theoretical perfection with intelligible cognition of the principles preceding 
the human soul in existence, that is, the separate Intellects. Initially, the soul is, 
however, devoid of the forms of existents (Ιuwar al-mawjūdāt), like “blank paper 
devoid of writing.” The ascent towards cognition of the higher principles occurs 
gradually, from the non-sensing embryo in its mother’s womb, through the sensing 
and imaginative souls, up to a perfected soul with completely actualized intellection. 
From pure sensation the soul will gradually rise to see correspondences between the 
sensible forms within its imaginative faculty, to seeing the correspondence between 
sensible existents and things of religion (al-umūr al-shar‘iyya), 587  to conceiving 
images of the separate Intellects (amthilat al-‘uqūl al-qā’ima bi-´l-fi‘l), until it finally 
gains the capability to grasp the non-sensible Intellects themselves. This is the final 
point of the soul’s progression, whereby it is connected to the Intellects, and dispenses 
of the lower forms of cognition altogether.588 
Despite the relatively low regard given to empirical knowledge in Neoplatonic 
thought, perhaps even more so for the Arabic Neoplatonists than their Greek 
predecessors, sensation is valued as the necessary first step towards intelligible 
knowledge. Given the epistemological background, it seems clear that the soul’s 
theoretical ascent should start from sense knowledge, from which it gradually 
advances towards intelligible knowledge. 
Al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity are in fact adamant in demanding that the 
intellectual progression of the pupil should start its ascent from sensible knowledge 
upwards. The Brethren of Purity call the road of the senses (Λarīq al-Ηawāss) a 
                                                 
584 Davidson 1992, pp. 84-93. For the Brethren’s parallel epistemological process, see, e.g., Rasā’il, III 
(35), pp. 232-43. 
585 Davidson 1992, pp. 51-3. 
586 Davidson 1992, pp. 53-4, 95-8. 
587 This is based on the Ismaili idea of balance of religion treated in chapter 3.5., and the resulting 
correspondence between all levels of reality. 
588 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 103, 115, 480-1, 490-2. 
 155
staircase through which one ascends to intelligible knowledge, the soul’s ultimate 
goal. In order to attain that ultimate goal one must, however, start from sense 
knowledge. The first human degree of knowledge therefore concerns the tangible 
sensible objects (al-umūr al-maΗsūsa dhawāt al-ashyā’ al-malmūsa).589 Al-Kirmānī 
similarly explains that sense knowledge is the proper starting point for the ascent, 
since the soul in its initial state is closer to the sensibles than the intelligibles. If one, 
on the contrary, were to start directly from knowledge of the higher realities, then the 
road to knowledge would become more difficult for the student, as he would be filled 
with doubts about it.590 
The epistemological progression then coincides with the general lines of the idea 
of Neoplatonic ascent, that is, the soul’s reascent from sensible-material to 
intelligible-spiritual level of existence. For the symmetry of the Neoplatonic descent 
and ascent to be complete, the theoretical ascent should progress gradually according 
to an order that represents the reversal of the emanationist process of creation. 
Al-Kirmānī in fact states this explicitly, in saying that the “devotional order 
leading to eternal happiness” (tartīb al-‘ibāda al-mu’addiya ilā dā’im al-sa‘āda) 
should be opposite to the natural hierarchy of being (al-tartīb al-Λabī‘ī), so that the 
first in the order of creation is last in the order of devotion, and vice versa.591 Man’s 
quest for theoretical knowledge should then progress gradually along the Neoplatonic 
order of existents, starting from the beings of “late” existence (wujūd ākhirī), the 
degree to which the human soul itself belongs, and proceeding from there until the 
first existents of the Intellects are reached. In contrast to Plotinus, however, for whom 
the symmetry becomes complete in return to the One, for al-Kirmānī knowledge of 
the Intellects is the ultimate limit, while God as the very first being remains beyond 
the reach of human intellect. Again if this natural epistemological order is not 
followed, according to al-Kirmānī the soul will be filled with doubts due to its 
incapability to conceive the things that should not be known before the things that 
precede them.592 
The Brethren of Purity similarly require time after time a precisely ordered 
procession in studying their epistles, although it remains to be seen to what degree the 
arrangement of their epistles actually corresponds to the Neoplatonic ascent. Only 
when the epistles are studied in this progressive order, starting from the first epistle 
and ascending from it one by one until the last one, do they fulfill their role as the 
“ladder to salvation” (sullam li-´l-najāt).593 Hence, “you, o’ brother, must read these 
epistles from the first to the last, and not enter on a chapter until you have learned 
                                                 
589 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (8), p. 340; Jāmi‘a, p. 380. 
590 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 107-8. 
591 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 107. 
592 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 107-8. 
593 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 17. “We have imposed as a condition on our masterly books and precise epistles 
that anyone studying them must begin from the first of them and ascend through them until the last of 
them, so that we have made them a ladder to salvation” (sharaΛnā fī kutubinā al-muΗkama wa-
rasā’ilinā al-mutqana annahu yajib ‘alā al-nāΝir fīhā an yabda’ bi-awwalihā murtaqiyan fīhā ilā 
ākhirihā wa-ja‘alnāhā sullaman li-´l-najāt). 
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what is before it, as then they will lead you to right guidance and the grade of 
perfection.”594 
Al-Fārābī presents the same idea of the progressive nature of philosophical 
knowledge in terms of philosophical methodology in his Attainment of Happiness. Al-
Fārābī’s progression follows the chain of causation upwards, thus in effect 
progressing along the reversed order of creation. Each science investigates a specific 
genus of existents, where the investigation of its objects of enquiry leads to discovery 
of the causes of these beings, or their principles of existence (mabādi’ al-wujūd). 
When one then proceeds upwards to principles that lie outside that genus, a new 
discipline investigating a higher genus of existents is found. All this results in that the 
procession of philosophical knowledge proceeds gradually higher from the principles 
to the principles of principles, until the furthest principle is found. As for al-Kirmānī, 
knowledge of existents then proceeds from those posterior in the hierarchy of being 
gradually upwards.595 
The general idea of the theoretical ascent to happiness in Arabic philosophy would 
then seem to be that since the ontological reality is hierarchical, the progression of 
philosophical knowledge should also be hierarchical, although following the inverse 
order of the gradation of ontological reality. For the actual philosophical or Ismaili 
discipline the theoretical ascent of course does not proceed this way through 
independent conception of progressively higher levels of reality.596 The practice of 
philosophical learning rather takes place through instruction by the philosophers, or 
the Ismaili da‘wa in case of al-Kirmānī. 
The philosophical instruction moreover had by the 10th century been petrified into 
curriculums of philosophical sciences, within which each discipline occupied its 
proper place. The Ismailis, on the other hand, had their own curriculum, in which the 
esoteric Ismaili philosophy formed the highest part. It is now time to see how this 
general idea of Neoplatonic ascent by knowledge is manifested in the actual 
curriculums of Arabic philosophy, such as they are presented in the philosophical 
compendiums on the one hand, and normative classifications of sciences on the other.  
7.4 Classification of sciences 
The curriculum of philosophical sciences was not devised by Arabic philosophers 
from scratch, but was adopted in slightly variant forms from the Greek philosophical 
schools of late Antiquity, the one in Alexandria in particular. Following implicit ideas 
in Aristotle’s own works, Alexandrian commentators had arranged Aristotle’s corpus 
into a philosophical curriculum. Within such a curriculum to each field of study was 
                                                 
594 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 333. “yanbaghī laka ayyuhā al-akh . . . an takūn qirā’atuka ayḍan li-hādhihi al-
rasā’il min awwalihā ilā ākhirihā, wa-lā tadkhul fī faṣl min fuṣūlihā illā ba‘d mā taqif ‘alā mā qablahu . 
. ., li-yakūn dhālika qā’idan ilā al-rashād, wa-mublighan bika ilā darajat al-kamāl wa-´l-sadād.” 
595 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 123ff. 
596 Only a man equipped with perfect theoretical intellect could grasp the totality of his knowledge by 
himself, as is the case for the protagonist of the twelfth-century Andalusian philosopher Ibn Ṭufayl’s 
famous fable Ζayy Ibn YaqΝān. Stranded on a desert island Ḥayy proceeds to gradually deduce the 
whole order of being from empirical reality up to the First Principle. For Ibn Sīnā, intelligible 
knowledge may be reached through instruction, demonstrative reasoning, or direct intuition (Ηads). 
Only a perfect man, that is, a prophet, would be capable of acquiring all knowledge directly by intuitive 
means, whereas as an eminent philosopher, such as Ibn Sīnā himself, would be able to dispense with 
much hard work due to his relatively strong intuitive faculty. See, Gutas 1988, pp. 20-1, 73, 159ff. 
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assigned a set of Aristotle’s works which together combined to form a pedagogical 
path of study. For late Greek Neoplatonists Aristotle’s works had moreover 
constituted the “minor mysteries,” preceding the “major mysteries” of Plato’s 
dialogues, which were also arranged to a set curricular order. Through such a 
curriculum the student would proceed to knowledge of progressively higher realities 
by studying the required works of Aristotle and Plato. 
In the school of Ammonius (d. ca. 517) then, the curriculum would start with a 
course of pre-philosophical morality, advance through one year of Aristotelian logic, 
one year of physics, and one year of mathematics and metaphysics. The course would 
then culminate in three years devoted to the 12 Platonic dialogues best thought to 
epitomize Platonism, similarly arranged to two cycles ascending from physical to 
metaphysical knowledge. 597  Arabic philosophy, despite its otherwise Neoplatonic 
tendencies, largely dismissed Plato from its own curriculum, reflecting in part the 
omission of Plato in the final Christianized years of the Alexandrian school.598 
The main criterion for the classification of philosophical sciences within these 
curricula was the correspondence of ontological and epistemological order, so that the 
philosophical disciplines were categorized into ascending order with respect to the 
materiality of their objects of enquiry. The order most generally adopted by Arabic 
philosophers from the late Alexandrian philosophers was the Aristotelian tripartition 
of theoretical philosophy into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, corresponding 
to the Platonic tripartition of being into sensibles (aisthēta), mathematicals 
(mathēmata), and ideas (eidē). Thus, physics was identified by the Alexandrians as 
the lowest in degree investigating material beings, metaphysics or theology as the 
highest investigating spiritual beings, and mathematics as the middle science, as its 
objects pertained to both material and immaterial spheres.599 
This division then fully manifests the idea of the soul’s ascent through philosophy 
from a sensible to intelligible level, with mathematics assumed as a necessary 
intermediary stage to soften the transition from “darkness to light.” Namely, to move 
directly from the “Platonic cave” to the luminosity of intelligible beings was not 
                                                 
597 Hein 1985, pp. 7-8; Gutas 1988, p. 149; Sorabji 2004, pp. 319-20. In contrast, Miskawayh’s Tartīb 
al-sa‘ādāt states the time period necessary to learn Aristotle’s philosophy, for a qualified student with a 
teacher, to be between ten and twenty years. Gutas 1983, p. 235. 
598 See, e.g., Hein 1985, p. 13. Al-Fārābī’s Philosophy of Plato summarizes the contents of some 20 
Platonic dialogues, introduced with the title “Philosophy of Plato, its parts, and the grades of its parts 
from the first to the last” (Falsafat AflāΛūn wa-ajzā‘uhā wa-marātib ajzā’ihā min awwalihā ilā 
ākhirihā). The title would suggest a systematic ordering of the dialogues according to subject matter, 
which one could presume might go back to the Greek Neoplatonists. Interestingly, al-Fārābī does start 
with Alcibiades, which according to him introduces the question of happiness as human perfection, as 
do the Greek Neoplatonists, for whom it is identified with the Delphic maxim demanding self-
knowledge as the starting point of all knowledge. After this, however, al-Fārābī’s ordering does not 
bear much resemblance to the Neoplatonic one, nor does it follow a progression from physical to 
metaphysical knowledge. See, al-Fārābī, Falsafat AflāΛūn; Sorabji 2004, pp. 319-21. 
599 Merlan 1953, pp. 53ff.; Hein 1995, pp. 25-8, 163ff. Merlan notes the un-Aristotelian character of the 
tripartition, given that Aristotle does not consider mathematical entities to possess objective existence. 
Nevertheless, the partition is found repeatedly in Aristotle’s works, although at times Aristotle does 
substitute astronomy for mathematics. However, Aristotle treats the tripartition of being as a Platonic 
doctrine. The two ideas are connected in the statement of Metaphysics (1004a2), “there are just as 
many divisions of philosophy as there are kinds of being” (tosauta merē philosophias estin hosai per’ 
hai ousiai). 
 158
deemed possible.600 Besides this tripartition, there was, however, an alternate division 
of theoretical philosophy, attributed to Plato by some Alexandrian philosophers. In 
this “Platonic” ordering mathematics was not assumed to form part of philosophy at 
all, but was instead merely propaedeutic to philosophy, whereas theoretical 
philosophy proper was composed of physics and metaphysics.601 This curriculum was 
also adopted by some Arabic philosophers, and while it also reflects the idea of 
Neoplatonic ascent, within it mathematics assumes a different role. The position of 
logic within the classification was a subject of discussion for the Alexandrians, the 
question revolving around whether logic was merely an instrument (organon) of 
philosophy or part of philosophy itself.602 
For the Arabic philosophers the curricular ideas and classifications of philosophy 
were transmitted especially through late Greek introductions to philosophy translated 
into Syriac and Arabic. 603  As a result, the Alexandrian curriculum is embodied 
perfectly in Arabic philosophy, for example, in the ninth-century philosopher Qusṭā 
Ibn Lūqā’s introduction to philosophy.604 Qusṭā divides theoretical philosophy into the 
lowest science (al-‘ilm al-asfal) of physics, middle science (al-‘ilm al-awsaΛ) of 
mathematics, and highest science (al-‘ilm al-a‘lā) of metaphysics, with each science 
further divided into their subsidiary parts. Logic is stated to be an instrument (āla) of 
philosophy, rather than forming part of theoretical philosophy itself. For each part, 
moreover, Qusṭā assigns works by Aristotle, although failing to find any for 
mathematics.605 
That the adoption of the Alexandrian classification was not entirely homogenous, 
however, is apparent in al-Kindī’s interpretation of the same scheme.606 For al-Kindī 
mathematics represents an indispensable preliminary for studying philosophy, rather 
than part of the actual philosophical sciences, whereas logic forms the first part of 
philosophy itself. Al-Kindī’s debt to the Aristotelian tripartition of sciences is, 
however, shown by his division of the rest of theoretical philosophy into three parts 
according to the ontological order of their objects, even though, rather uniquely, he 
substitutes psychology for mathematics. Hence, al-Kindī’s progression of philosophy 
after logic is now physics, dealing with corporeal existents, psychology dealing with 
existents between corporeality and incorporeality, and metaphysics concerned with 
purely incorporeal objects. 
Both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā are indebted to the Alexandrian-Arabic curricular 
tradition of the previous centuries in their classification of philosophy. Each of them, 
however, adopts a different variant of the two major classificatory orders. Ibn Sīnā 
offers his explanation for the division of philosophy in particular in the essay On the 
                                                 
600 Hein 1985, p. 169. Greek Neoplatonists resort to the Platonic cave metaphor as an argument for 
their arrangement of philosophy. To move directly from material to immaterial would be as ill-advised 
as to gaze directly at the sun after having spent a life-time in the darkness of the cave. 
601 Hein 1985, p. 170. 
602 Hein 1985, pp. 153-62. 
603 Biesterfeldt 2002, pp. 51-2; Hein 1985, pp. 1ff. 
604 Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā, Min kalām QusΛā Ibn Lūqā. 
605 There were, of course, no works by Aristotle on mathematics, but other Greek authors were adopted 
instead, such as Nikomakhos for arithmetic, Euclid for geometry, Ptolemy for astronomy, and 
Aristoxenos and others for music. 
606 Al-Kindī, Kammiyyat kutub ArisΛūΛālīs. 
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Parts of the Intellectual Sciences.607 The main framework of Ibn Sīnā’s division is the 
classical tripartition of theoretical philosophy supported by the tripartite Platonic 
ontology of being. 
Hence, his general division of theoretical philosophy follows the order physics, 
mathematics, and metaphysics, designated as the lowest, middle, and highest science 
respectively. Ibn Sīnā states the criterion for this division explicitly to be the degree of 
materiality of the objects of enquiry within each science. He, however, states this in 
terms of the concept pair of definition (Ηadd) and existence (wujūd). Physics forms 
the lowest science in degree because in it both definition and existence of the 
investigated things, that is, celestial bodies, the four elements, and their compounds, 
are dependent on matter and movement. Mathematics is the intermediate science, 
because its objects, such as geometrical forms, are reliant on matter and movement 
only such as they exist in actuality, but not in their abstract definitions. Metaphysics 
or theology (al-‘ilm al-ilāhī) is the highest science, because its objects, such as God or 
the abstract concepts of first philosophy, do not require matter and movement in their 
definitions nor in their existence. 
While Ibn Sīnā then follows rather faithfully the Alexandrian idea of gradation of 
knowledge based on ontological gradation of reality, his novel formulation liberates 
him from the un-Aristotelian idea of tripartite reality. Mathematicals as the middle 
objects of knowledge have no objective existence, but their immateriality only lies in 
their definitions. Still, as for the Alexandrians, mathematics presents a bridge between 
the complete materiality of the physical and utter immateriality of the spiritual 
worlds.608 To complete Ibn Sīnā’s classification of philosophy, logic finally precedes 
the three major parts of theoretical philosophy as its instrument, while the three parts 
of practical philosophy, ethics, economics, and politics, follow upon all of theoretical 
philosophy. 
Like the Alexandrians, al-Kindī, and others before him, Ibn Sīnā also further links 
the classification to a reading program of Aristotle’s works. Each subpart of the 
philosophical disciplines is assigned one or more work by Aristotle. When none are 
available, as in the case of mathematics, economics, and political philosophy, a work 
by another Greek author is substituted. Despite the fact that Ibn Sīnā then practically 
identifies philosophy with Aristotle in his ordering of philosophy, in his actual 
treatments of the philosophical subjects contained within his compendiums he often 
quite consciously diverges from the master.609 
In his autobiography, Ibn Sīnā presents the general lines of his own philosophical 
education. The sequence of studies that he claims to have gone through in his youth 
follows so schematically the normative ideas of the order of philosophy that it 
provokes Gutas to question whether Ibn Sīnā is describing his actual studies, 
                                                 
607 Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām. 
608 Apparently as an innovation of his own, al-‘Āmirī (d. 992) also projects the Alexandrian tripartition 
into to the religious sciences (al-‘ulūm al-milliyya). Hence, the division of philosophical sciences (al-
‘ulūm al-Ηikmiyya) according to the sensible-intelligible progression into physics, mathematics, and 
metaphysics, completed with logic as their instrument, is reproduced by analogy in the religious 
sciences. Hence, the science of Ηadīth is concerned with sense knowledge (Ηissiyya), theology with 
intelligible knowledge (‘aqliyya), and jurisprudence with both, whereas linguistics (Ιinā‘at al-lugha) 
provides an instrument for all three. Al-‘Āmirī, Kitāb al-i‘lām, pp. 84-5. 
609 See, chapter 2.4 above. 
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influenced by generally accepted curricular ideas, or whether he is rather employing 
his autobiography to promote a normative order of philosophical education. 610 
Interestingly, Ibn Sīnā’s own education does not, however, strictly follow his own 
normative ordering of philosophy which he, in contrast, does adopt in most of his 
philosophical compendiums. 
After his pre-philosophical studies, Ibn Sīnā states that he learned philosophy in 
the order logic, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, as an autodidact after 
receiving some preliminary logical and mathematical instruction. The major 
difference is then that mathematics has switched places with physics, and now 
assumes a role as a propaedeutic science, rather than as a mediator between physics 
and metaphysics. This is the other major variant of the Arabic philosophical 
curriculum, adopted by al-Fārābī and many others, and hence might have been a 
natural one for a young Peripatetic like Ibn Sīnā to follow. 
Moreover, the fact that it is in variance with Ibn Sīnā’s normative ordering of 
philosophy, and that in none of his compendia does he present philosophy in this 
order, would support the view that it was the actual order of his studies, rather than an 
argument for the order in which philosophy ought to be studied. This is so in 
particular if the autobiography is a relatively late work, as Gutas himself suggests.611 
Given the logic of ascent shown in the Alexandrian progression, it is interesting 
that al-Fārābī adopts the other variant, in which mathematics precedes both physics 
and metaphysics.612 The progression still follows the idea of passage from corporeal 
to incorporeal objects in that physics precedes metaphysics. But the position of 
mathematics does not seem to fit the gradual progression from materiality to 
spirituality. Still, al-Fārābī depicts the ascent in terms of materiality. 
The philosophical student starts from mathematical concepts which are conceived 
completely immaterially, and then ascends gradually (yartaqī qalīlan qalīlan) through 
the echelons of mathematics towards objects that require gradually more materiality in 
their conception, until he finally ends up in purely corporeal objects, and ascends from 
mathematics to physics. From the materiality of physics the student is, however, again 
led gradually towards non-physical principles, until the purely spiritual entities of 
metaphysics are reached.613 
The Brethren of Purity adopt the same pattern with respect to the position of 
mathematics, with the difference that for al-Fārābī logic precedes mathematics and the 
other theoretical sciences, whereas for the Brethren mathematics is preliminary even 
to logic.614 For both the explanation that allows their pattern to be fitted into the idea 
of the soul’s ascent seems to be that mathematics prepares the student for 
philosophical thought in general, rather than truly forming part of it, as we will see 
later. For both al-Fārābī and the Brethren of Purity, as for Ibn Sīnā, practical 
                                                 
610 Ibn Sīnā, Sīra, pp. 18ff; Gutas 1988, pp. 149-58. 
611 See, Gutas 1988, p. 145 for his proposal for a chronology of Ibn Sīnā’s works. 
612 Al-Fārābī’s classification is presented in particular in Enumeration of Sciences, which is quite 
similar in style to Ibn Sīnā’s Parts of the Intellectual Sciences, although it goes beyond mere 
definitions of the parts of philosophy. Parallel with this work is the first part of Attainment of 
Happiness, which follows the same general order of philosophy, but excludes the non-philosophical 
sciences, such as linguistics. 
613 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 129ff.; FuΙūl muntaza‘a, pp. 96-9. 
614 The Brethren of Purity present their normative account of the division of sciences in Rasā’il, I (7). 
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philosophy finally follows all of theoretical philosophy as its final part in the 
classification of philosophical sciences.  
While Peripatetic philosophers are for the most part only concerned with the 
progression of the philosophical sciences, in the wider Islamic world the “indigenous” 
Arabic-Islamic sciences were also incorporated into the classifications. In such 
curricula, the partition between native and foreign sciences constitutes the main line 
of division. Both were deemed commendable for the education of a truly civilized 
man, at least among the more liberal-minded writers. 
Such a versatile curriculum is recommended by al-Khwārizmī’s Keys of the 
Sciences (MafātīΗ al-‘ulūm) (ca. 977) for one aspiring to the secretarial art. In this 
treatise the Arabic sciences are distinguished from the foreign (‘ajamī), the latter 
following the classical Alexandrian ordering of philosophy. The philosophical 
disciplines are preceded by the native arts of Islamic law, theology, grammar, writing, 
prosody, and history.615 Al-Tawḥīdī similarly adopts both Arabic and Greek sciences 
into his treatise on sciences, so that the religious sciences precede some of the natural 
sciences, and finally conclude with the “science of Sufism,” although the arrangement 
does not seem to follow any particular order.616 
The Brethren of Purity follow a similar pattern in their general classification of 
sciences, sketched in the seventh epistle On the Theoretical Disciplines and Their 
Goals (Fī al-Ιanā’i‘ al-‘ilmiyya wa-´l-gharaΕ minhā).617  The Brethren, with their 
liberal appreciation of knowledge of all kinds and from all sources, develop a 
tripartite division of sciences into preparatory (riyāΕiyya), religious (shar‘iyya 
waΕ‘iyya), and philosophical (falsafiyya Ηaqīqiyya). The first group, which they also 
call the “humanistic” sciences (‘ulūm al-ādāb), comprise a rather diverse elementary 
education from the basic skills of reading and writing, through magic, to history. The 
secondary religious education proceeds through the properly Islamic sciences, such as 
revelation (tanzīl), allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl), and Islamic law, to more 
controversial subjects, such as Sufism and interpretation of dreams. 
Finally the education culminates in the philosophical sciences, which follow the 
order mathematics, logic, physics, and metaphysics, that is, the second major variant 
of philosophical classification which al-Fārābī also follows. While the Brethren of 
Purity also are indebted to the philosophical tradition of late Antiquity in their 
classification of philosophy, the tripartite curriculum of the totality of sciences seems 
to be of their own making. 
As for the Greek Neoplatonists, for the Brethren also the idea of progression from 
materiality to spirituality is present in the order of philosophical sciences in the 
passage from physical to metaphysical knowledge. But beyond that, it is also in some 
way incorporated to the whole scientific order. For the Brethren of Purity, the most 
                                                 
615 Bosworth 1963. The author is not the famous mathematician, whose heritage is enshrined in the 
word algorithm in western languages, but a more obscure civil servant by the name ‘Abd Allāh 
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Yūsuf al-Kātib al-Khwārizmī. He himself proposes the treatise to include the 
basic principles of various disciplines (awā’il al-Ιinā‘āt), including technical terms, for the education 
of a civil servant. This purpose reminds that of al-Fārābī’s Enumeration of Sciences, which the author 
says to be to introduce the fundaments of each philosophical discipline so that the reader may pass for 
an educated man. 
616 Al-Tawḥīdī, Risāla fī al-‘ulūm. 
617 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (7). See, Appendix 4 for their classification. 
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essential division of knowledge in general is the binary division between exoteric and 
esoteric knowledge. The exoteric sciences (Νawāhir al-‘ulūm) are explicitly attached 
to the corporeal sphere of being, whereas the esoteric sciences (bawāΛin al-‘ulūm) 
correspond to the spiritual sphere. Just as the corporeal forms grasped by the senses 
are images of the intelligible forms, so the exoteric sciences encompass allusions to 
the deeper meanings of the intelligible esoteric sciences. 
Hence, the progression from exoteric to esoteric is in effect the ascent of the soul 
from the material-sensible to the spiritual-intelligible sphere of being. It is through the 
latter, according to the Brethren, that the “angelic forms” (Ιūra malakiyya) are 
cognized, and through them the soul attains its “heavenly degree” (rutba 
samāwiyya).618 When applied to the Brethren’s tripartite general division of sciences, 
the first preparatory sciences would seem for the most part to fall out of the exoteric-
esoteric division, as they are, according to the Brethren, mostly concerned with 
gaining a basic livelihood, rather than knowledge of the objective reality. The 
religious sciences, however, provide the exoteric, revelatory truth about the world, 
whereas the philosophical sciences constitute the esoteric sciences, which provide for 
the student the ultimate intelligible truth behind the revelation. 
In a sense then a double progression from materiality to spirituality appears in the 
curriculum of the Brethren of Purity, first from exoteric to esoteric knowledge, and 
then within the philosophical sciences themselves from physical to metaphysical 
knowledge. 
This greatly resembles the Ismaili conception of sciences, whether the Brethren of 
Purity actually are Ismailis or not.619 For the Ismailis, the progression of theoretical 
knowledge proceeds similarly from the exoteric to esoteric, or from the outer 
appearance of religion (sharī‘a) to its innermost truths (Ηaqīqa). As for the Brethren, 
the exoteric sciences are related to the apparent reality of sensation, and the esoteric to 
the ultimate reality of intelligibles. For the Ismailis, all this leads to a properly Ismaili 
curriculum of intellectual sciences, where the learning of the disciple would proceed 
from such exoteric sciences as Ismaili law and history, through the science of 
allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl), up to the ultimate intelligible reality (Ηaqā’iq).620 
Interestingly, like the Alexandrian idea of theoretical philosophy, the Ismaili idea 
of progression of knowledge also culminates in a curriculum of three grades. Between 
the lowest grade of exoteric religious knowledge and the final stage of esoteric 
philosophical knowledge of the “ultimate realities” (Ηaqa’iq), there is a middle stage 
of “lower esoteric” knowledge related to ta’wīl, which functions as a bridge between 
the two extremes.621 
In contrast to the status of philosophical studies in the Islamic world, the 
instruction of Ismaili sciences was actually institutionalized in the Fatimid centers of 
learning by the time of al-Kirmānī, at least in Cairo, to comprise both the exoteric and 
esoteric sciences, and to follow the progression of three grades of knowledge.622 
While al-Kirmānī himself does not offer a complete classification of the sciences, his 
                                                 
618 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 109-10. 
619 See, the discussion in chapter 3.4 above. 
620 Daftary 1990, pp. 138, 233. 
621 Fyzee 1965, pp. 235-6. 
622 See, Halm 1997, pp. 24-6, 41-5; Fyzee 1965, pp. 234-9. 
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scheme does fall within the Ismaili curriculum, such as it was practiced in Fatimid 
Egypt. This classification emerges mostly from his introductory notes to the Rest of 
the Intellect, where he treats the reading required before that particular work. The 
totality of the Rest is related by al-Kirmānī to the highest esoteric, that is, spiritual-
intelligible, level of knowledge, corresponding to the third and final stage of the 
Ismaili curriculum. Before reaching that work, the reader, however, must have studied 
a corpus of works related to the two preceding stages of exoteric and lower esoteric 
knowledge.623 
For both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy, then, the general order of sciences is 
linked to the idea of ascent from material to spiritual, whether that ascent takes place 
from religious to philosophical knowledge, or within the philosophical sciences 
themselves. 
7.5 Philosophical compendiums 
Besides the normative accounts of classification of sciences, the philosophers also 
incorporated the classificatory order into their compendiums of philosophy. 
Philosophical “encyclopedism,” that is, organizing philosophical knowledge into 
wide-scale works covering all or most philosophical fields of study, would become an 
even more prevalent trend in the later centuries.624 However, both the Brethren of 
Purity and Ibn Sīnā already devised such full-scale compendiums. In these works all 
of the philosophical sciences are incorporated into a single philosophical summa 
following the classificatory order of sciences. 
While often described as encyclopedias, the word appears as slightly anachronistic 
with respect to their purpose. They are not meant as works of reference, nor do they 
intend to provide an all-round education for literate men. Definitely in the case of the 
Brethren of Purity, and slightly less so for Ibn Sīnā, their works rather have a Gnostic 
rationale. They provide the saving philosophical knowledge arranged to an organic 
whole that operates as the rational soul’s ladder to salvation. Hence, if they are 
encyclopedias, they are Gnostic encyclopedias.625 
Nevertheless, with respect to Alexandrian school philosophy, compilation of such 
works represents an innovation in exposition of philosophy, as in Alexandria the 
curriculum consisted of a reading list rather than a single comprehensive work. For 
Gutas, Ibn Sīnā is the first to fully actualize the curricular idea latent in the 
Alexandrian classification of sciences in this sense into a single opus.626 The Brethren 
of Purity, however, do the same slightly earlier, although they do not follow the 
                                                 
623 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 108-9; De Smet 1995, pp. 21-2. 
624 For discussions of “encyclopedias” in the medieval Islamic world, see, Peters 1968, pp. 104-20, 
Endress 2006, and Gutas 2006. 
625 I adopt here the term compendium which Gutas (1988, pp. 102-3) suggests for Ibn Sīnā’s Healing, 
on the argument that the work’s internal unity is at variance with what is commonly understood by 
encyclopedia. Van Ess (2006, p. 8) similarly views Healing more as a commentary on Aristotle’s 
corpus than an encyclopedia. The Epistles are even more commonly referred to as an encyclopedia, due 
to their more eclectic quality, but the term does not accurately describe their purpose. The authors time 
and again emphasize their aim is leading the soul towards its salvation, not providing a haphazard 
collection of information for reference or education. While the term enkyklios paideia, general 
education, might still somehow fit their contents, their goal is at variance with the Enlightenment 
concept of encyclopedia as a collection of all knowledge of the time in a condensed form. 
626 Gutas 1988, p. 87. 
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Alexandrian order strictly, nor is their account of philosophy as purely Aristotelian. In 
the case of both of them, however, in theory it would be possible for the student of 
philosophy to follow the whole progression of philosophical ascent through studying 
the Epistles or Healing from beginning to end.  
Ibn Sīnā’s compendiums for the most part follow closely his conception of the 
curriculum of sciences.627 The same consistency does not, however, always apply to 
the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. While the Epistles do follow the general order 
of sciences presented in the seventh epistle, that is, mathematics, logic, physics, 
metaphysics, and practical philosophy, on a closer look there is much divergence 
between the actual and normative order of sciences.628 
While both the normative and actual ordering classifies philosophy into four parts, 
they are not the same. In the normative “plan” of the work, philosophy is said to 
consist of mathematics, logic, physics, and metaphysics, where ethical and political 
philosophy form part of metaphysics. While the work still proceeds in roughly this 
order, the logical epistles are now inserted within the first mathematical part, while a 
fourth “religious-political” section, under the title “legislative-theological sciences” 
(al-‘ulūm al-nāmūsiyya al-ilāhiyya), is introduced. Besides this major reorganization 
of the general order of the work, the order of sciences within an individual category, 
such as logic in particular, does not always even approximately follow the planned 
order. Moreover, there are additional epistles added here and there, which apparently 
do not fit into any main category, or have received their place due to later editing. 
Finally, regardless of the title of an epistle, the Brethren can end up discussing 
various apparently unrelated themes within them. Consequently, the Gnostic-ethical 
orientation of the epistles as a whole is underlined by the fact that throughout the 
Epistles the way to salvation is emphasized, whether in discussing mathematics, logic, 
or theology. 
Neither al-Fārābī nor al-Kirmānī wrote a philosophical compendium in the same 
sense. While many have tended to interpret al-Fārābī’s political works, Virtuous City 
and Political Governance, as philosophical summas parallel to those of Ibn Sīnā, this 
is clearly not the case. While these twin works do present most parts of both 
theoretical and practical philosophy, with the notable exclusion of logic and 
mathematics, their purpose is not in fact to give a general account of philosophy, and 
even less are they meant as encyclopedias. 
The theoretical parts of the works proceed through the order of creation, that is, 
from God down through metaphysical theology to physics, and back through the 
ascending order of material world. The practical part presents the culmination of the 
ascent that in Neoplatonic thought takes place through the perfection of man. They are 
symmetrical in the sense of presenting both the descent of creation, and the ascent of 
man. The purpose of the works is, furthermore, primarily political, so that the 
                                                 
627 See, Appendixes 2-5 for a comparison of the order of philosophy in the distinct works of the 
philosophers. The fact that Ibn Sīnā mostly omits mathematics before and after Healing (the 
mathematical part in Salvation is devised by his pupil), is by Ibn Sīnā’s own admission because he has 
nothing to add to that science. Interestingly, Ibn Sīnā in two works, the mostly lost Easterners and 
Philosophy for ‘Alā’ al-Dawla, reverses the order between physics and metaphysics, an innovation that 
appears contradictory with the idea of ascent through philosophy. 
628 For the divergence between the seventh classificatory epistle and the actual arrangement, see also, 
De Callataÿ 2008.  
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theoretical first part is subjected to the practical second part. Since al-Fārābī’s ideal 
state emulates the structure of the cosmos, it is indispensable that the theoretical parts 
precede his political philosophy. The treatment of existents is focused in particular on 
the hierarchical ordering of the cosmos, whether at the level of the spiritual world, 
human body, or soul, in order to provide an argument for a similar ordering of the 
city. 
From among Ibn Sīnā’s works, al-Fārābī’s political works are in fact parallel with 
the idea and arrangement of Provenance and Destination, although Ibn Sīnā’s work 
largely dispenses with political philosophy. This work also consists of two parts, the 
first of which follows the order of descent, whereas the second follows the return 
through the ascent of the human soul, including a discussion of prophecy and 
revelation. Al-Kirmānī’s Rest of the Intellect also follows an almost identical order of 
descent and ascent of the Neoplatonic cosmic circle. 
None of these works then is a compendium in the sense of presenting the whole of 
philosophy in a curricular order, nor does their arrangement suggest that the student of 
philosophy should start his studies directly from God as the first being. Rather they 
are arranged to reflect the idea of Neoplatonic descent and reascent for a student 
already relatively advanced in his studies. 
Al-Fārābī, however, presents his curricular order in Attainment of Happiness and 
Enumeration of Sciences, without ever incorporating it to a complete philosophical 
compendium. For al-Kirmānī all of the Rest of the Intellect represents the very highest 
order of esoteric knowledge within the “science of divine unity,” which he does not 
classify in conventional terms into metaphysics and physics. 
Ibn Sīnā and particularly the Brethren of Purity are highly conscious that their 
philosophical compendia have a characteristic of providing the “Gnostic” knowledge 
required for salvation, in the precise order that the student should follow. For the 
Brethren of Purity, as for al-Kirmānī, the Gnostic character of their works is more 
pronounced due to their Ismaili influence, as they repeatedly emphasize the saving 
character of philosophy. Still, it is not true, as Peters argues, that the Epistles would be 
set apart from Ibn Sīnā’s “encyclopedias” by this Gnostic emphasis, for a similar idea 
is clearly present in Ibn Sīnā in a more subtle way.629 It is not coincidental that Ibn 
Sīnā provides such titles as Salvation and Healing for his two most famous 
philosophical compendiums. 
The Brethren of Purity depict the saving function of their epistles repeatedly in 
eloquent terms. The epistles are given the form that they have in order to follow the 
soul’s ascent; they are a ladder of salvation or a guidebook for the spiritual traveler. 
The Brethren declare themselves to be the spiritual guides who “have paved the 
rugged road, cleared it from spikes, boulders, and rocks, and alleviated the afflictions 
of the travelers. Then we made ponds and wells filled with sweet water, and planted 
trees supplied with sweet and aromatic fruit, setting a garden at the head of each stage 
of travel. They are places for rest and relaxation with beautiful servants, lads, and 
maidens attending to them, so that they are relieved from the weariness and hardships 
of travel, and are ready and rested in order to set off for the next stage with a healthy 
                                                 
629 See, Peters 1968, p. 113. 
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and calm soul.”630 Each of the 52 epistles is a stopping point (manzil) within the 
ascent towards a still more beautiful garden of different colors, until the final resting 
place of ultimate happiness is reached. 
Rest of the Intellect is presented by al-Kirmānī in similarly Gnostic terms, even 
though it does not follow a progression of ascent from lesser to higher knowledge. 
Rather it presents the highest order of esoteric knowledge, hence completing the 
soul’s theoretical ascent within the Ismaili curriculum. According to al-Kirmānī: “We 
named this book Rest of the Intellect, for it contains what the potential intellects desire 
to know, as the acquisition of that knowledge constitutes their rest.”631 This is the 
spiritual knowledge that for al-Kirmānī is transmitted to mankind through the 
intermediacy of the imam, the Intellect incarnate. The book is composed according to 
its own peculiar arrangement which further reflects its Gnostic character. Together it 
forms the “city of knowledge” (madīnat al-‘ilm), as it is divided into seven walls 
(aswār), each of which is further divided into seven pathways (mashāri‘), that lead the 
student along the path of theoretical perfection.632 
7.6 Pre-philosophical knowledge 
Philosophical knowledge arranged according to an ascending progression of 
spirituality then forms the core of the theoretical ascent to happiness for all Arabic 
philosophers. As we have seen, the ascent does not take place entirely through 
philosophy, but the student should be first prepared to receive the philosophical 
instruction by non-philosophical means. The pre-philosophical instruction includes in 
particular the moral molding of the soul discussed in the previous chapter, taking 
place mainly by means of the religious law. 
But even with respect to purely theoretical education, philosophical studies should 
be preceded with preparatory sciences preparing the discipline for philosophical 
education. For both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity such preparatory instruction 
is mainly connected to the distinction of exoteric and esoteric knowledge, in which 
the exoteric sciences provide the initiation towards esoteric knowledge identified with 
philosophy. But even for the Peripatetics, some theoretical preparation seems 
necessary before embarking on philosophy proper. 
The first kind of pre-philosophical education in Arabic philosophy consists of 
religious education. Religious sciences obviously form a particularly important 
                                                 
630 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 22-3. “naḥnu bi-manzilat man sahhala ṭarīqan wa‘ra, wa-azāla minhā al-shawk 
wa-´l-ṣakhr wa-´l-ḥijāra, wa-sahhala ḥuzūnahā, thumma ja‘ala fīhā aḥwāḍan wa-ābāran, wa-mala’ahā 
mā’an ḥulwan ṭayyiban ladhīdhan, wa-gharasa fīhā ashjāran dhāt fawākih ladhīdha, wa-rawā’iḥ 
ṭayyiba, wa-ja‘ala ‘alā ra’s kull farsakh minhā bustānan, fīhi mawāḍi‘ li-´l-rāḥa wa-muttaka’āt li-´l-
istirāḥa, wa-khadaman wa-ghilmānan wa-jawārī ḥisānan li-man nazala bihi fa-yazūl ‘anhu mā 
wajadahu min alam al-sayr wa-ṣu‘ūbat wa-‘akk al-safar, fa-yurayyaḥ wa-yastarīḥ, wa-yaqūm li-´l-
mashy ilā al-farsakh alladhī bayna yadayhi bi-nafs ṭayyiba sākina.” 
631 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 105-6. “inna kitābanā hādhā kitāb rāḥat al-‘aql sammaynāhu bi-dhālika li-
kawn mā yataḍammanuhu mimmā tashtāq al-‘uqūl al-qā’ima bi-´l-quwwa ilā ma‘rifatihi wa-fī 
wuṣūlihā ilayhi rāḥatuhā.” 
632 See, De Smet 1995, pp. 16-8 for the relation of the work’s arrangement to the Shii notion of “city of 
knowledge,” manifested in the Shii prophetic Ηadīth “I am the city of knowledge, and ‘Alī is its 
gateway” (anā madīnat al-‘ilm wa-‘Alī bābuhā). Interestingly, considering the question of their Ismaili 
allegiance, the Brethren (Rasā’il, IV (52), p. 460) repeat this Ηadīth: “I am the city of knowledge, and 
‘Alī is its gateway, and he who seeks what is in the city, let him come to the gate” (anā madīnat al-‘ilm 
wa-‘Alī bābuhā, fa-man arāda mā fī al-madīna fa-´l-ya’ti al-bāb). 
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prerequisite for Ismaili philosophy, but they appear to play some propaedeutic role 
even for the Peripatetic philosophers. In its propaedeutic sense, religious education is 
related not only to moral cultivation of the character, but also to the first steps of 
theoretical learning. 
For al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity there is a clear-cut distinction between 
religious and philosophical understanding of the world, or exoteric and esoteric 
knowledge. The first is related to the corporeal-sensible and the latter to the spiritual-
intelligible sphere of being. But unlike for the Peripatetic philosophers, the two do not 
represent alternative roads to knowledge about reality, the way of the common people 
versus the way of the philosophers. Rather religious and philosophical knowledge 
represent two stages of the ascent, where the proper order is to proceed from the 
exoteric to esoteric. The corporeal realm that the exoteric sciences are concerned with 
is a reflection of the spiritual one, and it is indispensable to proceed from the image to 
its source, rather than the other way round. 
Hence, for al-Kirmānī it is incumbent for the student to have proceeded through 
the exoteric religious sciences before he delves into the esoteric philosophy contained 
in Rest of the Intellect. Al-Kirmānī explicitly relates the pre-philosophical education 
to the sensible stage of the soul’s ascent, that is, the initial potential stage of the 
human intellect. As the soul initially is dependent on sensibles in its cognition, the 
Ismaili discipline should start from the works that correspond to this cognitive and 
existential state. The religious works in a sense operate as an introduction to the 
philosophical knowledge provided in the Rest of the Intellect, paving the way for the 
student to understand the higher principles and goals discussed in it. 
Al-Kirmānī repeatedly and emphatically states that it is crucial for the student to 
follow the proper order of knowledge in order for the Rest of the Intellect to realize its 
potential of bringing happiness and salvation to its reader. When this work of esoteric 
knowledge is studied as the culmination of the required curricular order, it acts as an 
“antidote bringing about health and a beautiful reward” to its student. However, one 
who against all instructions rushes to read it without the necessary prerequisites, will 
only hurt his soul (Νālim li-nafsihi), as the work will then act on him “like a poison 
leading towards perdition and painful torment.”633 
Al-Kirmānī sketches a rough outline of his pre-philosophical curriculum in the 
third “pathway” (mashra‘) of the introductory chapter of Rest of the Intellect, which is 
in effect a reading program of the works that the student must have completed before 
the book in question.634 It is not an exhaustive list, however, as the few specific works 
mentioned are given more in the form of an example, and presumably many others 
were included in the actual curriculums of the Fatimid centers of learning. 
The list, however, does coincide with the general curricular ideas prevalent in 
Fatimid Egypt, in which the Ismaili studies were divided into three grades. 
Reminiscent of the Alexandrian curriculum of lower, middle, and highest knowledge, 
the Fatimid curriculum would consist of the first stage of purely exoteric studies 
(Νāhir), a middle stage of “lower esoteric” (bāΛin) knowledge, related to the 
                                                 
633 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 110. “idh hādhā al-kitāb ma‘a tilka al-kutub wa-´l-‘ilm bihā ka-´l-tiryāq 
yuksib al-ṣiḥḥa wa-jamīl al-thawāb, wa-hādhā al-kitāb waḥdahu min ghayr tilka ka-´l-samm alladhī 
yu’addī ilā al-halāk wa-alīm al-‘adhāb.” 
634 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 107-10. 
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allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl) of scripture and law, and finally the higher esoteric 
knowledge of the ultimate realities (Ηaqā’iq).635 
For al-Kirmānī the exoteric studies should start first and foremost with the Quran, 
which is the point of departure for all further knowledge. The Quran contains within it 
entirety of knowledge, wisdom, and religious forms (Ιuwar al-dīn) in a condensed 
form, and instigates the soul towards further seeking its salvation in the afterlife. 
Secondly, al-Kirmānī’s preliminary readings include works related to the exoteric 
“practical worship” (Νāhir al-‘ibāda al-muta‘alliqa bi-´l-‘amal), that are in effect 
composed of the Ismaili interpretation of religious law, and includes three works on 
Ismaili jurisprudence by al-Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān (ca. 903-74).636 The third group consists 
of historical works relating the narrative of the Ismaili movement, also authored by al-
Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān.637 
These first three branches of knowledge would seem to constitute the lowest level 
of exoteric knowledge. There is nothing particularly Ismaili in them, however, as the 
Quran, Islamic law, and history would be included in the elementary education of any 
educated man in the Islamic world, whether Sunni or Shii.638 
The next grade of knowledge in al-Kirmānī’s curriculum, however, represents an 
ascent towards the more properly Ismaili knowledge of the deeper esoteric kind. 
These include first of all several works on the esoteric interpretation (ta’wīl) of the 
Quran and religious law by several Ismaili authors, such as the fourth Fatimid caliph-
imam al-Mu‘izz (d. 975), and the preceding Ismaili dā‘īs Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī, al-
Nasafī, and al-Sijistānī.639 
Further in the ascent, the esoteric part of the curriculum is continued by a lengthy 
list of al-Kirmānī’s own works, which he states to be introductory to the Rest of the 
Intellect. These include writings of very distinct kinds, of philosophical, polemic, and 
dogmatic nature.640 The first group of his own works lists four writings dealing with 
subjects as distinct as polemics against philosophers, Mu‘tazilites, and various other 
                                                 
635 Fyzee 1965, pp. 234-6. 
636 The three works of Ismaili fiqh suggested by al-Kirmānī are Book of Purity (Kitāb al-Λahāra), 
Pillars of Islam (Da‘ā’im al-islām), and Concise Book (Kitāb al-iqtiΙār wa-´l-ikhtiΙār). As Daftary 
notes, Ismaili legal literature is rather scarce in comparison with those produced in the Sunni and 
twelver-Shii schools of law. The Ismaili legal system was produced during the peak Fatimid period of 
Ismailism in the 10th century, and almost exclusively by al-Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān. According to Daftary, 
Ismaili law moreover generally agrees with that of the twelver-Shiis both in content and general 
principles, including the idea of expanding the legal sources from the Quran and sunna to include the 
authority of the imam. For the Ismaili legal system, see, Daftary 1990, pp. 249-52 and Poonawala 1996, 
and for al-Nu‘mān’s writings in general Daftary 2004, pp. 142ff. 
637 These also include three works with the titles The Campaigns (al-Maghāzī), Exposition of the 
Annals on the Virtues of the Pure Imams (SharΗ al-akhbār fī faΕā’il al-a’imma al-aΛhār), and Book of 
Virtues and Vices (Kitāb al-manāqib wa-´l-mathālib). While the discipline of history was in general 
Islamic classifications related to the Arabic-Islamic sciences, according to Daftary (1990, p. 233), 
historical works were rare among the Ismailis. 
638 In contrast to general Sunni religious education, exoteric commentary on the Quran (tafsīr) and 
prophetic traditions (Ηadīth) are notably absent. In the Fatimid Ismaili literature in general both were 
rendered almost obsolete by the presence of the “speaking Quran” (al-Qur‘ān al-nāΛiq) in the form of 
an imam among believers. Daftary 1990, p. 233. 
639 Of these only al-Mu‘izz’s Book of the Esoteric Interpretation of the Law (Kitāb ta’wīl al-sharī‘a) is 
mentioned by name. 
640 See, De Smet 1995, pp. 14-6 for a classification of al-Kirmānī’s works according to this tripartition, 
and Walker 1999, pp. 25-46 for a general discussion of the chronology and contents of his works.  
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Sunni and Shii sectarian groups, the dual observance of actions and knowledge, the 
imamate, and an attempt at reconciliation between the doctrinal differences of the 
preceding dā‘īs. The second consists of epistles on what al-Kirmānī calls the divine 
sciences (al-‘ulūm al-ilāhiyya), including epistles treating the eternity of time and 
creation by divine commandment (amr), which, according to al-Kirmānī, prepare the 
student for understanding the present work like “heat prepares the wax to receive an 
imprint.” The third group includes only a single lost epistle that apparently discussed 
the afterlife.641 
While this latter part of his curriculum does not show any clear-cut idea of 
progression from lower to higher knowledge, there is something of an ascent from 
general Ismaili lore to knowledge about theology and the afterlife. All these works for 
al-Kirmānī, however, lead to his main work, Rest of the Intellect, which is his 
properly philosophical treatise, dealing with the highest order of esoteric knowledge 
about spiritual and religious reality.  
For the Brethren of Purity the necessity of pre-philosophical instruction is 
similarly connected to the distinction between exoteric and esoteric knowledge. As we 
have seen, for them pre-philosophical knowledge consists of two levels. The first 
preparatory (riyāΕiyya) or humanistic (ādāb) sciences span from basic skills of 
reading and writing, through grammar, poetry, and trading crafts, to biographies 
(siyar) and history. As for al-Kirmānī, the religious-normative sciences span from 
exoteric revelation (tanzīl) through religious law to an allegorical interpretation of 
religion (ta’wīl). In the Brethren’s syncretistic vision such things as interpretation of 
dreams and Sufism are also included within the religious education. As for al-
Kirmānī, the pre-philosophical education is not strictly exoteric then, but includes the 
introduction to understanding the esoteric meanings and allegorical interpretation of 
the exoteric religion.642 
The Peripatetics do not lay similar emphasis on a pre-philosophical religious 
education. While Peripatetic philosophers also adopt a similar distinction between 
religious and philosophical knowledge, at least for al-Fārābī religious knowledge 
seems to represent the path of the common believer incapable of grasping the 
intelligible truth, rather than the first step of knowledge for everyone. 
Religious sciences do have a prominent role in the education of the general 
populace, however. In Enumeration of Sciences al-Fārābī treats Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh) and dialectical theology (kalām) as outcrops of political philosophy, and hence 
as the last, rather than first, part of his classification of sciences.643 Both assume their 
legitimacy within the philosophical curriculum due to their political function, rather 
than form a stepping stone to higher esoteric meanings, as they do for al-Kirmānī and 
                                                 
641 Al-Kirmānī’s list of his own works include 1) The Exhortation to the Guiders and the Guided (Kitāb 
tanbīh al-hādī wa-´l-mustahdī), Book on the Hallmarks of Religion (Kitāb ma‘ālim al-dīn), Book of 
Lights on the Demonstration of the Imamate (Kitāb al-maΙābīΗ fī ithbāt al-imāma), and Book of 
Meadows (Kitāb al-riyāΕ), 2) a group of theological treatises, including The Penetrating Treatise (al-
Risāla al-muΕī’a), The Treatise of the Garden (Risālat al-rawΕa), The Treatise of the Catalogue 
(Risālat al-fihrist), and other unnamed epistles, and 3) the epistle The Matchless Treatise on the 
Hereafter (al-WaΗīda fī al-ma‘ād). For these and other works by al-Kirmānī, see Walker 1999, pp. 
25ff. and Daftary 2004, pp. 124ff. 
642 Like al-Kirmānī, the Brethren do not mention exoteric interpretation of revelation (tafsīr) among the 
religious sciences, thus giving further credence to their ultimately Ismaili view of the sciences. 
643 Al-Fārābī, IΗΙā’, pp. 107-113. 
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the Brethren of Purity. Jurisprudence for al-Fārābī has the function of expanding 
religion with regard to both its theoretical and practical parts, that is, the religious 
dogma and required actions, by deducing further principles and ordinances from the 
basis found by the philosopher-prophet. Theology, on the other hand, is devoted to a 
dialectical defense of religion.644 
For al-Fārābī religious revelation and the related Islamic sciences in effect 
represent a rhetorical-persuasive interpretation of theoretical philosophy, and are 
hence wholly derivative. Religion is in essence an “imitation of philosophy.”645 In 
Book of Religion he accordingly says explicitly that the religion consisting of 
rhetorical images of philosophy is not meant for the philosophers, as they can grasp 
the philosophical truth directly by demonstrative means. 646  In Attainment of 
Happiness he further states that the persuasive and imaginary methods of instruction 
should be employed only for the general populace (‘āmma/jumhūr), whereas the elect 
(khāΙΙa) ought to be instructed by demonstrative means producing certain intelligible 
knowledge.647 
But while the philosopher does not acquire his knowledge about reality through 
religious symbols, religious education still might play some role in the philosopher’s 
primary rhetorical education. In the context of the Platonic education of the future 
philosopher-king, al-Fārābī insists that the prince should be instructed in theoretical 
matters first by rhetorical means (bi-´l-Λuruq al-iqnā‘iyya) and symbolic images (bi-
Λarīq al-takhyīl), until he becomes aware of the ultimate non-bodily principles (al-
mabādi’ al-quΙwā/al-mabādi’ allatī laysat hiya jismāniyya) behind them. 648 
Moreover, he counts among the pre-requisites of an aspiring philosopher that he hold 
fast to the opinions and actions prescribed by the religion of his upbringing.649 
If all people equally then receive religious education in their youth, some, that is, 
those who fulfill the prerequisites of a philosopher, might ascend from the religious-
rhetorical to philosophical-demonstrative knowledge. In the context of the virtuous 
city, the common populace should be restricted to sense images, according to al-
Fārābī, but at times some intellectually capable ones may be elevated to the 
intelligible truth behind them, if the rhetorical religious dogma fails to convince 
them.650 
In the actual living practice of the Islamic world, any philosopher’s elementary 
education would of course have consisted of religious instruction. Al-Fārābī is 
reported by the biographical tradition to have been a qāΕī as a young man, before 
abandoning the path of a religious scholar to pursue philosophical knowledge.651 
                                                 
644 For similar descriptions of the nature of fiqh and kalām, see also, Kitāb al-Ηurūf, pp. 131-3. 
645  “al-milla muḥākiya li-´l-falsafa.” Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 185. Al-Fārābī treats the theme of the 
relationship between philosophy and religion in a similar vein in numerous works, and it is clearly the 
central focus of his political philosophy. See, e.g., Kitāb al-Ηurūf, pp. 131-3, 153-7; Kitāb al-milla, pp. 
46ff.; al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, pp. 85-6. 
646 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, p. 47. 
647 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 181. 
648 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 167. 
649 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 192. 
650 Al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya, pp. 104-5. 
651 Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘Uyūn al-anbā’, p. 557. 
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Ibn Sīnā depicts the first stages of his personal intellectual upbringing in Bukhārā 
in his autobiography.652 The first stage of his pre-philosophical education consisted of 
studying the Quran and general humanistic literature (adab) under the guidance of a 
private teacher, which he claims to have finished by the age of ten. After that he 
studied Islamic law (fiqh), and became familiar with the techniques of argumentation 
involved within that discipline. These rather meager studies are the extent of the 
religious education that he mentions to have gone through, omitting completely such 
major Islamic sciences as Quranic exegesis or Prophetic tradition. Finally, his pre-
philosophical studies include rudimentary mathematics, the “Indian calculus” (Ηisāb 
al-hind) taught to him by a vegetable seller.653 The actual mathematical studies based 
on the established Greek authorities would follow later incorporated to his 
philosophical studies. 
Gutas again emphasizes the schematic nature of the account that Ibn Sīnā provides 
about his intellectual upbringing. The account seems to focus on the role of his 
elementary education as preparatory for philosophy, excluding sciences normally 
included in the religious education, such as Ηadīth, which are not appropriate for that 
purpose. In particular, Ibn Sīnā clearly introduces Islamic jurisprudence in the context 
of the dialectical skills of argumentation that it develops in him, thus preparing him 
for philosophical logic as the first stage of the properly philosophical studies.654 
Even for the Peripatetic philosophers then, religious education, however minimal, 
has some role in preparing the student for theoretical philosophy, besides the 
important role it plays in moral education. But besides the religious sciences, 
Peripatetic philosophers also elevate some of the more secular Arabic sciences to a 
propaedeutic role within the philosopher’s primary education. 
As we saw, Ibn Sīnā passingly mentions his general Arabic humanistic studies 
(adab) in his autobiography. Al-Fārābī seems to require some level of historical 
knowledge also. Besides the knowledge of more philosophical nature, the citizens of 
the virtuous city are required to study the history of the virtuous and vicious kings and 
leaders of past and present.655 Such anecdotal historical studies would presumably fall 
within the preliminary part within the education towards virtuous citizenship, just as 
history (al-siyar wa-´l-akhbār) is included in the preparatory sciences of the Brethren 
of Purity. 
                                                 
652 Ibn Sīnā, Sīra, pp. 18ff. 
653 The “Indian calculus” as part of elementary education would probably consist mainly of the basic 
arithmetical operations still learned by the student during his first years of education. In his 
classification of philosophy, Ibn Sīnā lists addition (jam‘) and subtraction (tafrīq) according to the 
“Indian style” (bi-´l-hindī) as one of the applied (far‘ī) parts of theoretical arithmetic. The term was 
common in the titles of Arabic text books of calculus, and is related to the adoption of the decimal 
system from the Indians. The Arabic-Indian numbers were not the only system of notation employed in 
the Arabic-Persian world, however, as is apparent from al-Khwārizmī’s treatment of the subject, but 
the Arabic alphabet in particular was also employed for the purposes of counting. Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām, p. 
112; Hein 1985, p. 205; Bosworth 1963, p. 109. 
654 Gutas 1988, pp. 154-7. Hence, for Gutas, the omission of other sciences, such as Ηadīth or tafsīr, 
does not mean that he did not study them, but merely that they have no place within the scheme he 
wants to present. It is, however, interesting to see that their omission is also consonant with the Ismaili 
leanings of his family. As we have seen, neither of these is included in al-Kirmānī’s religious education 
either. 
655 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, p. 45. 
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More importantly, al-Fārābī quite explicitly gives linguistics (‘ilm al-lisān) a 
central role in pre-philosophical propaedeutics. He devotes the whole first part of his 
Enumeration of Sciences to linguistics and its subdivisions, as the only non-
philosophical science included within the curriculum, besides the dialectical sciences 
related to political philosophy. For al-Fārābī the linguistic sciences are further divided 
into seven sub-branches, roughly falling into the modern subjects of lexicography, 
grammar, and poetics.656 Linguistics forms the very first science in the ascending 
ladder of knowledge which the work in effect constitutes, and hence functions as an 
introduction to the philosophical sciences that follow.657 Besides the brief summary he 
provides of the linguistic sciences in this work, al-Fārābī also makes an original 
contribution to the subject in his Book of letters.658 
The idea of the grammatical science as propaedeutic to philosophy is in fact in 
complete harmony with the Alexandrian view of sciences. For Plato, study of 
grammar, along with rhetoric, is also a sort of preliminary practice (pregumnasma) for 
philosophy.659 In an Alexandrian biography of Aristotle his elementary education is 
said to consist of poetry, grammar, and rhetoric.660 
For al-Fārābī, however, linguistics, and the grammatical science (‘ilm al-naΗw) in 
particular, functions more than anything as a preparation for logical reasoning. There 
is an obvious parallel between grammar and philosophical logic, and the relation 
between the two was a subject of discussion in al-Fārābī’s time, the former 
representing an indigenous and the latter a foreign science.661 For al-Fārābī, grammar 
is concerned with the rules of correct usage within a single language, whereas the 
latter is concerned with correct intellection (bi-Ιawāb mā yu‘qal), the subject of the 
first being words and expressions, and that of the latter intelligibles. Hence, logic is a 
kind of universal grammar common to the human intellect in general. 
Due to this relation, for al-Fārābī grammar is useful for the purpose of learning 
logic so that the student is aroused towards the first more universal principles of that 
science. Hence, sufficient linguistic studies should precede logic within the 
curriculum of the student of philosophy. Al-Fārābī is also highly conscious of the 
classical origin of this pedagogical program, as he states the ancients to have 
employed grammar as an introduction to logic.662 Al-Fārābī himself devised some 
pre-logical treatises making use of linguistics to introduce logical ideas, such as his 
elementary introduction to logic identifying grammatical with logical terms.663 
                                                 
656 Poetics as a part of linguistics, or the “science of the poetic rules” (‘ilm qawānīn al-ash‘ār), 
discusses things such as meters, rhymes, or poetic expressions, and is thus distinct from poetics as a 
part of the logical Organon. 
657 For the consistent ordering of the work in this sense, see also, Lomba Fuentes 1969. 
658 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ηurūf, pp. 134-41, 162ff. 
659 Hein 1985, pp. 170-1. The importance of rhetorical studies as propaideia to philosophy, with its link 
to the study of classical literature, was never embraced by Arabic philosophy, in contrast to the Latin 
world. See, Watt 1995. 
660 Gutas 1988, pp. 196-7. 
661 See, e.g., Mahdi 1970, for the famous debate on the merits of logic and grammar, carried out 
between the Baghdad Peripatetic Abū Bishr Mattā (d. 940), al-Fārābī’s teacher, and the jurist-
theologian Abū Sa‘īd al-Sīrāfī (d. 979). 
662 Al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, pp. 23, 25-6.  
663 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl tashtamil ‘alā jamī‘ mā yuΕΛarr ilā ma‘rifatihi man arāda al-shurū‘ fī Ιinā‘at al-
manΛiq. Al-Fārābī’s pupil and future head of the Baghdad Peripatetic school also predisposes study of 
grammar and rhetoric in the education of the philosopher. 
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In sum, for the Peripatetics, a major function of pre-philosophical theoretical 
education may be seen as preparation for demonstrative reasoning. Even religious 
education to some extent fulfills this role. For the mystically and religiously inclined 
Ibn Sīnā, studying of the Quran, and religion in general, undoubtedly also has a purely 
spiritual function in raising the attention of the pupil from material to spiritual reality, 
similar to the one it has for al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity. As we have seen, 
religion also plays a central role in moral education, to which the study of biographies 
and history may also be related, insofar as they contain edifying stories of virtuous 
individuals.664 However, in his autobiography, Ibn Sīnā clearly attaches his studies of 
jurisprudence as a science to the development of dialectical pre-philosophical 
reasoning. 
For al-Fārābī, religion in general embodies rhetorical and dialectical 
argumentation, and insofar as religious education for him has a role in philosophical 
education, it may lead the philosopher towards the higher order of purely deductive 
reasoning. Besides religious studies, grammar and poetics both operate as an 
introduction to syllogistic logic. 
In another way, for both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā the primary religious education, 
combined with the adab, may be seen as analogous with the primary studies of 
rhetoric and literature in the classical world.665 For Peripatetic philosophers, however, 
the rhetorical and intelligible phases of the studies are linked in a more substantial 
way. Religious opinions are symbolic images of the intelligible philosophical truth, 
and hence provide a first step for the soul desiring to ascend upwards towards a purely 
spiritual-intelligible state of being. 
7.7 Philosophical introductions and the beginning of philosophy 
Pre-philosophical knowledge then plays at least two different roles in the theoretical 
ascent of the philosopher. For al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity exoteric religious 
knowledge represents the lower grade of knowledge connected to the sensible sphere 
of being. Hence, it is the initial point of departure for the soul in its sensible state. For 
Peripatetic philosophers some of the Arabic-Islamic sciences play primarily a role in 
the logical habituation of the student in preparation for purely demonstrative 
reasoning. 
For both, however, it is ultimately through philosophical knowledge that the 
rational soul may ascend to a purely spiritual-intelligible state of being, as it is only 
philosophy that provides knowledge of the intelligible nature of ultimate reality. But 
what is the starting point of the actual philosophical studies? A natural starting point 
for the philosophical student consists of an introduction to philosophy, which explains 
to him the nature, purpose, and parts of the philosophical road upon which he is about 
to embark. 
As we have seen, in classical times the division of philosophical sciences had 
developed into a curricular order, much of which was transmitted to the Arabs in one 
                                                 
664 Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī associates study of ethical works together with reading of biographies and books of 
conduct. Griffith 2006, p. 301. 
665 The idea that the classical propadeutics to philosophy, consisting of rhetorical studies related to the 
classical Greek and Latin literature, is in al-Fārābī replaced by the ‘Islamic classics,’ is also suggested 
by Watt 1995, pp. 74-5. 
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form or another. In the Alexandrian school tradition, the curriculum included a genre 
of topical introductions to the study of philosophy, which preceded the actual 
philosophical works. Such introductions normally treated a number of questions in a 
fixed order, giving the student the necessary framework for understanding the nature 
and purpose of his philosophical studies. The influence of these introductions filtered 
down to Arabic philosophy, both as near verbatim paraphrases and as more free 
adaptations of the themes treated in them. 
Of the two major variants of Alexandrian introductions, the first was a general 
introduction to philosophy (prolegomena pros pāsan filosofian), which introduced the 
student to the nature of philosophy through treating a set of “pre-philosophical” 
questions. These included standard themes like the possibility of philosophical 
knowledge (ei estin filosofia), that is, a refutation of skeptical arguments, and the 
definitions, classification, and purpose of philosophy.666 
The questions related to the purpose and division of philosophy are treated by the 
Brethren of Purity very briefly in the beginning of their very first epistle, in giving the 
definition of philosophy and the division of its parts, while further on they give a set 
of nine further questions that the student should ponder before studying philosophy.667 
Ibn Sīnā, similarly, treats parallel themes in the introductions to his major works, as 
well as in his classificatory essay which begins with the definition of philosophy, and 
then proceeds to offer a detailed classification of sciences.668 
The other variant of Alexandrian introductions was an introduction to Aristotelian 
philosophy (prolegomena pros tēn Aristotelikēn filosofian) that consisted of ten points 
treating both questions specific to the Aristotelian corpus, and questions related to the 
nature of philosophical studies in general.669 The first include themes such as the 
distinct classes of Aristotle’s works, the kind of language employed in each, and 
Aristotle’s using of deliberate “obscurity” (asafeia/ighmāΕ) in his writing. The more 
general points include such questions as the nature and goal of the philosophical path, 
and the qualities required of the teacher and student of philosophy. 
Many of these questions also infiltrated Arabic philosophical works in varying 
contexts. In addition, al-Fārābī, provides an almost verbatim paraphrase of such an 
introduction with the title What must precede the study of Aristotle’s philosophy (Mā 
yanbaghī an yuqaddam qabla ta‘allum falsafat ArisΛū), reproducing nine of the ten 
standard points.670 While al-Kirmānī’s introduction to his Rest of the Intellect is more 
independent of the Alexandrian model, it also has the same purpose. In particular, it 
deals with the ultimate purpose (gharaΕ) of Ismaili philosophy, the benefit (manfa‘a) 
that the reader derives from it, as well as the proper order of the Ismaili studies.671 
                                                 
666 Hein 1985, pp. 33ff. 
667 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (1), pp. 48-9; III (40), p. 345. 
668 See, e.g., Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām; Najāt. 
669 Hein 1985, pp. 238ff. 
670 Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī an yuqaddam. See, Hein 1985, p. 254 for the ten points included in the 
Alexandrian introductions. Besides al-Fārābī, a reproduction of the ten-point introduction to Aristotle 
has been preserved in Arabic form in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s (d. 1043) introduction to Categories. Like al-
Fārābī, Ibn al-Ṭayyib is attached to the Baghdad Peripatetic school, thus further attesting to their 
Alexandrian affiliations. 
671 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, pp. 99ff.; De Smet 1995, pp. 18-22. De Smet sees that al-Kirmānī’s introduction 
follows the classical model of philosophical introduction, but the connection between the two seems 
slight at best. 
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The very beginning of philosophical studies for the student would then constitute 
of such an introduction to philosophy, through which he would come to understand 
the necessary qualities of a philosopher, the nature of philosophy and the interrelation 
of its parts, as well as the purpose for which philosophy is practiced. This final 
purpose is of course the ultimate happiness towards which the student strives through 
the theory and practice of philosophy. Only after understanding the ultimate goal of 
his philosophical education, may the student proceed to the philosophical works 
which finally form the way of ascent for the soul. 
The third of the ten standard questions treated in the Alexandrian introductions to 
Aristotelian philosophy was that of the starting point of philosophy. Al-Fārābī’s 
introduction also reproduces this debate, giving various alternatives professed by 
distinct schools of philosophy.672 However, even the Alexandrian introductions were 
not unanimous about the correct starting point, but vacillated between four major 
alternatives: ethics, physics, logic, and mathematics.673 
Al-Fārābī’s treatise presents all four positions, each related to a specific 
philosophical school, and supported with arguments. The priority of ethics is 
supported by the necessity of the soul’s purity before acquiring intelligible 
knowledge, whereas the priority of physics is supported by the initial familiarity 
(a‘raf/aqrab) of its subject matter to man, as it treats the objects of the sensible world 
related to immediate experience. Logic and geometry are both supported by the 
indispensability of formal reasoning for understanding philosophy. Geometry is 
placed before logic by the Platonists, according to al-Fārābī, because of the superior 
certainty of its demonstrations.674 
While, al-Fārābī finally concludes that none of the four alternatives is to be 
discarded, he ends up arranging them in the sequence of ethics, geometry, and logic. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the ethics that al-Fārābī refers to here is not 
necessarily philosophical ethics, but rather practical religious morality. In relation to 
the beginning of theoretical philosophy, al-Fārābī states that the student should first 
learn enough of mathematics to understand the nature of geometrical demonstrations, 
and then proceed to logic. 
All four of the alternative starting points of the theoretical ascent in some way find 
proponents within Arabic philosophy. For all Arabic philosophers pre-philosophical 
ethical instruction is necessary in the sense described in the previous chapter, 
although, in contrast to the Alexandrian Neoplatonists, Arabic philosophers place 
philosophical ethics at the end of the philosophical curriculum. Both al-Fārābī and Ibn 
Sīnā, however, tilt towards accepting logic as the indispensable starting point, but 
consider it more as a tool of philosophy than part of philosophy itself. 
The position of mathematics within the theoretical ascent is the one that causes 
most disagreement. The Brethren of Purity emphatically place it as the starting point 
                                                 
672 Al-Fārābī, Mā yanbaghī, pp. 11-2.  
673 Hein 1985, p. 382. 
674 According to Hein (1985, p. 383), among the Alexandrian introductions to Aristotelian philosophy, 
al-Fārābī’s treatise comes closest to the opinions of the sixth-century Neoplatonist Elias in this 
particular question. Both cite a maxim supposedly written above the Platonic school (kutiba ‘alā bāb 
haykalihi): “He who does not know geometry, shall not enter here” (ageōmetrētos mēdeis eisitō/man 
lam yakun muhandisan fa-lā yadkhul ‘alaynā). Elias, however, believes Plato to have prioritized 
geometry over logic only because logic in the Aristotelian sense did not exist in his time. 
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of philosophical studies, al-Fārābī situates it after logic as the first properly 
philosophical discipline, and Ibn Sīnā considers it to be the middle science between 
physics and mathematics. Insofar as logic is considered merely an instrument of 
philosophy, for al-Fārābī the starting point of the ascent is properly mathematics, and 
for Ibn Sīnā physics. 
Finally, al-Kirmānī uses the argument of “familiarity” and “proximity” to endorse 
the beginning of knowledge in the sensibles, which within the classical philosophical 
terms would mean the primacy of physics. But for al-Kirmānī it rather refers to the 
exoteric religious knowledge, whereas he is interested in physics only as part of the 
emanationist account of creation. 
There is also an alternative starting point for the soul’s ascent in knowledge, which 
is not directly related to any philosophical discipline. This is the theme of self-
knowledge crystallized in the Delphic maxim discussed above. Among the Greek 
Neoplatonists, knowledge of the self was often emphasized to be the beginning of all 
knowledge, reflected in the appointment of Alcibiades as the first within the Platonic 
cycle of dialogues.675 
The necessity of self-knowledge for any true knowledge of the exterior world is 
emphasized by both Ibn Sīnā and the Brethren of Purity, but for both self-knowledge 
seems to form rather an integral part of the theoretical ascent, and hence to be more a 
process than a first step of philosophy. Nevertheless, al-Fārābī also presents 
Alcibiades as the first dialogue in his Philosophy of Plato, summarizing its contents as 
the exposition of the true nature of human happiness.676 
At least in this restricted sense, then, self-knowledge would seem to represent the 
necessary point of departure for the philosophical ascent. Namely, before embarking 
on philosophy the student must become aware that his true self consists of an 
immortal substance, whose ultimate happiness consists of its theoretical perfection, 
which is the final purpose of his philosophical studies. This knowledge is divulged to 
the student within the philosophical introductions, as well as in Ibn Sīnā’s little 
treatises on the soul. 
7.8 The beginning of philosophy: logic and mathematics 
While al-Fārābī in his prolegomena attempts to reconcile the various views, following 
a schematized order of presentation, he is more decisive on the question of the 
beginning of philosophy in his original works. When classifying philosophy al-Fārābī 
consistently places logic as the first part of philosophy, before mathematics. In 
Exhortation to the Way of Happiness he further explicitly states that logic is the first 
discipline from which the student should start. It is the instrument through which man 
learns to distinguish true from false opinions, and through it he can test his opinions 
on an objective measure, and gain certainty about their truthfulness. Hence, he states: 
“Preoccupation with this discipline must necessarily precede all others.”677 While men 
                                                 
675 Hence, Proclus (d. 485) states: “Let this, then, be the beginning of philosophy and of Plato’s 
teaching, the knowledge of ourselves.” Sorabji 2004, p. 321; Hein 1985, p. 114; Altmann 1969a, p. 31. 
676 Al-Fārābī, Falsafat AflāΛūn, p. 3. 
677 Al-Fārābī, Tanbīh, pp. 21-2. “yalzam ḍarūratan an takūn al-‘ināya bi-hādhihi al-ṣinā‘a tataqaddam 
al-‘ināya bi-´l-ṣanā’i‘ al-ukhar.” 
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are naturally disposed to reason, to gain a faculty of truly rational thought they must 
be taught the correct rules of reasoning. 
For al-Fārābī, logic is then the first art that man must learn in order to enhance his 
natural epistemological capabilities so that he is able to distinguish true from false 
opinions, and to gain certain knowledge. Only after learning the logical rules of 
reasoning, is the aspiring philosopher prepared to understand the nature of external 
reality through philosophical arguments. As an instrument of philosophy, logic is then 
necessary to those devoted to philosophical enquiry at all stages, whether in 
independent investigation (faΗΙ), instruction (ta‘līm), or study (ta‘allum) of 
philosophy.678 
Ibn Sīnā concurs with al-Fārābī in giving logic the priority as the first step of 
philosophy, with largely similar arguments. Ibn Sīnā, however, treats the logical 
discipline more consistently as a necessary instrument for the practice of philosophy, 
which in itself falls outside the principal parts of philosophy. 
The question about the status of logic as a part (meros) or instrument (organon) of 
philosophy was one also debated by the Alexandrian commentators. According to a 
general Alexandrian view, logic was held to be a part of philosophy by the Stoics, an 
instrument by the Peripatetics, and both by the Platonists.679 Al-Fārābī views logic as 
primarily an instrument (āla) of philosophy, but he does not set it clearly apart from 
the principal parts of philosophy. 
In Ibn Sīnā’s classification of philosophy, however, logic is treated separately 
outside the actual tri-division of philosophy into lower, middle, and higher 
knowledge. While the principal parts of theoretical philosophy are defined through the 
ascending degree of spirituality of their subject matter, and are thereby related to the 
rational soul’s gradual ascent, logic has no place in such a division. Rather, Ibn Sīnā 
treats logic at the very end of his classificatory essay as the instrument that enables 
man to acquire both the theoretical and practical wisdom (al-Ηikam al-naΝariyya wa-
´l-‘amaliyya) with which the primary parts of philosophy are concerned.680 In relation 
to the rational soul’s ascent, for neither, however, is logic part of the actual ascent, but 
an instrument that enables the theoretical ascent of the soul to take place. 
The logical Organon is of course not exclusively concerned with demonstrative 
reasoning. Arabic philosophers adopted the Aristotelian logical curriculum of Greek 
philosophical schools, including Porphyry’s Eisagōgē as its introduction, but 
complemented it by adding Rhetoric and Poetic to the Organon.681 Hence, of the eight 
works only one, Posterior Analytics, is strictly speaking concerned with the 
demonstrative method (apodeiksis/burhān), around which the remaining works are 
centered, according to al-Fārābī. 
The rest consist of preliminary works (tawΛī’āt) preceding demonstration, and of 
works dealing with non-demonstrative methods of argumentation, that is, dialectical 
(al-aqāwīl al-jadaliyya), sophistical (sūfisΛā’iyya), rhetorical (khuΛbiyya), and poetic 
(shi‘riyya) arguments. 682  For al-Fārābī rhetorical arguments endeavor to persuade 
                                                 
678 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 120-3; Tanbīh, pp. 21-5. 
679 Hein 1985, pp. 153-4. 
680 Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām, pp. 115-8. See also, Ishārāt, I, pp. 117ff. 
681 According to Gutas (2006, pp. 94-5) the supplemented version of the logical corpus goes back to the 
Greek Neoplatonists. 
682 Al-Fārābī, IΗΙā’, pp. 63ff. 
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(iqnā‘) the listener, whereas poetic arguments evoke symbolic images (khayālāt) in 
his mind. Hence, both have for al-Fārābī an important role in particular at the political 
level, since religion consists essentially of a rhetorical-symbolic image of the truth. 
Thus, as in the Graeco-Latin world, rhetoric also is at least in the restricted sense of a 
logical art introduced into the Arabic curriculum of philosophical education. 
The Brethren of Purity likewise treat logic as an instrument, the “balance of the 
philosopher” (mīzān al-faylasūf) which enables the student to distinguish truth from 
falsehood, as well as good from evil. The logical epistles are inserted at the end of the 
mathematical part of the work, but number only five instead of the entire Organon; 
the “non-demonstrative methods” are dropped altogether. 683  Besides their 
instrumental role, the Brethren, however, true to their style state the goals of some of 
these logical epistles in esoteric terms. Hence, the purpose of the epistle on Eisagōgē 
is not only to instruct on the difference between philosophical and linguistic discourse 
(kalām), but also to awaken the soul to understanding what the human essence 
consists of, and what brings it its perfection and eternity.684  
As the Greek philosophers were not in agreement about the starting point of 
philosophy, neither were the Arabic-Persian ones. The Brethren of Purity, following 
their Pythagorean inclinations, opt for beginning of philosophical studies with 
mathematics, which precedes logic among the four principal parts of philosophy.685 
Again the place of mathematics in relation to philosophy reflects a classical 
discussion of this theme. Whereas in the Alexandrian and Aristotelian classification of 
philosophy mathematics was placed as the middle science, reflecting the ontological 
status of its objects, in a scheme attributed to Plato mathematics was seen as 
propaedeutic (propaideia) to philosophy, and was not properly a part of philosophy at 
all.686 Hence, for Platonists mathematics is the elementary knowledge which prepares 
the student for philosophy proper. 
In Arabic philosophy, this Platonic view of mathematics as philosophical 
propaedeutics becomes manifest in particular in al-Kindī, for whom the student must 
first study mathematics, before he can proceed to the Aristotelian corpus, starting with 
logic. While mathematics is not properly part of philosophy for al-Kindī, only by first 
learning the mathematical sciences can the student of Aristotle come to understand the 
true substance of Aristotelian philosophy.687 
                                                 
683  The “blueprint” of the work (I.7.) lists the five parts of logic as poetics, rhetoric, dialectics, 
analytics, and sophistics, hence including all the non-demonstrative methods, besides the actual theory 
of demonstration. Their final arrangement of the epistles, however, completely diverges from this 
scheme, containing five logical epistles: Eisagōgē, Categories, De Interpretatione, First Analytics, and 
Second Analytics. 
684 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 129. 
685 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (7); Jāmi‘a, pp. 110-2. 
686 Hein 1985, pp. 170-8. 
687 Al-Kindī, Kammiyyat kutub, pp. 369-70. “For if someone was deficient in mathematics, that is, 
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, and he then devoted to these [Aristotelian sciences] all his 
life, he would never attain complete knowledge about them. His efforts in them would never bring 
about anything more than external transmission, insofar as he memorized them, but he would not gain 
knowledge about their essence” (fa-innahu in ‘adima aΗad ‘ilm al-riyāΕāt allatī hiya ‘ilm al-‘adad wa-
´l-handasa wa-´l-tanajjum wa-´l-ta’līf, thumma ista‘mala hādhihi dahrahu, lam yastatimm ma‘rifat al-
shay’ min hādhihi, wa-lam yakun sa‘yuhu fīhā muksibuhu shay’an illā al-riwāya, in kāna ΗāfiΝan, fa-
ammā ‘ilmuhā ‘alā kunhihā wa-taΗΙīluhu fa-laysa bi-mawjūd). 
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The Platonic idea of mathematics as propaedeutics is even transferred to Arabic 
terminology, where mathematics is most commonly conveyed with the term 
“preparatory exercise” (propaideia/riyāΕa) and its derivatives.688 For the Brethren of 
Purity this produces a confusion of terms, as in their classification of sciences they, on 
the one hand, speak of the preparatory sciences (al-‘ulūm al-riyāΕiyya), consisting of 
basic instruction spanning from reading and writing to history, and of the 
mathematical sciences (al-riyāΕiyyāt) as part of philosophy, on the other. 689 
Nevertheless, for the Brethren of Purity mathematics clearly has such a propaedeutic 
function in training the student towards understanding philosophical principles. 
Hence, the Brethren state the purpose of their very first epistle on arithmetic (‘ilm 
al-‘adad/aritmāΛīqī) as “training (riyāΕa) the students of philosophy, lovers of 
wisdom, reflectors of the true natures of things, and investigators of the causes of all 
existents.”690 The Brethren state that they have placed the mathematical sciences as 
first in the order of philosophical knowledge, so that the students would prepare and 
purify their souls through them, and hence be prepared for understanding the further 
physical and metaphysical truths.691 
For the Brethren of Purity the primacy of mathematics is, however, more than 
anything supported by their Pythagorean notion of the mathematical nature of all 
reality.692 The forms of numbers (Ιuwar al-‘adad) correspond to the forms of material 
existents (Ιuwar al-mawjūdāt fī al-hayūlā), and the numbers are the model 
(namūdhaj) of the higher world which the things of the lower world reflect. 
Throughout the epistles, the Brethren give analogies between the numbers of the 
decimal system and degrees of existents, such as the equivalence of the numbers from 
one to nine with the nine metaphysical hypostases. Since numbers then have an 
ontological priority, mathematical knowledge consequently must possess an 
epistemological priority. 
If the ultimate metaphysical reality is in some sense analogous with the nine root 
numbers, then knowledge of the number arouses man to realize the ultimate nature of 
reality, of which the sensible world is a reflection. Consequently, the Brethren depict 
mathematics, or rather arithmetic in particular as the science of number, by 
innumerable superlatives, such as the “root of sciences” (jadhr al-‘ulūm), “origin of 
wisdom” (‘unΙur al-Ηikma), “beginning of knowledge” (mabda’ al-ma‘ārif), “first 
elixir” (al-iksīr al-awwal), and “lamp of the philosophers” (miΙbāΗ al-mutafalsifīn). It 
                                                 
688 The Greek word mathēmatika was translated by two groups of terms into Arabic. Whereas the root 
word mathēma (that which is learned) produces ta‘līm (instruction), the term propaideia (preparatory 
teaching) translates into riyāΕa (exercise). Hence, al-Fārābī knows mathematics as ‘ilm al-ta‘ālīm (the 
science of instructions), al-Khwārizmī as al-‘ilm al-ta‘līmī wa-´l-riyāΕī (the science of instruction and 
exercise), etc. Hein (1985, pp. 178-81) suggests that initially the philosophers connected to the 
Alexandrian tradition, such as al-Fārābī, tend to employ the term ta‘līm, with its implication of 
mathematics as part of philosophy, whereas those professing a Platonic view of the status of 
mathematics, such as al-Kindī and the Brethren of Purity, employ the term riyāΕa. Later, however, the 
latter term becomes generalized, as in Ibn Sīnā who talks about the mathematical science as al-‘ilm al-
riyāΕī without holding a Platonic view about mathematics as propadeutics. 
689 Ikhwān, Rasā’il, I (7). As Hein (1985, pp. 170-1) notes, this is parallel with the way Plato employs 
the term mathēmata for both elementary instruction in general and mathematics in particular. 
690 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 18. “al-murād min hādhihi al-risāla riyāḍat al-muta‘allimīn li-´l-falsafa, al-
mu’thirīn li-´l-ḥikma, al-nāԘirīn fī ḥaqā’iq al-ashyā’, al-bāḥithīn ‘an ‘ilal al-mawjūdāt bi-asrihā.” 
691 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 138-9. 
692 For the Pythagorean influences in the Brethren, see, Netton 1982, pp. 9-16. 
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is the foundation (aΙl) from which all other branches of knowledge (furū‘) are 
derived.693 
Due to its ontological and epistemological primacy, mathematics has a crucial 
function for the ascent of the soul for the Brethren. Since numbers are a “model from 
the higher world” to which the forms of all existents correspond ontologically, 
through knowing them the philosophical initiate may rise gradually towards 
knowledge of other mathematical, physical (Λabī‘iyyāt), and supra-physical (mā fawqa 
al-Λabī‘iyyāt) things. Hence, the ultimate goal of arithmetic is for the soul of the 
philosophical student to be gradually guided from the sensible to intelligible sphere of 
being, and from the composed things of the corporeal world towards things separate 
from matter (mujarradāt). 
Thus, for the Brethren arithmetic initiates the soul’s ascent towards knowledge of 
the complete unity of divine being (ma‘rifat al-tawΗīd) and acknowledgement of the 
Creator.694 While for al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, logic as the beginning of philosophy is 
an instrument for acquisition of knowledge, and as such does not form part of the 
soul’s ontological ascent, for the Brethren of Purity mathematics is the indisputable 
beginning of that ascent. 
Mathematics is of course not composed of only arithmetic within medieval Arabic 
philosophy, but of the standard quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and 
music.695 For the Brethren of Purity the other mathematical disciplines play a similar 
role in instigating the rational soul towards ascent, although they are given less 
priority than arithmetic.696 
Both music and geometry provide knowledge about the harmonious structure of 
the world, in which each existent occupies its proper place, and understanding the 
harmonious relations prevailing in the cosmos will “guide the souls of the intelligent 
towards the mysteries and truths of the sciences, and their esoteric meanings and 
wisdoms.”697 Besides, the practical application of the musical theory plays a more 
practical purificatory role in the molding of the soul towards practical perfection.698 
Moreover, astronomy teaches man about the existence of a supralunar world of 
spheres. Mathematical knowledge on the whole teaches man that there is another kind 
of existence beyond the world of immediate sense experience, and thus arouses a 
desire in the soul to reach towards that higher form of existence. Astronomy (‘ilm al-
                                                 
693 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 18, 30. 
694 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 18, 93-4. 
695 The quadrivium probably goes back to the mathematician Nikomakhos of Gerasa (d. ca. 120 CE), 
who divides mathematics into parts according to their objects of enquiry. Arithmetic is concerned with 
absolute quantity (to peri tou kath’ heauto), music with relative quantity (to peri tou pros allo), 
geometry with the stabile and continuous (to men menon kai ēremoun), and astronomy with the moving 
and revolving (to de feromenon kai peripoloun sfairikē). See, Hein 1985, pp. 182ff. for the adaptation 
and variations of this division in Greek and Arabic philosophy. 
696 In their classification of philosophy (I.7.), the Brethren divide mathematics according to the standard 
Arabic order of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. In the actual arrangement of the epistles 
geography is, however, inexplicably introduced between astronomy and music as the fourth epistle. To 
further corroborate that this represents confusion in the later editing of the epistles, rather than an 
original plan, in the Comprehensive Epistle geography is moved after the quadrivium as the fifth 
epistle. 
697 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 103-4. “al-gharaḍ minhā wa-´l-maqṣūd bihā al-tahaddī li-nufūs al-‘uqalā’ ilā 
sarā’ir al-‘ulūm wa-ḥaqā’iqihā wa-bawāṭin al-ḥikam wa-ma‘ānīhā.” 
698 See, chapter 6.8 above. 
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nujūm), in particular, instigates the “soul illuminated by the light of wisdom” towards 
desiring to “ascend to the world of spheres, layers of heavens, and to reach the state of 
perfection.”699 While the practical purification of the soul, discussed in the previous 
chapter, liberates human soul from its worldly attachments and the anxieties caused 
by them, mathematical knowledge plays a similar role. Through coming to know the 
world of spheres, “death will appear trivial to the soul, and it starts to desire it, seeing 
it as a sweet thing that no longer causes fear in it. Then it is no longer saddened by its 
separation from this familiar world and its comforts, for it comes to know with 
certainty that the world that it will enter is greater and nobler in degree.”700 
Insofar as logic for al-Fārābī is only an instrument, as it is not concerned with 
knowledge of reality, but with the means towards its acquisition, for him also 
mathematics represents the beginning of the theoretical ascent. 701  Al-Fārābī’s 
arguments for the primacy of mathematics in philosophy, however, are more 
mundane, and he does not share the Pythagorean notions of the mathematical nature 
of ultimate reality. 
Al-Fārābī supports beginning the study of theoretical philosophy with 
mathematics by the abstract clarity of its objects of study. Hence, “the first genus of 
beings into which one should inquire is that which is easier for man and in which 
perplexity and mental confusion are less likely to occur. This is the genus of numbers 
and magnitudes.”702 This is of course the science of mathematics, within which the 
student ought to start from arithmetic as the science of numbers, and ascend therefrom 
to geometry as the science of volumes. 
Al-Fārābī does not strictly follow the classical quadrivium in his conception of 
mathematics, but introduces additional mathematical arts, all of which together form 
an ascending epistemological progression from pure abstraction towards a gradually 
increased degree of materiality.703 From the study of objects that can be conceived as 
completely abstract from matter, that is, the subject matter of arithmetic, the student 
should proceed in his reflection step by step among existents whose conception 
(taΙawwur) requires a gradually ascending degree of materiality. Then he will reach 
objects in which “numbers and magnitudes are inherent essentially,” but which 
require “slight reference to matter” in their conception.704 All of this produces a ladder 
                                                 
699 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 96. ”tashwīq al-nufūs…al-mustaḍī’a bi-nūr al-ḥikma…ilā al-ṣu‘ūd ilā ‘ālam al-
aflāk, wa-aṭbāq al-samāwāt, wa-´l-wuṣūl ilā darajat al-kamāl.” 
700 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 96. “li-yahūn ‘alayhā al-mawt, wa-tatamannāhu, wa-yakūn rayḥāna lahā wa-lā 
takhāf minhu, wa-lā taḥzun ‘alā mufāraqat ma’lūf al-dunyā wa-na‘īmihā, wa-mulkihā, wa-´l-ta‘lam wa-
tastayqin anna alladhī taṣil ilayhi, taqdim ‘alayhi a‘Ԙam jalāla lahā wa-akbar manzila.” 
701 The theoretical part of Attainment of Happiness, in contrast to Enumeration of Sciences, in fact 
begins with mathematics, omitting logic altogether. 
702 “fa-awwal ajnās al-mawjūdāt allatī yunԘar fīhā mā kāna as’hal ‘alā al-insān, wa-aḥrā an lā taqa‘ fīhi 
ḥayra wa-iḍṭirāb al-dhihn, wa-huwa al-a‘dād wa-´l-a‘Ԙām.” Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 129 [translation by 
Mahdi 1962, p. 18]. 
703 In fact, al-Fārābī does divide mathematics according to the quadrivium in a few works, such as the 
De ortu scientarum surviving only in Latin. In his two major works exposing the order of philosophy, 
Enumeration of Sciences and Attainment of Happiness, in which the division of sciences is more clearly 
attached to the soul’s ascent, al-Fārābī presents a seven-fold division of mathematics. 
704 “In this way one begins with things that may be comprehended and conceived irrespective of any 
material. He then proceeds to things that can be comprehended, conceived, and intellected by only 
slight reference to a material. Next, the things that can only be comprehended, conceived, and 
intellected with slightly more reference to a material. He continues thus toward the things wherein 
number and magnitude inhere, yet that which can be intellected in them does not become intelligible 
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of mathematical sciences, ascending from the pure abstraction of arithmetic and 
geometry to their applications in optics (‘ilm al-manāΝir), astronomy (al-ajsām al-
samāwiyya), music (mūsīqā), study of weights (‘ilm al-athqāl), and mechanics (‘ilm 
al-Ηiyal).705 
For al-Fārābī mathematics seems to have a similar propaedeutic function in 
philosophical instruction as for the Brethren of Purity, excepting the Pythagorean 
tendencies. Knowledge of mathematics does not appear to be an end in itself, but is 
bound to the epistemological progression preparing the student for other kinds of 
philosophical knowledge. In al-Fārābī’s case, the mathematical sciences are 
specifically a preparation for physics, through an ascent from pure abstraction towards 
greater degree of materiality. The borderline between the mathematical and physical 
sciences is slightly fluid, but at the end of his mathematical ascent the student will 
enter a new genus of existents that cannot be conceived at all without reference to 
matter. Hence, the progression of mathematics gradually elevates him towards a 
conception of the existents of the natural world, and the physical principles (al-
mabādi’ al-Λabī‘iyya) that are necessary to understand them.706 
The kind of mathematics with which either al-Fārābī or the Brethren of Purity are 
concerned is a theoretical one that prepares the student towards understanding higher 
philosophical truths. The more practical branches of mathematics in which scholars of 
the medieval Islamic world made great progress, such as algebra, do not form part of 
the philosophical curriculum for either of them.707 
As we have seen, both al-Fārābī and the Brethren of Purity go against the standard 
Alexandrian order of sciences, which was adopted by most Arabic philosophers from 
al-Kindī to Ibn Sīnā, where mathematics forms the middle knowledge between 
physics and metaphysics. While for the Brethren of Purity this is supported by the 
ontological priority of the mathematicals, it is not immediately clear how this 
combines with the idea of the soul’s gradual ascent for al-Fārābī. Still, al-Fārābī 
                                                                                                                                            
except by progressively greater reference to the material. This will lead him to the heavenly bodies, 
then music, then the study of weights and mechanics, where he is forced to deal with things that 
become intelligible only with difficulty, or that cannot exist, except when they are in materials” (fa-
yakūn qad ibtada’ mimmā qad yufham wa-yutaΙawwar bi-lā mādda aΙlan. thumma ilā mā min sha’nihi 
an yuΗtāj fī tafahhumihi wa-taΙawwurihi ilā mādda mā Ηāja yasīra jiddan, thumma ilā mā al-Ηāja fī 
tafahhumihi wa-taΙawwurihi wa-fī an yu‘qal ilā mādda mā Ηāja azyad qalīlan. thumma lā yazāl 
yartaqī fīmā talΗaquhu al-a‘dād wa-´l-a‘Νām ilā mā yaΗtāj fī an yaΙīr mā yu‘qal minhu, muΗtājan fī an 
yaΙīr ma‘qūlan, ilā al-mādda akthar, ilā an yaΙīr ilā al-ajsām al-samāwiyya, thumma ilā al-mūsīqā, 
thumma ilā al-athqāl wa-‘ulūm al-Ηiyal. fa-yuΕΛarr Ηīna’idhin ilā isti‘māl al-ashyā’ allatī ya‘sur an 
taΙīr ma‘qūla idh lā yumkin an tūjad illā fī mawādd). Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 132-3 [Mahdi 1962, pp. 19-
20]. 
705 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 132; FuΙūl muntaza‘a, p. 96. All three of the sciences added by al-Fārābī to the 
quadrivium are counted by Ibn Sīnā (Aqsām, p. 112) among the “applied” (far‘iyya) sciences of 
geometry. The seven-part division is not carved into stone, however, as al-Fārābī suggests that to optics 
may be added further sciences derived from arithmetic and geometry, such as the science of moving 
bodies (al-a‘Νām/ukar al-mutaΗarrika). 
706 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 133-4. In al-Fārābī’s terminology, the distinction between mathematics and 
physics is in the number of “principles of existence” in each. While physical objects possess all four of 
the of principles of existence, roughly equivalent to the four Aristotelian causes, mathematical objects 
only have three, lacking a material one. Hence, ascent from mathematics to physics is equivalent to 
ascent from immateriality to materiality. 
707  Ibn Sīnā (Aqsām, p. 112) considers algebra (al-jabar wa-´l-muqābala) an applied branch of 
arithmetic. 
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depicts the progress of philosophical knowledge, in Attainment of Happiness in 
particular, as one of continuous ascent (irtiqā’), first from the purely abstract 
mathematical entities to physical existents, and then from physical to metaphysical 
ones. Each leap to a new science, or to a new class of existents, follows organically 
from the previous one, so that, for example, ascent within the mathematical entities 
eventually forces the student to insert a new principle that leads him to the class of 
physical existents. 
Al-Fārābī’s preferred ladder of sciences does not constitute, then, as clearly an 
ascent from the material-sensible to the spiritual-intelligible sphere of existence, as it 
does in the case of Ibn Sīnā. However, when mathematics is understood as 
propaedeutic to the two major philosophical sciences dealing with the external reality, 
it performs the function of preparing the student with its abstract concepts towards the 
properly philosophical ascent taking place within physics and metaphysics. 
In sum, from the perspective of the soul’s ascent towards ultimate happiness, both 
logic and mathematics are indispensable for the theoretical ascent of the soul. Logic is 
an instrument of philosophy, without which philosophical knowledge is impossible. 
Mathematics has either a preparatory, as in the case of al-Fārābī and the Brethren of 
Purity, or intermediary role, as in the case of Ibn Sīnā, in the progression of 
theoretical knowledge. 
When philosophy is viewed as a spiritual progression towards happiness, neither 
logical nor mathematical knowledge, however, constitutes an end in itself. The items 
of knowledge listed by Arabic philosophers as necessary for attainment of happiness 
consist of knowledge related to the spheres of physics, metaphysics, and practical 
philosophy, whereas none of the philosophers insists on logical or mathematical 
knowledge. Hence, it is physics and metaphysics that form the two primary parts of 
medieval Arabic philosophy, at least from the perspective of the theoretical ascent of 
the soul. 
7.9 The core of philosophy: physics and metaphysics 
For the Brethren of Purity and al-Fārābī then mathematical knowledge as the 
beginning of philosophy points the way towards the next stage within the ascent of 
knowledge: physical knowledge about the material world. According to the Brethren 
of Purity, after a student “has prepared and purified his soul through the mathematical 
sciences, and persisted in studying them, the sage ought to guide him towards the 
further sciences, until he is brought to the end of learning.”708 
For the Brethren the physical knowledge to which the student is prepared to 
ascend after this preparatory mathematical education already exists potentially in 
some sense in the mathematical learning now mastered by the student, which is the 
reason why philosophers set it at the head of the philosophical curriculum in the first 
place. After understanding “their meanings and mysteries other sciences appear to 
them, and come to exist in their souls potentially, so that when they confront them, 
                                                 
708  Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 138. “fa-man irtāḍa bi-´l-‘ulūm al-riyāḍiyya al-ta‘līmiyya wa-tahadhdhabat 
nafsuhu bihā, wa-dāwama ‘alā qirā’atihā, wajaba li-´l-ḥakīm an yunqilahu ilā ghayrihā, wa-lā yazāl 
ḥattā yublighuhu ilā nihayat mā ta‘allamahu.” 
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they learn and accept them swiftly.” 709  Through proceeding into the science of 
physics, the student will then actualize that potential, and the ascent from one step of 
knowledge to the next appears seamless. Similarly for al-Fārābī, the progression 
within the mathematical sciences eventually leads to the science of physics, as the 
reflection of mathematical objects inevitably leads the student to ponder their 
manifestation in the natural world. 
For all Arabic philosophers physical knowledge forms the first step of knowledge 
about the external world, or what Ibn Sīnā, following the Alexandrian tradition, calls 
the “lower knowledge” (al-‘ilm al-asfal). It is the first object of knowledge, because it 
is concerned with the natural world of material bodies, which are already in some way 
familiar to man through sense perception, and which within the theoretical ascent 
correspond to the human soul’s initial sensible state.710 For al-Kirmānī physics is 
rather treated as one integral part of the Ismaili esoteric philosophy presented in Rest 
of the Intellect, and as such it is not placed in the beginning philosophy. 
In its treatment of natural philosophy Arabic philosophy follows a standard 
curriculum of Aristotelian physical works, treating first the general principles 
governing all corporeal beings, then the elements, and finally the sublunar world of 
generation and corruption. Even al-Kirmānī’s treatment and ordering of the physical 
part of his work is largely Aristotelian. The Arabic philosophical depiction of nature 
arises from the four elements gradually towards more complex bodily compositions, 
proceeding through minerals, plants, and animals. Finally it culminates in man as the 
crown of sublunar beings. In sum, it comprises within itself, besides the physics 
dealing with inanimate objects, both biology and psychology, that is, the treatment of 
ensouled bodies.711  
From the perspective of the theoretical ascent, what is relevant, however, is the 
relation of the knowledge about the natural world to human happiness. While for the 
philosophers the acquisition of intelligible knowledge in general contributes to 
happiness, in the case of physics, what appears to be required in particular, is first of 
all knowledge about the structure and generation of the material world. The physical 
curriculum follows the ascent of the creative process of the material world, and hence 
the student becomes aware of the hierarchical manner in which nature is arranged. 
For al-Fārābī, the student at this point should reflect on bodies and their qualities, 
starting from simple bodies, that is, heavenly bodies and the four elements, and 
proceed from there to the composed bodies of stones, minerals, plants, animals, and 
                                                 
709 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 138. “wa-‘arafū ma‘āniyahā wa-waqafū ‘alā asrārihā, lāḥat lahum al-‘ulūm wa-
ṣārat fī nufūsihim bi-´l-quwwa, wa-idhā jā’athum ‘arafūhā, wa-asra‘ū ilā qabūlihā.” 
710 Al-Fārābī (IΗΙā’, p. 91) defines physics (al-‘ilm al-Λabī‘ī) as investigation of natural bodies (al-
ajsām al-Λabī‘iyya) and their properties (a‘rāΕ). 
711 For Ibn Sīnā (Aqsām, pp. 108-10), the physical curriculum consists of eight parts: 1) principles 
common to all physical entities (Physics); 2) elements (On Heaven and On World); 3) generation, 
corruption, and transformation of bodily entities (On Generation and Corruption); 4) states of the four 
elements before mixing (Meteorology, I-III); 5) states of the generated beings (Meteorology, IV); 6) 
plants (On Plants); 7) animals (On Animals), and 8) the soul and its faculties (On Soul and On Sense 
and Sensibilia). The Epistles follow roughly the same order, although the 17 physical epistles include 
many additional titles, with varying degrees of relevance to the physical sciences. Al-Fārābī’s (IΗΙā’, 
pp. 96ff.) eight-point division is almost identical with that of Ibn Sīnā, except that he, like the Brethren 
of Purity, includes a separate part dealing with minerals, dropping instead human psychology (De 
anima) outside of physics.  
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man. Thus, he will gain knowledge about the totality of the corporeal world and its 
parts.712 As we have seen above in the lists of knowledge required for happiness, it is 
such understanding of the ultimate structure of existence, including the corporeal 
world, that all philosophers set as the primary requirement for happiness.713  The 
knowledge required is then universal knowledge about the intelligible order of the 
corporeal world, that is, the astral bodies, elements, and composed bodies, and the 
way they are arranged. Hence, al-Fārābī requires of the virtuous citizens knowledge 
about natural bodies (al-ajsām al-Λabī‘iyya), their generation and corruption, and the 
wisdom and justice that govern their being.714 
But besides its intrinsic importance for the soul’s ascent, physics also plays an 
intermediary role in leading the student towards other forms of knowledge that are 
directly relevant to the soul’s salvation. Namely, knowledge about the physical world 
leads to knowledge about man and his place in the universe. It is not sufficient to 
know that the world consists of certain parts, but knowledge about the principles and 
causes behind them is also required. In al-Fārābī’s Attainment of Happiness physical 
knowledge, like mathematics, forms a seamless progression from lower towards 
higher principles, until the student reaches a point at which purely physical principles 
are no longer sufficient.715 
Physics not only leads to metaphysics for al-Fārābī, but also to ethics and practical 
philosophy. The progression of physical knowledge culminates in knowledge about 
man, the rational soul, and man’s perfection, or the final cause of his existence. 
Hence, it teaches man “that the natural principles inherent in man and in (physical) 
instruction are not sufficient for man to reach the perfection for the sake of which he 
was brought into existence.”716 This is what Ibn Sīnā calls the “fruit of physics” 
(thamarat al-Λabī‘iyyāt), knowledge about the human soul’s eternity and afterlife.717 
While even such somber Peripatetic philosophers as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā 
perceive a Gnostic dimension in physical knowledge, for the esoterically oriented 
Brethren of Purity it is all the more apparent. Hence, the purpose of the physical 
epistles is to “train the souls and purify the spirits by learning the physical mysteries 
existing in living bodies and how the spiritual souls are united to earthly bodies. 
Through that knowledge man also learns the hidden mysteries that man needs to know 
in order to be liberated from the world of bodies.”718 
Similarly for the Brethren all the individual physical epistles point towards a 
deeper esoteric knowledge, in particular the functioning of the Universal Soul in 
nature. Sometimes the apparently physical treatises lead in surprising directions. 
Hence, the goal of the third physical epistle on generation and corruption (al-kawn 
wa-´l-fasād) is not only to instruct that the true cause of the change of the elements is 
                                                 
712 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 134-5. 
713 See, e.g., Ibn Sīnā, Ζāl al-nafs al-insāniyya, p. 135; Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 353. 
714 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, pp. 44-5; al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 276-8. 
715 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 134ff. 
716 “wa-ya‘lam anna al-mabādi’ al-ṭabī‘iyya allatī fī al-insān wa-fī al-ta‘līm ghayr kāfiya fī an yaṣīr al-
insān bihā ilā al-kamāl alladhī li-ajl bulūghihi kuwwina al-insān.” Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 137. 
717 Ibn Sīnā, Mabda’, p. 1. 
718 “idh kāna bi-ma‘rifatihā tartāḍ al-nufūs wa-tatahadhdhab al-arwāḥ, wa-´l-yaṭṭali‘ ‘alā al-asrār al-
ṭabī‘iyya al-mawjūda fī al-ajsām al-ḥayya wa-kayfa ittaḥadat bi-´l-ajsām al-arḍiyya wa-´l-nufūs al-
rūḥāniyya wa-rubiṭat bihā wa-bi-ma‘rifatihā yakūn al-iṭṭilā‘ ‘alā mā khafiya fīhā, wa-tustar bihā min 
asrār al-‘ulūm, allatī bi-ma‘rifatihā yakūn al-khalāṣ min ‘ālam al-ajsām.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 143. 
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one of the faculties of the Universal Soul, but also to lead towards knowledge about 
the leaders supported by divine emanation from the Universal Soul, and about the 
final leader who will bring the cycle of concealment to end.719 The treatise on the 
minerals, on the other hand, not only reveals that the minerals are the lowest of the 
manifestations of Nature as a faculty of the Universal Soul, but also instigates man 
towards the purificatory ascent. Namely through it he learns that minerals are the 
lowest point of departure for the ascent and purification of the particular souls which 
ends up in the world of spheres.720 
As for the Peripatetics, for the Brethren also physical knowledge more than 
anything else leads up to knowledge about the nature and place of man in the world, 
and hence the purpose of his existence within it. This purpose is accentuated by the 
insertion of such epistles as “Man is a microcosm” (al-insān ‘ālam Ιaghīr) within the 
physical part, which reveal the Brethren’s own peculiar view of man’s place and 
purpose within the cosmos, and emphasize the importance of self-knowledge in his 
quest for salvation. 
While the science of physics then holds both inherent and instrumental importance 
for man in his quest for ultimate happiness, it also guides the student towards the 
highest part of theoretical philosophy, metaphysics. Whereas physics in its reflection 
of the natural world forms an ascending ladder of knowledge towards gradually more 
perfect beings, at its summit the philosophical reflection must reach beyond the 
physical realm of being, where lie the ultimate causes of nature itself. As metaphysics 
is a science that deals with immaterial existents, the transition from physics to 
metaphysics represents ascent from the corporeal to the non-corporeal sphere of 
being. And since in the Neoplatonic hierarchy of being purely spiritual existents lie 
above corporeal beings, the transition also stands for an ascent from the imperfection 
of composed material entities towards the perfection of purely spiritual existents. 
For al-Fārābī there are two points within physics that bring the reflection of 
existents to a point where non-physical principles of explanation must be introduced. 
The investigation of heavenly bodies leads to the discovery of beings that are non-
corporeal, and more perfect in their being than anything in the natural world, that is, 
the immaterial entities that produce the perfect motion of the planetary spheres. 
Secondly, the study of animals and man leads to the discovery of the soul and 
intellect, and hence leads the reflection beyond the material world to the origin of 
immaterial entities.721 Thus, the ascent from physical to metaphysical knowledge is 
just as smooth for al-Fārābī as is the one from mathematics to physics. 
For the Brethren of Purity also the physical sciences lead the student seamlessly 
towards an understanding of the metaphysical principles behind them. Hence, the 
Brethren state the first metaphysical epistle to be directed to those who “have learned 
the sensible concepts, reflected on the physical existents, and witnessed the corporeal 
visible beings, and who now desire the intelligible, psychical, and metaphysical 
benefits in order to reach the world of paradise and proximity of the Merciful.”722 
                                                 
719 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 148. See, chapter 3.4 above for the relationship of these leaders to the seven 
speaker-prophets and the cyclical history of the Ismaili doctrine. 
720 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 151. 
721 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, p. 137. 
722 Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 334. “wa-hiya mawḍū‘a li-´lladhīna…waqafat ‘alā ma‘āniya al-maḥsūsāt, wa-
‘āyanat al-ṭabī‘iyyāt, wa-shāhadat al-mar’iyyāt min al-umūr al-jismāniyyāt, wa-ishtāqat ilā al-ifāḍāt al-
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While for al-Fārābī and the Brethren of Purity there is a smooth transition from the 
reflection of natural to supranatural existents, for Ibn Sīnā the ascent takes place by 
the intermediacy of mathematics, as stated earlier, as the nature of mathematical 
entities falls between the pure materiality of corporeal and the pure immateriality of 
spiritual beings. Thus, both physics and mathematics lead the student towards the 
culmination of theoretical knowledge in metaphysics. Therefore, according to Ibn 
Sīnā, metaphysics should be studied only after both of these sciences, as it builds on 
concepts investigated in physics, such as movement, place, and time, whereas in its 
theological part it requires knowledge provided by astronomy, which again requires 
arithmetic and geometry.723 
As in physics, not all parts of philosophical metaphysics are equally important for 
the attainment of ultimate happiness. Parallel to the conception of the hierarchy and 
generation of the natural world taught by physics, metaphysics most importantly 
instructs the student about the hierarchy of spiritual existents above the sublunar 
world. Since these spiritual beings are the cause of the natural world, metaphysics also 
gives knowledge about the ultimate causes of the physical world, thereby completing 
the philosophical account of creation. 
While in Arabic philosophy metaphysics is often practically identified with 
theology, the theological part of metaphysics is of course not the only content of this 
science. Besides, metaphysics comprises the so-called first philosophy (al-falsafa al-
ūlā) investigating being at its most general level, and providing the first principles for 
the other parts of philosophy.724 But for the soul’s ascent it is this theological part 
                                                                                                                                            
‘aqliyyāt, wa-´l-dhakhā’ir al-nafsāniyyāt, wa-´l-ifāḍāt al-ilāhiyyāt, li-taṣīr ilā ‘ālam al-jinān, wa-jiwār 
al-raḥmān dhī al-jalāl wa-´l-ikrām.” 
723 Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 15. Of the four parts of mathematics, music is, however, not necessary 
for understanding metaphysics. 
724 The relation between the theological and ontological parts of metaphysics was not always 
immediately clear for the Arabic philosophers, as is evident in the young Ibn Sīnā’s famous difficulties 
in understanding the goal (gharaΕ/maqΙūd) of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which only treats theology in its 
final chapter. As Ibn Sīnā notes in his introduction to the metaphysical part of Healing, unlike the three 
other philosophical sciences, metaphysics does not have an immediately clear subject matter. Despite 
the fact that many philosophers, including Ibn Sīnā, in practice use the term theology (al-‘ilm al-
ilāhī/ilāhiyyāt) synonymously with metaphysics, Ibn Sīnā makes it clear that God cannot be the subject 
matter of metaphysics. This is because the subject matter of a given science is something taking as self-
evident within that particular science, and demonstrated in another, whereas metaphysics as the first 
science has no self-evident premises. Al-Fārābī is equally clear in that identification of metaphysics 
with theology is a misconception, and divides the science into three parts with three distinct spheres of 
subject matter: 1) existents as existents (al-mawjūdāt wa-´l-ashyā’ allatī tu‘raΕ lahā bi-mā hiya 
mawjūdāt), 2) principles of demonstration of the individual theoretical sciences (mabādi’ al-barāhīn fī 
al-‘ulūm al-naΝariyya al-juz’iyya), and 3) incorporeal existents (al-mawjūdāt allatī laysat bi-ajsām wa-
lā fī ajsām). Ibn Sīnā’s clever definition of the three parts of philosophy encompasses within itself all 
parts of metaphysics, while still defining metaphysics through its relation to immateriality. As he states 
metaphysics to be concerned with things which “do not require matter or movement in definition or 
existence,” the definition comes to encompass not only the theological objects of God and the spiritual 
pleroma, but also the objects of first philosophy, general attributes of being, such as oneness (waΗda) 
or identity (huwiyya). In his Parts of the Intellectual Sciences Ibn Sīnā furthermore divides metaphysics 
into five parts. Of these the first two, investigating concepts common to all existents (ma‘ānī ‘āmma li-
jamī‘ al-mawjūdāt) and foundations (uΙūl) of the other philosophical sciences, would constitute first 
philosophy. The third and fourth, God and the spiritual substances, constitute theology, whereas the 
fifth more properly pertains to practical philosophy. See, Ibn Sīnā, Sīra, p. 32; Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 
2ff.; Aqsām, pp. 106, 112-4; al-Fārābī, IΗΙā’, pp. 99-100; Gutas 1988, pp. 18-9, 238ff.; Genequand 
1996, pp. 783-7. 
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which provides the knowledge required for salvation. Theology (al-‘ilm al-ilāhī) is 
the crowning part of philosophical knowledge, or what Ibn Sīnā calls the “fruit of 
metaphysics.”725  
It is then this kind of philosophical-religious knowledge that is indispensable to 
salvation within metaphysics for the philosophers. As to its more specific contents, 
firstly it is necessary to come to know the pleroma of spiritual existents and the way 
they are arranged. This means in particular knowledge about the hierarchy of separate 
Intellects, identified with the Quranic angels, and their guidance of the material world. 
Or in the case of the Brethren of Purity, the duality of Intellect and Soul, and the way 
they are manifested in the material world.726 
True to its name, theology, however, finally culminates in knowledge about God 
as the First Cause of all being, even if that knowledge will always remain in some 
sense limited since the human soul can never attain complete understanding of the 
transcendent God. For al-Kirmānī, Ismaili philosophy as a whole is knowledge about 
divine unity (‘ilm al-tawΗīd). But as the Ismaili God is an utterly transcendent entity 
beyond description by intellectual concepts, the most important thing the initiate will 
learn is to avoid applying attributes of the created beings to Him.727 Likewise for the 
Brethren, man’s “ultimate goal and highest degree is to worship God through attesting 
His oneness and divesting Him from the attributes pertaining to His creations.”728 
For Peripatetic philosophers it means rather knowledge about the Aristotelian-
Neoplatonic First Cause and its attributes, and the way the rest of existence is 
emanated from Him.729 Altogether the ultimate goal of metaphysics is then to instruct 
about the totality of being above the lower material world, or as Ibn Sīnā states it, 
“knowledge of God’s governance, knowledge of the spiritual angels and their ranks, 
and knowledge of the order of the arrangement of the spheres.”730 
Despite the inscrutability of God especially for the Ismailis, knowledge about God 
represents the culmination of the theoretical knowledge through which soul reaches its 
salvation and happiness. This is the case despite the fact that there is no epistle by the 
Brethren of Purity solely discussing God, and although the metaphysical treatises of 
Ibn Sīnā, al-Fārābī, and al-Kirmānī, following the order of emanation, start rather than 
end with God. Theology as a whole presents the philosophical account of God’s 
creation of the world through the intermediacy of purely spiritual beings. Hence, 
                                                 
725 Ibn Sīnā, Mabda’, p. 1. 
726 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla, pp. 44-5; al-Madīna al-fāΕila, pp. 276-8; FuΙūl, p. 141; Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: 
Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 353-4; Ζāl al-nafs al-insāniyya, pp. 134-5; Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-nafs al-nāΛiqa, pp. 190-1; 
al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 501; Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, pp. 279-80, 527-8. 
727 Al-Kirmānī, RāΗa, p. 501. 
728 “wa-kāna al-gharaḍ al-aqṣā wa-´l-manzila al-‘ulyā huwa ‘ibādat Allāh ‘azza wa-jalla wa-´l-iqrār bi-
tawḥīdihi wa-tanzīh ‘an jamī‘ mā fī mubda‘ātihi wa-ṣifāt makhlūqātihi.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 406. In its 
transcendence the Brethren’s God then comes near the Ismaili God, or the God of Plotinus for that 
matter, which is completely beyond being and attribution. However, in the end there seems to be some 
possibility for the Brethren to gain direct unveiled knowledge about God’s mystery through the soul’s 
ascent to the level of the Intellect, which knows its Maker. See, Marquet 1973 pp. 49-54. 
729 Al-Fārābī, al-Madīna al-fāΕila, p. 276; Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 353-4; Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-
nafs al-nāΛiqa, p. 191. 
730 “li-anna al-gharaḍ al-aqṣā fī hādhā al-‘ilm wa-huwa ma‘rifat tadbīr al-bārī ta‘ālā, wa-ma‘rifat al-
malā’ika al-rūḥāniyya, wa-ma‘rifat al-niԘām fī tartīb al-aflāk.” Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt, p. 15. 
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according to the Brethren of Purity, “knowledge of God is the most noble of 
sciences.”731 
For al-Fārābī the philosopher’s reflection has been depicted as an ascent from 
lower to higher principles, from mathematics up to metaphysics, until he “has become 
near to reaching a degree of theoretical knowledge by which happiness is attained.”732 
It is finally consummated in knowledge about the First Principle above which there is 
no other, but which is itself the ultimate cause of all other existents. Knowledge of the 
First hence provides the philosopher a novel insight over the totality of being through 
which he has proceeded at this point. Then he gains “knowledge about existents 
through their ultimate causes, which is a divine reflection of existents.”733 
7.10 The end of philosophy: ethics and political philosophy 
As knowledge about the external world culminates in metaphysical knowledge about 
God and the spiritual world, this would seem to complete the ascent of the soul to 
perfection and happiness. At this point the aspiring philosopher has presumably 
completed his quest for intelligible knowledge, and hence fully actualized his 
theoretical intellect. If ultimate happiness is equal to theoretical perfection, and 
theoretical perfection to the intelligible knowledge provided by theoretical 
philosophy, then the student should now have reached the stage of ultimate happiness. 
In the Alexandrian curriculum the ascent of the soul through knowledge in fact 
does culminate in metaphysics as the highest stage of philosophical knowledge. In 
contrast to the Alexandrian order, in which ethics precedes theoretical philosophy, in 
Arabic philosophy metaphysics is, however, still followed by practical philosophy.734 
Hence, the question once again rises why is ethical and political philosophy set as the 
conclusion of the philosophical curriculum, rather than at the beginning? When 
practical philosophy deals with the ways to attain happiness, what is the point of 
introducing it only when the ascent to happiness is already complete? 
It seems that the most important reason for this is that the knowledge provided by 
theoretical philosophy is a necessary prerequisite for practical philosophy, just as 
physics is for metaphysics. Al-Fārābī seems to support the conclusion that the end 
point of theoretical philosophy concludes the quest for happiness by his statement that 
the student approaching the end of metaphysics has now “nearly reached” the degree 
of theoretical knowledge by which happiness is attained, after which he is ready to 
proceed to the practical part so that “he may begin to act the way he is supposed to 
act.”735 
While metaphysics does then constitute the end of theoretical knowledge for al-
Fārābī, it is immediately followed by a further genus of practical knowledge 
                                                 
731 “ma‘rifat Allāh ajall al-‘ulūm.” Ikhwān, Jāmi‘a, p. 22. 
732 “fa-yakūn al-insān qad qāraba al-bulūgh ilā al-manzila wa-´l-daraja min al-‘ilm al-naԘarī allatī yunāl 
bihā al-sa‘āda.” Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl muntaza‘a, p. 97. 
733  “fa-yaḥṣul lahu ma‘rifat al-mawjūdāt bi-aqṣā asbābihā, wa-hādhā huwa al-naԘar al-ilāhī fī al-
mawjūdāt.” Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl muntaza‘a, p. 98. 
734 Only in Miskawayh’s Tartīb al-sa‘ādāt is ethics stated to precede theoretical philosophy, as the 
order for the study of Aristotle’s philosophy is given as ethics, mathematics, logic, physics, and 
metaphysics. See, Gutas 1983, p. 236. 
735 Al-Fārābī, FuΙūl muntaza‘a, pp. 97-8. “fa-yakūn al-insān qad qāraba al-bulūgh ilā al-manzila wa-´l-
daraja min al-‘ilm al-naԘarī allatī yunāl bihā al-sa‘āda, . . .fa-ḥīna’idhin yaqdur an yantaqil ilā al-juz’ 
al-‘amalī wa-yumkinuhu an yabtadi’ fa-ya‘mal mā yanbaghī lahu an ya‘malahu.” 
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indispensable for correct action. Both physics and metaphysics, through the discovery 
of the soul and intellect, lead the philosopher to knowledge about the perfection and 
final goal of man. Through them he learns that man’s perfection is distinct from the 
other existents of the natural world, and it is necessary for man to actualize his 
intellect in order to reach that perfection. He also learns that other particular means 
are also required in order to reach the ultimate goal, and that he can only implement 
those means through political association with other people. 
All this leads to the final transition from one science and genus of existents to 
another, this time from metaphysics to ethics and political philosophy, which for al-
Fārābī constitute a single “human science” (al-‘ilm al-madanī/insānī). 736 
Paradoxically then the student of philosophy will have to have gone through the 
whole of theoretical philosophy in order to understand that his perfection is 
intellectual, and primarily acquired through theoretical philosophy. This is because 
only through understanding the ultimate nature of the world, can he fully understand 
the purpose of man within it. 
Similarly, for Ibn Sīnā and the Brethren of Purity physics and metaphysics are 
necessary in order to reach the knowledge provided by practical philosophy. As we 
have seen, for the esoterically oriented Brethren all philosophical sciences, in one way 
or another, in the end lead to knowledge about the soul and its ascent, the 
eschatological events involved in its resurrection, and the esoteric meaning of 
religion. The Brethren of Purity are far less systematic in the actual arrangement of 
their epistles than Ibn Sīnā, however, and in fact treat the central ethical questions 
related to the soul’s salvation from the first epistle to the last. 
But for Ibn Sīnā theoretical philosophy in the end is also consummated in the 
religious knowledge about the soul and its salvation. Hence, the “fruit of physics” is 
knowledge about the soul’s eternity and afterlife. The “fruit of metaphysics” is 
theology, which for him seamlessly leads to the central questions of practical 
philosophy. 737  Namely, the final part of his theology unites his Aristotelian-
Neoplatonic metaphysics into the religious questions central to the context of Islamic 
revelation. It treats the question of providence that the spiritual substances exercise 
over the earthly beings, and leads to knowledge about Intellects as the Quranic angels 
of revelation. Furthermore, Ibn Sīnā counts further knowledge about prophecy and 
afterlife among the “derived” (far‘iyya) parts of metaphysics.738 
It is through this applied metaphysics that man learns the true nature of happiness 
as an intellectual perfection, and the philosophical interpretation about the nature of 
afterlife. While practical philosophy investigating the particular means to attain 
happiness should follow upon this, in his surviving compendiums he does not devote 
a special section to them, but treats them rather as the final part of metaphysics. As 
Gutas notes, despite his Aristotelian background, Ibn Sīnā in fact was throughout his 
career singularly uninterested in treating ethics in any other context than this 
“metaphysics of the rational soul” placed as the final part of metaphysics.739 
                                                 
736 Al-Fārābī, TaΗΙīl, pp. 137-40. 
737 Ibn Sīnā, Mabda’, p. 1. 
738 Ibn Sīnā, Aqsām, pp. 113-5. 
739 Gutas 1988, pp. 254ff. 
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While for Ibn Sīnā theoretical philosophy then leads to philosophical-religious 
knowledge about the soul’s eternity, afterlife, and prophecy, surprisingly he does not 
appear to consider them as part of the theoretical knowledge through which the 
intellect is actualized. His minimum lists of knowledge required for happiness focus 
entirely on knowledge about the hierarchy of existence, with knowledge about the 
eternity and incorporeality of the human soul mentioned only once.740 Unlike al-
Fārābī, he does not mention knowledge about the nature of the afterlife or prophecy 
and revelation at all. Apparently this is the case because such knowledge is not strictly 
speaking intelligible knowledge which is limited to the conception of the ultimate 
causes of existence. Rather, it follows upon theoretical intelligible knowledge about 
the world as the “fruit” of the theoretical sciences.  
At least for al-Fārābī, there is, however, besides a further reason why practical 
philosophy completes the philosopher’s education. Namely, as we have seen, al-
Fārābī is very emphatic that a true philosopher is not an academic philosopher, but 
one who actualizes his theoretical knowledge to a lived praxis. 741  Even if the 
philosopher at the end of theoretical philosophy has completed his knowledge about 
the world, he still has not completed his quest to become a philosopher. In order to 
become one, he must also learn how to actualize his knowledge by instructing it to 
others. 
Through practical philosophy the philosopher learns not only the particular means 
that lead towards man’s practical and theoretical perfection, but also the ways in 
which they are implemented in order to form a virtuous society. As for al-Fārābī the 
true philosopher is also the legitimate ruler, the final political part of philosophy 
completes his transformation into a real philosopher – a philosopher who has not only 
reached his own perfection, but who is also capable of conveying it to others. 
However, since the particular political knowledge is based on universal intelligible 
knowledge, without his prior theoretical education al-Fārābī’s philosopher-king would 
have no basis for his rule. 
In the end then, all philosophical knowledge culminates in knowledge about man, 
his purpose, and salvation, and the prophecy and revelation that enable it. Ethical and 
political philosophy therefore brings about the synthesis of the philosophical with the 
religious world view. Still, the question remains how the philosopher is inspired to 
seek his salvation through philosophy in the first place, if the question of happiness is 
only investigated at its end. 
As shown above, for Arabic philosophy operating in the context of Islamic 
religion, religious education serves the function of pre-philosophical education. 
Hence, it inspires the believers towards the right path in their quest for happiness. 
Moreover, both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā wrote little treatises that serve a similarly 
inspiring purpose. Al-Fārābī’s Exhortation to the Path of Happiness guides the 
aspiring philosopher to seek his happiness through both theoretical and practical 
education, as do Ibn Sīnā’s various little treatises on the soul. The nature of 
philosophy as a way to spiritual happiness is moreover emphasized by the 
philosophers in innumerable introductions which guide the initiate towards the right 
                                                 
740 See, Appendix 1. 
741 See, chapter 5.1 above. 
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path of philosophy. Through them the student of philosophy is familiarized with the 
way to happiness before investigating it systematically as part of practical philosophy. 
Islam summons all Muslims to a belief in God, angels, prophets, revelation, and 
judgment day. 742  When viewed from a religious perspective, medieval Arabic 
philosophy answers this call. Philosophy in the end provides its own interpretation of 
these articles of faith, which it adapts to its own peculiar Aristotelian-Neoplatonic 
world view. It provides knowledge about God as the first principle of creation, and the 
way the rest of existents are emanated from Him. It demonstrates the existence of a 
supramaterial realm of Intellects, identified with the Quranic angels of revelation. The 
physical and metaphysical sciences produce as their fruit a philosophical 
interpretation about the true nature of prophecy, revelation, and afterlife. Physics and 
metaphysics hence are the central parts of philosophy in its Gnostic goal of providing 
the knowledge required for salvation. But even logic and mathematics ultimately 
serve this final goal of the philosopher’s ascent to saving knowledge. In sum, 
philosophy is a road to ultimate happiness and spiritual salvation, where all 
philosophical knowledge has its ultimately Gnostic component. 
                                                 
742 Quran, IV: 136. 
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Conclusions 
 
The aim of this study was to explore the idea of philosophy as a path to happiness 
through comparison of two distinct intellectual currents within early Arabic 
philosophy. The Arabic Peripatetic and Ismaili schools of philosophy appear as 
widely divergent in their initial viewpoints on philosophy. 
The attitude of the Peripatetic philosophers from al-Fārābī on is secular and 
rationalistic, as they self-consciously carry on the tradition of the Greek philosophers. 
Especially for al-Fārābī religious revelation is derivative of philosophy, serving the 
essentially political purpose of divulging the philosophical truth to the common 
populace. 
Ismaili philosophy, on the other hand, appears more religiously oriented in its 
initial position. It rejects at the outset the idea of the unaided human intellect’s 
capacity to reach truth about the world. Only the presence at each point of human 
history of a mediator figure, the divinely supported imam, ensures the validity of the 
esoteric truth which Ismaili philosophy ultimately represents. Both al-Kirmānī and the 
Brethren of Purity are moreover clearly more esoteric in their orientation than the 
Peripatetic philosophers, viewing philosophy as the hidden truth behind the exoteric 
exterior of religious revelation, unfolding to the mankind throughout the human 
history. 
Still, both traditions converge in the most important question concerning 
philosophy, namely its purpose in the human life. Both perceive the ultimate reason 
for which philosophy is practiced in the first place to lie in its saving function of 
leading man towards his greatest happiness. Moreover both traditions draw their 
inspiration from Neoplatonism to portray the philosophical path to happiness. 
The focal point of both schools of philosophy is a concept of happiness that 
corresponds to the contemplative ideal of the classical Aristotelian and Neoplatonic 
perceptions of eudaimonia. Ultimate human happiness is perceived as a transcendent 
ideal of perfection, or the greatest human good that is attainable for man. Human 
perfection is further identified with the perfection of the theoretical intellect as the 
summit of human faculties. 
Moreover, for both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy attainment of happiness 
embodies the counterpart of the Neoplatonic creative process of emanation, through 
which the soul returns to its origin in the spiritual world. Hence, ultimate happiness is 
identified with the soul’s connection with a transcendent Intellect of the spiritual 
world, whether the tenth Intellect of Peripatetic cosmology, al-Kirmānī’s first 
Intellect, or the Intellect as the second hypostasis of the Brethren of Purity. Through 
this identification of happiness as an approximation to a semi-divine entity of the 
higher world, happiness gains a mildly mystical flavor in Arabic philosophy, although 
only Ibn Sīnā at times portrays the experience of happiness in truly ecstatic terms. 
Finally, all four philosophers identify ultimate happiness as an intellectual bliss of 
the virtuous souls in the afterlife, making happiness and salvation almost synonymous 
terms, and hence providing the philosophical explanation for the Quranic account of 
the hereafter. Despite this, worldly happiness is viewed by all as consonant with the 
pursuit of otherworldly happiness, and philosophy is perceived to provide the way to 
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achieve happiness in this worldly life thus making the perspective of Arabic 
philosophy not wholly otherworldly in orientation. 
Finally, the view of happiness in Arabic philosophy is completed by the inclusion 
of practical-moral perfection in the concept of happiness. While happiness as the final 
goal of human existence consists of both intellectual and moral perfection, the 
practical goal still appears as an instrument towards the ultimate contemplative goal. 
However, within man’s embodied existence for all Arabic philosophers the pursuit of 
happiness is embodied in a quest for both theoretical knowledge and moral virtue.  
Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers further converge along general lines in their 
view about the path towards the attainment of happiness. For both it consists of a dual 
way of theory and practice, through which man strives to approach both his 
theoretical and practical perfection as much as possible. However, the two traditions 
of philosophy diverge in their views about the precise role that philosophy should play 
in this process. The differences of view in the end revert to distinct perceptions about 
the origin of saving knowledge, and the relationship between philosophy and 
revelation. Both Ismailism and Peripatetic philosophy purport to offer a complete 
spiritual path that leads the initiate towards his ultimate perfection. 
For the Peripatetics, however, the initial position is that philosophy and reason are 
by themselves sufficient to lead man towards happiness and salvation. The ultimate 
benefit of both theoretical and practical philosophy are stated to reside in their 
functional role of leading man towards happiness, in that theoretical philosophy 
actualizes the human intellect and the practical provides the means towards moral 
virtue. Ibn Sīnā, however, moderates al-Fārābī’s more rationalistic position through 
stating that it is practical philosophy together with religion that constitutes the 
instrument towards attainment of practical perfection. 
The concept of philosophy for the Peripatetics then materializes into a 
comprehensive ideal of philosophy as a way of life, in which the contemplative ideal 
is accompanied with the pursuit of virtue. This transcendent ideal of philosophy is 
also apparent in the definitions of philosophy adopted by Arabic philosophers from 
late Antiquity, in which philosophy is likened to a quest towards man’s divinization, 
and is understood as a practical as much as a theoretical pursuit. 
While for the Ismailis also man reaches his intellectual perfection through the 
acquisition of theoretical knowledge about the world, practical philosophy appears as 
superfluous in the quest towards happiness. For al-Kirmānī there is no need for a 
philosophical ethics seeking the practical means towards happiness, because such 
means are fully provided to man through religious revelation. Hence, al-Kirmānī is 
expressly critical of the philosophical path to happiness in general, and of Aristotelian 
virtue ethics in particular, as he does not perceive it to lead man towards either virtue 
or happiness. 
The main point of divergence lies in the role given to human reason in the path 
towards happiness. Namely, al-Kirmānī denies that man could reach happiness solely 
through reliance on the precepts of reason, and asserts that only divine revelation 
enables certain knowledge about the means towards salvation. Hence, al-Kirmānī 
identifies the practical part of the way to happiness with the religious law verified 
through prophecy, which then occupies the position taken by ethics in the Peripatetic 
system. Hence, for al-Kirmānī there is no special philosophical way of life which 
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would set the practitioners of philosophy apart from the common populace, but all 
believers equally share the common rules of conduct regardless of their intellectual 
capabilities. The function of theoretical philosophy, however, remains identical to that 
of the Peripatetic philosophers, namely the actualization of theoretical intellect. 
However, from the Ismaili perspective its validity also is ensured by the existence of 
divinely supported imams. 
The position of the Brethren of Purity seems to lie somewhere between the 
Peripatetics and al-Kirmānī. On the one hand, the Brethren of Purity are just as critical 
as al-Kirmānī of those philosophers who substitute religious law for complete reliance 
on human reason, and the Brethren also view divine support as essential for reaching 
salvation. On the other hand, for the Brethren philosophical ethics does play a role in 
the path towards happiness, as they do not identify the practical part wholly with 
religious law. 
A central idea going throughout the Epistles is the essential harmony of religious 
revelation and true philosophy, such as it was practiced by the ancients. Accordingly, 
the path towards happiness is formed of the combination of both. As for its practical 
part, philosophical ethics is, however, not sufficient in itself, but a divinely inspired 
guidance in the form of religious law is indispensable. However, for the Brethren 
virtuous life is not restricted to the obedience of religious law, but they moreover 
identify an esoteric level of practice for the spiritually advanced. Hence, the Brethren 
also in the end come to identify a special way of life of the philosophers, which 
distinguishes the philosophically inclined from common believers in their pursuit of 
happiness. 
Of the two constituent parts of the philosophical way to happiness, the practical 
part becomes identified with the practical purification of the soul, which is a 
Neoplatonic motif shared by both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy. This refers to 
the need for the human rational soul to liberate itself from the entanglements of its 
body and lower faculties which bind it to the material-sensible world. The process of 
practical purification then appears for the human soul as a quest towards a rediscovery 
of its purely spiritual essence. 
Even if the final goal of human existence is perceived as a contemplative life, the 
necessity of practical purification is supported by various grounds. First of all, the two 
spheres of being, the spiritual-intelligible and material-sensible, are seen as contrary 
to each other, hence making it impossible to face both simultaneously. Secondly, on 
purely epistemological grounds practical purification is necessary, as in order for the 
soul to be tuned towards receiving the intelligible emanations of the Intellect, it 
should be purified from the distractions that turn its attention downwards towards the 
sensibles. Moreover, practical purification arouses in the soul a desire towards a 
return to the spiritual-intelligible world, which is contrary to the downwards pull of its 
bodily nature, which rather makes it oblivious to its true spiritual essence. 
The actual content of the practical perfection as the end point of practical 
purification is expressed by Arabic philosophers through virtue ethics. However, there 
appears to be some tension between the Aristotelian ideal of moderation adopted by 
Peripatetic ethics, and the Neoplatonic goal of complete purging of the soul of its 
bodily liaisons and transformation into a pure intellect. What emerges from the 
Platonic-Aristotelian ethical theories embraced by Arabic philosophers is an ideal of 
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balanced psychical disposition, in which the desires and passions of the lower 
faculties are subjugated to the dominance of practical reason. However, as virtues are 
portrayed as Aristotelian mediums, this ethical ideal represents one of moderation, 
rather than a state of complete apatheia with respect to the soul’s lower functions. 
Since the ideal nevertheless requires a degree of control over one’s desires and 
emotions, the ideal of philosophical life appears to be one of practice of moderate 
ascesis. 
When viewed from the perspective of the practical ideal of philosophical life, all 
Arabic philosophers adopt a relatively moderate position, while there is slight 
variance as to the level of asceticism advocated by the individual philosophers. For 
Ibn Sīnā the philosophical life appears to be composed of a rationally governed state 
of moderation, while the Brethren of Purity adopt a slightly more ascetic tone in their 
encouragement for renouncement of worldly delights. While Arabic philosophers in 
general perceive the philosophical life of virtue, despite its contemplative objectives, 
to be possible only as part of a society, the Brethren do encourage towards withdrawal 
to their own community of the virtuous. Nevertheless, the ideal philosopher is one 
who also fully embodies the social virtues in his benevolent attitude towards fellow 
men. While the ideal of philosophical life in Arabic philosophy appears as a relatively 
moderate one, it does involve the ascetic goal of relative detachment from the worldly 
life. 
All the reasons stated above to make practical purification necessary, also support 
its precedence with respect to the acquisition of theoretical knowledge, as man can 
only truly pursue his theoretical perfection after being purified from the distractive 
influence of the worldly desires. In Greek Neoplatonism the idea of practical 
purification materializes in a ladder of virtues, which represent a gradual detachment 
from the worldly sphere, and in which some degree of pre-philosophical purification 
precedes the study of philosophy. In Arabic philosophy, however, the order of the 
practical and theoretical parts of philosophy appears somewhat ambiguous initially. 
While at times moral virtue is assumed as a necessary prerequisite of theoretical 
studies, at other times it is conceived of as following from theoretical virtue, reflected 
in the position of practical philosophy at the end of the Arabic philosophical 
curriculum. 
Al-Kirmānī is the most explicit of the four in placing practical worship clearly as a 
prerequisite for acquisition of philosophical knowledge, while the Brethren of Purity 
also clearly require a great degree of moral purity from a student of philosophy. Al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā appear to view moral molding as both a necessary prerequisite for 
the study of philosophy, and as the end point of philosophy where theoretical 
knowledge is actualized into a virtuous praxis. 
For al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā the contradiction appears to be resolved when the idea 
of purification is placed in the context of a political community. Namely, despite their 
focus on individualistic ethics as part of practical philosophy, for both the attainment 
of happiness is possible only as part of a society. Moreover, for both the political 
context of practical purification is that of a virtuous religion whose regulations now 
assume the function of purificatory practices within the philosophical ascent. 
Accordingly, despite the initial divergences between Peripatetic and Ismaili 
philosophy on the question of the role of philosophy versus religion in practical 
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purification, in the end both schools view the religious law as the main instrument for 
practical purification. For al-Fārābī religious law is in effect the political actualization 
of philosophical ethics for a particular nation. Moreover, both interpret the religious 
regulations into the context of Neoplatonic ascent through differentiating distinct 
levels of meanings within the religious rites for the masses and the intellectual elite. 
However, only for al-Kirmānī is the praxis of philosophy restricted to the 
following of religious law. For al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and the Brethren of Purity 
religious law is clearly insufficient for reaching the moral perfection that is stated to 
be the practical goal of philosophy. Hence, additional philosophical practices appear 
to be necessary in order to complement the religious practices incorporated into the 
law. 
From all this there emerges a path of the philosophical praxis, which together 
amounts to the ideal of philosophical life. Religious law operates as the first grade of 
moral purification, which arouses a tentative desire within the rational soul to an 
ascent towards the spiritual sphere of existence, and initiates its detachment from the 
material sphere of being. This would constitute the stage of pre-philosophical 
purification of the soul within the philosophical path to happiness. Besides this, 
however, supplementary practices and general exercise of ascesis are necessary for 
the philosopher to train his soul towards virtue. Music and poetry may also play a role 
in the instigation and habituation of the soul to virtue. Finally, for the more advanced 
student of philosophy the philosophical self-governance presented in the ethical works 
emerges as the final mode of practical purification for the philosopher. 
In the end practical purification is, however, subordinate to the contemplative 
objective of philosophy. The ultimate goal of theoretical perfection is brought about 
by the acquisition of intelligible knowledge about the world, whereby human intellect 
becomes like the immaterial Intellects of the spiritual world. The epistemological 
process is reflected in an ontological ascent of the human substance from the state of 
materiality to spirituality. 
Although the theoretical perfection is in principle equated with the actualization of 
the totality of intelligible knowledge within the human soul, in practice, however, not 
all philosophical knowledge is of equal value for the purpose of the attainment of 
happiness. For both Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophers the theoretical knowledge 
required for happiness consists essentially of conceiving the general Neoplatonic 
hierarchy of being at both its physical and metaphysical levels. While knowledge 
related to practical philosophy is also presented as necessary for salvation, for the 
most part it does not appear to be related directly to the intelligible knowledge of 
which the theoretical perfection is composed. 
Like the practical purification of the soul, the theoretical ascent also proceeds 
gradually towards its goal. It is not possible to proceed directly from the initial 
potential state of the human intellect to the intelligible conception of highest reality, 
as in its initial sensible and potential state man would be unable to understand them. 
The epistemological process towards a fully actualized intellect is rather a progressive 
one from the initial sensible state of the human soul towards gradually higher degrees 
of abstraction. On a general level the theoretical ascent of the soul comes to 
correspond inversely with the Neoplatonic hierarchy of creation, so that man starts his 
ascent in knowledge from the last sensible existents within the hierarchy of being and 
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proceeds upwards. Both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity are highly emphatic 
about the necessity of such graduation for the attainment of happiness, whereas al-
Fārābī also presents philosophy as a progression from lower to higher principles. 
For all Arabic philosophers this idea of gradual theoretical ascent materializes into 
curricula of knowledge, largely following classical ideas of classification of 
philosophy. However, between Peripatetic and Ismaili philosophy, and the individual 
philosophers within each tradition, the actual classificatory arrangements they adopt 
vary greatly. 
For both al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity the major distinction is that 
between exoteric and esoteric knowledge, where the first is explicitly associated with 
the corporeal-sensible and the latter with the spiritual-intelligible sphere of being. 
Hence, the progression of the student from exoteric to esoteric knowledge represents 
the soul’s ascent from its sensible to an intelligible state. For al-Kirmānī the Ismaili 
curriculum is set wholly within this framework, so that the studies proceed gradually 
towards higher esoteric knowledge, concluding in his major work of esoteric 
philosophy, Rest of the Intellect. The same idea of progressive ascent does not appear 
to apply within the highest philosophical knowledge itself, however, for al-Kirmānī 
does not present it as an ascent from physical to metaphysical knowledge, for 
example. For the Brethren of Purity, on the contrary, there emerges a double ascent, 
first from exoteric-religious to esoteric-philosophical knowledge, and secondly within 
the philosophical sciences. 
Whereas for al-Kirmānī and the Brethren of Purity the religious studies represent 
the first exoteric grade of the ascent, for the Peripatetic philosophers also religious 
education plays a role within the pre-philosophical theoretical education of the 
student. For al-Fārābī religious revelation and the related sciences appear to present 
the primary rhetorical-dialectical education preceding the actual intelligible 
knowledge, while the analogical reasoning of jurisprudence acts as a preparation for 
logical reasoning for Ibn Sīnā. 
Besides religious education, however, other branches of knowledge also serve the 
purpose of molding the rational soul towards the philosophical ascent. Of these 
linguistics as a preparation for logical reasoning is elevated in particular by al-Fārābī, 
while study of history and biographies may be seen as related to the moral molding of 
the philosophical initiate. As a further training of the student for his philosophical 
studies, general philosophical introductions and preparatory treatises serve 
particularly the purpose of explaining the nature and purpose of philosophy. 
As for the curriculum within the philosophical sciences, for all Arabic 
philosophers logic emerges as the indispensable instrument that enables the ascent. 
Hence, for al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā it is the self-evident starting point for philosophical 
studies, while the Brethren of Purity apparently following their Pythagorean 
inclinations place it as the second science after mathematics. Beyond this, all of them 
are in agreement that the theoretical ascent proceeds gradually from physical to 
metaphysical reality. 
However, mathematics occupies two alternative positions within the Arabic 
curriculum. For the Brethren of Purity and al-Fārābī it is preparatory towards higher 
philosophical knowledge, and hence is placed at the beginning of the ascent. For Ibn 
Sīnā it functions rather as an intermediary between the purely corporeal physical 
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objects and the purely spiritual metaphysical entities, thereby smoothing the transition 
from one science to the other. However, regardless of the classification they have 
chosen, for all Arabic philosophers the philosophical sciences form a gradually 
ascending progression, where each science leads seamlessly towards the higher one 
within the theoretical ascent of the soul. 
Even though the philosopher’s theoretical ascent culminates in knowledge about 
God as the pinnacle of the hierarchy of being, the Arabic philosophical curriculum 
culminates in practical philosophy. While the knowledge provided by ethical and 
political philosophy does not appear to form part of the theoretical knowledge 
required for the actualization of the intellect, practical philosophy emerges as the 
natural consummation of theoretical knowledge. Both physical and metaphysical 
knowledge lead up to knowledge about man’s spiritual substance, purpose within the 
totality of creation, and the philosophical interpretation of prophecy and afterlife. 
Moreover, for al-Fārābī, political philosophy completes the philosopher’s education 
through guiding him to actualize his theoretical knowledge in the instruction of others. 
Hence, while the philosopher’s quest towards purifying himself from material 
attachments already began at the start of his philosophical path, through practical 
philosophy his knowledge about the practice of philosophy also reaches its 
completion. 
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Appendix 1. Theoretical requirements of happiness 
 
1) Al-Fārābī 
 
Kitāb al-milla (pp. 44-5) 
Opinions concerning theoretical things: 
1) God and His attributes 
2) spiritual beings, their degrees and actions 
3) generation of the world, its parts and degrees 
4) generation of first and composed bodies and their degrees 
5) connection of the things of the world to each other and their arrangement 
6) everything in world occurs according to justice and there is no injustice in it 
7) relation of each thing to God and the spiritual existents 
8) generation of man and his soul 
9) intellect and its degree in the world and with respect to God and the spiritual existents 
10) prophecy and revelation 
11) death and afterlife 
12) happiness and misery in the afterlife 
 
Opinions concerning voluntary things: 
13) prophets, virtuous kings, leaders, and rightly guided imams, and their good actions in past times 
14) vicious kings, immoral leaders, governors, and imams of perdition, and their bad actions in past 
times 
15) present-day virtuous kings and imams, their good actions, and similitudes and differences with the 
past leaders 
16) present-day immoral leaders and imams of perdition, and their similitudes and differences with 
past leaders 
 
Fu?ūl al-madanī (p. 141) 
1) beginning 
a. God 
b. spiritual beings 
c. saints to be followed 
d. beginning of the world and its parts 
e. generation of man 
f. grades of the parts of the world 
g. relation of things to each other 
h. grade of things in relation to God and spiritual beings 
i. grade of man in relation to God and spiritual beings 
2) middle 
a. actions by which happiness is achieved 
3) end 
a. happiness 
 
Al-Madīna al-fā?ila (pp. 276-8) 
1) First Cause and Its attributes 
2) immaterial existents, their attributes and actions 
3) celestial substances and their attributes 
4) natural bodies, their generation and corruption, and the perfection, providence, justice and wisdom 
of the things happening to them 
5) generation of man and the faculties of his soul, emanation from the Active Intellect of the first 
intelligibles to him, and free choice and volition 
6) First Ruler and revelation 
7) subsequent rulers 
8) virtuous and non-virtuous cities and the happiness and misery of their inhabitants 
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Al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya (pp. 84-5) 
1) ultimate principles of existents 
2) ranks of existents 
3) happiness 
4) first leadership and its ranks 
5) actions by which happiness is achieved 
6) the necessity of performing these actions 
 
2) Ibn Sīnā 
 
Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt (pp. 353-4) 
1) separate principles 
2) final causes of things occurring in universal motions 
3) form of the whole 
4) relations of its parts to each other 
5) arrangement of the whole from First Principle until the most remote existents 
6) providence 
7) Essence preceding the whole, the manner of Its existence, unity and knowledge, and relation to the 
hierarchy of existents 
 
Risāla fī ma‘rifat al-nafs al-nā?iqa (pp. 190-1) 
1) Necessary Existent 
a. attributes 
b. transcendence 
c. providence over the created beings 
d. knowledge of existents 
e. omnipotence 
2) beginning and emanation of existence from It to: 
a. intellectual substances 
b. spiritual astral souls 
c. elemental bodies of minerals, plants, and animals 
3) substance of human soul 
a. its incorporeality 
b. its eternity 
 
3) Brethren of Purity 
 
Beliefs beneficial to all (Rasā’il, III (42), pp. 452-3) 
1) world is created 
2) world has been created in time by a Creator 
3) Creator is wise 
4) Creator is pre-eternal 
5) Creator is compassionate 
6) Creator has created the world in the best possible order and arrangement without defects or faults 
7) Nothing takes place in the world without God knowing it in advance 
8) God has angels who do what He orders them to do 
9) God has chosen people who acts as his mediators 
 
Belief as commitment to five beliefs (Rasā’il, IV (46), p. 67): 
1) Creator 
2) angels 
3) prophets 
4) revelation 
5) resurrection and reward and punishment in the afterlife 
 
Four foundations of knowledge in the virtuous city (Risālat al-jāmi‘a, p. 528) 
1) Intellect and what it embraces 
2) Soul and what it contains 
3) Nature and what supports it 
4) Matter and what is formed of it  
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4) Al-Kirmānī 
 
Knowledge of the divine unity (Rā?at al-‘aql, p. 501): 
1) avoiding attributing things to God 
2) proximate incorporeal angels and their actions 
3) corporeal substances and their attributes 
4) lower bodies and their actions 
5) generation and destiny of man 
6) prophets, initiators of cycles, awΙiyā’, and Ηudūd past and present 
7) religious laws 
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Appendix 2. Al-Fārābī’s ladder of sciences 
 
1) I??ā’ al-‘ulūm (contents) 
 
Political science, jurisprudence, and theology 
       
Metaphysics 
Existents as existents  Premises of proofs of the particular theoretical sciences  Incorporeal 
existents     
       
Physics 
Physics  Heavens and the world  Generation and corruption  Meteorology, I-III  Meteorology, 
IV  Mineralogy  Botany  Zoology and the soul 
       
Mathematics 
Arithmetic  Geometry  Optics  Astronomy  Music  Science of weights  Mechanics  
       
Logic  
Categories  On Interpretation  Prior Analytics  Posterior Analytics  Dialectic  Sophistics  
Rhetoric  Poetics    
 
Linguistics 
Single expressions  Composed expressions  Rules of single expressions  Rules of composed 
expressions  Rules of correct writing  Rules of correct reading  Rules of poems 
 
2) Ta??īl al-sa‘āda (pp. 129ff.) 
 
Political science 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Physics 
 
Mathematics 
Arithmetic  Geometry  Optics  Astronomy  Music  Science of weights  Mechanics 
 
3) Al-Tanbīh ‘alā sabīl al-sa‘āda (pp. 20-1) 
 
Theoretical     Practical 
Metaphysics     Political philosophy 
       
Physics      Ethics 
 
Mathematics 
 
Logic 
 
4) Fu?ūl muntaza‘a (pp. 96ff.) 
 
Practical philosophy 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Physics 
 
Mathematics 
Arithmetic  Geometry  Optics, moving bodies, and other things following from arithmetic and 
geometry  Heavenly bodies  Music  Weights  Mechanics  
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5) Al-Madīna al-fā?ila (contents) 
 
Metaphysics (supralunar world) 
First Existent  Emanation of existents from the First and degrees of existents  Emanation of the 
Intellects and heavenly bodies 
 
Physics (sublunar world) 
Sublunar bodies  Form and matter  Order of material and divine existents  Nature of heavenly 
bodies  Generation of material bodies 
 
Psychology (man) 
Man and his psychic faculties  Rational soul and its intellection  Choice, volition, and happiness 
 Dreams  Revelation and vision 
 
Political philosophy and ethics 
Necessity of political association  First Leader  Virtuous and non-virtuous cities  Ultimate 
happiness and misery 
 
6) Falsafat Aris?ū?ālīs (contents) 
 
Political and human philosophy 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Physics 
Physics  On the Heavens and the world  On Generation and corruption  Meteorology, I-III  
Meteorology, IV  On Minerals  On Health and Disease  On Youth and Old Age  On Sense 
and the Sensible  On the Local Motions of Animals  On the Soul 
 
Logic 
Categories  On Interpretation  Prior Analytics  Posterior Analytics  Topics  Sophistics  
Rhetoric  Poetics 
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Appendix 3. Ibn Sīnā’s ladder of sciences 
 
1) Aqsām al-‘ulūm al-‘aqliyya 
 
Practical philosophy 
Political philosophy 
↑ 
Economics 
↑ 
Ethics 
 
 
 
Theoretical philosophy     Applied theoretical (far‘iyya) 
Metaphysics (higher knowledge) 
Providence of spiritual substances    Spiritual happiness, etc. 
↑       ↑ 
First spiritual substances    Nature of devout spirit 
↑       ↑ 
First Truth      Knowledge of the afterlife 
↑       ↑     
Principles of physics, logic, and mathematics Procession of revelation 
↑       ↑ 
Concepts common to all existents    Descent of revelation 
 
Mathematics (middle knowledge) 
Music       Construction of instruments 
↑       ↑ 
Astronomy      Planetary tables and calendars 
↑       ↑ 
Geometry      Surveying, mechanics, etc. 
↑       ↑ 
Arithmetic      “Indian calculus” and algebra 
 
Physics (lower knowledge) 
On the Soul & On Sense and the Sensible    
↑         
Zoology      Alchemy 
↑       ↑ 
Botany       Incantations 
↑      ↑ 
Meteorology, IV     Science of talismans 
↑       ↑ 
Meteorology, I-III    Interpretation of dreams 
↑       ↑ 
Generation and corruption    Physiognomy 
↑       ↑ 
Heavens and the world    Astrology 
↑       ↑ 
Physics       Medicine 
 
  
 206
Logic (instrument of philosophy) 
Poetics 
↑ 
Rhetoric 
↑ 
Sophistics 
↑ 
Dialectic 
↑ 
Posterior Analytics 
↑ 
Prior Analytics 
↑ 
On Interpretation 
↑ 
Categories 
↑ 
Eisagōgē 
 
2) Al-Shifā’ (contents) 
 
Metaphysics 
First philosophy  Theology  Prophecy  Acts of worship  Political philosophy 
 
Mathematics 
Geometry  Astronomy  Arithmetic Music 
 
Physics 
Physics  Heavens  Generation and Corruption  Meteorology, I-III  Meteorology, IV  Soul 
 Botany  Zoology 
 
Logic 
Eisagōgē  Categories  On Interpretation  Prior Analytics  Posterior Analytics  Dialectic  
Sophistics  Rhetoric  Poetics 
 
3) Al-Najāt (contents) 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Physics 
 
Logic 
 
4) Al-Ishārāt wa-´l-tanbīhāt (contents) 
 
Prophecy 
 
Ethics/mysticism 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Physics 
 
Logic 
  
 207
5) Al-?ikmā al-‘arū?iyya (contents) 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Physics 
 
Logic 
 
6) Dāneneshnāme-ye ‘Alā’ī (contents) 
 
Mathematics 
 
Physics 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Logic 
 
7) Easterners (intended contents according to Gutas 1988, pp. 124-5) 
 
Ethics 
 
Physics 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Logic 
 
8) Al-Mabda’ wa-´l-ma‘ād (contents) 
 
Metaphysics 
Necessary Existent  Heavens  Universal Body, Soul, and Intellect  Hierarchy of emanation  
Providence over earthly existents 
 
Physics 
Elements  Plants  Animals  Man  Intellect  Degrees of abstraction 
 
Ethics 
Happiness  Theoretical and practical intellect  Happiness and misery in the afterlife  Revelation 
and prophecy 
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Appendix 4. Brethren of Purity’s ladder of sciences 
 
1) On Theoretical Scientific Disciplines (Rasā’il, I.7./Jāmi‘a, pp. 110-2) 
 
Metaphysics 
God  Spiritual beings  Psychic beings  Governance  Return 
 
Physics 
Corporeal principles  Heavens and the world  Generation and corruption  Meteorology  
Mineralogy  Botanic  Zoology 
 
Logic 
Poetics  Rhetoric  Dialectic  Analytics  Sophistics 
 
Mathematics 
Arithmetic  Geometry  Astronomy  Music 
 
III. Philosophical sciences of ultimate reality 
 
 
 
II. Religious-normative sciences 
1. Revelation  2. Allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl)  3. Narratives and transmission  4. 
Jurisprudence, customs, and regulations  5. Remembrance, exhortations, and Sufism  6. 
Interpretation of dreams 
 
 
 
I. Preparatory sciences 
1. Reading and writing  2. Grammar and language  3. Calculation and transactions  4. Poetry 
and prosody  5. Auguries and auspices  6. Magic, incantations, talisman, alchemy, mechanical 
devices, etc.  7. Trades and crafts  8. Buying, selling, trade, cultivation, and breeding  9. 
Biographies and history 
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2) Rasā’il Ikhwān al-?afā’ (contents) 
 
Comprehensive Epistle 
 
 
 
IV. Legislative-theological sciences 
1. Opinions and religions  2. Nature of the road to God  3. Belief of the Brethren of Purity  4. 
Community of the Brethren of Purity  5. Essence of faith and the qualities of believers  6. Essence 
of divine law and the qualities of the prophet  7. Manner of the summons to God  8. States of the 
spiritual beings  9. Kinds of governance  10. Order of the world as a whole  11. Essence of 
magic, spells, and the evil eye 
 
 
 
III. Psychical-intelligible sciences 
1. Intelligible principles according to the Pythagoreans  2. Intelligible principles according to the 
Brethren of Purity  3. World as a macrocosm  4. Intellect and the intelligibles  5. Cycles and 
rotations  6. Essence of love  7. Resurrection  8. Kinds of movement  9. Causes and effects  
10. Definitions and descriptions 
 
 
 
II. Physics 
1. Matter, form, movement, time, and space  2. Heavens and world  3. Generation and corruption 
 4. Meteorology  5. Mineralogy  6. Essence of Nature  7. Botany  8. Zoology  9. 
Composition of body  10. Sense and the sensible  11. Conception of sperm  12. Man as a 
microcosm  13. Origin of particular souls in human bodies  14. Human capacity for knowledge  
15. Death and life  16. Pleasure and pain  17. Causes of differences in languages and scripts 
 
 
 
I. Mathematics 
1. Arithmetic  2. Geometry  3. Astronomy  4. Geography  5. Music  6. Arithmetic and 
geometric proportions in purification of the soul  7. Theoretical disciplines  8. Practical disciplines 
 9. Dispositions of character  10. Eisagōgē  11. Categories  12. On Interpretation  13. Prior 
Analytics  14. Posterior Analytics 
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Appendix 5. Al-Kirmānī’s ladder of sciences 
 
1) Rā?āt al-‘aql (pp. 108ff.) 
 
Esoteric theoretical worship 
Esoteric interpretation of revelation and law  Introductory philosophical works  Rest of the 
Intellect 
 
 
 
Exoteric practical worship 
Jurisprudence  History 
 
 
 
Religious books  
The Quran 
 
2) Rā?at al-‘aql (contents) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1. Purification and preparation of the soul before reading this book 
2. Required previous learning from teachers and religious books 
3. Books that must be read before this book 
4. Purpose of the arrangement of this book in walls and pathways 
5. Blessing gained from reading this book in accordance with the way of faith and practice of 
worship 
6. Misfortune gained from reading this book in defiance of the way of faith and practice of worship 
7. Benefit of the soul from reading and comprehending this book and its advantage on the attainment 
of perfection 
 
II. Unity of God 
 
1. Oneness of God and the falsity of His being a non-existent 
2. Falsity of God being an existent 
3. God has no attributes, is non-corporeal, non-intelligible, and non-sensible 
4. God has no matter or form 
5. God has no opposite or likeness 
6. God is not expressible in language 
7. The most truthful statement of God denies Him the attributes of created beings 
 
III. First Existent = Pen 
 
1. First created being whose existence is not from its own essence, to which the existents end, and 
which is outside the corporeal world 
2. Generation of its existence from God through creation and that grasping the manner of its coming 
to exist is impossible 
3. Its existence is the creation itself, being created itself, and the oneness itself, and nothing precedes 
it in existence 
4. It is complete, eternal, non-changeable, one, and without likeness, and it intellects only its own 
essence 
5. On the essence of its substance, what follows necessarily from its attributes, and that it is one and 
many 
6. Its glory, beauty, and delight with its own essence are too great to be described, and it is 
impossible for it to grasp what is outside it and that from which it derives its own existence, but it 
still yearns to do so and is bewildered by it 
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7. It is the first mover to all moving things, has no need for anything besides its essence, and is 
intellect, intellecting, and the intellected 
 
IV. Procession from the First Existent 
 
1. The manner of procession 
2. First processive being, which is the second Intellect, is called the Pen, and is like the First in 
perfection 
3. Second processive being, which is the first subsisting potentially, is the prime matter, and is called 
the Tablet, and whose existence comes from the first processive being, and which is the principle 
of the bodily world 
4. The cause because of which that which exists from the first innovated being is not of the same kind 
5. Heavenly letters which are the noble principles within the world of procession, and their number, 
and what exists because of them, and the manner of their coming to exist 
6. The cause because of which the heavenly letters must come to exist as seven Intellects separate 
from bodies 
7. Things coming to exist through the procession exist outside of time, are pure forms, are one and 
many, only intellect their own essences and what precedes them in existence, and infuse their 
radiance on bodies and souls 
 
V. Nature and the heavenly bodies 
 
1. Essence of nature 
2. Nature has two ends: first and second perfection 
3. Nature has knowledge 
4. Footstool = proximate angel = first moving mover 
5. Throne = proximate angel = farthest sphere 
6. Bodies of the spheres 
7. States of the heavenly bodies 
 
VI. Lower bodies 
 
1. First matter 
2. Four elements 
3. Movements of the four elements 
4. Four elements are immutable and durable, and transmutable into one another 
5. Cause of the heaviness and divisibility of bodies 
6. That earth is not circular 
7. That water does not envelop the surface of earth and that the form appearing from it toward the air 
is the human form 
 
VII. Kingdoms of lower bodies and human perfection 
 
1. Second matter 
2. Beings in the domain of air 
3. Minerals as bodies 
4. Minerals as natural souls possessing actions and knowledge 
5. Plants as bodies of more complexity and benefit than minerals 
6. Plants as growing souls 
7. Animals as bodies, their generation, and higher complexity and benefit than that of plants 
8. Animals as sensing souls 
9. Human soul as sensing 
10. Human soul as rational 
11. Rational soul and its actions 
12. Rational soul as eternal, and the cause of its eternity and happiness and of destruction and misery 
13. Afterlife and resurrection 
14. Human soul as rational and divinely supported, and its connection with the Holy Spirit 
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